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Abstract
Recent road safety statistics show that the decades-long fatalities decreasing trend is stop-
ping and stagnating. Statistics further show that crashes are mostly driven by human error,
compared to other factors such as environmental conditions and mechanical defects. Within
human error, the dominant error source is perceptive errors, which represent about 50% of the
total. The next two sources are interpretation and evaluation, which accounts together with
perception for more than 75% of human error related crashes.
Those statistics show that allowing drivers to perceive and understand their environment better,
or supplement them when they are clearly at fault, is a solution to a good assessment of road risk,
and, as a consequence, further decreasing fatalities. To answer this problem, currently deployed
driving assistance systems combine more and more information from diverse sources (sensors) to
enhance the driver's perception of their environment. However, because of inherent limitations
in range and field of view, these systems' perception of their environment remains largely limited
to a small interest zone around a single vehicle. Such limitations can be overcomed by increasing
the interest zone through a cooperative process.
Cooperative Systems (CS), a specific subset of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), aim
at compensating for local systems' limitations by associating embedded information technology
and intervehicular communication technology (IVC). With CS, information sources are not
limited to a single vehicle anymore. From this distribution arises the concept of extended or
augmented perception. Augmented perception allows extending an actor's perceptive horizon
beyond its natural limits not only by fusing information from multiple in-vehicle sensors but
also information obtained from remote sensors. The end result of an augmented perception
and data fusion chain is known as an augmented map. It is a repository where any relevant
information about objects in the environment, and the environment itself, can be stored in a
layered architecture.
This thesis aims at demonstrating that augmented perception has better performance than non-
cooperative approaches, and that it can be used to successfully identify road risk. We found
it was necessary to evaluate the performance of augmented perception, in order to obtain a
better knowledge on their limitations. Indeed, while many promising results have already been
obtained, the feasibility of building an augmented map from exchanged local perception in-
formation and, then, using this information beneficially for road users, has not been thoroughly
assessed yet. The limitations of augmented perception, and underlying technologies, have not
be thoroughly assessed yet. Most notably, many questions remain unanswered as to the IVC
performance and their ability to deliver appropriate quality of service to support life-saving
critical systems. This is especially true as the road environment is a complex, highly variable
setting where many sources of imperfections and errors exist, not only limited to IVC.
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We provide at first a discussion on these limitations and a performance model built to incorpor-
ate them, created from empirical data collected on test tracks. Our results are more pessimistic
than existing literature, suggesting IVC limitations have been underestimated. Then, we de-
velop a new CS-applications simulation architecture. This architecture is used to obtain new
results on the safety benefits of a cooperative safety application (EEBL), and then to support
further study on augmented perception. At first, we confirm earlier results in terms of crashes
numbers decrease, but raise doubts on benefits in terms of crashes' severity.
In the next step, we implement an augmented perception architecture tasked with creating an
augmented map. Our approach is aimed at providing a generalist architecture that can use
many different types of sensors to create the map, and which is not limited to any specific
application. The data association problem is tackled with an MHT approach based on the
Belief Theory.
Then, augmented and single-vehicle perceptions are compared in a reference driving scenario for
risk assessment,taking into account the IVC limitations obtained earlier; we show their impact
on the augmented map's performance. Our results show that augmented perception performs
better than non-cooperative approaches, allowing to almost tripling the advance warning time
before a crash. IVC limitations appear to have no significant effect on the previous performance,
although this might be valid only for our specific scenario.
Eventually, we propose a new approach using augmented perception to identify road risk
through a surrogate: near-miss events. A CS-based approach is designed and validated to
detect near-miss events, and then compared to a non-cooperative approach based on vehicles
equiped with local sensors only. The cooperative approach shows a significant improvement in
the number of events that can be detected, especially at the higher rates of system's deployment.
vThis thesis was funded through a Postgraduate Scholarship awarded
by the Cooperative Research Centre for Advanced Automotive
Technology.
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Précis
Foreword
As per the requirements of the cotutelle agreement between the Queensland University of Tech-
nology, the Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines and the French Institute of Sci-
ence and Technology for Transport, Development and Networks, the thesis main language will
be English. However, an extended abstract (précis) shall be provided in the French language
for the benefit of French-speaking readers.
Introduction
De 1970 à de nos jours : le combat contre la mortalité sur la route
Les innovations technologiques de la seconde révolution industrielle (fin 19ème et début 20ème)
ont permis l'appariation d'un moyen simple et rapide de parcourir d'importantes distances, qui
auraient autrefois été perçues comme insurmontables. Ce moyen, c'est l'automobile. La vie
quotidienne de nombreuses personnes, et de manière plus générale l'ensemble de la société ont
été fondamentalement changées par cette nouvelle technologie.
Malheureusement, l'avènement de l'automobile a aussi signifiée l'arrivée d'une nouvelle forme
de mortalité. Le premier accident de la route mortel remonte à la fin du 19ème siècle, mais
c'est surtout la démocratisation de l'automobile dans la seconde moitié du siècle dernier qui a
déclenché une véritable explosion de la mortalité sur les routes. Un pic a été atteint dans les
années 70, avec des chiffres particulièrement élevés. Par exemple, en France, on a enregistré
par moins de 16000 tués sur la route en 1970. L'Australie comptait 3798 victimes la même
année. Rapportés à leurs populations respectives cette année là (50,7 millions pour la France,
12,5 millions pour l'Australie), ces taux de mortalité étaient comparables : 0,315 tué par millier
d'habitants en France, 0,304 en Australie. Puisque que les accidents corporels non-mortels ont
suivi une tendance similaire, nous allons nous concentrer uniquement sur les accidents mortels.
Pour justifier cela, on peut citer le ratio de tués pour cent blessés qui est resté constant entre
1990 et 2004, démontrant clairement que quand la mortalité diminue, le nombre de blessés fait
de même.
Mis devant cette situation inquiétante dans les années 70, les gouvernements occidentaux ont
initié un sérieux effort réglementaire et législatif, avec l'introduction des limitations de vitesses,
des ceintures de sécurités trois points obligatoires, la limitation de l'alcool au volant, le permis
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à points, et cetera. En combinaison avec l'introduction de nouvelles technologies comme l'ABS
(1978) ou les airbags (1981 à 1987), ainsi que des progrès dans la construction des véhicules
(matériaux absorbants les chocs, etc.), ces efforts ont permis de réduire considérablement la
mortalité sur la route. Après vingt ans, au début des années 90, la France n'enregistrait plus
que 10483 tués sur la route, soit 0,184 par millier d'habitants. En Australie, les chiffres étaient
de 2331 tués, soit 0,137 par millier d'habitants.
Pendant les deux décennies suivantes ces efforts ont continué, permettant de réduire encore le
nombre de tués sur les routes. En France, on passa ainsi de 10483 tués en 1991 à 7643 en l'an
2000 et 4092 en 2008. Les derniers chiffres officiels définitifs, pour 2010, montre 3992 tués, soit
0,063 par millier d'habitants. En Australie, pour l'année 2010, le nombre de tués est de 1352,
soit 0,06 par millier d'habitants.
Ces récentes avancées sont notamment dues, en Europe occidentale, au déploiement des radars
automatiques. Il serait cependant incorrect de minimiser le rôle des nouvelles technologies dans
les véhicules, telles que l'ESP. Ces nouvelles technologies ont grandement bénéficié de la réduc-
tion des prix de l'électronique embarquée (après les années 80) et de la révolution informatique.
Ces changements ont permis un important effort de recherche et développement dans le do-
maine des systèmes d'assistance à la conduite. Ces systèmes peuvent être, grosso modo, classés
en deux catégories dépendant de la fonction qui leur est assignée : confort ou sécurité. Un
système de confort cherche logiquement à rendre la conduite plus facile et confortable pour le
conducteur. On compte dans cette catégorie des technologies comme l'assistance au parking,
les essuie-glaces et phares automatiques ou les régulateurs de vitesse. Les boites de vitesses
automatiques peuvent aussi être considérées comme des systèmes de confort. D'un autre coté,
de nombreux systèmes ont été développés avec la sécurité du conducteur en ligne de mire. On a
déjà cité l'ESP/ESC (1995), qui fut suivi des régulateurs de vitesse automatiques (1997), de la
vision nocturne (2000 à 2002), de l'alerte à la sortie de voie (2001) et du freinage automatique
pré-accident (2003).
En ce début des années 2010, la majorité des systèmes susmentionnés sont désormais disponibles
sur des véhicules de milieu de gamme, et non uniquement sur des voitures de luxe ou haut de
gamme. De nombreux systèmes plus sophistiqués, impliquant généralement une conduite semi-
automatisée, sont également proches d'un déploiement commercial. On peut par exemple citer
la conduite automatique à basse vitesse dans des ralentissements, des copilotes automatiques
capables de prendre le contrôle du véhicule dans certaines situations et de classifier les possibles
man÷uvres du conducteurs en fonction de leur risque et légalité, ou bien encore un assistant
d'arrêt d'urgence capable d'amener sans risque le véhicule à un arrêt sur le bord de la route en
cas d'incapacité soudaine du conducteur (crise cardiaque, par exemple). La distinction entre
confort et sécurité peut aussi devenir plus floue, notamment avec la régulation automatique de
vitesse (ACC). Cette technologie utilise un radar frontal pour adapter au contexte la vitesse
du véhicule initialement spécifiée par le conducteur. Le système fournit donc à la fois une
assistance de confort (régulation) et de sécurité (respect des distances de sécurité, amélioration
de la réaction en cas de ralentissement inopiné). Cependant, si les systèmes orientés confort
peuvent avoir des bénéfices de sécurité, ceux-ci sont généralement secondaires par rapport à la
fonction initiale.
ix
Le grand bond en avant : les systèmes coopératifs
Malgré les bons résultats décrits précédemment, les plus récentes statistiques tendent à montrer
que la réduction de la mortalité sur la route est en train de ralentir ou de stagner. En France,
entre 2008 et 2011, la mortalité a ainsi diminué de 305 tués, à comparer avec une diminution de
1043 sur la même durée entre 2005 et 2008. Ces chiffres suggèrent que la recherche technologique
orientée sécurité doit fournir un effort supplémentaire pour améliorer encore l'efficacité des
systèmes et permettre à la réduction de la mortalité de continuer.
La réponse à ce défi prend la forme des systèmes coopératifs (SC). Au sens le plus large, les
systèmes coopératifs sont un groupe des systèmes de transport intelligents (STI) où un certain
nombre d'acteurs de la route coopérèrent pour effectuer une tâche. Ces acteurs peuvent être
des véhicules (et leurs conducteurs), de systèmes de bord de route intelligents, des piétons, etc.
Cette coopération permet d'avoir accès à de multiples sources d'information simultanément.
De fait, les systèmes d'assistance à la conduite non-coopératifs actuels combinent déjà de plus
en plus d'informations provenant de diverses sources pour améliorer la qualité des services
rendues aux conducteurs. Typiquement, le nombre de capteurs embarqués va croissant avec
de multiples caméras, des télémètres laser, des radars, etc. L'information provenant de ces
capteurs est analysée par diverses méthodes mathématiques telles que le filtrage de Kalman,
la logique floue ou la théorie des croyances (aussi connue sous le nom de théorie de Demptser-
Shafer). Cette perception améliorée permet, in fine, aux conducteurs de mieux percevoir leur
environnement. Cependant, à cause des limites de portée et de champ de vision inhérentes à
ces capteurs, un tel système de perception reste largement limité à une petite zone d'intérêt
autours du véhicule-hôte.
Les SC cherchent à compenser ces limites via la fusion de l'informatique embarquée et des
technologies de communication inter-véhiculaire. Cette fusion doit permettre la mise au point
d'un système décentralisé de gestion de l'information pour les systèmes d'assistance à la conduite
et la sécurité routière. En particulier, ce système ne serait plus limité à un seul véhicule. Les
SC sont devenus une perspective réaliste après 1999, année de la formation de l'alliance Wi-Fi
pour la commercialisation des standards IEEE 802.11a et 802.11b, rendant les technologies de
communication sans-fils accessible au grand public.
Les SC ont déjà attiré un certain intérêt de la part des chercheurs et ingénieurs dans les trois
grandes régions de l'industrie automobile (l'UE, les USA et le Japon). On peut lister plusieurs
grands projets, souvent multinationaux pour ce qui est de l'Europe, s'intéressant aux possibilités
offertes par les SC en termes de sécurité routière : COOPERS, SAFESPOT et CVIS dans l'UE
; DSSS au Japon ; PATH, CICAS-V et IntelliDrive aux USA. Les applications potentielles sont
nombreuses : gestion coopérative du trafic, prévention des accidents, information en temps
réel sur le trafic et l'état des routes, limites de vitesse variables, pour n'en citer qu'un nombre
restreint. Par exemple, l'une des applications sécuritaire les plus simples des SC est les feux
de freinage électroniques d'urgence (FFEU, Emergency Electronic Break Light en anglais). Ce
système utilise une liaison radio pour transmettre un message d'urgence alertant les conducteurs
qu'un freinage d'urgence (impliquant une accident) est en train de se produire devant eux, avant
qu'ils ne puisse se rendre compte  naturellement  du danger. Cette information leur permet
de se préparer à freiner pour éviter l'accident et ainsi la formation d'un carambolage. Des
simulations ont montré que les FFEU peuvent réduire de manière substantielle le nombre de
tués dans un tel scénario.
xCependant, les SC seront généralement plus complexes qu'une application telle que les FFEU.
En effet, en exploitant la distribution des sources d'information et des centres de calculs per-
mise par la mise en réseau des différents acteurs de la route, on peut aller plus loin que des
systèmes purement locaux. Cette distribution des sources d'information amène au concept de
la perception augmentée.
La perception augmentée
La perception augmentée permet d'étendre l'horizon perceptif d'un acteur de la route au delà de
ses limites  naturelles . On utilise pour cela de multiples sources (capteurs) dans le véhicule-
hôte mais aussi de l'information reçue depuis des sources distantes. L'horizon perceptif est
défini comme la limite entre la partie de l'environnement que les capteurs du véhicule-hôte
peuvent percevoir (on parle de la  scène ) et la partie qui se trouve hors de portée. Cette
limite inclut la portée maximum et aussi les occultations par des objets de la scène qui bloquent
les lignes de vue directes sur d'autres objets. En permettant d'accéder à des informations ob-
tenues depuis un autre point de vue sur l'environnement, la perception augmentée permet à une
application d'avoir accès à des informations qu'elle n'aurait normalement pas si elle se reposait
uniquement sur un seul point de vue (son horizon  naturel ). De plus, ce type d'échange
permet aussi d'obtenir des informations normalement hors d'accès pour des capteurs extéro-
ceptifs, par exemple des données sur la physiologie du conducteur. Au final, les mécanismes de
fusion de données exploitant cette information distribuée permettent d'augmenter la précision,
robustesse et fidélité de l'information extraite de l'environnement, que se soit dans ou en dehors
de l'horizon perceptif naturel.
A la fin de la chaine capteurs/algorithmes impliquée dans la perception augmentée on trouve la
carte augmentée. Une carte augmentée est, au plus simple, une base de données contenant toute
information intéressante à propos de l'environnement et des objets qui le composent. Elle peut
prendre une architecture en couche, avec une couche contenant une carte des objets mobiles,
chacun décrit par une liste d'attributs (leur vecteur d'état). Cette carte augmentée est ensuite
mise à disposition d'applications d'assistance à la conduite, qui l'utilisent pour améliorer leur
perception de l'environnement routier. La carte peut être utilisée de diverses manières : par
exemple, pour améliorer la perception du conducteur quant à ce qu'il se passe quelques véhicules
devant lui dans une zone de ralentissements. Elle peut aussi être utilisée pour alimenter une
application de calcul du risque de collision, qui bénéficiera d'une meilleure représentation de la
route et pourrait même utiliser la coopération entre véhicule pour activement éviter un accident.
La perception augmentée fait particulièrement sens du point de vue de l'accidentologie et du
problème de réduction de la mortalité routière. En effet, les statistiques montrent que les
accidents sont principalement dus à l'erreur humaine, plutôt qu'à d'autres facteurs tels que
les conditions environnementales ou des défaillances techniques. La principale raison de cette
erreur (50% du total) est une perception erronée. Combinée aux erreurs d'interprétation et
d'évaluation de l'environnement, on explique ainsi près de trois-quarts des accidents liés à
l'erreur humaine. . . Cela montre que permettre aux conducteurs de mieux percevoir et com-
prendre leur environnement, voire les remplacer lorsque leur interprétation est clairement er-
ronée, est une bonne solution au problème de la mortalité sur la route.
Il est important de noter que la manière dont l'information additionnelle offerte par la per-
ception augmentée est présentée aux conducteurs doit être sérieusement prise en compte. En
effet, il est possible que les conducteurs se retrouvent submergés d'information provenant de
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l'extérieur de leur horizon perceptif. Ils pourraient ainsi ne pas comprendre ou être distraits
des informations essentielles par des informations peu utiles ou non prioritaires. Il existe donc
un important potentiel de recherche concernant des méthodes efficaces d'interface entre les SC
et les conducteurs. Ces questions resteront cependant en dehors de cadre des travaux de cette
thèse.
Objectifs et cadre de cette thèse
L'objectif de ce thèse est d'identifier le risque routier via l'utilisation de l'information distribuée
extraire d'une carte augmentée et, en conséquence, de démontrer qu'une approche basée sur les
SC a de meilleures performances qu'une approche non-coopérative. Cependant, avant d'évaluer
le risque pour une situation de conduite donnée, il est nécessaire d'évaluer les limites de la
perception augmentée, ainsi que de la carte augmentée en particulier. En effet, bien que de
nombreux résultats prometteurs aient déjà été obtenus, la faisabilité de la construction d'une
carte à partir d'informations échangées via un réseau sans-fils et, par la suite l'utilité de cette
nouvelle information pour les conducteurs, n'ont pas encore été sérieusement évaluées. De
nombreuses questions restent sans réponses quant aux performances des télécommunications
pour des systèmes de sécurité critiques. En conséquence, le but de cette thèse peut être résumé
en trois questions principales :
1. Comment peut-on évaluer, en temps-réel, le risque d'accident en utilisant une carte aug-
mentée ?
2. Un système basé sur une approche coopérative (perception augmenté) peut-il être plus
efficace qu'une approche non-coopérative ?
3. Quelles sont les limites, vis-à-vis des technologies d'informatique embarquée et de télé-
communication actuelles, de la perception augmentée ?
Il faut en effet pouvoir montrer que les SC sont plus efficaces, dans la majorité des cas, que
des systèmes équivalents mais non-coopératifs pour la détection et l'évaluation de situations
de conduite dangereuses. On peut en effet craindre que des télécommunications inefficaces
annulent tous les avantages potentiels d'une approche coopérative. C'est particulièrement vrai
pour l'environnement routier, qui est un environnement complexe et extrêmement variable
où de nombreuses sources d'erreurs et d'imperfections existent, n'affectant pas seulement les
télécommunications. Afin de prendre en compte ces imperfections, cette thèse utilisera des
mesures concrètes pour soutenir une forte composante empirique.
Enfin, il est important de préciser les sujets qui seront considérés comme étant hors du cadre
de notre projet. Essentiellement, l'ensemble des facteurs humains liés aux SC ne seront pas
couverts dans cette thèse. Par facteurs humains nous entendons aussi bien les aspects d'interface
homme-machine (IMM) que les questions sur le comportement des conducteurs. La question des
IMM est importante, en effet il est nécessaire de déterminer comment efficacement distribuer
les informations obtenues via les SC aux conducteurs. Cependant, nous nous concentrons sur
les challenges techniques liés aux SC, plutôt que sur l'aspect des interactions entre les SC et
leurs utilisateurs. On peut remarquer que ce projet a tout de même une certaine influence
sur les questions d'IMM et de comportement des conducteurs. Un aspect des travaux futurs
qui pourront se baser sur cette thèse concerne en effet l'utilisation des informations sur le
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risque fournies par la carte augmentée et les modifications du comportement des usagers qui
en découleront (temps de réaction, niveau de concentration, nombre de tâches, homéostasie du
risque, etc.).
Approche et résultats
Notre première étape a consisté en choisir une méthodologie de recherche appropriée à l'étude
des apports sécuritaires des SC et à l'évaluation du risque routier via la perception augmentée.
Trois méthodologies potentielles étaient disponibles : (1) des simulations complexes, (2) des
investigations théoriques (analytiques) et (3) une implémentation complète sur piste d'essais.
Nous avons d'emblé exclu l'approche théorique. En effet, elle serait rapidement devenue trop
complexe sachant le niveau de réalisme et détails que nous cherchions à prendre en compte.
A priori, aucune des deux autres méthodes n'était plus avantageuse que l'autre. Cependant,
nous avons identifié un manque d'information concernant les mérites d'une approche purement
expérimentale, particulièrement concernant ses désavantages. Dans le but de permettre une
sélection adéquate de notre méthodologie, nous avons déployé sur les pistes de Satory une
application de FFEU. Les résultats de ces tests furent, au mieux, mitigés. En effet, d'un coté
nous avons montré qu'il n'y avait pas de difficulté technique majeure pour la mise au point et le
déploiement d'une telle application sur plusieurs véhicules. D'un autre coté, certains problèmes,
notamment liés aux conducteurs, sont devenus apparents, empêchant l'obtention de résultats
significatifs.
En réaction à ces résultats mitigés, nous avons choisi un compromis quant à notre méthodologie
pour le reste du projet. Nous avons conclus qu'il était nécessaire de se focaliser sur une approche
via des simulations plus complexes, mais que la seule simulation n'était pas appropriée. Au
contraire, l'utilisation de données empiriques est nécessaire pour améliorer la qualité et la fidélité
des simulations de SC. C'est notamment important pour prendre en compte les imperfections
liées aux technologies de télécommunication. Par exemple, nous n'avons pas trouvé dans la
littérature scientifique de modèle du standard IEEE 802.11p construit à partir de données
empiriques, et qui soit adapté à notre cadre de recherche. Concernant les simulations, nous avons
également déterminé qu'il n'existait pas d'architecture dédiée complète pour la construction de
cartes augmentées ou la simulation de SC complexes.
Notre seconde étape s'est focalisée sur les limites des télécommunications inter-véhiculaires
basées sur le standard 802.11p, directement en relation avec notre troisième question de recher-
che :  quelles sont les limites, vis-à-vis des technologies d'informatique embarquée et de télécom-
munication actuelles, de la perception augmentée ? . En effet, puisque les télécommunications
sont à la base du déploiement de SC, leurs performances sont le principal facteur d'influence sur
les performances de la perception augmentée. Le 802.11p est en phase de devenir le principal
standard pour les communications sans-fils sur la route, mais ses performances exactes sont
encore peu connues. Pour combler ce manque, nous avons effectué une étude empirique des
performances du 802.11p sur les pistes de Satory en 2011 et 2012, dans un contexte proche d'un
déploiement sur routes ouvertes. Dans cette étude, nous avons cherché à combler les manques
de précédentes études, nous assurant par exemple de bien prendre en compte l'intervalle complet
des vitesses auxquels un véhicule peut conduire.
En termes de résultats, nous avons montré que la portée maximale dépend fortement de la
vitesse relative entre l'émetteur et le récepteur, et que la perte de trames a le même comporte-
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ment (perte de trames et portée sont liés). Nous avons aussi déterminé que la latence ne dépend
que la taille des trames échangées sur le réseau ; pour des trames de 100 octets, la latence reste
sous les 4 millisecondes dans quasiment toutes les configurations, quelles que soient la portée où
la vitesse relative (sauf à longue portée, où les mécanismes internes du mode ad-hoc du 802.11p
provoquent des délais supplémentaires).
Une tendance émergeant de nos résultats est le relatif optimisme des précédentes études de
performances. En effet, nos résultats sont, dans la majorité des cas, plus pessimistes que la
littérature scientifique. Les inhomogénéités matériels sont un problème important : une com-
binaison de la qualité des antennes et de l'influence de la forme du véhicule sur le signal peut
amener à des variations de portée de 500 mètres et explique l'apparition d'une forme de 
directivité  dans la portée maximale. Notre conclusion est que ces inhomogénéités expliquent
certains résultats imprévus de précédentes études. Cependant, ces inhomogénéités ne peuvent
pas à elles seules expliquer toutes les variations mesurées. Certaines variations sont dues aux
conditions météorologiques, l'humidité ambiante notamment. Certaines variations restent in-
expliquées.
Se basant sur nos mesures, nous avons ensuite construit un modèle de performance pour le
802.11p, cherchant à rester dans une optique orientée application. Trois versions de ce mod-
èle ont été créées, variant en sophistication (polynomiale, semi-logistique et semi-linéaire).
L'avantage de ce modèle est qu'il prend en compte toutes les sources d'imperfections mesurées
sur les pistes et peut reproduire leur comportement relativement imprédictible. Nous pen-
sons que ce modèle comble un manque entre les modèles physiques et les modèles centrés sur
les réseaux (routage, etc.) en permettant d'obtenir un nombre limité d'indicateurs de per-
formance clefs du 802.11p. Ce modèle est approprié pour des réseaux véhiculaires de petite
taille (10 véhicules au plus), et permet de fournir des performances réalistes à des simulations
d'applications coopératives.
Concernant les applications coopératives notre problème se résume en cette question : comment
construire une carte augmentée et évaluer ses performances ? Nous avons donc développé
une architecture de simulation utilisant le package logiciel formé par l'interconnexion SiVIC-
RTMaps. Ces deux logiciels nous permettent de créer des simulations très réalistes et flexibles
via une architecture de plug-ins dédiés à certaines tâches et codés en C++. Par exemple, la
granularité du modèle physique et le grand nombre de variables accessibles permet d'étudier en
détail le comportement de véhicules individuels dans n'importe quel scénario. L'architecture
que nous avons développé dans ce contexte a servi à deux aspect fondamentaux de cette thèse
: (1) la construction de la carte augmentée et (2) l'évaluation des performances des SC d'un
point de vue sécuritaire (et en particulier l'évaluation du risque routier par ceux-ci).
Une première version de l'architecture offre deux apports significatifs sur de précédents travaux
du LIVIC. En premier lieu, l'introduction de la modélisation empirique des performances du
802.11p. En second lieu, un algorithme plus réaliste de control des véhicules, visant à reproduire
plus efficacement le comportement d'un vrai conducteur dans la simulation.
Se basant sur cette première version, nous avons créé par la suite une architecture dédiée à la
construction de la carte augmentée, sous la forme de plug-ins échangeant des informations entre
les différentes simulations (véhicules, environnement, télécommunications, etc.). L'architecture
utilise une approche centralisée de fusion de données, organisée selon trois fonctions : syn-
chronisation, association et fusion. Les fonctions de synchronisation et de fusion utilisent un
filtre de Kalman linéaire classique, un estimateur efficace bien connu de la communauté de
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recherche en fusion de données. L'innovation principal de cette architecture se trouve dans
la fonction d'association, où nous proposons le premier déploiement effectif, dans le contexte
de la perception augmentée, d'un algorithme de suivi multi-hypothèses basé sur la théorie des
croyances.
Notre architecture à l'avantage de ne pas être limité aux données simulées provenant de SiVIC.
En effet, elle est transparente quant à l'origine des données en entrée, et peut être déployée
facilement dans un véhicule réel (cette fonctionnalité est largement facilitée par l'utilisation
de RTMaps). De manière générale, nous pensons que le système complet formé par notre
architecture de simulation de SC et de perception augmentée est un concept innovant qui a
un fort potentiel de croissance, via des améliorations supplémentaires, au cours des prochaines
années. Dans sa forme actuelle, l'architecture est plus adaptée à des groupes limités de véhicules,
une dizaine au plus. Cela correspond aussi aux performances du modèle de 802.11p utilisé dans
l'architecture.
Les travaux liés à la construction de ces architectures ont permis d'engager l'étude de la question
de recherche suivante :  un système basé sur une approche coopérative (perception augmenté)
peut-il être plus efficace qu'une approche non-coopérative ? . Nous avons approchés cette
question principalement du coté des contributions des SC à la sécurité des conducteurs. Notre
étude du 802.11p ayant permis de conclure que les performances théoriques et précédemment
mesurées étaient souvent surestimées, nous nous sommes posé la question de savoir si ces per-
formances réduites affectaient les avantages en termes de sécurité obtenus avec des applications
coopératives dans la littérature scientifique. En effet, des communications idéales ou excellentes
étaient souvent prises en compte dans ces études.
Pour répondre à cette interrogation, nous avons créé une simulation d'une application de FFEU
(choisie comme notre scénario de référence, avec 5 véhicules). Les résultats obtenus, dans
des simulations plus réalistes, confirment l'utilité potentielle des FFEU pour la réduction du
nombre d'accidents dans la file de véhicule. Nous avons aussi déterminé que les limitations des
télécommunications n'avaient pas d'impact significatif sur cette application.
Cependant, dans ce même scénario, nous avons obtenu des résultats inquiétants quant à la
sévérité des accidents. De précédents travaux ont déterminé que la sévérité des accidents décroit
avec l'utilisation des FFEU. Cependant, nos résultats ont montré une sévérité constante lors
d'une comparaison entre des files de véhicules équipés avec le système et des files non-équipées.
Ces résultats impliquent que si le cout matériel d'un carambolage va décroitre avec le FFEU, le
cout humain pourrait, dans certains cas, augmenter. Il est intéressant de noter que ce problème
ne semble pas être lié à des limitations des télécommunications.
Après cette première étude utilisant le FFEU, nous avons créé un système d'évaluation du risque
utilisant la carte augmentée. Le but de ce système était de pouvoir comparer les performances
d'une approche coopérative et d'une approche non-coopérative. Ces deux approches utilisent la
même méthode d'évaluation du risque, assez classique, basée sur le temps-à-collision prédit par
le système. Une série d'indicateurs de risque locaux et globaux ont été utilisés, combinant le
temps-à-collision et la sévérité de la collision. Ces différents indicateurs sont ensuite réduits en
un seul indicateur qui décrit le risque de la situation de conduite tel que perçu par un véhicule,
sachant toutes les informations disponibles (locales et/ou augmentées). Le scénario de conduite
restait celui d'un freinage d'urgence dans une file de 5 véhicules.
Les résultats de cette étude montrent qu'un système d'évaluation du risque entièrement local
peut informer un conducteur qu'il se trouve dans une situation  dangereuse  avec, au mieux,
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5 secondes d'avance avant que le véhicule n'atteigne l'accident. D'un autre coté, une approche
coopérative permet de rajouter 2 à 7 secondes supplémentaires, fournissant ainsi jusqu'à 13
secondes de marge avant l'accident dans le meilleur des cas. Ces résultats sont consistants sur
de multiples répétitions du scénario, incluant de fortes variabilités dans la position des véhicules
dans la file. Dans ce cas également, les imperfections des télécommunications n'ont pas remis
en cause les performances de l'approche coopérative.
Nous concluons que ce temps supplémentaire fournit au conducteur est suffisant pour qu'il puisse
adapter son comportement à l'urgence et se préparer au freinage imminent. Certains véhicules
ne bénéficient pas vraiment de ce système. En effet, plus proche un véhicule est de l'événement
initial (l'accident) dans la file, moins de temps il aura pour adapter son comportement. Ce
résultat n'est pas complètement inattendu, sachant que l'indicateur de risque global est biaisé
vis-à-vis du véhicule le plus proche du véhicule-hôte. La première moitié de la file bénéficie peu
du système, mais la seconde moitié obtient de meilleurs résultats et devraient avoir suffisamment
de temps pour s'adapter (comme indiqué dans le précédent paragraphe). Ces résultats montrent
que, dans ce scénario, la perception augmentée est plus efficace que la perception purement
locale pour l'évaluation du risque routier.
En dernier lieu, afin de montrer l'intérêt de la perception augmentée dans un autre contexte,
nous avons mis au point une simulation dédiée à la détection des presque-accidents. Les presque-
accidents sont souvent utilisés comme des substituts aux accidents (la présence de nombreux
presque-accidents suggère la présence d'un nombre réduit, mais non-nul, d'accidents). Les STI,
et les SC en particulier, offrent une solution possible au problème complexe de la détection et
classification des presque-accidents dans les données extraient de collectes de données natural-
istiques.
Les résultats de nos simulations démontrent les capacités des SC pour détecter une large pro-
portion des presque-accidents. Ces résultats montrent aussi que la distribution des véhicules
équipés (en SC) dans le flux de trafic est le principal facteur d'influence quant à leur perform-
ance. Cependant, nous avons aussi montré l'influence des imperfections des télécommunications
: la perte de message peut diminuer le nombre d'événements détectés de jusqu'à 10%. D'un
autre coté, les imprévisions du GPS et la latence n'ont pas semblé avoir d'effets significatifs.
Enfin, nous avons aussi montré que dans ce contexte une approche coopérative est plus efficace
qu'une approche non-coopérative. C'est principalement le cas lorsque le taux de véhicules
équipés dans l'un ou l'autre des systèmes dépasse les 50%. A de fort taux d'équipements, une
approche coopérative double le nombre d'événements détectés, permettant même de quadrupler
ce nombre dans certaines conditions particulières. Cependant, à des taux d'équipements plus
faible, la différence entre approches coopératives et non-coopératives est inférieure à 10%.
Ouvertures sur de futurs travaux
Les résultats de cette thèse et les outils développés pour celle-ci offrent de nombreuses ouver-
tures pour de futurs travaux. L'évaluation des performances du 802.11p a été faite dans un
environnement fortement contrôlé avec un nombre limité d'émetteurs et récepteurs actifs. Il
est probablement nécessaire de réitérer cette étude avec deux ajouts importants : (1) du trafic
routier et (2) un milieu de télécommunication fortement encombré. Le premier ajout devrait
permettre d'évaluer les perturbations liées à la présence d'autres véhicules ainsi qu'à des en-
vironnements variés (urbain par exemple). Le second ajout permettra d'évaluer les effets d'un
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milieu encombré par de nombreux émetteur/récepteurs essayent d'échanger des informations
simultanément. A l'évidence, cette étude sera contrainte par des questions logistiques, mais un
scénario mixte véhicule-à-véhicule et véhicule-à-infrastructure peut être déployé sur les pistes
de Satory sachant que, à la fin de cette thèse, le LIVIC dispose de 17 boitiers 802.11p. Enfin,
il sera important d'utiliser le mode spécial  OCB  du 802.11p, visant à réduire encore la
latence, pour tester les performances de messages critiques dans cet environnement encombré
(ou fortement imparfait).
Ces nouvelles mesures permettront l'extension du modèle de 802.11p. Certaines imperfections
liées à l'environnement sont prises en compte par le modèle actuel, mais il est impossible de
discriminer leurs effets. Par exemple, on ne peut pas quantifier l'influence relative de différentes
conditions météorologiques dans le modèle actuel. Une version étendue devrait aussi inclure
une forme de corrélation de voisinage. A l'heure actuelle, deux véhicules voisins de quelques
mètres peuvent obtenir des performances très différentes, ce qui n'est pas suffisamment réaliste.
Notre architecture de simulation de SC a permis de confirmer l'utilité des SC pour la réduction
du nombre d'accidents dans une file de véhicules. Elle peut désormais être utilisée pour tester
d'autres scénarios et applications coopératives, notamment plus complexes que l'application
de FFEU testée dans le cadre de cette thèse. Enfin, il sera nécessaire d'étudier l'origine de
l'absence d'amélioration de la sévérité des accidents lors de l'utilisation du FFEU.
En dernier lieu, l'évaluation du risque routier via la perception augmentée fournit également un
certain nombre d'axes pour de futurs travaux. Nos résultats sont prometteurs mais le système
d'évaluation utilisé reste relativement simple. Ainsi, nous avons utilisé un unique indicateur basé
sur le temps-à-collision. Une approche plus complexe, combinant différents indicateurs grâce
à la carte augmentée sera plus réaliste. De nouveaux scénarios, par exemple à un carrefour,
devront également être testés. Ces travaux devraient permettre, à termes, de créer un système
d'évaluation du risque généraliste qui pourra être déployé dans les véhicules, fournissant des
informations utiles aux conducteurs. En conclusion, notre architecture de construction de
la carte augmentée est aussi disponible pour être testée avec d'autres données à ces entrées,
notamment des données provenant de capteurs réels. La versatilité de l'architecture devrait
permettre de la tester dans un large nombre de contextes différents.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Foreword
This thesis positions itself within the context of a tri-lateral international cooperation between
the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) in Australia, the Université de Versailles Saint-
Quentin-en-Yveline (UVSQ) and the Institut français des sciences et technologies des transports,
de l'aménagement et des réseaux (IFSTTAR) in France. The research study has been made
possible thanks to the continued cooperation and shared research interests for half a decade
between the Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety at QUT and the Laboratoire sur
les Interactions Véhicules-Infrastructure-Conducteurs (IFSTTAR). As a result, this thesis will
combine both Australian and French perspectives on road safety research. Funding for this
study was provided by the Australian Cooperative Research Centre for Advanced Automotive
Technology (AutoCRC).
1.1 Rationale and Research Objectives
1.1.1 1970 to 2000: fighting road fatalities
Technological advances in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gave us a quick and easy
means to travel over vast distances that once seemed impossible i.e. the automobile. Human
civilisation and more modestly, people's daily lives, were fundamentally changed by this new
technological advent.
Unfortunately, automobiles also brought about a new form of mortality. If the first death as a
result of a road crash goes back to the late nineteenth century, it is the democratisation of motor
vehicles that started in the second half of the twentieth century that led to an explosion in the
number of casualties on the road. The peak was reached in the 1970s, where the number of
fatalities literally sky-rocketed. For example, in 1970, no less than 16,000 people died in France
[1]; in the same year fatalities in Australia amounted to 3,798 [2] Projected over their respective
populations at the time (50.772 and 12.507 million respectively), fatalities reached 0.315 deaths
per thousand inhabitants in France, and 0.304 deaths per thousand inhabitants in Australia.
Overall, injuries, from the most to the least severe, have followed similar trends as fatalities.
To simplify matters, we will focus on fatality figures, knowing that measures implemented to
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reduce fatalities also have a similar effect on injuries. To illustrate this, the ratio of fatalities per
100 injuries remained constant between 1990 and 2004 [3], clearly showing that when fatalities
go down, injuries do so too.
Faced with such a dire situation on roads in the 1970s, governments initiated significant regu-
latory efforts with the introduction of speed limits, compulsory three points seatbelts, alcohol
regulations, points system, etc. These regulations, combined with technological innovations
such as the ABS (1978), airbags (1981-87) and generally better built vehicles (with shock-
absorbing materials, etc.), helped to break the tide and bring fatalities numbers down. After
twenty years, in the early 1990s, fatalities had fallen in France to 10,483 [1], or 0.184 per
thousand inhabitants; and in Australia to 2,331 [2], or 0.137 per thousand inhabitants.
In the following two decades, technological and regulatory efforts have helped reduce the num-
bers and severity of road crashes from 10,483 in 1991, to 7,643 in 2000 and 4,092 in 2008 [1].
The latest French figures for 2010 record 3,992 fatalities, or 0.063 per thousand inhabitants [3].
A similar reduction took place in Australia, with the 2010 figures standing at 1,352 fatalities,
or 0.06 per thousand inhabitants [2]. In Europe, notably France, many lives have been saved by
the widespread deployment of automated roadside speed limits enforcement radars [4, 5, 6, 7],
but new in-vehicle technologies have also played a role, for example ESP (Electronic Stabil-
ity Program, also known as Electronic Stability Control) [8, 9]. This trend was largely made
possible by the increased affordability of in-vehicle electronics after the 1980s, which lead to
considerable research effort on driving assistance systems.
These systems have two tasks  comfort and safety. For comfort, the system is designed to make
driving easier and more comfortable for the driver; technologies such as cruise control, parking
assistance, automated wipers and lights fall into this category. It can be argued that automated
gearboxes also provide comfort driving assistance. On the other hand, many driving assistance
systems have been developed solely to improve safety. It started with the ESP (1995) and
continued with automated cruise control (ACC, 1997), enhanced night-vision (2000-02), lane
departure alert (2001) and automated pre-crash braking (2003).
By early 2010s, most of these aforementioned systems were available in high-end mainstream
vehicles, and not just luxury vehicles. More sophisticated systems, which are close to being
available commercially, involve semi-automated driving such as low-speed automated control
in traffic jams [10], co-pilots that do not only take control of the vehicles in some settings but
also rank potential manoeuvres on their risk and legality [11], or an Emergency Stop Assistant
[12] that can safely park a vehicle if the driver becomes suddenly incapacitated. At times,
the distinction between safety and comfort driving assistance can become blurred. This is for
example the case with ACC. ACC uses a forward-facing radar to adapt the driver's speed input
to the driving context. The system provides both comfort (cruise control) and safety (respecting
safety distances and enhanced braking reaction) benefits [13, 14]. Generally, comfort-orientated
systems may have safety benefits, but these are often secondary to their initial comfort task.
1.1.2 The great leap forward: Cooperative Systems
Despite the excellent results described in the previous subsection, recent statistics show that
the decreasing trend in fatalities has stopped and stagnated [15]. In France, between 2008 and
2011, the number of fatalities only decreased by 305, while decreasing by 1,043 between 2005
and 2008. This suggests that technological research in safety-orientated driving assistance needs
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to go further in providing additional benefits and to continue sustaining the fatalities-decreasing
trend.
The answer to this problem is in the form of Cooperative Systems (CS). In the broadest sense,
CS describe a family of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) where several actors of the
road environment cooperate to perform a task. Road actors can be vehicles (and their drivers),
roadside intelligent infrastructure, pedestrians, etc. Cooperation between road actors provides
multiple information sources.
As a matter of fact, current non-cooperative driving assistance systems combine more and
more information from diverse sources to provide better services to drivers. Typically, this has
meant an increase in the number of in-vehicle sensors, with multiple cameras, laser telemeters,
radars, etc. Information is analysed using various mathematical methods and algorithms such as
Kalman filtering, fuzzy logic or the Dempster-Shafer Theory (also known as the Belief Theory).
With such enhanced perception and driving assistance systems, drivers ultimately become more
aware of their environment. However, because of inherent limitations in range and field of view,
the systems' perception of the environment remains largely limited to a small interest zone
around the ego-vehicle1.
CS aim at compensating such limitations with the fusion of embedded information technology
and intervehicular communication technology. Such a combination would bring the advent
of decentralised information managing systems for driving assistance and road safety which
would not be limited to a single vehicle anymore. The formation of the Wi-Fi Alliance2 in
1999, to market the IEEE 802.11a and 802.11b standards, marked the point at which wireless
communication technology became affordable to the average household consumers and as a
result, the point at which CS became a realistic perspective.
CS have already gathered a lot of interest from the research community in the main automotive-
making regions of Europe, Japan and the USA. Many large projects, often multinational in the
case of Europe, have been dedicated to them in the safety area: COOPERS, SAFESPOT and
CVIS in the European Union [16]; DSSS in Japan [17]; and PATH, CICAS-V and IntelliDrive
in the USA [18, 19, 20]. Many potential applications to such technologies have been envisioned:
cooperative traffic management, crash prevention, real-time road and traffic state information,
variable speed limits, etc. For example, one of the most straightforward safety-related CS
applications is termed Emergency Electronic Break Light (EEBL) [21]. It uses radio links to
transmit a message alerting drivers that an emergency braking event is taking place ahead of
them, so that they can prepare to brake when the braking wave reaches them. Simulations
show that using EEBL is sufficient to lead to substantial fatalities reduction [22, 23].
However, CS will typically be more complex than EEBL. Indeed, by networking road actors
one can go further than classical in-vehicle driving assistance systems thanks to the distribution
of information sources and data processing capabilities. From this distribution of information
sources, the concept of extended or augmented perception arises.
Augmented perception allows extending an actor's perceptive horizon beyond its natural
limits, not only with information from multiple in-vehicle sensors but also information obtained
from remote sensors. The perceptive horizon is defined as the limit between the environment
part that can be perceived by in-vehicle sensors (the scene) and the other parts that cannot be
1The ego-vehicle is a vehicle where the focus of a system is made: for example with a collision prevention
application, the vehicle which gathers information about its surroundings to analyse other objects' trajectories
and their collision risk.
2http://www.wi-fi.org/
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Figure 1.1: Layered augmented map concept
perceived. This covers the maximum range of sensors and occultation (shadowing) by objects in
the scene that block direct line of sight. By bringing in data from other sensors that have another
point of view on the environment, augmented perception provides applications with information
they would not have access to if limited to a single point of view (the native perception
horizon). Furthermore, an actor can also share information that external sensors have no way
of measuring; for example, physiological data about the driver. Eventually, the underlying data
fusion mechanisms increases the precision, reliability and robustness of information extracted
from the environment, whether from inside or outside the horizons of native perception
The end result of an augmented perception and data fusion chain is known as an augmented
map. It is a repository where any relevant information about objects in the environment, and
the environment itself, can be stored in a layered architecture (see Fig. 1.1). One layer can,
for example, include a map of moving objects detected in the environment, each described by
a set of attributes (their state vector). Afterwards, the augmented map is made available to
driving assistance systems and drivers to enhance their perception of the environment. It can
be used in many different ways, for example, to enhance a driver's perception of what is going
on a few vehicles ahead in dense traffic. It can also feed a collision risk computation application
that will benefit from a better representation of the road, and even allow cooperation between
actors to actively avoid an impending crash.
Augmented perception is especially relevant to the accidentology. Indeed, statistics show that
crashes are mostly driven by human error [24], compared to other factors such as environmental
conditions and mechanical defects. Within human errors, the dominant error source is percept-
ive errors, which represent about 50% of the total [25]. The next two sources are interpretation
and evaluation, which together with perception, accounts for more than 75% of human error
related crashes. This shows that allowing drivers to perceive and understand their environment
better, or supplement them when they are clearly at fault, is a solution to a good assessment
of road risk, and as a consequence, can further decrease fatalities.
It is important to note that care should be taken in the way drivers are presented with the
additional information provided by augmented perception. Indeed, drivers are at risk to be
overwhelmed by information from outside their natural perceptive horizon. Similarly, they
could be distracted by this information and overlook other critical information. Thus, there
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is a research opportunity here to find efficient and appropriate solutions to convey augmented
information to drivers. However, this falls outside the scope of the present research.
1.1.3 Research Objectives & Scope
The aim of this thesis is to identify road risks by using distributed information extracted from
an augmented map thus, demonstrating that cooperative systems-based safety applications
have better performance than non-cooperative ones. However, before computing risks, it is
necessary to evaluate the limitations of augmented perception, in general, and augmented maps
in particular. Indeed, while many promising results have already been obtained, the feasibility of
building an augmented map from exchanged local perception information and, then, being able
to use this information beneficially for road users, has not been thoroughly assessed. Notably,
many questions remain unanswered as to the telecommunications performance and their ability
to deliver appropriate quality of service to support life-saving critical systems. The aim of this
research can be summarised with the following research questions:
1. How can crash risk be assessed in real-time with an augmented map built from local
sensors' data gathered from multiple vehicles?
2. Can an augmented map-based risk assessment system be more efficient than a similar
non-cooperative system?
3. What are augmented perception's limitations, given current technology in embedded com-
puting and telecommunications?
One needs to demonstrate whether cooperative systems can indeed be more efficient than their
non-cooperative equivalents to detect and evaluate risky driving situations. Thus, it is import-
ant to show what limitations current technology introduces for the CS. It can be argued that
inefficient intervehicular communications may render the benefits from introducing information
sharing null. This is especially true as the road environment is a complex, highly variable
setting where many sources of imperfections and errors exist, and not only for wireless commu-
nications. In order to take into account these sources of imperfections, this thesis has a strong
empirical flavouring, basing itself on concrete measurements.
Before proceeding further along this chapter, it is important to state what will be considered as
out of scope of this research thus, will not be covered in this thesis. Essentially, all the human
factors (HF) aspects of Cooperative Systems will be excluded from this research. This concerns
the Human-Machine Interface (HMI); even though more research is necessary to determine how
to efficiently convey the drivers additional information that is obtained with CS, we will not be
interested in this aspect rather, focusing on the technical challenges that come with CS. Other
HF aspects that are outside the scope of this research concerns differences in driver behaviour
on the road and their interaction with safety systems, or what will be the effect of augmenting
the driver's awareness of their environment, on their behaviour. Although these aspects are
out of the scope of this thesis, our work will still have implication for them; further details
regarding these implications will be discussed in the general conclusion in Chapter 7.
1.1.4 Approach
Firstly, we need to answer a few questions regarding the research methodology that we will use
to study the performance of augmented maps. Indeed, our requirements can be addressed using
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two different manners of equal a-priori outlooks: (1) on one hand, advanced simulations and
(2) on the other hand, actual full on-road implementation in a research setting. We note there
were unknown quantities (within the specific context of CS) affecting the empirical methodo-
logy in terms of its advantages and disadvantages versus the simulation methodology. Given
these unknown quantities, and the availability of appropriate resources (hardware, drivers, etc.)
at the LIVIC laboratory, our first step in the research approach is to evaluate the empirical
methodology to fill the missing gaps and lead to a more informed choice. To do so, we imple-
mented an EEBL scenario on the Satory test tracks located in the city of Versailles, France.
The results from this implementation showed that it was unwarranted to continue with the
EEBL implementation, in particular, and with a fully empirical research methodology, because
it was difficult to obtain meaningful results on the safety benefits of the system being studied.
Thus, we selected a research methodology focused on advanced simulations, but still taking
into account improvements brought by empirical research on the performance of wireless com-
munication technologies.
As we mentioned, CS aim at deploying an integrated wireless network between road actors
- vehicles and additionally, roadside infrastructure. Although wireless communications need
not be radiofrequency only (infrared communication have been suggested), they do dominate
the field. In 2010, the IEEE adopted an amendment to the 802.11 standard, 802.11p [26],
which is specifically dedicated to enhancing 802.11 technology for the road environment. This
amendment was released in the latest version of the standard (IEEE 802.11-2012) alongside
others [27]. Performance evaluation of 802.11p is an ongoing area of research, into which it is
necessary to delve when considering the efficiency of Cooperative Systems.
Our approach consists of, firstly, evaluating the empirical performance of IEEE 802.11p tele-
communications in close-to-real-road settings on the Satory test tracks. Our evaluation process
allowed us to define a set of boundaries on the performance that one can expect from this tech-
nology. Importantly, it showed that many assumptions made on the usefulness of CS for safety
tasks may have been over-optimistic, especially in terms of the connection ranges that 802.11p
systems can achieve. This is further aggravated by the fact that we obtained these results in a
relatively open and controlled freeway-like environment, and not on actual roads, where sources
of imperfections are omnipresent. The considered performance metrics were latency, frame loss
and range.
We used results from the evaluation process to build a representative, yet straightforward,
empirical model of 802.11p performance metrics; environmental factors such as the weather
as well as performance variations introduced by hardware inhomogeneities (for example, non-
omnidirectionality in antennas) were taken into account. The proposed model is particularly
well adapted to higher-level simulations of CS applications with up to a dozen road actors. It
is complementary to more detailed networking models such as the one used in the well-known
ns-x family of simulators.
Consecutively, we developed a CS simulation architecture in the SiVIC sensor simulator [28].
This architecture is very versatile, and can be used to simulate simple CS applications, or to
build an augmented map. At first, we developed an EEBL application inside this architecture,
which we use to validate it in a reproducible reference scenario. We selected a freeway vehicles
string as our reference driving scenario, leading to rear-end crash-prone situations. Rear-end
crashes represent between one fifth and one third of all road crashes (depending on regions
and countries) [29, 30]. Furthermore, more than half (56.4%) of the drivers do not follow safe
interdistances recommendations (at least 2 seconds) in dense traffic [3]. For these reasons,
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Figure 1.2: Layered structure of augmented perception, and its relations with client applications
freeway crashes provide a good setting to evaluate the impact of CS, with the added benefit
of these cooperative safety applications (within this environment) being commercially available
in the not-too-distant future. Indeed, freeways are probably the most controlled and least
variable of the various road environments. As such, many advanced driving assistance systems
have been, or are being, deployed for freeway usage.
We then make the scenario progressively more realistic (and not reproducible), in order to
study the impact of intervehicular communications on the safety of the vehicles strings. Some
unexpected findings emerged, which highlights some flaws in previous conclusions on the ef-
fectiveness of CS in reducing the severity of crashes. Indeed, we note that while the number of
crashes was lowered by the introduction of CS into the string, we find no apparent reduction
on the severity of the remaining crashes.
Our next step consists of implementing a generalist augmented map construction architecture.
Generalist implies that we dissociate the augmented map from its client applications. Indeed,
it is common in current research that augmented perception is tailored specifically to an end
application, for example, collision prevention at intersections. The data fusion process can
thus be difficult to apply to another problem. Acknowledging the variability of future CS
applications, we believe it is required to develop and assess augmented maps that are generalist
in purpose, able to feed any sort of client application (see Fig. 1.2). It is important that building
augmented maps with local maps implies using data of varied granularity. Within the context
of augmented perception, the exchange of exteroceptive data is still fairly recent. A majority of
existing systems either use only exchange localisation (GPS position fixes) and proprioceptive
data (inertial data, inter alia), or use these to complement locally-sensed exteroceptive data.
The feasibility of exchanging local maps built from both proprioceptive and exteroceptive data
to form an augmented map remains to be systematically demonstrated.
8 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The augmented map building architecture is implemented in SiVIC, supported by our earlier
model of 802.11p performance. Using SiVIC allows us to create a very realistic simulation that
integrates a wide range of imperfections. Data fusion is performed using Kalman filtering and
the Dempster-Shafer Theory, as a follow-up to previous works concerning the adaptation of these
mathematical principles to augmented perception [31]. We use this architecture to study the
performance of CS versus non-cooperative systems to assess the risk of a driving situation (our
reference scenario). Results show that the CS-based approach consistently provides advanced
warning to drivers during an emergency braking event compared to the non-CS based approach,
despite the limitations introduced by imperfect telecommunications.
Eventually, we developed a dedicated simulation to demonstrate the ability of CS to be used
to detect near-miss events, as a further step towards assessing risks using CS. Near-misses or
near-collisions, are a common crash surrogate measurement. An evaluation of augmented map-
based risk-assessment is performed within the same reference scenario, to compare cooperative
and non-cooperative approaches, highlighting the benefits of the cooperative approach.
Overall, this research approach allows us to conclude on the merits of CS that is solidly grounded
in reality, and not only on potential merits that is assumed from simulations.
The research approach described in this section is also summarised in graphical form in Fig. 1.3.
Research problems, the different research tasks and their results are paired with the relevant
chapters (for more details, see 1.2). The relationship between each aspect of the thesis is shown
with arrows linking them; the arrows are directed to show the hierarchy that exists between each
section and which task influences the other (for example, how the implementation performed
in a specific task was later used in another implementation).
As an example, if we consider the blue box building an augmented map? , it covers a sub-
question of our first research question, and leads to the third research question (the blue box
CS/IVC performance? ); this second question is the central theme for Chapter 3, leading
to the performance evaluation of 802.11p on the tracks and the construction of an empirical
performance model. The building an augmented map?  box is answered in Chapter 5 together
with the design of the augmented map-building architecture.
1.1.5 Contributions
This thesis' contributions span several research disciplines, from vehicular wireless networks,
simulation of driving assistance systems and data fusion . They are classified and explained
further in the remainder of this section.
V2V/I evaluation
A comprehensive evaluation of V2V/I telecommunication technology (802.11p) was performed
on the track in a close-to-real-road setting, demonstrating that while V2V/I is indeed suitable for
safety cooperative applications, its performance with average hardware have been overestimated
by previous studies. Indeed, performance showed a large variability even within the relatively
controlled environment of Satory's test tracks.
Relevant sections: chapter 3, sections 3.3 to 3.6
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V2V/I implementation
As part of the aforementioned V2V/I evaluation, an implementation of 802.11p-enabled devices
and of an EEBL application was completed. This open source implementation is adaptable and
fully controllable, and can be used to support further research. As a matter of fact, several
technological demonstrations utilised this system in 2011 and early 2012.
Relevant section: chapter 3, section 3.5
V2V/I modelling
This thesis provides a new empirical 802.11p performance model which is aimed at being used
by higher-level simulations of CS applications, contrary to most existing models that are focused
on lower-level network simulations.
Relevant section: chapter 3, section 3.7
Cooperative Systems simulation architectures
A complete CS simulation architecture was designed and implemented as part of this thesis,
within the SiVIC-RTMaps simulation framework. The programming language used is C++.
This architecture is versatile and can be easily modified to accommodate other research on CS.
It provides major improvements in terms of realism, compared to previous architectures.
Relevant sections: chapter 4, sections 4.1 to 4.4
Generalist augmented map building architecture
A generalist augmented map building architecture was designed and implemented as part of
this thesis, within the SiVIC-RTMaps simulation framework. It uses data from simulated
scenarios generated with the aforementioned CS simulation architecture, or data recorded from
real vehicles. An emphasis is placed upon independence from client applications, and thus
increasing its versatility in the architecture. The programming language used is C++. The
architecture also builds upon previous research to adapt the Dempster-Shafer theory to data
fusion problems within the specific context of augmented perception.
Relevant sections: chapter 5, sections 5.3 and 5.4
Benefits of CS for road safety
This thesis finds new insight on the safety benefits of CS in general, and augmented maps
in particular. We demonstrate that they can be more useful than non-cooperative systems
in assessing road risks in certain conditions, typically in warning drivers in advance of an
impending crash in vehicles strings. We also demonstrate that they can be used to record
useful data about near-collision events in a naturalistic driving setting. However, we also
show that potential benefits might have been over-estimated by previous research. Reduced
communications performance at high relative speed means that in such conditions CS do not
perform any better than non-cooperative systems. Furthermore, we find that a typical EEBL
application had no benefits according to a crash severity criterion based on the EES.
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Relevant sections: chapter 3, section 3.6; chapter 4, sections 4.4 and 4.5; chapter 5, section
5.5; chapter 6, section 6.4
1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2: Studying the safety benefits of Cooperative Systems After laying out
the research methodology problem, chapter 2 presents a literature review of CS applications,
especially regarding safety-related ones, and introduces the reference on-road scenario that we
will use for the remainder of this thesis. Then, it discusses the merits of empirical-focused
research versus simulations-focused research and explains why we choose, at first, to implement
an on-road study of a CS application (EEBL). Then it discusses the design, implementation
and mixed findings of this real-world implementation of EEBL which involves four vehicles.
Eventually, it concludes on the rationale for selecting the simulations, which we will improve
using empirical data, as our principal research methodology.
Chapter 3: Evaluation of telecommunications for augmented perception Chapter 3
begins with a literature review regarding V2V/I telecommunication technologies in general, and
IEEE 802.11p in particular to present in further detail the context of the present research and
how it is essential to CS. The experimental design (setups and scenarios) for the performance
evaluation is then explained, before the analysis of the chosen performance metrics. From this
analysis, chapter 3 moves forward to the development of an empirical 802.11p performance
model, of which several different versions are presented. Eventually, we discuss findings such as
the telecommunications' limitations and, especially, the unwarranted optimistic expectations of
previous research.
Chapter 4: Simulation architecture for Cooperative Systems applications Chapter
4 introduces our CS simulation architecture in the SiVIC simulator and the RTMaps multi-
sensors prototyping platform. Validation of the simulation architecture compared to previous
research is described. Eventually, new results are discussed, notably regarding the reduced effi-
ciency, regarding the crash severity (EES) criterion, of a typical EEBL application implemented
with our CS simulation architecture.
Chapter 5: Building an augmented map Chapter 5 begins with a literature review on
data fusion for local and augmented perception in order to provide some context. Then, it details
the map building architecture we implemented in SiVIC, including its theoretical foundations,
most notably the adaptation of the Dempster-Shafer Theory to augmented perception problems.
Eventually, it offers a performance analysis of a simple risk-assessment approach using our map-
building architecture versus non-cooperative local maps, taking into account the limitations
determined in Chapter 3.
Chapter 6: Towards risk assessment: an application Chapter 6 presents, at first,
a literature review of studies on near-misses and their relationship to classic risk assessment,
as well as how augmented perception can be used to solve research problems surrounding
the detection and classification of near-miss events. Then, it discusses the design and results
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obtained from a dedicated simulation of near-miss events detection using CS, demonstrating its
advantages compared to non-cooperative approaches.
Chapter 7: General Conclusion Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary of the
work presented in previous chapters and continues on to discuss issues and insights that have
been identified in the course of this research, along with paths for future research.
Appendix A: Experimental documentation Appendix A provides for reference the uned-
ited (in French) and translated experimental documents that were written over the course of this
research for later reference as well as to allow other researchers to reproduce the experiments.
Experimental implementation of the EEBL scenario is covered, as well as the installation of
802.11p-enabled IVC devices.
Chapter 2
Studying the safety benefits of
Cooperative Systems
2.1 Introduction
One of the principal aims of this thesis is to evaluate the limitations of augmented perception,
particularly augmented maps within the context of their potential contribution to the safety of
road users. In the initial chapter, we argued that while many promising results have already
been obtained, the feasibility of building an augmented map from exchanged local perception
information had not been thoroughly assessed, and that it was necessary to show whether
applications using augmented perception are more efficient than non-cooperative applications.
In order to do so, an appropriate research methodology is selected which will provide results on
benefits of augmented perception that are realistic enough to withstand scrutiny. The research
methodology must provide conditions that are similar to the future conditions into which the
studied applications are likely to be deployed, as well as the conditions of current applications
with which they will be compared. These requirements are not straightforward, and can be
answered in two different manners of equal a-priori outlooks using advanced simulations that
may be supported by empirical data or full on-road implementations in a research setting. This
should not be seen as being limited to augmented perception only but can be applied to any
type of applications offered by Cooperative Systems (CS).
The aim of this chapter is to select the most appropriate research methodology. Neither of the
competing methodologies are superior to the other, a-priori, but are actually complementary
as one can be used to support the other for some specific tasks. We identified some gaps in
the merits of the fully empirical methodology, notably, its disadvantages were not clearly laid
out. Concerns were raised in relation to the limitations that might arise when implementing a
system on real vehicles and hinder the process of our research on that system's safety benefits.
Given the availability of test hardware at the LIVIC laboratory, we chose to perform an initial
evaluation of these potential issues by implementing an Emergency Electronic Break Light
(EEBL) application on the Satory's test tracks. This implementation had two goals: (1) validate
the use of an empirical research methodology for future CS-related research (and identify its
weaknesses); and (2) empirically confirming previous research on the contribution of IVC to
the safety of vehicles' strings.
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Previous studies on EEBL, one of the most straight forward safety-related CS applications,
have shown promising safety benefits even with a limited number of vehicles equipped with the
system. These studies were undertaken in dedicated simulations in which assumptions about
the performance of IVC, vehicles and drivers were done. We decided to test the validity of the
IVC safety benefits in an imperfect semi-realistic1 environment, in terms of IVC and vehicle
performance, by implementing an EEBL application on Satory's test tracks.
The difficulty in evaluating CS applications on track (or on the road) without important invest-
ments will be demonstrated in this chapter. The implementation was challenging in terms of
engineering experience but yielded interesting preliminary results that were used in preparation
for the IEEE 802.11p performance study which is covered in Chapter 3. The results provided
data on the performance of IEEE 802.11g telecommunication that can be used as a bench-
mark for future empirical investigations, as well as design for a common software and hardware
architecture for on-track measurements.
However, the outcome of the validation of IVC safety benefits was not conclusive, with a num-
ber of logistical and experimental protocol limitations exposed during the experiment. This led
to the conclusion that advanced simulations should be used as the main method to address our
research problems. We also concluded that it was necessary to provide models based on empir-
ical data for these advanced simulations, to increase output quality and relevance, in relations
to the performance and benefits of safety critical CS applications. Designing an advanced CS
simulation architecture and collecting the empirical data to support its modelisation of IVC
performance will be the focus in the two following chapters.
Chapter Outline
The first section presents a concise review of Cooperative Systems (CS) focusing on the proposed
or existing safety applications. To provide further context, this section discusses the safety
benefits of CS followed by the introduction of a vehicle strings scenario since it will be used
extensively as a reference for the on-road implementation as well as for future simulations.
In the second section, we will discuss the rationale and issues surrounding the methodology
settlement in more detail.
The third section presents the design and implementation of a simplified on-road EEBL
system, aiming at validating its safety benefits in an imperfect environment.
Then, the fourth section discusses the results of a four-vehicle test on the Versailles-Satory's
tracks, showing the complexities surrounding such implementation, as well as the difficulty of
obtaining meaningful results without actually extending into unsafe driving situations.
In conclusion, the fifth section covers the rationale and motivations for focusing on simulations
to assess CS's safety benefits, especially the most advanced ones.
1The Satory tracks can be presumed to be semi-realistic because they are not open to normal traffic
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2.2 Literature review and state-of-the-art
2.2.1 Cooperative Systems: a wide potential
As argued in Chapter 1, Cooperative Systems can be seen as the technological answer to the
current problem of stagnating fatality rates on roads in First World nations. In the broadest
sense, CS describe a family of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) where several actors
involved in the road environment such as vehicles, roadside intelligent infrastructure or ped-
estrians, cooperate to perform a task. Eventually, research aims at creating an integrated
network between the aforementioned actors based on wireless communications. The underlying
technologies required to support a cooperative architecture and most notably 802.11p will be
addressed in Chapter 3. In this section, we will concentrate on the applications and benefits,
especially the safety benefits of CS.
Using wireless communications, of any form, to allow in-vehicle and roadside systems to cooper-
ate can lead to many potentially useful applications, of varying complexities. Many of them do
not have safety aspects and the applications that are on the consumers market are often exten-
sions of existing non-cooperative applications. In Table 2.1 (from [32, 33] and other sources),
we list applications which have been deployed, are currently in research and development stages
(at various levels of advancement) and potential applications which are still more remote, with
possible commercial availability well into the 2020s.
Electronic tolling (ETC) and cooperative driving (platooning) are the oldest forms of CS.
ETC has been widely deployed in the late 1990s and 2000s. Earliest examples are found in
Norway in 1986 and the USA in 1989. The first truly unassisted ETC system was deployed
in Trondheim, Norway in 1991 [34]. The first fully automated toll freeway, Ontario Highway
407 (Express Toll Route), opened in Canada on 7 June 1997. It provided an early example
of CS integration with other ITS systems, as the ETC system on Highway 407 combines RF
transponders with roadside cameras for automatic number plate recognition[35]. Platooning
and cooperative driving research began more than 20 years ago [36, 37, 38, 39]. Although,
the most advanced concepts related to platooning have not found their way in the market at
present, cooperative driving in the form of CS-enhanced autonomous cruise control system is
currently in active research. Significant safety and comfort benefits are expected from these
enhanced systems.
Another type of cooperative application that is likely to be desired by the general public is
infotainment, also known as In-Car Entertainment (ICE). With constant connectivity made
available with smartphones and other mobile devices, it is relatively logical to use the vehicle's
capability to support more advanced forms of online activities however, some sources have spec-
ulated that the ICE will not be as popular as expected because of the prevalence of smartphones
and the potential cost of ICE services. Currently, the existing ICE services (provided by Ca-
dillac and Chrysler) uses 3G mobile phone connections to reach the outside network but these
technologies have limitations (refer to Chapter 3). Seamless access to the Internet and espe-
cially social media and video sharing platforms might be achieved by dedicated infrastructure
provided within a CS context [40, 41].
However, neither ETC nor ICE should be perceived as the principle potential of cooperative
applications. The main potential of CS, which is gathering the most research interest, lies in
its ability to extend one road actor's perceptive horizon, which is achieved from the fusion of
information obtained from a multitude of remote and local sources.
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Table 2.1: Current and future applications of Cooperative Systems
Category Application
Electronic tolling
Electronic toll collection
Adaptive toll collection
Adaptive insurance (pay-as-you-drive)
Traffic management
Adaptive traffic re-routing
Emergency services (eCall)
Remote sensing of breakdowns and crashes
Fleet management
Trade vehicles (delivery services, freight)
Public transports vehicles
Taxis
Tracking
Emergency vehicles
Funds, precious or dangerous goods
Regulations enforcement or information
Intelligent Speed Adaptation
Emergency lane usage
Right of way rules
Banning of specific manoeuvres/actions
Incident and threats warning
Collision prevention
Crash and breakdown warning
Weather and road conditions
Ghost driver warning
Infotainment services
In-vehicle high-speed Internet
House-vehicle networking link (domotics)
Other services
Remote diagnostic
Remote update
Geo-activated services (advertisement, ...)
Perceptive horizon is defined as the limit between the part of the environment that one can
access with its sensors and the part of the environment that is inaccessible. The term scene
is also used to describe the area bounded by the perceptive horizon. Maximum range and
occultations by objects both define the boundaries of the perceptive horizon. For a driver,
the perceptive horizon is broadly the limit of their field of view, in depth as much as angular
opening. Technically the range of the eyes could be described as infinitewe can see light
emanating from sources located thousands of billions kilometres away, e.g. stars (1 light-year
is about 1013 kilometres, the closest star is located 4.22 light-years away)but in practice it is
limited by resolution. Vehicle-embedded sensors for mono-vehicle ADAS can extend this natural
perceptive horizon but this is not always the case, nor is it required by their specifications. For
example, a radar has a range of about 200 metres so it does not really extend the driver's
perceptive horizon to objects further than this distance.
CS can thus be used to provide perception augmentation to road users such as drivers. Per-
ception augmentation covers both perception extension and perception enrichment. Perception
extension simply consists of obtaining data from areas that are outside the perceptive horizon,
as described in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, perception enrichment consists of
obtaining information about an object that a given set of external sensors cannot measure from
a distance. For example, no sensor can remotely measure the vigilance state of other drivers
thus, obtaining some information about this state is a form of perception enrichment. Similarly,
transmitting the state of pedals to other vehicles is a form of perception enrichment.
The subject of perception augmentation by CS, independently of the applications that it could
support, is well covered in the literature. To quote a few examples, Wender and Dietmayer
[42] combined an ego-vehicle embedded laserscanner with positioning data transmitted from
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other vehicles to extend the ego-vehicle perception and enrich objects already measured by
the laserscanner. Von Arnim et al. [43] have shown that radiofrequency communications and
infrared beacons mounted on vehicles and infrastructure can be used to detect road signs and
cooperative traffic lights. With this system, hidden road signs can be detected and long range
identification performed by exteroceptive sensors (stereovision cameras) can be confirmed and
the state of traffic lights can be forwarded to drivers even if they are out of view. Yoshizu et al.
[44] have done similar work on remote traffic light information. Many of the applications listed
in Table 2.1 can be or need to be, supported by perception augmentation such as cooperative
traffic management, crash prevention, real-time road and traffic state information, or variable
speed limits. Further details on the way to achieve augmented perception, specifically for the
subject of the augmented map, will be covered in Chapter 5.
2.2.2 Safety-orientated CS applications and their potential benefits
As mentioned before, Cooperative Systems has gathered a lot of interest from the research
community in the main automotive-making regions, notably for their safety aspects and the
benefits given to their users. Many large projects, often multinational in the case of Europe,
have been dedicated to them in this area: COOPERS, SAFESPOT and CVIS in the European
Union [16]; DSSS in Japan [17]; and PATH, CICAS-V and IntelliDrive in the USA [18, 19, 20].
These projects are often concerned with a range of safety applications instead of a specific one.
For example, one of the CVIS's project outcomes was the Extended Driver Awareness (EDA)
framework [45], an environment inside which dedicated safety-orientated software applications
can be developed. Overall, a number of applications have been covered by the project:
 Cooperative Urban Applications - to improve the efficient use of the urban road network
at both local junction and network level, and enhance individual mobility; which includes
mostly traffic management and routing applications.
 Cooperative Inter-urban Applications - to enable cooperation and communication between
the vehicle and infrastructure on inter-urban highways; includes EDA and a Cooperative
Travellers Assistance.
 Cooperative Freight & Fleet - to increase the safety of dangerous goods transport and
optimise transport companies' delivery logistics.
 Cooperative Monitoring - to develop specifications and prototypes for the collection, in-
tegration and delivery of real-time information on vehicle movements as well as the state
of the road network.
As shown in Fig. 2.12 the myriad of CS applications that have been studied or proposed, focuses
on safety. They are classified into two categories: active vs. passive safety, and the type of
action they perform (such as informing the driver or intervening in their place). Each category
is also organised around a central axis depicting the timeframe before and after the crash; the
scale is not linear and mostly indicative, as the same application might function at different
timescales. The closer we get to the actual crash, the more coercive the applications become,
which are listed below the time axis. The distinction between some applications that would
2Used and adapted with authorisation from Christopher J. Skinner, DISplay Pty Ltd: cjskin-
ner@acslink.net.au
18 CHAPTER 2. STUDYING THE SAFETY BENEFITS OF COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS
crash
Preventive and active safety Passive safety
Information
Foresighted driving
Support
Warning & assistance 
systems
Intervention
Active vehicle
control
Rescue systems
& services
Safety
systems
Time before the crash:            minutes                                  seconds milliseconds
Traffic information
Traffic routing
Road conditions
Hazard warning Lane merging
Collision warning
Collision avoidance
Emergency braking
Cooperative driving
Stop sign violation
Airbags
Safety materials
Restraint systems
eCall
Crash warning 
V2V message
Post-crash 
safety
Capability
V2V/V2I
Cellular communications
Figure 2.1: Classification of cooperative applications and their potential relationship to the
crash's timeline
otherwise sound similar is well established here. Collision warning (more precisely, Cooperative
Collision Warning or CCW) is a support application that is purely informative. It will help
the driver but will not take any action in its place. On the other hand, collision avoidance
falls into the intervention category, which implies that the machine takes upon itself to perform
the necessary actions to avoid a crash, regardless of what the driver is doing. These two tasks
can be performed by the same application, that would have a reactive part triggered when the
driver is not reacting to the informative part, among other solutions. At Fig. 2.1 bottom,
a graph shows a comparison between the potential of two telecommunications technologies,
mobile cellular communications and 802.11p-based DSRC to support the applications listed
just above the graph. The capabilities and limitations of these two technologies will be covered
in greater detail in Chapter 3 (section 3.2), but the graph clearly highlights that mobile 3G or
4G is principally useful purely for non-critical informative and post-crash applications.
One of the most straightforward safety-related CS applications is termed Emergency Electronic
Break Light (EEBL) [21]. It uses radio links to transmit a message alerting drivers that an
emergency braking event is taking place ahead, so they can prepare to brake when the braking
wave reaches them. EEBL is between support and intervention categories in Fig. 2.1 as it
can either be informative, warning the driver of the impending danger, or reactive by taking
over the braking action. Previous studies have used EEBL to study the safety benefits of IVC,
notably through the safety-capacity trade off: how traffic density of already congested roads
in modern urban agglomerations be increased without decreasing safety for drivers, without
any infrastructure modification. This leads us to the corollary questions to determine what
equipment ratio (ρ) is necessary for the EEBL system to lead to significant benefits in terms of
safety.
In [22, 31], the authors developed safety indexes based on either the number of collisions or the
severity of collisions. The second index was found to be more relevant and less pessimistic than
the former, because under the number of collisions-based safety index, all collisions have an
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equal impact whereas collisions at lower relative velocities typically lead to less severe injuries
and fatalities than collisions at higher velocities. Nonetheless, for both indexes, it was found
that IVC contributed to the increase in the string's safety. Lambert et al. [23] provided a more
in depth analysis of the equipment ratio influence on the vehicle's string's safety. It remained
within the context of the safety index based on the total number of collisions; different models
for the distribution of inter-vehicular distances were studied. The study's simulation concluded
that only a small equipment ratio was necessary to drastically reduce the number of collisions.
For example, at a capacity of 3,000 vehicles/hour (a very dense traffic) and ρ = 5%, the
number of collisions reduced by two third compared to an unequipped fleet. The best results
were obtained with ρ = 25% , where the number of collisions was reduced by 90% (at higher
capacities) and remained very stable for most simulated capacities.
The question of the appropriate equipment ratio ρ is not trivial. Safety-orientated CS systems
have high theoretical benefits [44], but nothing guarantees that these benefits will be obtained
if the fleet is heterogeneous. Takatori and Hasegawa [46] have shown that while CCW-equipped
vehicles might benefit from positive effects within 20 and 60% of market penetration (the same
as ρ), those positive effects are really noticeable above 60% for the whole fleet. However, simply
reaching ρ = 20% will take a certain amount of time, let alone 60%.
Let us have a simple simulation of the market penetration ρ of a given CS system. We have ymax
the number of years for which the simulation will run; N0 the initial fleet size and Ntotal (y) the
fleet size for any given year y; Nnew is the number of vehicles that are added to the fleet each
year, which can be either the number of registrations, or the actual increase in size accounting
for scrapping; Neq (y) is the number of CS-equipped vehicle in year y; s is the ratio of equipped
vehicles on the first year and i is the ratio of equipped vehicles within Nnew; finally, ρ (y) gives
the equipment ratio on a given year y. We assume that both Nnew and i are constant over the
timeframe of the simulation. The simulation is described by the following pseudo-algorithm:
 First year (y = 1):
 For 1 to N0
* Randomly generate Neq (y = 1) ≤ s×Ntotal CS-equipped vehicles
 End for
 Then ρ (y = 1) =
Neq(y=1)
N0
 Ntotal (y = 1) = N0
 Following years (1 < y ≤ ymax):
 For y = 1 to ymax
* Randomly generate P ≤ i×Nnew CS-equipped vehicles
* Then Neq (y) = P +Neq (y − 1)
* Ntotal (y) = Nnew +Ntotal (y − 1)
* ρ (y) =
Neq(y)
Ntotal(y)
 End for
Note that this model is not accurate past a given value of ymax, , as the number of scrapped
vehicles is not modelled realistically and the fleet increase (new registrations) is assumed to be
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Figure 2.2: Simulation of market penetration (ρ) for an on-vehicle system
constant. Typically, this value would be about the same as the average lifespan of a modern
light vehicle i.e. 20 years. Let us have the following values [47]:
Nstart = 248.76× 106
Nnew = 16.0× 106
s = 0.05%
i = [10, 25, 50, 75, 100] %
ymax = 20
Fig. 2.2 shows the evolution of ρ for different values of i over 20 years. The fastest way to
reach ρ = 20%, is by having i set at 100% (i.e. imposing it on all new vehicles), where it would
only take 4 years. Achieving such a rate requires strong government leadership and a standard
that is accepted by all vehicle manufacturers in the world, which does not exist for most CS
applications at the moment. If all new vehicles are not equipped with the system, which is
more likely to be the case, the time to reach ρ = 20% increases significantly. For example, if
i = 25%, after 20 years we will have ρ = 14%.
Without concerted effort, the market penetration rate will remain small. For example in 2002,
ACC was fitted on 0.05% of the latest manufactured Toyota vehicles in the United States [32].
At this rate, only 1 in 1900 vehicles would be equipped taking 2006 years. The recent economic
crisis have also affected the deployment of such systems, with recent forecasts showing only
5.2 millions ACC-equipped vehicles in the world by 2015 , a meagre ρ = 0.52%. At such low
levels, the network effect syndrome [48] might hinder the system's deployment and acceptance
because quality of service is poor for early users, which would be especially true for systems
such as EEBL or CCW, that actively relies on other equipped vehicles to perform its tasks.
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND STATE-OF-THE-ART 21
Thus, one must ensure that the system remains functional in heterogeneous environments (i.e.
at low values of ρ) and encourage its diffusion among road users. From a marketing point of
view, Eichler et al. [49] suggested developing comfort-orientated V2I applications initially so
customers will be enticed to invest quickly in communication-capable vehicles. Approximately
after one decade, CS safety applications could be introduced into this more mature market, at
a higher initial market penetration rate. From a technical point of view, the system must be
developed to be robust in heterogeneous environments, what augmented perception could be
used to do.
2.2.3 Vehicles strings scenario(s)
Throughout this study, we will focus on a single scenario that we will use as our reference in
later chapters. Its generic name is vehicles strings scenario but there are many references to
it as the brick wall scenario [50]. Actually, the brick wall scenario is only one of two ways
the vehicles string scenario can be played out, and arguably the least realistic one. Overall, the
scenario is an emergency braking scenario involving a string of vehicles driving on a freeway
(see Fig. 2.3). The string's leader suffers from a crash which triggers a series of rear-end crashes
in reaction as the following vehicles are progressively affected by the event. One can describe
a braking wave propagating through the string, which is a specific form of the kinematic wave
described by Lighthill and Whitham [51], which originally concerns variations of density inside
a vehicles string. In the brick wall version, the leader is stopped instantaneously (or almost) as
if it had collided a static heavy obstacle on the road, for an example, a collapsed overpass. In
the other more likely version, the leader performs a sudden emergency braking manoeuvre, still
moving some distance before coming to a complete stop. In both versions, the leader sends an
emergency collision warning message through IVC, thus performing an EEBL task. Vehicles
further down the string are able to use this information to respond to the crash.
Arguably, EEBL is the simplest form of safety-orientated CS application. Although it can
be argued that it is a primitive form of augmented perception, allowing vehicles to sense an
event that they normally cannot perceive, we will keep these two aspects of CS separate. Indeed,
EEBL will most likely be active for a very limited amount of time i.e. during an emergency
event, while augmented perception is more likely to be active at all times whenever a vehicle is
on the road, especially if it is used to support a road risk assessment application. Additionally,
it is not necessary to exchange complex information to be able to perform an EEBL task.
The amount of rear-end crashes that can be avoided using IVC depends on many parameters
including: the string's density, reaction times, IVC equipment ratio and the type of EEBL
application. In most cases, not all vehicles in the string can avoid the initial incident, so an
amalgam of crash vehicles tend to form at the beginning of the string. It has been shown
in[22, 31, 23] that the first vehicle to avoid the crash will stop with a greater margin if there
are IVC-equipped vehicles in the string. This implies that, thanks to IVC, the minimal safe
vehicular interdistance can be reduced while maintaining overall safety for drivers in the string.
One limitation to this study, as it is usually applied to simulations, is that IVC-equipped vehicles
apply the brakes regardless of the driving context. It means that a secondary crashing incident
will occur a distance away from the leader vehicle. However, the number of collisions that might
have been avoided if no IVC was present did not undermine the safety benefits of IVC [22].
It should be noted that the vehicles string scenario is limited to EEBL. Indeed, we will also
use it to evaluate augmented perception, where a more complex scenario will be considered
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Normal driving
CrashAlert message transmission
Braking
Stopped vehicle
CollisionStopped vehicles
Figure 2.3: Four stages of the vehicles string scenario
for assessing crash risk for an individual vehicle, or for a group of vehicles. The vehicles
string scenario can be made as complex as required, from very homogeneous regularly-spaced
strings to heterogeneous ones where interdistances can fluctuate. Incidentally, our CS simulation
architecture's objective is to be able to offer this large array of variability.
The rationale for choosing this scenario as our reference scenario for implementations and
simulations can be justified in several points:
 Rear-end crashes represent between one fifth and one third of all road crashes [29, 30]
and it is widely demonstrated that the majority of drivers do not follow safe interdistance
recommendations [3]. Thus, a system that can reduce rear-end crashes will contribute
significantly to the reduction of road casualties.
 Freeways are the least complex road environment, with driving flows well segregated and
a limited set of possible manoeuvres. Thus, they are the easiest to study and the simplest
to approximate in simulations or on test tracks.
 Due to the reasons above, deployment of CS applications on freeways are expected to
be marketed before other road settings. Thus, EEBL and related cooperative safety
systems should be studied thoroughly so they can deliver their promises and be selected
by automotive manufacturers and regulatory authorities for commercial deployment.
 The scenario is versatile enough to be used for studying simpler CS applications such as
EEBL, to more complex ones based on augmented perception.
 The range of test tracks available at the Versailles-Satory grounds allows us to easily
deploy this scenario with actual vehicles.
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2.3 Studying CS: simulation versus empirical methodolo-
gies
In the introduction, we mentioned that the aim of this chapter is to select between two possible
research methodologies in studying the limitations of CS (and augmented perception) and
their expected safety benefits. The final research methodology should be the one that is most
likely to provide us with results on augmented perception's benefits that are realist enough to
withstand scrutiny. It will have to provide conditions that are similar to the future conditions
into which the studied applications are likely to be deployed, as well as matching the conditions
of current applications within which they will be compared to. This means being able to provide
conditions that are similar to an open road driving environment, and that generates normal
and non-normal (i.e. dangerous) driving conditions.
Actually, there are three possible answers to this methodological question: advanced simula-
tions, theoretical studies and empirical implementation. Note that here, simulations cover a
large variety of potential methods. We will principally understand simulations in the context of
microscopic simulations of a number of vehicles in a simulated environment, equipped (or not)
with a specific system that is studied. Indeed, within the context of augmented perception,
large-scale traffic simulations for example, have a too wide of a scope. Because of that, they do
not offer the necessary granularity required to study the performance of perception algorithms.
Some of the previous studies upon which our work is based have used theoretical approaches or
simple simulations to assess the safety benefits of CS applications. However, we already men-
tioned that we aim at obtaining results that account for many potential imperfection sources.
In order to improve the results obtained by previous research, a theoretical analytical approach
would not allow obtaining realistic results without a significant increase in complexity. The
large discrepancies between theoretical and measured IVC performance (see Chapter 3) are an
example of a theoretical methodology's limitations, as they would be too complex to model
analytically. For these reasons, we will consider that theoretical methods are out of this thesis'
scope.
Without further assumptions, these two methodological approaches cannot be discriminated. It
can be argued initially, that an actual empirical approach which uses on-road implementation
of the system to be studied, is better than the limited and non-complete reproduction that
would be proposed by a simulation. However, there are a number of advantages to simulation
[52], and it is possible to create meaningful and successful simulations, provided a number of
factors are taken into account and adjusted [53].
In Table 2.2 we propose a listing of simulation versus empirical methods in the context of
studying a CS application within a specific test scenario. The parameters in the scenario are
variables such as the number of vehicles and the type of driving manoeuvres that have to be
performed. Environmental factors such as the meteorological conditions and the surrounding
traffic are considered independently. A number of unknown or uncertain a-priori quantities are
written in italics.
Table 2.2 shows that there is no methodology that has a clear advantage over the other, given the
unknown quantities that affect (mostly) the empirical methodology. The unknown quantities
are present within the context of research on CS. We need to determine which methodology is
the most appropriate in solving our research questions adequately, notably by evaluating the
impact on some potential issues in our research process.
24 CHAPTER 2. STUDYING THE SAFETY BENEFITS OF COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS
T
a
b
le
2
.2
:
C
o
m
p
a
riso
n
o
f
sim
u
la
tio
n
v
s.
em
p
irica
l
m
ea
su
rem
en
ts
S
im
u
la
tio
n
E
m
p
irica
l
stu
d
y
V
a
ria
b
ility
o
f
th
e
scen
a
rio
's
p
a
ra
m
eters
N
ea
r
to
ta
l
Im
p
o
rta
n
t
M
ay
req
u
ire
co
m
p
lex
m
o
d
els
fo
r
so
m
e
p
a
ra
m
eters
M
igh
t
be
lim
ited
by
logistica
l
a
n
d
tim
in
g
issu
es
C
o
n
tro
l
over
th
e
scen
a
rio
's
p
a
ra
m
eters
T
o
ta
l
Im
p
o
rta
n
t
(in
clu
d
in
g
m
o
d
ifi
ca
tio
n
s)
C
h
a
n
ges
in
o
n
e
set
o
f
pa
ra
m
eters
m
igh
t
h
a
ve
h
id
d
en
co
n
sequ
en
ces
o
n
o
th
ers
M
igh
t
be
lim
ited
by
logistica
l
a
n
d
tim
in
g
issu
es
E
n
v
iro
n
m
en
ta
l
fa
cto
rs
E
a
sy
/
q
u
ick
to
ch
a
n
g
e
C
a
n
n
o
t
b
e
m
o
re
rea
listic
th
a
n
rea
lity
L
ess
rep
resen
ta
tiv
e
(a
p
p
rox
im
a
tio
n
)
C
a
n
b
e
lim
ited
b
y
u
n
availa
b
ility
o
f
a
p
p
ro
p
ria
te
m
o
d
els
M
o
re
co
m
p
lex
to
o
b
ta
in
th
e
d
esired
co
n
d
itio
n
s
(va
riab
le
w
ea
th
er,
etc.)
L
a
ck
o
f
co
n
tro
l
o
n
so
m
e
fa
cto
rs
C
a
n
b
e
d
iffi
cu
lt
to
m
easu
re
so
m
e
va
ria
b
les
A
cco
u
n
tin
g
im
p
erfectio
n
s
K
n
ow
n
m
o
d
elisa
tio
n
a
n
d
p
o
ssib
ility
to
va
ry
th
eir
so
u
rces/
m
a
g
n
itu
d
e
Im
m
ed
ia
te
(n
o
a
d
d
itio
n
a
l
w
o
rk
n
eed
ed
)
R
eq
u
ire
co
m
p
lex
m
o
d
els
if
rea
lism
m
u
st
b
e
en
su
red
(m
o
re
p
rep
a
ra
tio
n
w
o
rk
)
C
a
n
b
e
lim
ited
b
y
u
n
availa
b
ility
o
f
a
p
p
ro
p
ria
te
m
o
d
els
L
im
ited
co
n
tro
l
over
a
ll
im
p
erfectio
n
so
u
rces
D
iffi
cu
lty
to
d
iscrim
in
a
te
ea
ch
im
p
erfectio
n
so
u
rces
O
u
tco
m
e's
rep
resen
ta
tiv
en
ess
N
o
id
en
tifi
ed
a
d
va
n
ta
ge
A
ctu
a
l
sy
stem
(o
r
p
ro
to
ty
p
e)
u
sed
L
im
ited
to
th
e
accu
ra
cy
/
fi
d
elity
o
f
th
e
m
o
d
els
u
sed
L
im
ited
b
y
th
e
sca
le
o
f
th
e
stu
d
y
o
r
th
e
en
v
iro
n
m
en
t
(clo
sed
ro
a
d
)
H
u
m
a
n
fa
cto
rs
N
o
id
en
tifi
ed
a
d
va
n
ta
ge
Im
m
ed
ia
te
a
cco
u
n
tin
g
C
a
n
n
o
t
a
cco
u
n
t
fo
r
a
ll
H
F
(sen
sitiv
ity
to
lim
ita
tio
n
s
o
f
d
rivers'
m
o
d
els)
M
igh
t
h
a
ve
h
id
d
en
o
r
u
n
w
a
rra
n
ted
in
fl
u
en
ce
o
n
th
e
scen
a
rio
o
u
t
o
f
sco
pe
R
ep
ea
ta
b
ility
E
a
sy
to
rep
ea
t
la
rg
e
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
tim
es
N
o
id
en
tifi
ed
a
d
va
n
ta
ge
L
ess
va
ria
b
ility
b
etw
een
ea
ch
itera
tio
n
s,
d
ep
en
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
m
o
d
els
u
sed
M
igh
t
be
co
m
p
lica
ted
by
H
F
/
logistics/
la
ck
o
f
d
esired
en
v.
fa
cto
rs
S
ca
le
o
f
stu
d
y
L
a
rg
e
sca
les
p
o
ssib
le
N
o
id
en
tifi
ed
a
d
va
n
ta
ge
M
igh
t
be
h
ea
vy
in
term
s
o
f
w
o
rkloa
d
to
im
p
lem
en
t
la
rge
stu
d
y
S
ca
le
o
f
stu
d
y
stro
n
g
ly
lim
ited
b
y
ava
ila
b
le
reso
u
rces
L
o
g
istics
a
n
d
co
st(s)
L
im
ited
co
sts
a
n
d
lo
g
istics
N
o
id
en
tifi
ed
a
d
va
n
ta
ge
In
a
p
p
ro
p
ria
te
p
ro
cessin
g
p
ow
er
m
ig
h
t
len
g
th
en
im
p
lem
en
ta
tio
n
o
f
stu
d
y
H
ig
h
ter
co
sts
w
h
en
m
o
re
th
a
n
a
few
veh
icles
in
v
o
lved
C
o
m
p
lex
lo
g
istics
(fi
n
d
in
g
d
rivers,
in
sta
llin
g
eq
u
ip
m
en
t,
etc.)
2.3. STUDYING CS: SIMULATION VERSUS EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGIES 25
As evident in the literature review, the vehicle strings scenario has been investigated within
a simulation to show the safety benefits of using IVC inside the strings. We have noted a
number of limitations surrounding these previous works, notably in terms of the assumptions
used to model IVC (notably the 802.11p-based ones). Even if the simulation's assumptions
allow demonstrating the benefits of IVC, especially in small increment ratios, these limitations
may preclude the scenario's transposition to actual vehicles strings. Indeed, communication
latency could negate the observed positive effects, for example a large latency in transmitting
the emergency message would not give drivers enough time to improve their reaction to the
braking event. The IVC technology used therefore has to ensure that latency remains under a
certain threshold. On the other hand, previous simulations assumes perfect (i.e. instantaneous
and lossless) communications. Other strong assumptions are taken by previous simulations,
notably concerning the vehicles composing the string and their drivers. The string is seen as
perfectly homogeneous, and the drivers perfect (they are constantly at their best reaction times
and do not make interpretation errors). Variations in vehicles and drivers characteristics could
have the same negative effects on the simulations' results.
Evaluating the impact of the imperfections from the expected benefits of the IVC is important.
We note that the empirical research methodology allows us to take into account all the imme-
diate potential limitations that can be encountered by an IVC system. The advantages and
disadvantages of simulation (for our research) have already been addressed in these previous
studies. Given the absence of practical information in some categories and the availability of ap-
propriate resources (hardware, drivers, etc.) at the LIVIC laboratory, evaluating the empirical
methodology appears to be the most logical choice to start our research process. Furthermore,
the LIVIC laboratory had a set of simulation tools that could be modified and enhanced to
accommodate our research needs which allowed us to test if the other methodology could be
used successfully. This in return, meant avoiding locking ourselves into a single methodology
from the beginning. This process should allow filling in the gaps and lead to a more informed
choice.
To do so, we will implement our reference vehicles string scenario. The experimentation will have
two related goals. Firstly, it will have to validate the methodology, characterise its limitations
and provide evidence it will be possible to use it for further research. In order to satisfy
this future research objective, the second goal to this on-tracks implementation will be to
determine whether it is possible to validate IVC benefits in an imperfect environment, compared
to the homogeneous strings and environments available in simulations. Indeed, performing
an empirical measurement study with a set of IVC-equipped vehicles in a realistic driving
environment is a good way to test several issues concurrently.
A number of benefits can be expected from the empirical Methodology. This approach allows
taking into account all possible imperfections that can arise inside a real driving environment,
including but not limited to IVC ones. Additionally, using real drivers and vehicles allow
introducing heterogeneity in the string. Note that the focus of this experiment is not on
human factors, such as drivers' reaction time, although being able to measure some driver-
related metrics is a consequence of the experimental design. However, human factors have been
identified as part of the issue that might negatively affect the study, so being able to take them
into account, up to a limit, is to our advantage.
In the following sections, we will present the design and implementation of a scenario aimed at
fulfilling these goals. The direction of this thesis will be contingent on our experience with the
implementation and discussed in the final section (4.5).
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2.4 On-tracks demonstration of EEBL
We reiterate the two major goals from this implementation:
1. Validate the use of an empirical research methodology for future CS-related research and
identify its weaknesses.
2. Confirm previous research on the contribution of IVC to the safety of vehicles strings.
These goals are inter-related because achieving the second goal means that a fully empirical
methodology focused on implementing actual devices on vehicles, can be used for the remainder
of this thesis. On the other hand, if the second goal is not achieved or is not satisfactory, a fully
empirical methodology would not be the most informed choice. In that case, advanced simu-
lations which can be enhanced by empirical research, would be the most appropriate approach
to assess the safety benefits of CS.
2.4.1 Design and experimental protocol
2.4.1.1 Experimental requirements
To verify the potential safety benefits of our EEBL application, we need to compare the number
of crashes before and after the introduction of the EEBL system. This is done by counting vir-
tual collisions (see ??) at different values of equipment ratio and compare the collision counts'
variation to match it with the simulation results; the overall variation has to be compared
rather than the absolute number of collisions. Experimental requirements are:
Requirements concerning the environment
The environment in which the experiment will take place must:
 Be similar to the driving conditions found on a freeway, at least for a few hundred metres.
.
 Allow enough driving distance for drivers to form an appropriate string.
 Be a closed (private) environment to avoid disturbance from traffic.
Requirements concerning the EEBL system
The EEBL system which will be used for the experiment must:
 Be inexpensive, using mostly pre-existing hardware so that they are not too far away from
future commercial applications.
 Use a common hardware and software architecture for all vehicles and/or RSUs (Road
Side Units).
 Allow complete control over the software suites, so that all parameters can be known and
edited if required by the experimental protocol.
 Have an HMI (Human-Machine Interface) that can be used to convey emergency inform-
ation to the drivers.
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Requirements concerning the experimental protocol
The experimental protocol used for the experiment must:
 Have at least 4 vehicles forming a string and braking in safe conditions, while still allowing
a virtual crash.
 Have different models of vehicles present in the string.
2.4.1.2 Participants
The implementation requires the participation of a number of drivers to drive the vehicles
engaged in the string. Since the aspect of human factors is not our concern, recruiting the
drivers was straightforward. Volunteers from the LIVIC laboratory were gathered from age 25
to 57 , roughly 3/4 male versus 1/4 female. Overall, 8 individuals including the author took part
in the experiments including preliminary tests, over several days.
The drivers were each given a vehicle and which equipment with the EEBL system was determ-
ined beforehand. They start to drive and are instructed to form a string and maintain, as best
they can, the relative interdistances between each vehicle (which have been selected beforehand,
for example 20 metres). Visual clues on the road, or stickers on the vehicles' windshields are
used to enhance the sense of relative distances. The drivers are also instructed to brake when
the EEBL system's HMI displays an alert symbol, which is triggered by the receipt of an emer-
gency braking message over the IVC device. If driving in an unequipped vehicle, the driver has
to brake when the leading vehicle is braking, as would happen in a real string. This introduces
a delay in the braking reaction, compared to equipped vehicles.
This protocol is repeated a number of times with each drive labelled a run. The order of
drivers in the string is changed regularly.
2.4.1.3 Procedures
The experimental scenario is designed to reproduce previous simulations' conditions as closely as
possible, which is a single-lane vehicles string, with a controlled repartition of the interdistances
between each vehicle. A number of procedure parameters must thus be considered; string
size, equipment ratio (ρ), distribution of equipped vehicles, interdistances, and speed of the
vehicles. As the scenario aims at reproducing an emergency situation that would lead to rear-
end crashes, precautions must be taken to safeguard drivers (and research hardware) from risks,
while allowing for meaningful results to be obtained. To do so, a method to obtain virtual
collisions must be designed. Note that this subsection provides a number of justification for
choices of procedures. Indeed, the aforementioned parameters must be carefully tuned if the
experimental results are to be compared to previous simulations. Otherwise, the simulations
and the present implementations would be too different from each other.
Virtual collisions and safety considerations The scenario requires vehicles to brake in
order to avoid impeding head-on collisions, but it is not possible for them to actually collide.
The benefits of IVC are shown from the decrease in collision count according to ρ. The best
way to apply this to an actual implementation, without putting drivers into conditions that
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would lead to real collisions, is counting virtual collisions as one would count actual collisions
in a vehicle string on a freeway. Virtual collisions are simply events emulating real collisions,
which are safe for drivers.
The best analogy to an emergency-braking vehicles string that we have found involves using
an alternating formation (see Fig. 2.4). With vehicles positioned alternatively on two lanes,
the interdistances between vehicles Vi and Vi+1 can be maintained at the required value while
the actual distance between two vehicles in the same lane is twice the interdistance. Vi and
Vi+1 can then virtually collide during the braking manoeuvre, which is measured when their
longitudinal position intersect.
However, dense strings might actually negate the security offset gained by using this formation.
Thus, it is necessary to compute a safety margin that bounds the possible interdistances in
the string. The residual distance dr between two vehicles after braking in the same lane can
be computed with equation 2.1., where di is the pre-braking interdistance, v is the vehicles'
velocity and τ is the (following) driver reaction time.
dr = 2× (di − vτ) (2.1)
With τ = 0.8 seconds, an interdistance of 30 metres becomes unsafe at 110 km/h and 20
metres becomes unsafe at 75 km/h. Considering that drivers will have difficulties knowing the
interdistances precisely, especially given the alternating formation, additional safety margins
might have to be implemented. This limits the achievable speed/interdistances combinations
(see Table 2.3).
The alternating formation also has some limitation:. since vehicle Vi driver is able to see vehicle
Vi+2 brake lights, it is probable that its reaction time will be modified compared to a normally
organised string where Vi+1 obstructs the view to Vi+2.
Counting virtual collisions in the alternating formation, as well as obtaining back-up information
in case the virtual collisions approach does not work, requires measuring the following variables:
 The location of vehicles when they have stopped, which determines if a virtual collision
took place.
 The interdistance between vehicles, both to help with counting crashes and to know the
string's density just before the braking event.
 The latency in the EEBL warning, that includes the communication latencies and pro-
cessing latencies associated with the application, such as decoding the warning message,
interpreting it and displaying the information to the driver through a HMI.
 The drivers' reaction time(s).
To measure the vehicle's location and interdistances, we used a dual-head laserscanner that is
located on the side of the road. It is positioned and orientated so that there is no occultations
by the vehicles, especially in the braking area. This sensor is also useful to record the driver's
reaction time, as it can accurately sense the vehicle's behaviour so, using speed and position
data we can estimate the moment the vehicle starts to slow down. To do so, the laserscanner
has to be synchronised with the telecommunication system, and the reaction time measurement
will always include the braking system's reaction time in addition to the driver's. The latency
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Figure 2.4: Implementation scheme with the alternating formation for a safe experiment and
the virtual leader vehicle
is measured within the on-board EEBL system, which ensures that all the vehicles (and the
roadside laserscanner) are synced throughout the experiment. Further details are provided in
the following section on how these systems were implemented.
Number of vehicles in the string and IVC equipment We limited ourselves to a max-
imum of five research vehicles for practical reasons. This limited the results' achievable granu-
larity, but a larger number of vehicles would have required complex logistics, especially in terms
of drivers, which we did not have access to. The five vehicles were sufficient in order to study
the effects of IVC on the string's safety. The vehicles used were:
 two identical Renault Clio III 5-door estates (nicknamed Tic and Tac 3)
 one Renault Scénic I 5-door compact MPV (nicknamed VIPER)
 one Citroën C4 Grand Picasso 5-door MPV.
 one Peugeot 307 5-door hatchback.
The vehicles were fitted with powered equipment racks in the boot and several in-cabin screens
for the HMI. A variety of sensors can be fitted on them depending on the experimental re-
quirements; one of the Clios had a permanent forward-facing radar, the Senic had multiple
laserscanners, cameras and a forward-facing radar for a complete perception of its surround-
ings, and the Peugeot 307 is also equipped with two laserscanners and cameras for stereovision.
However, none of this equipment was used in our implementation, which only required a com-
munication device (see 2.4.2).
The goal is to test the scenario at each value of ρ: 0/5 (unequipped string), 2/5 (leader + 1
follower), 3/5, 4/5, and 5/5; or in terms of percentage: 0, 40, 60, 80 and 100%. Equipped vehicles
are randomly distributed in the string, based on drawings of an uniform probability law. Data
from [23] suggests that the most important reduction in crash numbers occurs when ρ rises from
0 to 30%. At first, it seemed that we would not be able to study what is going on between 0 and
40%, indeed ρ = 20% corresponds to just one equipped vehicle in a five-vehicle string. If the
leader is considered an equipped vehicle, there is no receptor vehicle left for ρ = 20%. However,
to avoid this limitation, our implementation used a workaround where the leading vehicle is
virtualised and replaced by an RSU that sends a emergency message at the appropriate time
(more details on the setting in 2.4.2).
3Tic & Tac are the French name of Disney's Chip and Dale
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Table 2.3: Interdistances computed from speed and capacity. Capacity in vehicles/hour, velocity
in kilometres/hour and interdistance in metres
Velocity
50 70 90 110 130
Capacity
1800 23.78 34.88 46.00 57.12 68.22
2000 21.00 30.99 41.00 51.01 61.00
2500 16.00 23.99 32.00 40.00 48.00
3000 12.67 19.33 26.00 32.67 39.33
Interdistances and vehicle speed The interdistances between vehicles is the next major
factor that will influence the number of crashes in the string. In [22] interdistances are modelled
as constants noised by a centred Gaussian noise; whereas in [23]three models are used  constant,
exponential and truncated (strictly positive) Gaussian distributions. The road capacity, the
temporal definition of the string's density, was the principle parameter in previous studies.
However, in an experimental application of the vehicles string scenario, capacity is not an
appropriate indicator. By controlling the string's average intervehicular distance, it is possible
to approximate simulated capacities. The average interdistance d and road capacity c are linked
as shown in equation 2.2, where v is the string velocity and l is the average vehicle's length [51]:
c =
v(
l + d
) (2.2)
LIVIC's fleet l is 4.002 metres; using this value we can compute the interdistances required, at a
specific speed, to approximate a given capacity value (see Table 2.3). For example, if the string
velocity is 90 km/h and the desired equivalent capacity is 2,000 vehicles per hour, the average
interdistance must be 41 metres. These values represent the ideal target interdistances, but it
can be difficult for drivers to maintain this without visual clues or technological help (with a
forward facing radar, for example). As mentioned above, drivers are provided with visual clues
in the form of stickers on their windshields however, these measures only allow a relatively rough
following of the appropriate interdistances. Additionally, to accurately record the interdistance
before and during the emergency braking event, we used the roadside laserscanner.
2.4.2 Implementation and measurements setup
To implement the EEBL scenario, we developed an IVC warning system architecture, which
is shown in Fig. 2.5. It is organised in 3 blocks (represented by the dashed boxes) which are
each located on a separate platform  vehicles, the RSU and the sensor cone. As also shown in
Fig. 2.4, the RSU and sensor cone are used to simulate the string's first vehicle that broadcast
the warning message. The vehicle's setup (labelled IV on the figure, for Intelligent Vehicle),
is reproduced in each equipped vehicle. Most of the hardware used here is a precursor to
the hardware used for the experiments performed in Chapter 3, in which more details will be
provided regarding the implementation of IVCD (including 802.11p). In the present chapter,
we will only mention the major interest point of how the hardware and software were designed
for this experiment.
The RSU and IV blocks use identical hardware and software. An eBOX638 embedded com-
puter hosts all applications (running under Linux) and is connected by Ethernet networking
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to additional components: an IVCD, labelled IMARA box on Fig. 2.5, and a BNTA4 device
for time synchronisation. Vehicles are also fitted with HMI devices (screens and sound devices)
and an additional standard GPS. The RSU main block includes a dedicated wireless receptor
to receive the trigger signal, which is sent by a purpose-built traffic cone fitted with a small
laser sensor.
The IMARA box is an earlier version of our IVCD featured in Chapter 3. The hardware is
identical, but the software suite is based on the GeoNet project 5 outcomes, allowing us to use
geographical networking and routing in IPv6, developed at the INRIA by the IMARA team
(hence the IVDC's naming convention). However, the IVCD's geographical routing capabilities
are not used in this experiment, although the IVCD forms a simple ad-hoc 802.11g network. We
proceed so because vehicles will always remain in direct communication range to the emitter,
removing the need for routing management. The only concession to GeoNet's architecture is
that IPv6 is used instead of IPv4. The RSU IVCD is acting as a master for multicasting
purposes, with all the vehicle members of the target group. Multicasting is the IPv6 equivalent
of broadcasting in IPv4.
It is very important to note that this experiment does not use 802.11p, but instead uses 802.11g
in the classical 2.4 GHz range. We were unable to use 802.11p at the time of the experiment
design and implementation phase. Transmission power was boosted, and higher-gain antennas
used to ensure that a significant range was achievable (informal measurements put it at 700
metres).
Additional to the hardware associated with the vehicles and RSU, we also used a roadside laser-
scanner to accurately measure the position of all vehicles before, during and after the braking
event. The device used is an IBEO LUX fusion system, fitted with two sensor heads, arranged
so that they cover more than 180° (see Fig. 2.6). The LUX fusion system's output is recor-
ded on a separate computer, which is also synchronised through its own BNTA. Both raw and
processed outputs from the LUX fusion system were recorded for further post-processing. This
setting allows for greater accuracy than the in-vehicle GPS for such a relative positioning meas-
urement, as we do not have access to sufficient high accuracy GPS systems for the experiment,
though the laserscanner has submetric accuracy within the range used for the experiment.
The unified software architecture is based on the Extended Driver Awareness (EDA) framework,
which was developed at LIVIC for the CVIS project [45]. EDA is a Java environment where
dedicated software applications labelled services, can be developed. We chose to use this
environment in order to benefit from the integration and automatic management of various
features such as networking sockets.
A service named BrakeAlert was developed, which can be further subdivided into a RSU and
an IV version. The two versions have identical code and are differentiated only by the inputs
and outputs that they use. In the RSU, the service receives prompts on a serial port from the
sensor-enabled traffic cone and in reaction, outputs a message on its Ethernet interface for the
IVDC. The master IVCD will relay this message to its multicasting group, while on-vehicle
IVCDs will relay the message to their client computer through the Ethernet network. For the
vehicle-based BrakeAlert service, this message triggers a warning sign on the in-cabin screen
(Fig. 2.7). BrakeAlert logs all activity, allowing to track precisely all the latencies at various
stages of a message progression. Timestamps of interest include prompts on the serial port
4Refer to Chapter 3, section 3.5.2 for more details
5http://www.geonet-project.eu/
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Figure 2.5: General system's architecture
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Figure 2.6: Map of the scenario's area of interest, on the eastern straight part of la routière;
the laserscanner coverage area is shown to scale
Figure 2.7: Warning message as displayed on the EDA human-machine interface
of the RSU, transmission of outbound messages to the Ethernet interface, arrival of inbound
messages at the Ethernet interface and activation of the HMI. Some data are not accessible:
(1) any latency within the traffic cone to RSU chain and (2) latencies inside and between
the IVCDs. The second limitation occured because we did not have control over the INRIA's
software, which was a strong incentive to implement an open source system as described in
Chapter 3.
Eventually, the scenario was performed on the eastern straight part of la routière track, as
shown in Fig. 2.6. The drivers form the string over the first part of the 800 metres section,
then press the brakes within the laserscanner's coverage area. Even with allowing more room,
the speed track is impractical because the laserscanner does not have a large-enough field of
view. The braking event triggered a small delay after the first vehicle drove pass the sensor
cone. The drivers were instructed to perform emergency braking as soon as the emergency
message displayed on their HMI or, if they are in an unequipped vehicle, as soon as they see the
brake lights on the car driving in front of them in the side line. In an unequipped string, the
leading driver was instructed to press the brakes at their convenience when they have passed
the traffic cone.
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Figure 2.8: Latencies recorded for 113 messages
2.5 Results
The scenario was undertaken in late 2010, over a three-day experimental session with a total of
24 full runs using 4 vehicles. We considered these measurements to be a half-size demonstration
of a future experiment involving eight vehicles. The goal was to validate our implementation
and also, more importantly, to test whether the experimental protocol was workable. Although
there were no objections to the experimental protocol beforehand, the design process had shed
some doubts as to whether we would be able to obtain meaningful results. However, these
doubts could not be laid to rest without actually taking the system to the track.
The 24 test runs (and a number of secondary runs) showed that our architecture and imple-
mentation are functional, as well as demonstrating how implementing an EEBL scenario can
be done. All the variables were measured successfully, with the vehicles driving at 70 km/h
and the chosen target interdistance was 25 metres. The most immediate useful findings in the
EEBL application concerned latency. We measured the whole latency, from the BrakeAlert
RSU application to the BrakeAlert IV application and not just the IVC latency. As already
stated, the host application does not send the message. A different device, the IVCD, is re-
sponsible for doing so. As such, there is an increased latency due to the time necessary for the
IVCD in receiving the message from the host (through Ethernet), process it and send it to the
wireless chipset. This process is repeated in the receptor IVCD. Our latency measurement must
thus be understood as the worst case scenario for an implementation that uses modems, i.e.
specialised devices to manage networking needs.
113 messages were suitable for analysis (a single multicast generated more than one data point).
The average delay was 46 milliseconds, although 11% of the messages were delayed by more
than 100 milliseconds; the most extreme latency was measured close to 600 milliseconds (see
Fig. 2.8). All measurements were taken at ranges less than 150 metres, as the first vehicle had
already passed by the RSU. Some of the drivers involved reported that in extreme cases, the
delay was noticeable. 46 milliseconds is not a very large delay, however the exchanged frame is
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relatively small, similar to the ones that will be used in the 802.11p experiments (see Chapter
3). Although we found that using IPv6 added a small amount of delay, the principal reason
for these large values seem to be the multiple number of processes that needed to take place
between the two applications. Having no control over the IVCDs, we were not able to verify
these delays. Nonetheless, these latency measurements are useful to set a benchmark for our
subsequent 802.11p performance evaluation, as improving latency is deemed to be one of the
most important improvements enabled by the amendments to the 802.11p.
For the measurement of interdistances and braking patterns, typical results obtained from the
roadside laserscanner sensor are shown in Fig 2.9, this particular example having three vehicles
with ρ = 0. Fig. 2.9a shows the progression of each vehicle along the track's longitudinal axis
over time (transversal position is irrelevant here); fig. 2.9b shows the speed of each vehicle, over
the same time frame. The three vehicles' formation is clearly visible, as well as the braking
event.
An analysis of these positioning measurements allows us to extract the drivers' reaction time .
The average reaction time computed from the laserscanner data for these same ten test drives is
606 milliseconds, which is quicker than the average reaction time in more generic conditions [54].
When comparing the average reaction time for two consecutive vehicles between test drives with
and without BrakeAlert, the average value decreases from 606 to 378 milliseconds. However,
there are not enough measurements to claim that the modified and non-modified averages
are statistically significant. Nonetheless, it is a logical result resulting from outcomes of the
experiment and drivers' feedback. Furthermore, it can be expected that all vehicles would brake
within a brief window after receiving the warning message, with varying timeframes depending
on the time needed for drivers to become aware and reaction to the HMI warning. The present
data does not allow us to determine if this is the case or not.
On the other hand, it became evident during the 24 test runs that obtaining virtual collisions was
very difficult. For example, over 10 test drives using 4 vehicles and without any communications,
we only received 2 virtual collisions and 2 close calls in conditions that in previous simulations
would have led to a crash. Our assessment of this result is that in these experimental conditions,
human factors take an importance that we had not anticipated beforehand.
The drivers are strongly expecting the braking event, as they were aware of the goal of the
test runs from the start. Understandably, it was impossible, for safety reasons, to conduct
a blind experiment especially given the relatively small number of drivers that were involved
in this test. The aim of this study was not to assess a driver's reaction time or any other
human-related metrics rather, we were more interested in designing an engineering-orientated
experiment with a focus on the system's performance. Because of these conditions, the drivers'
reaction times were considerably decreased. This is pointed out by the fact that some drivers
noticed the slow warning message, which demonstrates they were highly aware of what was
going on. Furthermore, all the vehicles used for the test runs are recent models capable of
strong emergency braking. These two effects compounded to reduce the number of virtual
crashes by making emergency stops very efficient.
Eventually, we discovered an important IVCD-related limitation. Having no control over the
IVCDs, we were not able to analyse precisely the IVCD's functions and any latency this could
add to our system. No actual EEBL application would function in such a way and it is obvious
that 10% of latencies over 100 milliseconds is not acceptable in any safety critical applications.
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(a) Vehicle positions along the longitudinal axis of the test track
(b) Vehicles' speed
Figure 2.9: Laserscanner measurements for a three vehicles string, showing the braking event
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2.6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter is to settle on a choice between two possible research methodologies
regarding the evaluation of performance and safety benefits of Cooperative Systems in general
and augmented perception, in particular. The two potential methodologies are (1) advanced
simulations, or (2) actual fully on-road implementation in a research setting. A-priori, none
of the two competing methodologies are superior to the other, although we identified a lack of
information regarding the empirical methodology's merits and some disadvantages.
Thus, given logistical factors and research interests at the time, we selected the empirical
research methodology for initial evaluation, and implemented an EEBL application on Satory's
test tracks. This implementation had two related goals; (1) validate the use of an empirical
research methodology for future CS-related research (and identifying its weaknesses) and (2)
empirically confirming previous research on the contribution of IVC to the safety of vehicles
strings. Indeed, showing that we could obtain results on IVC/CS safety benefits would have
validated the use of a fully empirical research methodology. If that was not the case, advanced
simulations would be a more appropriate choice, with the possibility of enhancing them through
specialised empirical research.
The results obtained from the implementation are mixed. Although the engineering aspects
were challenging, we found no major difficulty in designing an EEBL application for several
vehicles, and putting them on the track. Important benchmark data were obtained from the
IVC using IEEE 802.11g. The implementation also allowed us to gather useful engineering
experience that will be applied for the data collection described in Chapter 3. On the other
hand, it highlighted a number of issues with the empirical approach. The logistics proved to
be more complex than expected, even for a relatively simple experiment such as EEBL. More
importantly, issues with the drivers meant that we were unable to obtain the virtual collisions
that was our prime interest in validating the safety benefits of IVC in such an empirical setting.
Accordingly, we can fill-in the table from section 2.3, presenting in Table 2.4 an updated version
(changes shown in bold font).
Taking these results and the related methodological limitations in consideration, we have come
to the conclusion that it is unwarranted to continue with this EEBL implementation and a
full empirical research methodology. A research methodology focused on advanced simulations
appears to be the best course of action to follow, whether in validating and improving previous
studies on IVC safety benefits, or preparing the evaluation of augmented perception. Indeed,
using advanced simulations at this stage enables a much wider field of research and experi-
mentation than keeping a focus on on-road systems. It also allows us to get around logistical
issues that may be associated with implementing a system to a scale where it starts to yield
relevant outcomes (this is one of the reasons for large multinational projects such as CVIS or
COOPERS). It will also help alleviate the human factors-related issues that became apparent
during the EEBL implementation.
Settling for a simulation-focused methodology does not mean that simulations are perfect.
There is significant room for improvement in their design and the models used to represent
important parameters of CS-related research. Consequently, improving the simulation envir-
onment of CS to provide more realistic and accurate studies will be the focus in the following
chapters.
The enhancements will concern technical aspects of CS, most notably the simulation of IVC.
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Our goal will be to allow representing realistic imperfection within these simulations, as they
are the factors that will affect any CS application performance the most. Although we chose
to focus on the simulation research methodology, this does not mean that there will be no
more on-road studies for the remainder of this thesis. On the contrary, we will show that using
empirical data is necessary in improving the quality of CS simulations. Indeed, as we will
see in the following chapter, there is an important need to study the empirical performance
of telecommunication technologies poised to support CS, most notably 802.11p. An empirical
model of 802.11p performance metrics aimed at simulations of CS applications, rather than
focusing on the network performance, is the type of improvement that we are proposing.
This work is necessary, as it will provide a solid research environment that will enable answering
two of the research questions mentioned in Chapter 1, i.e. (1) can an augmented map-based
risk assessment system be more efficient than a non-cooperative similar system? and (2) what
are augmented perception limitations, given current technology in embedded computing and
telecommunications?
Summary of the chapter's contributions
 Outcomes
 A research methodology focusing on improving the realism of CS simulation, includ-
ing empirically-driven improvements, was selected.
 The technical feasibility of an EEBL implementation was demonstrated.
 Engineering guidelines were set for further on-road performance analysis.
 Performance benchmarks for latency in 802.11g IVC were obtained.
 Limitations
 Human factors and experimental protocol issues did not allow a study into the safety
contributions of IVC into a vehicles string.
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Chapter 3
Evaluation of telecommunications
for augmented perception
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we experimented with an actual implementation of a Cooperative
Systems application (EEBL), with mixed results which lead to the conclusion that it was more
appropriate to focus on enhancing simulations of CS applications to study their limitations
and their safety benefits as our research methodology. To start this enhancement process,
the present chapter focuses on the underlying technology supporting Cooperative Systems i.e.
telecommunications.
CS, and augmented perception, claim to be useful in reducing the number of fatalities on the
road, as we saw in the literature review in Chapter 2. But, one must be able to demonstrate
they can indeed live up to their promises. Telecommunications are used to extend a system's
perceptive horizon and provide additional information that are expected to have important
safety benefits. Before even asking how it is possible to use cooperation to enhance road users'
safety, this augmentation of information source begs the question; what are augmented percep-
tion's limitations, given current technology in embedded computing and telecommunications?
This is one the main research question that will be addressed by this thesis. Indeed, one can
argue that inefficient intervehicular communications may render the benefits from introducing
information sharing null. Accordingly, the first step in evaluating the limitations of augmen-
ted perception, in general, and augmented maps in particular should focus on the principal
technological difference between themselves and non-cooperative perception.
Thus, the aim of this chapter is, firstly, to evaluate the telecommunications (specifically 802.11p)
performance and its ability to deliver appropriate quality of service to support safety-critical
applications. Then, our second aim is to create a new representative empirical model of limited
complexity, that will be used to support and enhance (with empirical data) our subsequent
higher-level simulations development (e.g. an augmented map building architecture), that we
will explain in the following chapters.
Performance evaluation of 802.11p is an ongoing area of research, but we will show that the
state-of-the-art neglects some important performance metrics (principally latency). This justi-
fies undertaking a series of new, controlled data collections that allows the assessment of the
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performance metrics which are the most relevant to CS. Our evaluation process allowed us to
define a set of boundaries on the performance that one can expect from 802.11p. It showed
that many assumptions behind CS's road safety benefits have been too optimistic, expecting
802.11p to achieve theoretical performances in most cases. Our measurements show that this is
not the case. This also relates to the existing simulation of 802.11p, which work upon unrealistic
performance assumptions.
The dichotomy between theoretical and experimental performance is further aggravated by the
fact that we performed our measurements in a relatively open and controlled environment, and
not on actual roads, where sources of imperfections are omnipresent. It means that actual
on-road performance might be even more degraded than what we measured. Nonetheless, our
measurements do not discount the use of telecommunications to enhance perception. Rather,
they advise being careful about quality of service assumptions when designing higher-level safety
applications.
We then proceed to develop an empirical model for 802.11p performance metrics. The state-of-
the-art in empirical modelisation of 802.11p shows that models usually focus either on higher
layers of the OSI architecture, more relevant to information dissemination in vehicular networks,
or either on the actual physical layer. Our requirements are intermediate, as we are solely
interested in the performance metrics for a vehicular network where complex routing is not
necessary. Also, we did not find a model that included an evidence-based simulation of latency
in 802.11p for this type of small network that we are interested in. The aim of building this
model is to support and enhance higher-level simulations of CS applications with up to a
dozen road actors. The proposed model has several advantages, such as taking into account
environmental factors such as the weather, as well as performance variations introduced by
hardware inhomogeneities.
Chapter outline
The first section reviews V2V/I telecommunication technologies in general, and IEEE 802.11p
in particular. It exposes our research context, and argues that an empirical performance eval-
uation of telecommunications systems is essential to design efficient, potentially safety-critical
CS. At first, we present details on telecommunications within CS in general, detailing the ex-
isting technologies and tackling issues such as scalability and data security. Then, we focus on
technologies from the IEEE 802.11 family, detailing how they have already been used in CS.
We then present the specifics surrounding 802.11p. The state-of-the-art in 802.11p performance
evaluation is explained; limitations of existing studies are discussed to highlight the rational for
our own evaluation process. Eventually, existing empirical models of 802.11p are presented, to
offer some context regarding and to present the rationale for creating our own model.
The second and third sections present our experimental design, from the measurement scenarios
to the hardware and software architectures. We explain the rationale for the design, and what
is and is not possible to study.
The fourth section analyses the results from the data collection undertaken on the Satory's test
tracks (closed roads), allowing it to define a set of boundaries on the performance that one can
expect from 802.11p. The considered performance metrics are latency, frame loss, and range.
We provide evidence that previous expectations in terms of the possible 802.11p performance
have largely been over-optimistic, especially with the connection ranges that 802.11p systems
could achieve, even in relatively open freeway-like environments.
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The fifth section then details the development of an empirical 802.11p performance model based
on the measurements detailed in the previous section. We present a two-step model building
process, starting with a simple polynomial approach before settling on the final modelisation.
Eventually, in the final section, we conclude on the limitations for 802.11p that have emerged
from the previous sections. We argue that researchers working on safety-critical CS should be
aware of these limitations, especially for their impact on augmented perception.
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3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 IVC: the backbone of Cooperative Systems
Wireless Inter-vehicular Communications are the core of Cooperative Systems, as they provide
the link between the various actors in the cooperation environment. Because of their mobile
and highly variable nature, IVC impose new concepts for communication systems, information
dissemination and data security management. The term communication medium will be used
henceforth to describe all the processes involved in an Open System Interconnection (OSI )
type of telecommunication architecture see Fig. 3.1). Indeed, CS design covers all the aspects
of the OSI model, from the upper application layer to the lowermost physical layer (i.e. the
nature of the support medium, either radiofrequencies, infrared, etc.). However, we will exclude
the applications themselves from the communication medium: applications are data sources or
clients for the medium, but not an integral part of the medium itself. We shall note that the
present thesis will not cover each layer of the OSI model; we will look at, firstly, the lowermost
levels, and then place ourselves outside of the communication medium by focusing on the
application layer. It is however necessary to keep in mind design issues associated with these
lower layers, as they might influence the upper layers.
Eichler et al. [49], Nagel et al. [55] provide a comprehensive list of the communication medium's
fundamental requirements, classified into two themes: (1) scalability, topology and routing;
and (2) data security. Nagel et al. [55] actually places an emphasis on one CS application,
cooperative driving, but the requirements listed for this specific application also applies to all
other cooperative applications. Before focusing on our core interest for this chapter, the physical
layer, we will provide a concise presentation of these requirements.
3.2.1.1 Scalability, topology and routing
One of the most fundamental requirement is that the IVC medium must not be affected by
scale effects, i.e. it must be fully scalable. It means that the medium must perform with
the same efficiency regardless the number of communicating actors, as well as whatever the
extent of their geographic dispersion. For example, in a dense traffic scenario, if the number
of communicating vehicles is large, broadcasting techniques such as flooding are at stake with
issues such as interferences, data packet collisions and major latency; this phenomenon is usually
described as a broadcast storm [56, 57]. Nagel et al. pointed out the need to minimise
latency with appropriate information dissemination techniques. They mentioned pre-allocated
frequencies or temporal windows as a possible solution (FDMA, TDMA), but this would require
a centralised architecture (server/client), which is not necessarily the most suitable architecture
for the quickly changing context of IVC (see below). Eichler et al. [49] also proposed not to use
broadcast but more sophisticated techniques such as power level control or beamforming. These
latter techniques are also important in managing interferences at smaller scales and limiting
the load on the communication medium.
Typically, the IVC medium's topology will be highly variable: the nodes' positions change
constantly, their numbers change as new vehicles enter the IVC range and others drive away,
links between the nodes change, etc. This volatile nature increases the required sophistication of
information dissemination techniques (especially if one wants to maintain high data security).
In this type of variable topology, classical routing and dissemination techniques faces some
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Figure 3.1: Layers of the OSI model
problems. For example, a flooding dissemination can saturate the network (creating a broadcast
storm); targeted complex techniques, such as unicasting, will increase data latency as well as
data overhead (which can lead to even more latency by increasing sizes of the frames) [49].
Higher level protocols, such as the TCP/IP internet suite, are also not necessarily appropriate
for a variable medium and will require modifications.
Nagel et al. proposed to compensate these issues by building networks where each node (i.e.
each vehicle) would have an accurate knowledge of the network's topology, at all times. This
is a form of geographical routing (geo-routing). By modelling the network as an oriented
graph, incorporating all important parameters on each node (including data on the vehicle's
motion), links states and capabilities, one could use more optimised dissemination techniques.
Nodes would keep their information up to date by periodically broadcasting information on their
motion and state. The authors also envisioned a network topology evolution prediction stage.
However, this approach would be limited in regards to long-range communications, because
each node must have a limit to the extent of its knowledge of the network's topology.
Similar geo-routing techniques such as the Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) or
Reactive Location Service (RLS) are described in [58]. The European GeoNet project1 has de-
veloped a standardised approach, using IPv6, that features geo-casting to specific geographical
zones, linked together by long-range communications over the Internet. Another solution pro-
posed by Cenerariol et al. [57] is to take into account the relevance of a piece of information via
an evaluation of the distance between the receiving node and the event described by this piece
of information. Thanks to this approach, a vehicle will not relay a message that is not relevant
to itself, contrary to a simple flooding scenario, thus limiting the load on the communication
medium.
We must emphasise here that routing and information dissemination issues are not, usually,
related to issues regarding the physical medium. We will not take further interest to these
former issues in this thesis, focusing solely on physical-layer related research problems.
3.2.1.2 Security
In the future, securing the communication medium will be indispensable, notably to provide
guaranteed quality of service and ensure that cooperative systems are well accepted by the
1www.geonet-project.eu
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general public [49, 59]. Cooperative applications must have complete confidence in the integrity
of the data they receive. This requires using cryptographic techniques to ensure malicious
messages are not transmitted on the network. Unfortunately, most of the current cryptographic
techniques appear to be un-adapted to the conditions of IVC. For example the classic technique
of public key infrastructure (PKI) is organised around a centralised architecture and cannot be
used in a decentralised network without modifications. One of the modifications could be the
elliptical curves cryptography described in [55]. Füßler et al. [58] also notes that a certificate
system to verify a message content is not appropriate in an environment where nodes are unlikely
to meet each other more than once in their lifetime
Furthermore, it is important to ensure that the security of the medium does impact the propaga-
tion speed of data, that is, introducing additional latencies. Decrypting a message is not instant-
aneous, especially in cases where bilateral communications have to be used to exchange keys.
Füßler et al. [58] found up to 50 milliseconds of additional latency introduced by cryptographic
processing.
3.2.2 A variety of Physical layers
So far, we have not considered the question of the exact technology that will be used to deploy
and support IVC, the  physical layer in the OSI model. Ideally the communication medium
can be multi-supported in the future; that is using several different technologies at the same
time to carry information. This can be seen in the CALM framework2, which allows a variety
of technologies at the physical layer. Nevertheless, we have found that many current studies
usually focus on a single technological approach. Multi-support approaches are usually found
when inexpensive equipment is desired or if one support is used to confirm the information
carried by another. We have examples such as the combination between IEEE 802.11p and
802.15.4 in [60], looking into reducing the system's costs, and between infrared and Zigbee
(802.15.4-2003) in [61], using one technology to verify identification based upon the other. Fig.
3.2 shows a diagram of all types of physical supports for CS currently being considered.
The most popular, and likely to remain the most ubiquitous medium for intervehicular commu-
nications are radiofrequencies technologies, especially the IEEE 802.11 standards family. This
popularity is exemplified by the publication of an amendment (802.11p) to the IEEE 802.11
standard specifically for CS usage (the complete version is found in [27]). Given the popularity
of this technology, and that this chapter will cover empirical evaluation of 802.11p, we will
address both in further detail respectively in section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.
Other forms of radiofrequencies are also considered or already actively used: mobile phone
protocols such as GSM or UMTS; dedicated short-range technologies such as RFID or IEEE
802.15.4 (Zigbee, WirelessHART, etc.); terrestrial radio. The choice to use one form over
another is usually dictated by the pre-existence of an infrastructure network. Mobile phone
networks for example have the advantage of a widespread deployment (in France) or at least
inhabited (in Australia) areas. Focusing on using them, we can mention the German project
2CALM (Communication Access for Land Mobile) is an integrated architecture supporting communication
media and application diversity, and allowing many different communication scenarios (V2X, multihop, point-
to-point and multipoint). Its goal is to provide an architecture that standardises the set of air interface protocols
and parameters for medium and long range, high speed IVC, using any of several communication media and
networking protocols. This process should enable transparent connectivity over any possible medium. It has
been implemented in the EU through the CVIS project, inter alia.
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Figure 3.2: Diagram presenting all the potential physical supports that are considered for CS
deployment
Aktiv CoCar [62] that uses Vodafone's UMTS network to send safety alerts, emergency vehicles
and traffic information messages to vehicles via a central server [63].
However pre-existing networks have not been designed and built for automotive applications;
this means that they are not necessarily adapted to their requirements. One of the principal
issues with cellular networks is latency [64]. Because of the way telephone networks are built,
there is no direct communication possible between two nearby vehicles: the message they want
to exchange must transit through a number of routing systems first. This means that cellular
networks are not suitable for time-critical message dissemination, such as required in CCW
applications, for example.
3.2.3 The IEEE 802.11 standard
IEEE 802.11 is a set of standards for implementing Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
radiofrequency communication, in the 2.4, 3.6 and 5 GHz frequency bands. It covers the MAC
and PHY layer of the OSI model. The original version of the standard was released in 1997
but is obsolete today. 802.11 started to be used commercially in 1999 with the formation of
the Wi-Fi alliance to market 802.11a and 802.11b. It has since grown tremendously for private
and public usage, with the advent of versions g and n, among others. For example, 13% of the
total internet usage in the United Kingdom went through Wi-Fi hotspots in 2011 [65]. In Table
3.1, we show a list of the different versions of 802.11 as well as several technical characteristics
pertaining to them.
Although it grants a degree of mobility, to laptops and smartphones on a university campus
for example, 802.11 was essentially developed for short-range, indoor usage with a focus on
high data rate (see Fig. 3.3). Indeed, no technology can compete with Wi-Fi in terms of
network capabilities for relatively static usage. However, this means that using 802.11 versions
to support the highly mobile telecommunications required in CS is not a straightforward choice.
Nonetheless, it was made because of the ubiquity of 802.11 technology and the fact that it offered
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Figure 3.3: Data rate (speed) versus mobility of wireless systems: Wi-Fi, WiMAX, High
Speed Packet Access (HSPA), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) and GSM.
Range and data rate are indicative and can vary depending on the conditions surrounding the
device.
several advantages compared to competing mobile technologies, such as 3 or 4G connections.
Indeed, the latter require a SIM card to connect to the cellular network, which usage is not free.
More importantly, they suffer from important latency issue as they form a centralised network;
for example, even in good signal conditions and with small packets, the latency (as the Round
Trip Time) will be in the 100 to 300 milliseconds in 3G networks [64]. WiMAX (included
in IEEE 802.16) is a complementary system to 802.11, that is designed for metropolitan area
network with a 50 km radius. It can support a higher degree of mobility than the classic 802.11
versions, but it has certain requirements (notably in terms of access points) that make it less
adaptable for highly-mobile ad-hoc networks. Thus, 802.11 is perceived as the best available
technology to offer capabilities for decentralised, ad-hoc and free networking.
Since interest in CS started in the late 1990s, many studies have assessed 802.11b or 802.11g
capabilities for cooperative applications. We will quote a few of these studies, but it is important
to state that earlier versions of 802.11, or versions that are primarily dedicated to indoor usages,
have mostly been discontinued for cooperative applications on the road. This is especially true
ever since the 802.11p amendment was defined, which was designed specifically for high-mobility
vehicular use. We have not found any ongoing research that still uses non 802.11p versions.
A number of performance evaluation have investigated performance metrics such as range,
bandwidth and latency in 802.11b/g networks for CS applications. An interesting study can
be found in Ammoun et al. [66], Ammoun [48], who measured 802.11g performance in urban
and rural environments. In dense urban environments, namely the sixth district of Paris, range
varied from 120 to 320 metres; in rural environments they reached up to 500 metres. In [67], the
maximum range was 850 metres, yet the actual useful range was less than 200 metres (for an
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Figure 3.4: IEEE 802.11p and IEEE 1609 relative to the OSI model layers
I2V setting). Both studies were faced with serious LoS issues; we suspect that high transmission
power was used to achieve these ranges with 802.11g. In terms of latency, Ott and Kutscher
[67] reported a maximum total latency of 500 ms (i.e. delays in 802.11 and processing delays
at upper layers: IP protocol, etc.) but in good conditions they obtained very small latencies,
under 20 ms. Sengupta et al. [68] found 814 ms also in good, short range conditions. We will
discuss the disadvantages of earlier versions of 802.11 in the section dedicated to the 802.11p
amendment.
3.2.4 The 802.11p amendment
The 802.11p amendment was adopted in 2010 [26] and released in the latest version of the
802.11 standard (IEEE 802.11-2012, [27]) alongside other amendments. Its design process took
several years, as it started with the formation of an IEEE taskgroup3 in 2004. At the earliest,
its development stems from the decision by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
to allocate channels for ITS application in the 5.9 GHz band in late 1999. The eleventh draft
was adopted in April 2010, and published in July of the same year.
802.11p is often called WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments), although WAVE
per se is the usual name of the combination of IEEE 802.11p and IEEE 1609. IEEE 1609 is
a standard that manages upper layers within the OSI architecture, while 802.11p is concerned
with lowest layers (MAC and PHY), as shown on Fig. 3.4. WAVE covers the entire OSI
architecture, and is also a part of the CALM architecture. Its development ran in parallel with
802.11p. Since 1609 and 802.11p are not dependent on each other, we shall now focus on the
latter.
802.11p provides enhancements to 802.11 to support ITS applications. Indeed, existing versions
of 802.11 were essentially designed for short range fixed or low mobility communications, not-
ably indoor. As explained in the previous sections, ITS and CS applications have high mobility
requirements, with rapidly changing physical layer properties and very short-duration commu-
nications. 802.11p's purpose is to provide the minimum set of specifications required to ensure
interoperability between devices attempting to communicate in this type of setting. A number
of changes are required from other versions of 802.11 to achieve this purpose, which will be
explained in the following subsections.
3grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11
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3.2.4.1 Changes compared to 802.11abg/n
802.11p specifies several changes from other versions of 802.11. It is similar to 802.11a in most
aspects, with changes made ensuring its usefulness within the ITS context [69].
The principal difference between the common 802.11bg/n and 802.11p is the frequency band
occupied, 2.4 and 5.9 GHz respectively (see section 3.2.4.2 for regulatory questions). In that
respect, 802.11p is similar to 802.11a, which operates at 5 GHz. Operating at higher frequen-
cies has several advantages such as less interference and higher bandwidth (because of greater
spectrum availability), higher data rate and smaller antennas. Surprisingly for an outdoor
application, operating at higher frequencies also means that the achievable range for a same
transmission power is slightly lower (path loss is proportional to the square of the frequency,
and absorption by solid objects is higher). Nonetheless, modulation techniques and antenna
design can compensate such issues.
802.11p features 10 MHz-wide channels, spaced 10 MHz apart, while other versions have 20
MHz-wide channels spaced 5 MHz apart. Thus, there is minimal channel overlap in 802.11p
compared to other versions, and the RMS delay spread 4 is offset by using smaller channels
[70].
The other major innovation introduced by 802.11p is its ability to function outside of the normal
(in 802.11) ad-hoc framework. In the 802.11 architecture, the basic building block of a LAN is
the Basic Service Set (BSS). In infrastructure mode, the most common Wi-Fi in households is
a single access point together with all associated stations called a BSS; the access point acts as
a master to control the stations within its BSS.
The other mode is the ad-hoc mode, where it becomes possible to create a LAN without a
controlling access point; this network is called an Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS). This
mode is the most logical to use with Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs), as it accounts for
mobility issues by greatly reducing the length of procedure that is required for a new station to
connect to the network. However, authentification and association still happens for an IBSS,
which can incur some delays. Since the 802.11p amendment's purpose is to allow communication
between devices in rapidly changing settings, where some data exchange must be completed in
time frames much shorter than the minimum possible with BSS or IBSS networks, it makes
sense that it includes provisions for functioning outside of their context.
802.11p allows a device that is not a member of a BSS to transmit data frames, outside the
context of said BSS, in what is called the OCB mode (Outside the Context of a BSS, not
to be confused with the Offset Codebook Mode in cryptographic block ciphers). This type of
communication is only possible between devices that are able to communicate directly over the
wireless medium, and thus takes place at the lower MAC level. Regulatory authorities require
that it takes place on specific channels to avoid interfering with BSS or IBSS activities. OCB
mode allows immediate communication, avoiding the latency associated with establishing a
BSS. Applications are numerous, for example the fast dissemination of critical safety alerts or
the exchange of data between two vehicles driving in opposite directions on the freeway, where
relative speed is more than 250 Km/h. However, a device functioning in OCB mode cannot
join a BSS or an IBSS, so it is unwarranted for it to operate in this mode at all times, unless
4The delay spread is usually the difference between the time of arrival of the earliest significant multipath
component (LoS component) and the time of arrival of the latest multipath component; it is largely increased
in real outdoor environments because of the high number of potential sources for multipath effects.
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the entire communication architecture is designed around it. Switching the OCB on and off is
controlled by a flag, dot11OCBEnabled.
Some issues remain with the new amendment; most importantly the high-mobility context is
still a source of problem and a significant research question. For example, the question of how
on-vehicle devices should share the radio resources to ensure service quality, remains unresolved,
as 802.11p uses Distributed Coordination Function (DCF): DCF was originally designed for low
mobility networks [71].
3.2.4.2 Regulatory context
The expected performance advantage in the 5.9 GHz band was not the only reason that sup-
ported moving away from the 2.4 GHz band. Indeed, the latter band has become, over the
past decade, quite crowded with other users and parasite broadcasts, especially in urban areas:
private, public and corporate Wi-Fi networks and hotspots, Bluetooth systems, radars, mi-
crowave ovens parasite emissions, etc. This is mostly due to the fact that operations in the 2.4
GHz band are mostly unlicensed, which offers no protection against interference to a particu-
lar user or system. Although this profusion of existing networks could be potentially turned
to the ITS's advantage, such as in [40] where it is used to provide continuous connectivity to
infotainment applications, in most cases it is more of a disadvantage than an advantage. This
is especially true if one considers the problem of delaying critical safety messages.
The 5.9 GHz band is a less crowded part of the spectrum, where parasitic emissions are less
likely. However, it would be untrue to claim that the 5.9 GHz band is completely unused.
International-level regulation by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has alloc-
ated frequencies blocks of the 5.9 GHz. Earth-to-space and space-to-Earth communications by
satellite operators are the principal licensed uses of this band; notably, the 5.850-5.925 GHz
band is used for Earth-to-space non-mobile links in all the 3 ITU regions (region 1 includes the
EU, region 2 includes the USA and region 3 includes Australia and Japan).
Since Earth-to-space communication is largely directed, and occurs only at a limited number of
locations, other unlicensed usage is permitted in the band, as long as transmission power does
not exceed a certain threshold. Authorised usage vary depending on the regions: in region 2
(USA) amateur usage and radiolocation are allowed; in region 3 (Australia) only radiolocation
is allowed. Fixed or mobile ground-to-ground communications are allowed in the three regions,
and include 802.11a as a part of the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band.
In order to secure spectrum usage and limit interferences with other systems, regulatory au-
thorities have specified that the ITS band can be used by licensed operators only. Within the
ITU provisions, each regional and national regulatory authority is allowed to further specify
authorised spectrum usage, and manage licensing issues. This means that different spectrum
allocations and licensing options exist for the ITS band.
As of mid-2012, from the three major worldwide automotive industry centres, only Japan has
not finalised its spectrum allocation. The FCC in the USA, and the ETSI in the European
Union have both allocated to the ITS band the whole of the 5.850-5.925 GHz frequency range,
with 10 MHz-wide channels. The FCC has designed 7 channels, while the ETSI created only
5 and reserved two additional for future use. A comparison of the European and American
spectrum allocations is shown in Fig. 3.5; the figure also shows the maximum transmission
power (or Effective Isotropically Radiated Power, EIRP) authorised for each channel. For
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example, European regulations allow an EIRP of 33 dBm in all channels, approximatively 2
Watts. Note that the 5.850-5.925 GHz band in the European Union does not have a Dynamic
Frequency Selection5 (DFS) requirement, unlike the close 5.470-5.725 GHz band, which is used
primarily for on-vehicle radar operations, but also allows WLAN operations.
Service channel (mixed use)
Safety only channel
Non-safety channel
Control channel
Future use
Frequency (MHz) 5850 5855 5860 5865 5870 5875 5880 5885 5890 5895 5900 5905 5910 5915 5920
USA
Max EIRP (dBm)
EU
Max EIRP (dBm) 33
33 43 23 40
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Figure 3.5: Spectrum allocations and EIRP limits in the USA and EU
The Japanese spectrum allocation plan differs from the other two as it was initially planned for
the 5.770-5.850 GHz band. However, Japan's regulatory authority has not finalised its decision
yet, and observers expect that to allow interoperability, it will extend its allocation plan to the
band chosen by the USA and Europe.
Australia has not made a decision on its exact spectrum allocation and licensing options for the
ITS band, as the Australian government is still waiting for the major automotive manufacturing
regions to settle their allocation plans. Some overlaps do exist, such as the frequencies used by
the police in the state of Victoria that overlaps with the ITS band starting from 5.875 GHz and
up. Typically, police and ITS communications would take place in a similar context and range,
which means they are likely to interfere with each other if both usage are authorised.
3.2.4.3 State-of-the-Art: performance evaluation of 802.11p
Prior to 2008, 802.11p was primarily evaluated in theoretical and simulation studies. Empirical
evaluation was limited to 802.11a, because of the similarity between the two standards, although
a number of researchers continued to use 802.11g to work on CS. Starting in 2008, 802.11p
hardware became available in prototype and, later, commercial forms. This enabled the actual
field evaluation of 802.11p performance using the amendment's complete specifications, rather
than approximation with 802.11a (or other versions).
Theoretical and simulation studies of 802.11p abounds. A large number of them use simulators
from the ns-x family6, which grant the user a wide array of possibilities in terms of model
development for the whole 802.11p architecture. As a result, such studies vary widely in scope
and interests. For example Yang et al. [72] and Torrent-Moreno [73] studies geographical routing
strategies to disseminate safety-critical messages in freeway traffic with minimal loss, using
flagging or contention area approaches respectively. Sepulcre and Gozalvez [74] highlighted how
vehicle behaviour could affect 802.11p ability to transmit critical message in time, proposing
to adopt schemes such as adaptive power control and opportunistic transmission rates. Böhm
and Jonsson [75] looked into the issue of handover between roadside units, proposing a MAC
improvement to reduce handover delays and maintain appropriate quality of service (QoS) for
5Dynamic Frequency Selection continuously monitors a device's operating range for any radar signals. If
DFS discovers a radar signal, it will either abandon the occupied channel or mark it as unavailable to prevent
interference with the radar.
6www.nsnam.org
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safety-critical applications. Hassan et al. [76] developed a model to evaluate 802.11p MAC
performances, and proposed a new MAC method that enables larger density of nodes without
increasing frame delays.
However, many of these studies do not fall directly within the context of the present research.
Indeed, our focus remains on the application side of CS. We are specifically interested in the
performance that 802.11p can offer to such applications, as they directly impact the performance
one can expect from client applications; thus our prime focus is on the evaluation of 802.11p
performance metrics such as range, throughput, latencies and frame loss. These metrics can be
evaluated in simulation too, for example if the simulation looks at the behaviour of the PHY
and MAC layers in the 802.11 architecture, such as in [76]. However, we argue, and others have
too [77], that it is more relevant to empirically evaluate these metrics. It is hard for a simulation
to take into account all the imperfect sources that are present in the road environment, which
is varied and complex. The performance of a safety critical application could be dramatically
affected by performance variation of the underlying communication architecture, thus making
it necessary to perform an extensive empirical evaluation.
Thanks to the increased availability of technology, empirical evaluation of 802.11p performance
metrics have increased in recent years. For example, both Cheng et al. [78] and Tan et al. [79]
found that the 5.9 GHz channels see an increase in error rates for large packets compared to
smaller packets. Guo et al. [80] demonstrated that 802.11p could be used for average throughput
applications at ranges close to the theoretical limit. Maier et al. [81] investigated performance
enhancements resulting from the use of multiple antennas. They have shown that frame de-
tection can be improved significantly if two receiving antennas and an appropriate combining
scheme for frequency synchronisation process are used. Martelli et al. [82] studied throughput
and (application-level) beacon reception in both indoor and outdoor scenarios, discovering that
they managed to maintain adequate communication between two vehicles and argued that the
assumption on channel symmetry was confirmed. As with other studies, they noted important
fluctuations when LoS conditions were tampered with by other vehicles.
Böhm et al. [83] undertook a performance study in a variety of settings (urban, rural) and
road configurations (freeway, straight sections, curves, non-flat sections, etc.); they found that
802.11p was still highly subject to LoS effects, with connectivity lost very quickly after LoS is
lost, and that the direction of movement and relative speed had a significant impact on range,
especially at higher speeds. As their measurements used only one emitter-receptor couple,
these issues cannot be sourced to the unfairness problem described in Alasmary and Zhuang
[71]. Böhm et al. study is particularly interesting for this research, as it is in line with the type
of performance evaluation that is the most useful to us and the hardware used is very similar
to ours; their results will be discussed more thoroughly in section 3.6, and will be compared to
ours.
Lin et al. [84] is one of the few studies that considered both frame loss and latency. They found
that latency increased with range (albeit between static nodes), but that it was not affected
by the relative speed between the emitter and receptor. They came to the same conclusion for
frame loss. Similarly to [83], Lin et al. is quite similar to our approach and their results will be
used for subsequent discussion.
Further studies take specific contexts into interest. For example, freeway-based I2V commu-
nications. Shivaldova et al. [85] have tested 802.11p performances for a scenario focusing on
freeway tunnels and their surroundings; they also highlighted the impact of LoS on the qual-
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ity of the communications. Paier et al. [86] investigated the effect of antenna's height on I2V
communications; they showed the effect of occultations by vehicles on frame loss when low
height antennas (less than 2 metres) were considered, especially with larger packets, where a
significantly stronger signal was required to minimise frame loss. They presented further results
in [87], showing a RSU could have a coverage range of up to 700 metres (at low data rates).
However, they also showed that it was highly vulnerable to shadowing by traffic, particularly
for settings with large packets and higher speeds, and that the many metallic items in the
freeway environment created an asymmetry in the achievable range between the upstream and
downstream directions. The study also confirmed that high data rate was detrimental to range,
as the RSU saw its achievable range decrease by 85% at 27 Mbit/s, compared to 3 Mbit/s.
As a side note, a recent area of research was also focused on evaluating and improving 802.11p
for infotainment purposes i.e. to allow seamless access to the Internet and especially, social
media and video sharing platforms on the go, for example in Amadeo et al. [41]. Another
example can be found with Lin et al. [88], where full-duplex voice communications in a vehicle
group over 802.11p are investigated; when group members stay within 200 metres of each
other. Their results suggest, among other things, that the authorised range for acceptable
voice communications shrinks when absolute speed increases, because latency and packet loss
increases slightly. This type of research is not directly related to ours; nonetheless, it can be
argued that research results for high throughput applications like video streaming can actually
be taken into consideration for augmented perception applications that would require a large
amount of data to be exchanged.
3.2.4.4 State-of-the-Art: empirical modelisation of 802.11p
Empirical modelisation is a good avenue to improve the accuracy of the simulations by obtain-
ing models that already combine all the possible perturbations that one can encounter in real
situations. Obviously, such approach will usually not allow discrimination between all perturb-
ation's sources, but it would not matter if one's focus is to obtain realistic performance metrics
to feed upper-level applications.
We already mentioned the popularity of the ns-x family of network simulators. Thus, it is
logical that most research in empirical modelling takes place for this software. Recent develop-
ments have shown interesting approaches, such as using a Two-Ray Interference model for LoS
conditions [89], or improving non-LoS conditions [90, 91]. These models focus on simulating
the received power given a certain distance, so they operate at the lowest level in ns-2.
3.2.4.5 Shortcomings in the state-of-the-art
Unfortunately, we have noted several limitations with the empirical studies in the state-of-the-
art. Overall, many of the present studies are relatively optimistic in outlook, and conclude that
802.11p indeed have the capability to support the expected safety critical (and infotainment)
applications. However, there are a few studies particularly [87], which results call to caution
with this general optimism. There are more specific limitations that need to be addressed, so
that we can conclude whether this optimism is warranted.
Firstly, latencies have not been investigated but in a few specific cases. Lin et al. [84] took
interest in them, but their study remains incomplete. They measured that latency was not
affected by the speed of the receptor vehicle, but they did not map the evolution of latency over
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range according to speed. The latency was only measured relative to speed at a fixed distance
between the roadside emitter and the receptor. Additionally, their latency measurements relat-
ing to range were taken with a pair of devices which distance was progressively increased, but
which remained static during the actual measurements. We explained that reducing latency is
suppose to be a significant improvement brought upon by 802.11p, notably by allowing it to
operate outside of BSS context. Latency is a fundamental problem for any perception system
in the highly mobile context of roads, especially for augmented perception where information
can come from distant sources. Important questions remain: what is the effect of absolute and
relative speed on latency? Does latency degrades significantly at long range?
In a number of studies, experimental conditions are not very well known or controlled, notably
when the data collection takes place in open traffic [83, 85, 82]. Guo et al. [80] is an extreme
example where the authors made no mention of experimental conditions such as traffic, the
surrounding density, etc. Although it is advantageous to measure performances in real road
conditions, as they have shown to be very variable depending on the experimental environment,
it is also important to be able to have baseline performance measurements in more controlled
environments first. Indeed, measuring range (inter alia) on a track that reproduce freeway
conditions but is not perturbed by traffic allows us to set an upper boundary for this metric.
Furthermore, the whole set of possible speed classes have not been investigated (notably in[92,
80, 85, 82]), with each study focusing rather on a precise range such as lower speeds or freeway
speeds.
Eventually, if the benefits of using multiple antennas [81], or antenna heights [86] have been
assessed, we found that the influence of antenna quality and vehicle body shape have not been
studied with actual 5.9 GHz devices. Results from [93] in the 5 GHz band (802.11a) could be
extrapolated to the 5.9 GHz band (the authors consider their results to be lower boundaries for
actual 802.11p performance). However, we believe it is advisable to measure these factors with
802.11p hardware.
To address these limitations, we propose a performance evaluation experimentation, focusing on
three metrics: (1) range (2) frame loss (3) and latencies. It will takes place in a well controlled
outdoor environment and trial a large range of speeds, from 30 to 130 km/h. We have not
found any studies in the literature that look into these three metrics at the same time, in such
a range of conditions. The experimental design is covered in sections 3.4 and 3.5.
We noted that there are few empirical models of 802.11p performance that can be used in
simulations, especially in application-orientated ones. As one of our research goal is to design
an application-orientated simulation of CS, we need such a model. Thus, we will use data
collected during our on-track experiments to develop a new empirical model. The prime function
of this model will be to provide a frame loss probability given the distance and relative speed
between two nodes (vehicles or RSUs). Within that context, range itself is a subset of frame
loss: indeed, the maximum range simply express the distance at which frame loss is always
100%. As experimental data analysis will show (see section 3.6.5), the model for latency will
be considerably simpler, yet still based upon practical results.
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3.3 Experimental requirements
In the previous section, we argued that a new set of experimental evaluation of 802.11p was
necessary to address several limitations within the state-of-the-art. In this section, we will
discuss the experimental requirements for such an evaluation. They cover a number of different
themes, and will be presented in a synthetic format to ease reading and referencing.
Requirements concerning the environment
The environment in which data collection will take place must:
 Possess road-like surroundings which exclude for example (former) airport runways.
 Be a closed (private) environment to avoid traffic disturbance.
 Allow the use of a variety of node density, from low (e.g. 2 vehicles) to high (e.g. 5
vehicles and 5 RSUs) densities.
Requirements concerning the 802.11p devices
The 802.11p devices which will be used for the data collection must:
 Be inexpensive, using mostly pre-existing hardware, so that they are not too far away
from future commercial applications.
 Use a common hardware and software architecture for all experimental scenarios.
 Use an open-source 802.11p driver.
 Allow complete control over the software suites, so that all parameters can be known and
edited if required by the experimental protocol.
 Be able to work equally in IPv4 and IPv6 (allowing inter-operability with future IPv6
systems).
Requirements concerning the experimental protocol
The experimental protocol used for the data collection must:
 Cover speeds that represent the whole variety of roads, from small local traffic roads to
freeways.
 Ensure that measurements at each speed are repeated enough for the results to be stat-
istically significant.
58 CHAPTER 3. TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR AUGMENTED PERCEPTION
Figure 3.6: One static emitter, one mobile receptor drive-by scenario
3.4 Experimental protocol and measurements scenarios
In this section, we shall provide a description of the experimental protocol and scenarios that
have been used throughout our on-track experiments for 802.11p evaluation. These scenarios
were designed to address the requirements laid out in section 3.3. In total, there were three
different scenarios used, with some sub-scenarios allowed for. The different scenarios were:
 Drive-by at different speeds, a static emitter transmitting toward a mobile receptor
 One mobile emitter crossing way with one mobile receptor
 with no other network activity
 with several emitter-receptor RSU couples active
 One mobile emitter following, or being followed, by one mobile receptor, including an
overtaking manoeuvre
We shall now give a more detailed description of each of the aforementioned scenarios and
their respective experimental protocols. Note that unless specified, the parameters used for
the communications (payload size, frequency of frame emission) follow the standard that are
addressed in section 3.5.3. Some measurement setups, used to study specific questions that
arose during data collection and with early analysis, are not detailed in this section as they
were ad-hoc scenarios however, details concerning these setups are given whenever appropriate
in the data analysis in section 3.6.
3.4.1 Outdoor drive-by scenario
The outdoor drive-by scenario has a mobile receptor vehicle passing by a static emitter (Fig.
3.6), which is located on the side of the track. The principal test location was the speed track,
in its section that allows for 1.4 kilometres of direct LoS. The emitter was either located on the
track's eastern end, or near the central slight bend, so to have LoS with all the track's length.
We consider V2V and V2I communications to be equivalent. Indeed, it is suggested by previous
research [92, 83], and informal experience at LIVIC, that the absolute speed in the environment's
referential of an emitter and a receptor does not affect communication quality between these two
vehicles. Rather, it is the speed difference (relative speed) between the vehicles that matters.
As we consider a static emitter, the speed difference and speed relative to the environment
are equivalent. The following speeds were tested: 30, 50, 70, 130 and 170 km/h, allowing a
representation of not only freeway situations, but different types of roads. This scenario features
the most measurements, as it was played out 162 times including all the tested speeds.
This scenario will be used to measure the three performance metrics (range, frame loss and
latency) in a clean network environment, according to different speed variations. It will be
the principal scenario, used to generate most data that we will analyse later in this chapter.
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Figure 3.7: One emitter, one receptor crossing scenario
Figure 3.8: Three emitters (1 OBU + 2 RSU), two receptors (1 OBU + 1 RSU) crossing scenario
3.4.2 Outdoor crossing scenarios
The outdoor crossing scenario has a receptor vehicle passing by an emitter vehicle, both mobile.
The principal test location was the speed track. Two sub-scenarios are considered.
A first, clean sub-scenario where there is only one emitter and one receptor (Fig. 3.7). Each
vehicle started at one end of the track, outside of direct view from the other and drove the
whole track at constant speed before turning around in the roundabout end. The location
of the crossing event moved depending on each vehicle's speed (it usually took place in the
western-most third of the track's eastern section). For this sub-scenario, the following speeds
were tested: 30, 70, and 130 km/h, which in terms of relative speeds between the two vehicle
gives: 60, 140 and 260 Km/h.
A second, noisy sub-scenario where there is not only the two vehicles but also three roadside
units, of which two are emitting (unicasting) a constant data stream (on the same channel)
toward the third one (Fig. 3.8). Although the java sender/receiver in the receptor vehicle does
not record frames sent by the RSUs, they are available in the Wireshark (a well-known network
performance monitoring tool) log, as well as in the java sender/receiver in the receptor RSU.
The RSUs are arranged so that the receptor one is surrounded by the two others, about 50
metres on each side. Each vehicle started at one end of the track, outside of direct view from
the other and drove towards the noisy area formed by the RSUs; drivers were instructed to
try at their best to cross in the middle of the noisy area, while maintaining constant speed as
they approached and receded from it. The vehicles drove only at 50 km/h in this sub-scenario.
For this sub-scenario, the communication parameters varied. The following parameters were
used at the emitter vehicle (the noise communication between the RSU remained constant, with
500 bytes payloads sent at 20 Hz):
1. 50 bytes payload sent each 25 milliseconds (40 Hz)
2. 500 bytes payload sent each 50 milliseconds (20 Hz)
3. 1 kilobytes payload sent each 500 milliseconds (2 Hz)
The crossing scenarios will be used, firstly, to confirm that V2V and V2I are equivalent; then
most importantly, it will be used to quantify the influence of other active emitters upon the
latency of frame exchanged between the two vehicles.
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Figure 3.9: One emitter, one receptor following scenario
3.4.3 Outdoor following/overtaking scenario
The outdoor following scenario has a receptor vehicle following or being followed by an emitter
vehicle, both mobile (Fig. 3.9). They start at the same location with a few seconds delay;
occasionally overtaking each other to switch role, until one accelerate slightly to break LoS
conditions before they have driven the whole track. The principal test location was the speed
track. The vehicles drove only at 70 km/h in this scenario.
The goal of this scenario is to test whether the absolute movement of vehicles has any influence
on the performance metrics when relative speed is small, as well as accounting for changes in
the relative speed sign (hence the direction of the relative movement).
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3.5 802.11p devices implementation and measurements set-
up
In this section, we shall provide a detailed description of the hardware and software architecture
that have been used throughout our on-track experiments related to 802.11p evaluation, as well
as the supporting non-IT and non-ionic hardware (typically test vehicles) and infrastructure.
For most of the measurements, we have restrained ourselves to a limited number of tools, which
streamlined the experimental developments and allowed us to compare data more easily.
3.5.1 IVC devices
3.5.1.1 Rationale for using existing hardware
802.11p is still a relatively new technology, as such the number of standardised off-the-shelf
IVC devices (IVCD) remain limited. This is likely to remain true as long as all regulatory
authorities do not finalise spectrum bands allocation. Nevertheless, a few providers do offer
hardware suites, such as Denso (Germany) and Cohda Wireless (Australia). There are also
numerous prototype equipment available to researchers, providing they have taken part of CS-
related projects. The LIVIC has been involved in two CS projects: CVIS7 and COOPERS8.
As part of these projects, the best reasonably-priced 802.11p technology available had been
selected, and similar devices are still in use in many ongoing research programs. Thus, we chose
to re-use hardware from these previous studies for the purpose of our research.
As well as limiting expenses, re-using hardware from previous projects also allowed us to come
up with using a system running completely on open-source software, or on locally-developed one.
Indeed, one of the principal limitations of off-the-shelf or software from previous projects is that
it often includes, if not completely made of, proprietary code. An example of these functional,
yet limited, software is the original 802.11p drivers developed as part of the CVIS project. After
the CVIS project ended in 2010, it became increasingly difficult to access documentation and
support for these drivers. Licensing questions also remained unresolved. Furthermore, assessing
802.11p performances requires an important level of control over the IVCD; many parameters
need, or might need to be adjusted. This level of control is best attainable with open-source
and LIVIC-developed software. Thus, focusing on an open-source implementation was our best
chance in gaining access to reliable devices.
3.5.1.2 IVCD system's characteristics
Our IVCD is based on an ALIX 3D3 system board. It was initially designed for wireless
routing and network security applications, but can be also used for in-vehicle application as
well. It has already been used in several CS projects, where a 500 MHz single core processor
is enough to sustain IVC networking and some safety-related applications. To access wireless
LAN (WiFi), and 802.11p in particular, the system board is fitted with an Atheros 5413 WiFi
chipset. Already used for CVIS hardware, 5413 chipsets are primarily 802.11abg, but have been
modified by the manufacturer to access 802.11p channels, providing the appropriate drivers are
7www.cvisproject.org
8www.coopers-ip.eu
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used. The only other notable hardware on the ALIX 3D3 boards are their 8 gigabytes solid-state
drive memories.
Regarding the board's functions within our architecture, there was no need for a complex
operating system. Thus, we chose to use a command line-only version of Linux Ubuntu (also
note that the device's memory can barely support a graphical operating system). The system
can use IPv4 or IPv6, depending on the requirements of the experiment (most of the time, IPv4
was used).
As we mentioned in 3.5.1.1, we focus on using open-source resources for the IVCD. Unfortu-
nately, open-source resources for 802.11p are quite limited, due to the amendment's young age,
as well as a significant focus on simulation studies instead of actual implementations. The prin-
cipal open-source WiFi driver for Atheros chipsets (802.11abg) on Linux is the ath5K driver9, a
part of the MadWifi drivers set. A patch developed for the Dutch Grand Cooperative Driving
Challenge (GCDC) 10 in 2010 allows this driver to operate within the 802.11p framework. The
drivers used in CVIS were also based on ath5k, and the GCDC patch actually emulates CVIS
drivers functionalities (it is also distributed with a CALM manager).
As part of our IVCD, only the patched ath5k is used. For the best performance and stability,
the patch limited the IVCD to the 2.6.31 version of Linux's kernel, with Ubuntu 9.10 (Karmic
Koala).
Implementing the patched driver on our IVDC was a significant Challenge due to limited doc-
umentation available and involved many incremental trials. Eventually, thanks to the help of
researchers11 involved in the development of the patch, we managed to obtain a functional
802.11p-enabled system. We wrote a document enhancing the original documentation, which
was then distributed to the patch's developers; a copy of this document is available in Appendix
A.
Eventually, we installed on the IVDC the CarGeo6 framework. CarGeo6 is an open-source
system allowing the use of geographical networking and routing in IPv6, developed at the
INRIA as part of the GeoNet European project12. Georouting presents a strong potential for
CS applications, and especially augmented perception. It was initially used for the emergency
braking application that we implemented as discussed in Chapter 2. Even though we did not
use it for the rest of our study, including the 802.11p performance evaluation, we also installed
it on our IVCD with future research in mind.
As of mid-2012, 13 IVCD have been created, via cloning of the solid-state drives. Since all the
devices are essentially identical, only a few parameter changes were required for a newly copied
device to be connected to the network.
Our inexpensive, open-source, completely controllable and easy-to-replicate 802.11p-enabled
IVCD is a significant engineering outcome of this thesis. Previous IVCD used at LIVIC have
been superseded by our version, and we expect future research on IVC and CS to continue using
this setting. They have already been used for several demonstrations to high-level executives
within the French government, including the Minister of Higher Education and Research.
9linuxwireless.org/en/users/Drivers/ath5k
10www.gcdc.net/mainmenu/Home/technology/Communication_Stack
11We thank the following people for their help in this matter: Sagar Behere, from the KTH Royal Institute
of Technology, Sweden; Anh Tuan Giang, from the École Supérieure d'Électricité, France; Jan de Jongh, from
TNO, the Netherlands; Kristoffer Lidström, from the Viktoria Institute, Sweden; and Holger Rapp, from the
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany.
12www.geonet-project.eu
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Figure 3.10: Hardware architecture used for the measurements
3.5.2 Hardware architecture
Despite the diversity of the scenarios, our measurements could be performed with similar hard-
ware architecture, as they shared the same requirements:
 Using our IVCD for 802.11p networking and applications hosting
 Availability of precise localisation sensors
 Time synchronisation
To fulfil these requirements, our experimental architecture features an IVCD, a host computer,
a GPS device (RTK or classical) and a NTP time server, as seen in Fig. 3.10. Connection
to the vehicle's CAN bus and/or to an inertial navigation unit is possible, if the host vehicle is
fitted with such system(s), although it was not a requirement in most cases. The architecture
is duplicated in each vehicle and roadside units (RSU).
IVC device
The IVCD is connected to a roof-mounted omnidirectional stick antenna13, with a 8 dBi gain
in the horizontal plane. The chipset's transmission power is lowered to 20 dBm. The Effective
Isotropically Radiated Power (EIRP) can be used to approximate the actual power output at
the antennas. It can be computed from equation 3.1:
EIRP = Ptx +G− Lc (3.1)
where Ptx is the transmission power at the emitter (dBm); G is the antenna gain, relative to
a (theoretical) isotropic reference antenna, in dBi; and Lc represents cable and connectors loss
(in dB). In our architecture Lc is approximated from manufacturers' data to 2.5 dB, accounting
for one pigtail connector, the efficiency of the antenna, and about 2 metres of coaxial cable.
13Antenna's reference: Doradus 50-1360, 5.0 to 5.9 GHz
64 CHAPTER 3. TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR AUGMENTED PERCEPTION
EIRP (dBm) EIRP (milliwatts)
40 10000
36 4000
30 1000
25 320
20 100
15 32
10 10
5 3.2
1 1.3
0 1
-1 0.79
-5 0.32
-10 0.1
-20 0.01
-40 0.0001
-80 0.00000001
Table 3.2: EIRP conversion chart, dBm to mW
Thus, we have EIRP = 20 − 2.5 + 8 = 25.5 dBm, or 355 mW (refer to Table 3.2 for dBm to
mW conversion). This value was used in all measurements drives, unless stated otherwise.
One could note that with EIRP = 25.5 dBm, we were largely under the regulatory limits im-
posed by telecommunication regulatory agencies, as described in section 3.2.4.2. Indeed, in the
European Union, the maximum EIRP in the 802.11p 5.9 GHz band is 33 dBm (2 watts). It was
our understanding that it would be unlikely that in the future 802.11p-based CS applications
would use the maximum allowed transmission power at all times, especially when the number
of connected actors would have significantly grown. Also, American regulations specify a max-
imum EIRP for some channels of only 23 dBm, with short range services in mind. For these
reasons, it is more interesting to evaluate 802.11p performance at a non-extreme, intermediate
power output.
In terms of practical implementation, we had access to a limited number of antennas. We
could choose between small 1 dBi antennas of several shapes, and larger 8 dBi stick antennas.
Informal measurements were used to determine which were the most appropriate for our future
experiments, keeping in mind that we had to be able to (1) remain under regulatory limits at
all times and (2) allow signal's natural extinction within line of sight and more importantly,
within the 802.11p's theoretical range of 1 kilometre. Eventually, we settled on using the large,
8 dBi-gain antennas with a reduced power output at the chipset.
It is necessary to add that the test tracks are located in the vicinity of telecommunication
equipments operated by the French military police, thus further stressing the need to stick to
regulatory transmission power limits.
For all experiments, the devices are set to operate on the control channel adopted in the USA
for ITS, i.e. 5.890 GHz.
Host computer and GPS
The host computer's prime function is to record the vehicles' location, but it can also be used
to host applications that require too much processing power to be installed on the IVCD.
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Table 3.3: Summary of 802.11p and frames parameters
Parameter Value
Frequency 5.890 GHz
TX power (at chipset) 20 dBm
Antenna type, gain Omnidirectional, 8 dBi
EIRP ~25.5 dBm (355 mW)
Frame size > 84 bytes
Frame frequency 20 Hz
Data rate auto (max 36 Mb/s)
Additionally, any application requiring a graphical interface have to be run by it, as the IVCD
uses a command-line OS.
In most of our measurements, the host PC was connected to a RTK GPS device updating at
two to five Hertz. Actually, any type of GPS device could be used, as the software tasked with
recording the host vehicle's localisation did not differentiate between specific versions of GPS
(it is able to handle higher frequency inputs). Our prime GPS device was a RTK GPS from
Thales, with its base station installed in the middle of Satory's tracks.
GPS performance have been sufficient during most measurements, with lane-level accuracy
(typically within 1 metre). Although we did not require a centimetric accuracy, we have noted
worrying fluctuations in accuracy at some times, with positioning errors of several dozen metres
or more. Since the distance between the emitter and the receptor was computed using linear
interpolation and the jumps in GPS positions were relatively limited in duration, these errors
did not affect the accuracy of our telecommunication measurements. However, their impact
could be much stronger on the augmented map, and the presence of such errors in a relatively
simple configuration such as Satory's tracks reinforces the case for using data fusion approaches
to improve the accuracy of localisation and perception of the environment.
NTP time server
Time synchronisation is critical for different functionalities - fusion of remote data, accurate
evaluation of latencies between different hosts, etc. Even if our devices' clocks were not of
the lowest quality, it is nevertheless necessary to ensure good synchronisation by correcting
clock drift at all times. Indeed, unsynchronised IVCD will drift by several seconds over a day
compared to an absolute time reference.
A straightforward way to do so is to use the Network Time Protocol (NTP). We installed
one Brandywine Network Time Adapter14 (BNTA) in each host vehicle or RSU, to distribute
accurate timing information from GPS through a NTP architecture. Within the NTP parlance,
the BNTA is a stratum 1 time server, as it is directly referenced to GPS satellite-based clocks
(stratum 0). As such, the IVCD and host computer are clients of stratum 2. The BNTA is set
in broadcast mode, sending timing information to its clients four times a second.
This system's performances have been excellent, most of the time. The offset between the GPS
reference time and our devices' clocks was smaller than one millisecond. An example of the
offset measured during data collection is shown in Fig. 3.11; the offset presented was recorded
on the receptor vehicle on 5 October 2011, the grey bars represent the error in the measurement,
as computed by the NTP algorithm. This error depends principally on (1) the number of visible
14http://www.brandywinecomm.com/images/NTA-100GM_datasheet.pdf
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Figure 3.11: Variation of offset between the GPS reference time and the IVCD's clock over a 2
hour period
GPS satellites and (2) the quality of the in-vehicle wired network linking the BNTA and its
client(s).
3.5.3 Software architecture
Similarly with the hardware architecture, a single software architecture was able to answer
most of our requirements for data collection in the different experimental scenarios. However,
a diversity of software could be used to achieve this. The overall software architecture is shown
in Fig. 3.12; it features different software solutions that could be used for the same role. As
with the hardware, the architecture is duplicated in all vehicles and RSU, with only the need
to update some configuration files to have the architecture behave either as receptor or emitter.
All devices operate on Linux OS.
Network performance application
The software architecture's central element is the software used to generate and record frames,
which are exchanged on the 802.11p network. We had several methods to apply this, two of
which are entirely contained on the IVCD.
The first method was to use the iperf tool on the IVCD. Iperf is a widely used network tool that
can be used to measure various network performances. It is primarily used for wired networks,
but can be used with wireless networks without difficulties. It generates TCP or UDP data
streams between a server and a client, and can be set for half or full duplex connectivity. Bitrate
and frame loss are immediately available in iperf 's logs however, latency cannot be measured
with it.
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Figure 3.12: Software architecture used for the measurements
To compensate for iperf 's limitations, we developed a second method entirely hosted on the
IVCD. It is a Java application that can be set as sender or receiver (henceforth the Java
sender/receiver), and is controlled via shell files (example on Fig. 3.13). It sends a UDP frame
through a Java datagram socket (equivalent to any other raw socket) to the IP address of the
target vehicle, at a frequency set by the user. The default frequency is 20 Hz (deterministic
timer). Data rate is automatically determined by the chipset and fluctuates from 6 to 54 Mb/s,
depending on the signal/noise ratio.
A typical payload size is 20 bytes however, it can vary by up to 10 bytes because of the
increased length of the frame number field (see Table 3.4). The actual frame at the MAC
level also includes 8 bytes of UDP header, 20 bytes of IP header, 8 bytes for LLC, and 28
additional bytes of overheads including the 802.11 MAC preamble and header, as well as the
CRC sequence. Thus, with a payload if 20 bytes, a MAC frame reaches 84 bytes. As our focus
was primarily on collision alert dissemination (e.g. EEBL), we chose to use a frame size in line
with EEBL's requirements. In [32], the recommended payload for EEBL frames is 36 bytes,
and includes detailed information on the emitter's behaviour. Some data fields listed in the
cited report, such as the vehicle's size and the GPS antenna's offset can be removed without
affecting the application's usefulness. We believe 20 to 30 bytes is a good compromise for an
EEBL frame that can include a vehicle's ID, location and timing information. The frame's
structure is shown in Table 3.4.
The application automatically computes the latency based on the frame's emission time, as
recorded in its payload. A log file is automatically generated containing the frame's information:
computed latency, payload size, received power (signal strength indicator) and reception time.
Frame loss and bitrate can then be processed from this log file (a log extract is shown in Fig.
3.13c). This application was the principal one we used during data collection.
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(a) Receiver shell (b) Sender shell
(c) Log extract
Figure 3.13: Code and logs snapshots
Eventually, we also used an application that is located on the host PC. Indeed, it can be argued
that in a future CS application, the IVCD will not necessarily host the safety application,
especially if they require larger processing power. Moving the application away from the IVCD
can however introduce additional latencies over the vehicle's internal network. Our rationale
to develop this application was to be able to test these in-vehicle latencies. The application is
hosted with the Extended Driver Awareness (EDA) framework, which was developed at LIVIC
for the CVIS project [45]. It is essentially identical in purpose and functions to the IVCD Java
sender/receiver; however, as the host PC has access to localisation information, these are also
included into the frame. Thus, the relative distance between the emitter and receptor is directly
available in the log file and does not have to be computed in post-processing. However, because
of EDA limitations, this application cannot handle high frequency frames.
Table 3.4: Frame structure
Headers (UDP) emission time (absolute, in microseconds) ; frame number ; emitter ID
To get the received power (as measured by the chipset's driver, expressed as the Signal Strength
Indicator [SSI]), or to be able to read management frames suck as beacons, we set up a virtual
interface (dubbed v0 ) in monitor mode. This configuration allowed us to sniff all packets on the
wireless medium while the principal interface (wlan0 ) continued to function normally with the
Java sender/receiver or iperf. To record the packets on this virtual interface, we used dumpcap.
It records the network activity in the libpcap format, a common file format among network
capture software. The archive can then be read by Wireshark to analyse the captured packets.
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root@cargeo6-router2:~# ping 192.168.99.1 -I wlan0
PING 192.168.99.1 (192.168.99.1) from 192.168.99.2 wlan0: 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=1   ttl=64 time=4.460 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=2   ttl=64 time=0.416 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=3   ttl=64 time=0.428 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=4   ttl=64 time=0.414 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=5   ttl=64 time=0.408 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=6   ttl=64 time=0.392 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=7   ttl=64 time=0.410 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=8   ttl=64 time=0.415 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=9   ttl=64 time=0.411 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.99.1: icmp_seq=10 ttl=64 time=0.409 ms
(a) IPv4
root@cargeo6-router2:~# ping6 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991 -I wlan0
PING 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991(2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991)
from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:992 wlan0: 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=1   ttl=64 time=4.310 ms
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=2   ttl=64 time=0.831 ms
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=3   ttl=64 time=0.785 ms
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=4   ttl=64 time=0.822 ms
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=5   ttl=64 time=0.818 ms
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=6   ttl=64 time=0.750 ms
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=7   ttl=64 time=0.611 ms
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=8   ttl=64 time=0.508 ms
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=9   ttl=64 time=0.457 ms
64 bytes from 2011:192:168:ca01:147:e0ff:fe55:991: icmp_seq=10 ttl=64 time=0.467 ms
(b) IPv6
Figure 3.14: Latencies for ICMP echo requests over a 802.11p ad-hoc network, at short range,
in IPv4 and IPv6
802.11p specific
As we mentioned in section 3.2.4, one important change that was introduced by the 802.11p
amendment is the ability for a 802.11p device to operate outside of the classical BSS context by
using the dot11OCBEnabled flag. This functionality is designed to be used with high priority
emergency-related frames, as it shrinks transmission delays as much as possible within the
802.11 architecture.
We chose to maintain the dot11OCBEnabled flag to false, meaning that the normal BSS context
is in use. Indeed, not all frames exchanged within a VANET during normal, day-to-day use will
require a high priority. It can be argued that in order to maintain the advantage of priority
management, the number of high priority frames must be limited. Thus, it is unlikely that
augmented perception-related messages will be high priority (though, they will be of higher
priority than frames which payload have less stringent latency requirements). Furthermore,
frames that contain critical information about a vehicle's location and behaviour need to be
secured, which would not be possible outside of a BSS context. Setting dot11OCBEnabled to
true for an collision alert dissemination makes more sense.
However, latencies measured within a BSS context for collision alert frames will provide an
upper boundary for latency outside of BSS context. Indeed, the OCB mechanism removes
authentification and other upper-layer dealings, but remain essentially identical at the MAC
level. If good latency performance is found within a BSS context, it will be possible to safely
conclude that the same performance would be achieved outside a BSS context.
Eventually, while focused on collision alert dissemination (as far as protocol is concerned), we
aim at assessing performance metrics of 802.11p in general, so given that frames outside of BSS
context would represent only a minority of the total frames exchanged, it is logical to remain
within a classic BSS context.
Other network functions
All network functionalities (physical, data link, network and transports layers) are managed
either with Linux's native protocols or by the patched ath5k WiFi driver (as detailed in 3.5.1).
Routing is handled with a manually-inputed routes table, or with CarGeo6. Note that iperf
and our applications are indifferent to the exact version of the IP protocol used. Most of our
measurements used IPv4 for the sake of simplicity, but could have equally been made with
IPv6; the principal difference with IPv6 would be a slightly increased latency; this is shown in
Fig. 3.14. CarGeo6 operates exclusively in IPv6.
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Clock synchronisation
Both the IVCD and host computer use the NTP architecture to remain synchronised with an
external GPS reference clock, provided by the BNTA. An off-the-shelf Linux NTP client is used
on both machines.
Vehicle's localisation
The host PC is primarily tasked with recording its host vehicle's localisation. Data from a
GPS device (RTK or classical) is sent to one of the PC's serial port; this data stream is then
captured by the RTMaps software. RTMaps is marketed by Intempora15, based upon work
undertaken at Mines ParisTech a decade ago [94]. Its primary goal is to record and process a
large number of simultaneous data flows such as images, laserscanner scans, positioning data
(from GPS, odometer or INS), etc. It is also used to host algorithms for image processing or
data fusion for example, as we shall see further in this document.
3.5.4 Test vehicles at LIVIC
LIVIC is well equipped in terms of prototyping and experimental capabilities, with a fleet of
six experimental vehicles, fitted with various sensors, prototype hardware and software, ranging
from IVC to automated control. Three vehicles are used specifically for IVC-related research:
two identical Renault Clio III 5-door estates and one Citroën C4 Grand Picasso 5-door MPV (see
Fig. 3.15). The vehicles were fitted with powered equipment racks in the boot and several in-
cabin screens for HMI. A variety of sensors can be fitted on them depending on the experimental
requirements; only one of the Clios had a permanent forward-facing radar.
3.5.5 Test tracks
The LIVIC is located immediately next to the Satory's test tracks (at the outskirts of Versailles).
The Satory's site is owned by the French Ministry of Defence, and was initially intended to test
armoured vehicles developed by Nexter (formerly GIAT Industries). It has since opened to
other private and public operators, including IFSTTAR, Citroën sports and Renault Trucks.
The site's most important features are its three test tracks, shown on figure 3.16a:
 the speed track (la vitesse), a 2-lane 2 km straight line (orange on the map)
 the road track (la routière), a 2-lane unidirectional 3.5 km loop (red)
 the forest track (le Val d'Or), a 2-lane double loop set in small hillside wood (pink and
lila)
The speed track's surroundings are largely open, despite a few sections with over-reaching trees.
La routière track is modelled on French non-segregated trunk road (route nationale), and its
surroundings are also largely open, presenting a greater diversity than the speed track (it comes
close to several buildings).
15www.intempora.com
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(a) Citroën C4 Grand Picasso (b) Renault Clio 3 (one of Tic & Tac)
Figure 3.15: Photographs of the test vehicles
(a) Map of the test tracks
(c) Looking westward (d) Looking eastward
(d) Photographs of the speed track (la vitesse), the track's bend appears in the distance, 1.2 km westward
Figure 3.16: Map and photographs of Satory's test tracks
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3.6 Performance metrics analysis
3.6.1 Introduction
In this section, we shall analyse the data collected during our experiments. We will break down
the analysis by performance metrics, in the following order: (1) range, (2) latency, and (3)
frame loss. Each subsection will use data collected during different scenarios, as described in
section 3.4. This analysis will form the base upon which we will build our 802.11p model, as
described in section 3.7.
Data collection was spread out from September 2011 to February 2012, with a total of over
400 kilometres driven during experiments on the Satory test tracks. Meteorological conditions
were quite variable from day to day; most measurements took place on typical Parisian overcast
autumn or winter days, but we also gathered data during dry sunny conditions or light rain.
Unfortunately, we minimised a-priori the influence of meteorological conditions, considering it
would not affect performance metrics, especially range, to a great amount. However, we will
see that meteorological conditions can create important performance variations.
Further in the performance analysis, two datasets will be described  the 2011 and 2012 data-
sets. As their names suggest, these two dataset are only segregated by the time at which their
data were collected. The 2011 dataset was collected during 6 different days from September
to December 2011, and the 2012 dataset was collected during 4 days in January and February
2012. Each single day represents several hours of recording. The need to differentiate into two
datasets arose from the fact that we did not take into account some important influences on the
experimental data at the beginning, which were only discovered when the first dataset (2011)
was analysed. Accordingly, more variables are controlled for in the second dataset; however,
the 2011 dataset contains a larger amount of data then the 2012 dataset (the repartition is
about 60-40% in favour of the 2011 dataset).
For the remainder of this chapter, closing will refer to items relevant to when the receptor
vehicle is moving toward the emitter; away will refer to items relevant to when the receptor
vehicle is moving away from the emitter.
3.6.2 Maximum range
3.6.2.1 General analysis
The range is the maximum distance at which a frame is successfully received by the receptor
vehicle from the emitter (when frame loss is almost 100%); thus what we call the range is
actually the transmission range. The physical carrier sensing range was not directly taken
into account, although it is possible to approximate it by looking at the underlying protocol
management frames. As described in section 3.5.2, the actual range value is estimated by linear
interpolation, in post-processing. The time of a frame reception is extracted and the two GPS
fixes that comes immediately before and immediately after it are used as reference points. This
method is relatively accurate, thanks to the RTK GPS performance.
Fig. 3.17 is a box plot of all measured maximum ranges, classified according to speed (from
30 to 170 km/h) and direction of driving (left side, with the letter A, is the away set; right
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(a) Average and median maximum ranges and their dispersion, as computed on the 2011 dataset only
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(b) Average and median maximum ranges and their dispersion, as computed on the whole measurements
Figure 3.17: Analysis of maximum transmission ranges obtained during our data collection
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side, with the letter C, is the closing set). Fig. 3.17b is based on the whole data we collected,
while Fig. 3.17a shows only data from the 2011 dataset. The green x are the averages, while
the red lines shows the medians. The blue boxes and black whiskers shows the measurement's
dispersion: the boxes' edges represent the 25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers extend to the
most extreme data points not considered outliers. Outliers are shown as individual red crosses.
The median range (red lines) is not necessarily centred in the blue boxes, which shows that
maximum ranges are not evenly distributed and tend to concentrate around some values. For
example in 3.17a at 30 km/h away, 25% of the data is concentrated in the [680; 690] metres
interval. Data show a clear inverse relationship between relative speed and range.
The largest range for all measurements is 1,397 metres. Nonetheless, most of the measured
maximum ranges were largely under specifications or ranges measured in other studies, espe-
cially in the 2011 dataset. As specified in Section 3.5.2, the transmission power was lowered to
remain in line with 802.11p specifications. In [83], the transmission power was actually slightly
lower than ours (17 versus 20dBm, at the chipset), yet they achieved larger ranges. Given
that antennas gains were similar in both studies, [83]'s authors probably have used cables and
connectors with a lower attenuation than ours. However, the antennas' quality must probably
still have played a role to explain the difference between our studies, as well shall see in 3.6.2.2.
Informal measurements with Tx power = 33 dBm (the maximum authorised transmission
power), suggested no difficulty in achieving kilometric range systematically with larger powers.
However, given the antenna's gain, the EIRP was above the regulatory threshold in France
(and the EU), which disqualifies such powers for future use. Furthermore, it is probable that
legally high-power transmissions will be restricted to a limited number of uses, in order to limit
physical medium saturation. This is the reason why high-powered (40+ dBm) transmissions
are only legal on 2 channels in the American spectrum allocation scheme, and strictly reserved
for governmental operations.
In Fig. 3.17a, one notes significant differences between the closing and away ranges at the same
speed (notably at 70 or 130 km/h), with the closing range being greater than away range, on
some occasions by up to 200 metres. This relates to findings by Böhm et al. [83]; however, their
data are reverse compared to ours: away range is greater than closing range. The following
could be offered as an explanation: this effect can be explained by the mechanism of signal
validation in the Wi-Fi access points. This mechanism includes a hysteresis (or two thresholds)
to validate the signal. In fact, the receiver continues to accept the communication until the
signal power falls below a threshold S1. But to accept a new signal, it is necessary that is
power is larger than a threshold S2. In general S1 < S2, which means that the [away] range is
usually higher than the capture range [92]. However, this explanation does not apply to our
measurement, or Böhm et al., for several reasons. Both studies used ad-hoc mode instead of
access point. And in our study, closing range is systematically greater than away range in the
2011 dataset, while reverse measurements would be expected from [92]'s explanation.
Fig. 3.17b adds additional measurements taken at low speed (30 km/h), from the 2012 dataset.
These additional measurements are presented separately in Fig. 3.17a. As demonstrated on
the latter figure, there is no significant difference between closing and away ranges with those
measurements. The latter leads further credence to the fact that the power-level-based CCA and
CSMA/CA mechanisms used in 802.11p will not make any difference to the vehicles' direction of
travel. Doppler effects likely only explain the range reduction with increased speeds, which was
verified for the whole data. We conclude that another effect must explain the original dataset's
behaviour; further analysis should be dedicated to investigate it in the following sub-sections.
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Figure 3.18: Average and median maximum ranges and their dispersion, as computed on the
2012 dataset only
3.6.2.2 Driving direction, car's body shape and antennas' imperfections
In order to investigate the difference between closing and away range, we need to access MAC
layer frames directly. The only way to do so is to use the monitor mode. The monitor mode is a
standard 802.11 feature in which the chipset will send toward higher-level process all activities
that occur on the physical medium (at the frequency in use). All the hidden frames that are used
by the 802.11 standard, the so-called management frames, then become accessible. However,
when a wireless interface is set-up in monitor mode, it can only listen to the network, there
is no way to send frames. However, chipsets can support several interfaces at the same time.
Thus, by setting up a virtual interface working in monitor mode, management frames can be
recorded without disturbing the measurement process, while our application runs on the main
interface in ad-hoc mode.
We performed additional measurements in the exact same experimental conditions as previ-
ously, in order to confirm whether the user transmission on the IP stack had any effect on the
results. Our investigation suggests that there is no significant difference between the range for
management frames (beacons included) and for applications' frames in the speed track setting
(this is not clear cut in other settings, see 3.6.4). The direction of driving produces the same
influence over the maximum range of beacons, which suggests that the difference is due to an
actual physical effect.
Consequently, we have investigated the Signal Strength Indicator (SSI) for various speeds. The
SSI is measured by the Atheros chipset and included in the data passed to the upper layer; we
extracted it with Wireshark.
Fig. 3.19 shows the recorded SSI for a typical drive at 50 km/h, in both directions extracted
from the 2011 dataset. The figure shows that application frames (the smoothed lines) are
recorded as far as beacons (the crosses).
Furthermore, one can clearly see that two paths exist: the SSI is consistently lower when the
vehicle drives away, compared to when the vehicle drives toward the emitter. However, data
from the 2012 dataset, in otherwise exactly the same experimental conditions, do not show such
an hysteresis. Fig. 3.20 allows one to compare two measurements taken at the same speed, in
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Figure 3.19: SSI according to direction of driving, for beacons and application frames (single
drive pictured)
the same experimental conditions (location, vehicles, hardware, etc.) from the 2011 and 2012
datasets. The raw data have been smoothed using a Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression. The
difference between the away and closing curves is much larger in the 2011 dataset than the
2012 dataset. The power difference between the two dataset is explained by the difference in
weather conditions and a better controlled experimental protocol in the 2012 dataset, so that
the received power is maximised in that dataset.
From these data, we assume that two factors could explain the hysteresis noted in the 2011
dataset, as well as the considerable difference in received power (hence, range): (1) an imperfect
omnidirectionality of the antennas (in the horizontal plane), and (2) an influence of the vehicle's
body. Indeed, during the 2011 dataset collection, the orientation of the antennas and vehicles
on the track (hence which side faced each other) was not controlled.
Antenna quality The antennas used during our experimentation are omnidirectional. Ac-
cording to the manufacturer's data, their gain varies on the horizontal plane by no more than
2 dB, with a good symmetry between the two sides of the antennas (the antenna's azimuthal
pattern is a slightly flattened circle). We decided to verify whether this was really the case. At
first, we focused on the receptor's antenna, as it was the one that would be affecting the most
received power during a normal experimental drive. Note that the same IVCD and antenna
pairs were always used for the same roles (emitter or receptor) throughout the measurements,
not only for the present experiment.
We measured the SSI for 8 orientations of the antenna, rotated 45 degrees each time from the
previous orientation. The initial orientation (angle 0) was chosen arbitrarily. The experimental
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Figure 3.20: Smoothed SSI measured for application frames for two typical drives, one from the
2011 dataset and the other from the 2012 dataset ; experimental conditions otherwise identical
(apart from the weather).
protocol was a variation of the outdoor drive-by scenario. This time, the receiver was static
on the track side, while the emitter was mobile. Data was only collected when the emitter was
moving away from the receptor, with 700 metres of straight line before having to turn out of
direct LoS. The relative orientation between the vehicles' bodies and the part of the emitter's
antenna facing the receptor remained the same in all measurement drives. Only the receptor
antenna was rotated.
Fig. 3.21 shows the averaged differences between the overall average SSI and the measured
SSI for each angle, in red. The strongest signal was measured at 225 degrees, 4.6 dBm over
the average. This represent a 5% difference with the average, and almost 10% with the lowest
measurement (found at 0 degrees).
The same experiment was then repeated, but with switched roles; a mobile receptor with a
fixed-angle antenna moving away from a static emitter while antenna was rotated progressively.
The results (measured on the mobile receptor) are shown on Fig. 3.21 in green. The variation in
received SSI is smaller than in the previous experiment, which shows that the emitting antenna
is of slightly better quality than the receiving one.
In conclusion, the receptor's antenna inhomogeneities alone can explain the difference between
away and closing measurements in the 2011 dataset. Indeed, the difference measured on the
signal shown in Fig. 3.19 averages to 5 dBm. Looking closely at the results, along the 0-180°
and 45-225° axes, the difference between SSI on each side are 4.9 and 6.3 dBm. If, by chance,
the 45-225° axis happened to be aligned with the road with 225° to the front of the receptor
vehicle, the signal received when moving away from the emitter would have been up to 6 dBm
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Figure 3.21: Differences with the average SSI (in dBm) for 8 angular sectors (in degrees) of
the receiving antenna (in red) and of the emitting antenna (in green); measurements were not
simultaneous. The other antenna is always facing the measured sector.
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Figure 3.22: Smoothed SSI measured at 50 km/h, alternating the side of the vehicle facing the
emitter (antenna's orientation is always maintained), from the 2012 dataset
less powerful. Close to the chipset's power threshold, this can lead to several hundred metres
difference in range, as found in our measurements (the probability that the worst axes were
aligned during the measurements is low; however, the average difference is enough to explain
most of the measured differences).
Vehicles' body Although antenna inhomogeneities can explain the closing/away hysteresis,
we still wanted to find whether the vehicle's body had an influence on the SSI, and thus the
range. So, we measured how the SSI reacts when the receptor vehicle is moving either away
from the emitter or closing to it, alternatively front and rear-facing, at fixed speed (50 km/h).
The antennas' relative orientation was maintained throughout the whole measurement session,
so that the non-omnidirectionality does not affect the experiment.
Our measurements show that the vehicle's orientation (and thus shape) has an influence on the
received power of no more than 2 dBm, as seen on Fig. 3.22 for a typical drive at 50 km/h. This
is small, but can still change the performance when combine with issues with the antennas.
Direction of driving Eventually, we performed a third experiment measuring SSI in order to
determine whether the driving directions had a real influence on the range, while controlling for
antenna's inhomogeneities, and if yes what was its strength. In this version of the experiment,
the receptor vehicle is moving away from and back to the emitter, but always facing the same
direction, controlling its shape and the relative orientation of the antenna. The measured
difference was not significant compared to the other scenarios.
Böhm et al. [83] claim that they measured a difference due to the direction of travel even at
walking speed, which allows them to rule out Doppler effects as a possible source for their range
difference. Measurements obtained with our set-up at low speeds (<10 km/h) do not show any
significant difference between each direction of driving. It is probable that their findings can be
attributed to non perfect omnidirectional antennas. Similarly, the range difference related to
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the direction of driving that they found, at normal driving speeds, can probably be explained
by non-omnidirectionality.
3.6.3 Frame loss
Frame loss is defined as the percentage of frames that are missed during a certain measurement
interval, which we define temporarily and according to range. It is straightforward to deduce
the actual bitrate from the nominal bitrate and the measured frame loss. The maximum range
is an important indicator, but does not say anything about the quality of transmissions within
this range. Typically, one could receive frames up to a thousand metres, yet have 90% frame loss
beginning as soon as 400 metres away from the emitter. Thus, it is also important to measure
the quality of transmission within the transmission range, typically via frame loss. Here, frame
loss is viewed from the logging application point of view. That means that any frame that is
not passed on to the IP layer is seen as lost. This include frames that are not received, or
only partially received, but also corrupted frames.
Fig. 3.23 presents the average and maximum (worst) frame loss measured over the whole
range, at 5-metre intervals. Both the 2011 and 2012 datasets are used (hence the continuing
classification along the direction of driving). Frame loss was initially computed each second,
before being re-projected on distance rather than time. One can note important fluctuations
within the transmission range, at all speeds, of the maximum frame loss (red). However, one
should remember that the maximum (red) frame loss is defined by a single data point over the
whole datasets; that is why its fluctuations are the most extreme. The average frame loss, in
green, shows less fluctuations.
Another view of the average frame loss is given in Fig. 3.24 constructed on the 2011 dataset
only; this time the direction of the driving is not taken into account. This second graph
explains the incongruous shape of the 30 km/h average frame loss in Fig. 3.23, which results
from the interaction of the two datasets, creating patterns that are not representative of actual
measurements. This can be seen when the average and maximum frame loss starts to increase
after 400 metres (away) or after 700 metres (closing). In Fig. 3.24, the average frame loss
regardless of the driving direction increases sharply at 600 metres. The average does not reach
100% because data from other runs with much larger ranges are still accounted for at that
point, and these runs did not experience a rise in frame loss at these distances. The absence
of significant difference between the direction of movement in the 2012 dataset is visible here,
when looking at the maximum ranges (beyond 1,000 metres). The dip in average frame loss
around 1,300 metres in closing conditions is not an artefact; rather, we experienced a sudden
increase of the transmission quality at some point on the track, roughly corresponding to the
bend. This suggests some factors in the environment compounded to focus the emitter's signal,
decreasing the frame loss at the receptor for about 100 metres.
The fluctuations of the average frame loss can also be explained by environmental features that
degrade the transmission's quality (scattering leading to multipath, interferences, degraded
LoS, etc.). A typical example is the destructive interferences that build up because of signal
reflected from the ground (Two-Rays propagation model), which can be seen on most sub-
graphs at distances of 100-150 metres. Changing meteorological conditions affected the signal's
quality too.
Overall, the average frame loss shows that within range, the quality of transmission is reason-
able, but far from perfect.
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Figure 3.24: Average frame loss in the 2011 dataset, not accounting for direction of driving
3.6.4 Mapping transmission ranges and frame loss rates
After the principal outdoor drive-by scenario, where results have been detailed in previous
subsections, we performed additional measurements on la routière track, taking interest into
the perturbations introduced by objects in the environments. For this, we considered a I2V-like
scenario, where a roadside unit would service an area that featured medium density occulting
objects such as trees, buildings and mounds. All these would rise at least to the same height
as the RSU's antenna. The considered area is the eastern-half of la routière, where the track
turns into what is informally dubbed the plane's tail (see areas of interest on Fig 3.25). This
scenario is useful to further illustrate the fact that 802.11p is vulnerable to LoS effects and
that its performance degrades quickly when the environment is not largely open. Note that the
maximum gain of the emitting antenna was orientated towards the straight section that the
vehicle drive directly toward the RSU.
Fig. 3.26 represents the data collected at 3 different speeds (50, 70 and 90 km/h), over 26
runs on the track, for SSI and frame loss. Frame loss is pictured as black circles, the larger
the circle, the higher the frame loss. The smallest circles mean there is no frame loss, and no
circle means there was no connection established at this point between the RSU and the vehicle
(in other words, frame loss at 100%). The SSI is colour coded, from green to dark red, each
colour representing a 10 dBm decrease in signal power. SSI data covers both application frames
and management frames (beacons), so the difference between the actual connectivity range for
the application and the range at which beacons are picked-up can be seen by comparing the
coloured area with the location of the black circles. The data confirms that range decreases
with speed. However, it also shows some variabilities; at 90 km/h, there were three sectors
at which frame loss increased quickly to 100%, leading to loss of connectivity. At 70 and 50
km/h, there were only one such sector for each speed. Interestingly, one the 100 km/h sector
was located as far away from the RSU as the maximum range obtained at 50 km/h.
An unexpected phenomenon that emerged from this data is what we labelled a capture
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Figure 3.25: Areas of interest for I2V measurements on la routière track
latency. There is an important difference between the range at which beacon frames get
captured (about 850 metres at 50 km/h, and about 750 at 90 km/h) and the range at which
application frames get captured (400 to 600 metres at 50 km/h, 250 metres at 90 km/h), in all
three speed studies. Our measurements on the speed track did not show such a difference. Upon
closer analysis, it shows that while beacons are received, some are still missed, which appears to
block the establishment of an ad-hoc network between the RSU and the vehicle hence, delaying
the transmission of the application frames. Furthermore, at times an even more problematic
phenomenon took place - capture blindness. Capture blindness takes place when the receptor
vehicle drives towards the emitter and the beacon frame is captured according to the behaviour
we just described, preventing the establishment of a proper ad-hoc network. This phenomenon
continues until the receptor drives by the emitter, at ranges smaller than 50 metres.
For an application, half of the potentially useful transmission range is lost, especially considering
that there was comparatively no difference in beacons and application frames range when the
vehicle was driving away. In that context (both for capture latency and blindness), using the
outside of BSS context mode would make sense, as a large proportion of beacon frames (>50%)
was successfully transmitted up to 700 metres away from the RSUs.
3.6.5 Latency
We define latency as the temporal delay between the generation of a frame at the emitting
device, and its receipt at the receptor device. More precisely, we consider the time when the
message is generated and sent to the transport layer (UDP) through the socket; similarly, the
receipt time is set the instant the frame is read by the application in the receptor vehicle.
Thus, latency includes IP, MAC, and physical16 layers latencies. We have not tried to measure
the specific latencies at each layer, as our main interest is in the application-to-application
latency. Indeed, understanding the global latency is essential to design robust vehicular safety
applications.
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(a) Measurements for 50 km/h
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(b) Measurements for 70 km/h
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(c) Measurements for 90 km/h
Figure 3.26: Maps of SSI and frame loss recorded on la routière track, at 50, 70 and 90 km/h
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(b) Influence of the direction of movement on latency, measured averages for 70 km/h
Figure 3.27: Outdoor latency measurements, in clean network conditions
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3.6.5.1 Analysis in clean network conditions
At first, we discussed the data on latency collected during the outdoor on-track measurements,
most notably in the drive-by scenario. In this scenario, the network is clean as there were no
other nodes active on the 5.980 GHz channel than our two IVC devices. Thus, the latencies
measured here are the best case scenario that we could possibly obtain on an open road with a
few active nodes. The results shown here used the small frames (84 bytes) that are equivalent
to frames used in an EEBL application.
Fig. 3.27a shows the average latencies measured at 30, 50, 70, 130 and 170 km/h. The
average latency is focused around 1.5 milliseconds. Results showed that average latencies are
not dependent on the relative speed of the vehicles or the range. For the latter, only at the
largest range, latency increased slightly, while still remaining under 3.5 milliseconds. At these
ranges, averages are based on fewer measurement points as the number of lost frames increased
considerably, thus they are more sensitive to outliers. It is probable that latency increases at
these large ranges when the underlying management processes in 802.11 introduce latencies as
they struggle to maintain IBSS (Independent Basic Service Set) membership over a degraded
medium link (especially considering we did not use the dot11OCBEnabled option). Indeed,
a number of beacons and other management frames have to be exchanged before any useful
transmission can take place. At long ranges, IBSS membership can be lost and regained several
times, as even management frames have difficulties getting transmitted properly. An application
frame can thus be stored in a buffer for one or two milliseconds before communication is regained
within the IBSS group. Finally, the direction of the vehicles does not have any influence on the
latencies, as illustrated by Fig. 3.27b, showing data for 70 km/h (the IBSS struggling is well
illustrated here).
Overall, 99.47% of frames' latencies were inferior to 5 milliseconds.
3.6.5.2 Analysis in crowded network conditions
In this subsection, we discuss the data collected during one outdoor scenario where the goal is
to study how latency behave in a more crowded environment, after we have established that
speed and range do not have any influence in an outdoor clean network context. The outdoor
scenario is described in 3.4.2. The latencies and frame loss are computed for the timeframe when
the emitter and receptor vehicles move in range of the noise-generating RSUs. As the RSUs
broadcast to the whole IBSS, the receptor vehicle also receive their frames up to the application
level, where they are logged as useful frames coming from the emitter vehicle. The noisy
communications are done with 500 bytes payloads sent at 20 Hz, from two broadcasters; a
central receiving-only RSUs is also present. Statistical results are presented in Table 3.5. As
latency is strictly positive, we demonstrate both the arithmetic and geometric means, as well
a the mode value (i.e. the latency that occurred the most frequently in the dataset, using the
integer part only). Showing these three values allows us to determine the actual average latency
by removing the effects of outliers.
Firstly, we compare the baseline and noisy settings with 50 bytes frames sent at a 40 Hz
frequency. The noisy environment does not seem to have a significant effect on the average
16While the wave propagation latency is likely negligible (a radio signal propagates over one kilometre in
about 3.5 microseconds), the time needed to actually emit a frame can be more significant, and depends on the
data rate
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Table 3.5: Latency statistics for the outdoor noisy scenario, with different frame settings,
compared to a clean network baseline
Setting
Mean
(arithmetic)
Mean
(geometric)
Mode σ Variance
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms²)
Baseline
50 bytes frames,
at 40 Hz
6.23 5.39 4 5.65 31.88
Noisy
50 bytes frames,
at 40 Hz
7.89 4.48 3 27.08 733.33
Noisy
500 bytes
frames, at 20 Hz
11.4 9.78 7 14.62 213.74
Noisy
1,000 bytes
frames, at 2 Hz
50.25 27.6 22 152.82 23,353
latency, as seen from the arithmetic and geometric means which are similar; the mode value
in the noisy scenario is even smaller than in the baseline. However, the effect of noise appears
in the standard deviation and variance. The standard deviation in the noisy scenario is five
times the one measured in the baseline. Latencies of 15 milliseconds are common when the
two vehicles are at its closest range, at the centre of the noisy area, with peaks up to 30-35
milliseconds.
The same type of behaviour is recorded for larger frames. It is evident that the geometric
average latency increases because of the frames' size, from 5 to 10 milliseconds when using 500
bytes frames and to 28 milliseconds with 1 kB frames. We can see that, in the latter case,
the average mean is almost twice the geometric mean, which differs from the other cases. The
standard deviation of the dataset is six times the geometric mean (which is close to the mode),
and three times the arithmetic mean. The mean and mode value show a relatively pseudo-
linear increase in latency with the frame's size, after 0.5 kB or so, although we do not have
enough data points to make more specific conclusions. Nonetheless, the large standard deviation
suggests that with larger frames, the probability in getting very important delays (i.e. larger
than 100 milliseconds) increases considerably. This might be related to the increased error rates
measured by Cheng et al. [78], Tan et al. [79] for larger frames.
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3.7 802.11p modelisation
3.7.1 Introduction
After having analysed the results of our experimental study of 802.11p performance, we can
now build the empirical model. As stated in the literature review, the state-of-the-art in
empirical modelisation of 802.11p shows that models usually focus either on higher layers of
the OSI architecture, more relevant to information dissemination in vehicular networks, or
on the actual physical layer. On the other hand, our goal is to get a model that is familiar
with simulation performance in small-to-medium sized vehicular network where no routing (or
complex topology) is required. Ultimately, this model will be used as part of our research to
support higher-level simulations, especially to study the performance of augmented perception
with realistic data. We do not propose an accurate physical model of 802.11p that would
describe metrics such as the signal strength, but one that describe performance metrics.
Because latency remains constant for the same frame size, the principal variable in the model is
frame loss. A simple latency model can be used, using a linear regression of latencies measured
for certain frame sizes. Range is defined as a subset of frame loss: indeed, the maximum range
simply express the distance at which frame loss is always 100%. The model's inputs are the
distance and relative speed between two communicating devices (vehicles or roadside device);
the model's output is a frame loss probability for the given inputs.
At first, we used a simple polynomial fitting approach to build our model. However, it quickly
proved to be under-performing to represent the variability of performance that we found over
the course of our data collection. Thus, we upgraded the model to a more complex approach
based on frame loss profiles which are re-generated from a set of parameters each time a
connection is established between two nodes. This approach itself is divided into two types
of model, one based on a logistical regression and one based on a semi-linear approach. The
semi-linear model was necessary to improve on some limitations that arose from the logistical
model. Overall, all approaches have the advantages of being relatively simple to implement in
a C++ based simulation environment such as the SiVIC/RTMaps framework (more details
in the next chapter).
The model will be able to reproduce the experimental data, but will also allow the generation
of new data, i.e. runs that have not been measured but that are plausible, given the measure-
ments. Considering the environments where the measurements campaign took place, our model
will be appropriate for open freeway-type environments, as well as rural roads and possibly
low-density suburban ones. We do not claim that our model works for urban situations, or for
non-LoS conditions. Some limitations to the model are discussed at the end of this section.
Note that the 2011 dataset will be the main source of data to build the model, rather than the
more-optimistic 2012 dataset. This allows us to account for most of the original measurement
imperfections. It can be argued that the antennas mounted on vehicles on the road will never
be perfectly omnidirectional, or face their higher gain segments at all times. Using the 2011
dataset allows us to keep this data inside the model, and also for a greater variability as the
total amount of recordings present in the dataset is larger.
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Figure 3.28: Polynomial fitting of average frame loss for 50 (green) and 70 (blue) km/h, driving
away from the emitter
3.7.2 Polynomial fitting model
The simplest and least computationally expensive way to create an empirical model of frame
loss is to apply a polynomial fitting (in the least squares sense) to our measurements. Typically,
we use the average frame loss value over a complete dataset; such a fitting is shown in Fig. 3.28
for 50 and 70 km/h (while driving away from the emitter). We initially built this model upon
the 2011 dataset, which allowed to generate 8 polynomials to create 8 speed/driving direction
classes:
speed = [0; 50] , [50; 100] , [100; 150] , [> 150]
direction = [away, closing]
The classes are shown in Fig. 3.29. TThe polynomial fitting is only used for a section of
the range, namely the range for which the average frame loss increases from a low, relatively
stable value, towards 100%. For example, at 130 km/h the increase occurs between 370 and
520 metres from the emitter. We have computed a constant frame loss probability aimed
at simulating a minimum amount of interference from the environment (ground reflections,
scattering by vegetation, etc.) before the average frame loss starts to rise. These values,
obtained by averaging the measured frame loss over the concerned distances are: for [0;50]
km/h, 0.74%; for [50;100] km/h, 0.97%; for [100;150] km/h, 1.53%; and for [>150] km/h,
2.55%. Beyond the maximum measured range, the frame loss probability is set at 100%. If the
relative speed is exactly null, the most optimistic class is selected, which is the [0;50, closing ]
class. This approach is simple, quick to develop and easy to implement in a C++ simulation
engine.
However, polynomial fitting does not allow us to represent all the variations that exist in the
experimental data, providing a too-wide approximation of actual performance. Indeed, for
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Figure 3.29: Frame loss model's classes based on polynomial fitting, taking into account direc-
tion of the driving
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Figure 3.30: Polynomial fitting of the average measured frame loss at 30 km/h (closing) for the
whole data, showing that it is insufficient to represent variations within the data; a number of
runs saw their frame loss start to increase around 600 and 800 metres, these runs would not be
appropriately accounted for with a single polynomial fitting
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example as seen in 3.6.2, at 30 km/h range varied a lot, from 460 metres in the worst case to
almost 1.4 km in the best case. Trying to get the least squares fitted upon the average frame
loss measured in these conditions would result to something akin to Fig. 3.28. Obviously, this
does not model real performance. Using a noise envelop around the average fitting would not
yield better results. Indeed, unless the noise keeps a memory of its previous realisations, the
frame loss probability at two consecutive discretised ranges (e.g. every 10 metres) could jump
to very different values. This does not correspond to the behaviour we have measured.
3.7.3 Frame loss profiles logistical model
In order to compensate for the disadvantages in the polynomial fitting, another approach is
needed; it is a requirement that it can simulate a large variability of performances and include
sources of defects like multi-path reflections from the ground, objects and vegetation, weather,
and hardware inhomogeneities. This means being able to simulate conditions from the worst
case, barely 200 metres of range, to the best case, more than one kilometre, while remaining
consistent over the time window while the two nodes are connected.
To do so, we decided to use an approach we named frame loss profiles. A profile represents a
single uninterrupted connection between two IVC devices and is used to determine the frame
loss probability at any given distance, as long as they are within range (that is, as long as frame
loss is under 100%). In using profiles we focus on modelling individual measurement runs rather
than the average frame loss as shown for all runs in Fig. 3.23; thus, by generating different
profiles we can cover the large performance variations we measured. This approach also allows
a temporally consistent frame loss probability and avoid unrealistic probability shifts at two
consecutive distances that could arise from using a simple average-plus-noise model of the
whole measurement. It is important to note however that although they are accounted for in
the model, the sources of performance variations cannot be differentiated, nor can their relative
importance be modified.
3.7.3.1 Individual frame loss profiles
A frame loss profile τ is described by equation 3.2:
τ = A. expB.(d−C)
2
+
exp (D.d+ E)
1 + exp (D.d+ E)
(3.2)
where d is the distance between the emitter and receptor; and A,B, . . . E are parameters es-
timated from empirical data. τ is the addition of two models, as illustrated in Fig. 3.31. An
instance of a profile compared to an individual measurement run is shown in Fig. 3.33.
Term A. expB.(d−C)
2
represents the frame loss area corresponding to the strongest ground re-
flection interferences, centred at distance C. At this point the ground-reflected signal is strong
enough to cancel out a large proportion of the incoming direct signal's energy, pushing a pro-
portion of frames under the reception threshold of the chipset; the frame loss corresponding to
this proportion is represented by A. The width of the bell curve is in proportion to B; note
that B is always negative. The model assumes that no counter-measure is applied to reduce
the frame loss induced by interferences at C.
The Friis transmission equation, modified to account for ground reflections, can be used to
theoretically confirm the value of C. Assuming a dry concrete ground and realistic antenna
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Figure 3.33: Comparison of a frame loss profile versus the corresponding actual measurement
heights, the Friss equation yields the received signal lowest strength at a distance of 120 metres.
The probability densities for the location of C are shown in Fig. 3.32, together with the
theoretical value computed with the Friss equation. Factors such as speed, vehicle body shape,
altitude profile of the track and pitch variations, explain that C is not always recorded at the
same distance.
Term exp(D.d+E)1+exp(D.d+E) is a logistical regression where the log-odds of τ is modelled linearly as
a function of distance d. This term represents the progressive increase of frame loss as the
received signal strength decreases. D and E by themselves have no direct physical meaning;
however, the ratio −ED corresponds to the distance from the emitter at which the average frame
loss passes over 50%. Similarly, 4D expresses the distance between the 10% and 90% frame loss
thresholds.
3.7.3.2 Frame loss profiles classes
We created three classes, which are classified according to the relative speed between the emitter
and receptor. Since the measurements have shown that the direction of movement is not an
actual influence on 802.11p performance, it is not used in this model. The classes are:
speed = [0; 50] , [50; 100] , [100; 150]
The model's parameters A,B, . . . E are estimated on the 2011 dataset using the Levenberg-
Marquardt algorithm for non-linear least squares [95], for each class. Experimental data show
that D and E are linearly correlated. The other parameters are assumed to be independent.
The relationship between D and E is given by a Generalised Linear Model regression from the
observed values of D and E:
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Figure 3.34: Distributions of parameters A,B,C,D extracted from experimental data, for low
speeds (0 to 50 km/h)
E = αD + β + e e N (0, σ) (3.3)
Then, for each class and each parameter A,B,C,D (so excluding E), a non-parametric probab-
ility density estimate is computed; no classical distributions would accurately fit the observed
distributions, which leads to a choice of a non-parametric approach. The continuous distribu-
tion A,B,C,D of each parameter A,B,C,D are computed with a Gaussian kernel smoothing
method (the distribution E of the parameter E can be obtained through its linear correlation
with D).
A sample of the extracted distributions is shown in Fig. 3.34 for the low speeds class ([0; 50]
km/h). Based on the outliers recorded on tracks, the parameters' distribution do not allow for
a range greater than 1,500 metres to be achieved by the model.
3.7.3.3 Profiles generation
We will now provide an illustration of the frame loss profiles generated by our model. In a
simulation environment such as the one presented in the next chapter, the parameters' distri-
butions are used to generate realistic random parameters for the frame loss profile model. To
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generate sets of parameters, the inverse transform sampling method is used. The A,B,C,D
distributions for each class are transformed into cumulative distribution functions Gx where
x ∈ {A,B,C,D}. These cumulative distributions are then used as follows:
1. For each x ∈ {A,B,C,D} // x is a parameter and x its distribution
(a) u← U(0, 1) // a random number u is generated from the uniform distribution U(0, 1)
(b) x← G−1x (u) // a parameter receives the value from its inverse cumulative distribu-
tion
2. End For
3. E ← αD + β + e // E is obtained from the linear relationship that links it to D, where
α and β are the regression parameters and e is the Gaussian noise e N (0, σ)
4. τ = A. expB.(d−C)
2
+ exp(D.d+E)1+exp(D.d+E) // Once each parameter has been assigned a value, τ
can be processed from the values with Eq. (3.2)
Fig. 3.35a shows the range that our model can achieve in generating individual frame loss
profiles; each curve is a single different drawing of u for the parameters. The ground-reflection
interference remain concentrated around the 120-metre mark (as shown in the zoomed-in graph
from 3.35b), and the rising part shows a large range of variability: the best case profile allowed
an error-free connection between two nodes until almost 1,000 metres, while on the other hand
the worst case profile did not even return to a very low loss probability (i.e. less than 5%) after
passing the ground interference area, yielding a total range of barely 300 metres.
Each individual profile represent a set of specific conditions that could be found on the road; a
profile can represent realistic conditions on a sunny or on a rainy day. Changing the paramet-
ers of the Gaussian kernel smoothing method allows generating distributions for the model's
parameters that either closely reproduce experimental data or, on the other hand, allow non-
measured but plausible profiles.
In Fig. 3.36a, we show the distribution of the point at which frame loss reaches 50%, expressed
in our model as the ratio −ED , obtained for 1,000 profile generations. The influence of relative
speed on frame loss (and range) is clear, as the bulk of generated profiles shift from a relatively
uniform distribution towards being concentrated in the 200 to 400-metre interval. Similarly, in
Fig. 3.36b we show the distribution of C, the point of maximum ground-reflection interference,
as obtained for 1,000 profile generations in each class.
However, this logistical model has a few limitations. Most of the distributions are estimated
independently of each other (they are not correlated), which can lead to the generation of
parameters whose values are independently realistic, but combination is unlikely. One must
decided beforehand what is deemed an acceptable level of innovation from the model regarding
the experimental data.
The most important limitation however, is found in an average trailing effect that takes place
at large range values, when the average of many profiles are considered. When comparing the
average frame loss obtained from many profile generations with the average experimental frame
loss (see Fig. 3.41), one notices that the model does not reach a 100% frame loss until very
large range values, compared to the measured data. This trailing arises from the asymptotic
nature of term exp(D.d+E)1+exp(D.d+E) , and means that there is a non-zero probability of letting some
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(b) Zoom on the frame loss peaks caused by ground-reflection interferences, for 12 drawings of u
Figure 3.35: Generation of frame loss profiles for the [50;100] km/h class
3.7. 802.11P MODELISATION 97
200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
0
20
40
60
Range (metres)
# 
of
 in
st
an
ce
s
[0;50] km/h
200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
0
20
40
60
Range (metres)
# 
of
 in
st
an
ce
s
[50;100] km/h
200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
0
20
40
60
Range (metres)
# 
of
 in
st
an
ce
s
[100;150] km/h
(a) Distribution of −E
D
50 75 100 125 150 175 200
0
50
100
150
Range (metres)
# 
of
 in
st
an
ce
s
[0;50] km/h
50 75 100 125 150 175 200
0
50
100
150
Range (metres)
# 
of
 in
st
an
ce
s
[50;100] km/h
50 75 100 125 150 175 200
0
50
100
150
Range (metres)
# 
of
 in
st
an
ce
s
[100;150] km/h
(b) Distribution of C
Figure 3.36: Distributions of parameters for the low (red, [0;50] km/h), intermediate (green,
[50;100] km/h), and high (blue, [100;150] km/h) speed classes, for a thousand drawings each
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Figure 3.37: Decomposition of a frame loss profile τ , with its parameters
frames pass at infinite ranges. Infinite ranges can be avoided by forcing the frame loss profile
at 100% past a certain range threshold (typically 1,500 metres), but it can be argued that it
is a relatively non-elegant solution. However, a small probability that a frame passes at more
than 1 km in some classes will, where no experimental data showed such a behaviour.
3.7.4 Frame loss profiles semi-linear model
In order to compensate for the non-zero transmission success probability produced by logistical
frame profile model, we refined our approach to ensure that the frame loss does reach 100%
within the maximum range measured during our on-track experiments. Instead of having a
logistical regression-based second term, we now use a linear second term.
3.7.4.1 Individual Frame Loss Profiles
In this new version of the model, a single frame loss profile τ is now described by:
τ = max
[
A. expB.(d−C)
2
; min (max [D.d+ E;F ] ; 1)
]
(3.4)
where d is still the distance between the emitter and receptor; and A,B, . . . F are the model's
new parameters. The new frame profile shape is illustrated on Fig. 3.37. Term A. expB.(d−C)
2
is the same as in the logistical model. The new term D.d+ E is a linear regression where τ is
modelled linearly as a function of distance d and parameters D and E. This term represents the
progressive increase of frame loss as the received signal strength decrease. The increase starts
from a non-zero frame loss ratio value given by parameter F , which represents the average small
perturbations measured within range. Typically, F will be low (less than 5%). D and E have
two meaningful ratios: ratio F−ED gives the distance at which frame loss starts to increase from
the plateau at F ; ratio 1−ED expresses the distance at which frame loss reaches 100%, hence
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Figure 3.38: Comparison of a semi-linear frame loss profile versus an actual measurement
the maximum range. An instance of a new semi-linear profile compared to a typical individual
measurement run is shown on Fig. 3.38.
3.7.4.2 Frame Loss Profiles Classes
In order to further refine our model, we changed the classes so that they are now four, which
are classified according to the relative speed between the emitter and receptor:
speed = [0; 40] , [40; 60] , [60; 100] , [100; 160]
The model's parameters A,B, . . . F are estimated again using the Levenberg-Marquardt al-
gorithm. D and E are linearly correlated and the other parameters are also assumed to be
independent. The relationship between D and E is the same as given by Eq. (3.3). To enhance
the model's ability to reproduce experimental data more closely, the high speed class is actually
subdivided into 3 additional classes that depend on the D and E correlation parameters (α and
β).
As previously, the continuous distribution A,B,C,D,F of each parameter A,B,C,D, F are
computed with a Gaussian kernel smoothing method. The distribution E is obtained through
its linear correlation with D; the correlation-related specific subclass is selected through a
stratified randomisation, based on experimental data.
3.7.4.3 Profiles Generation
The procedure to generate profiles remain unchanged; we give it again for the sake of clarity.
The A,B,C,D,F distributions for each class are transformed into cumulative distribution
functions Gx where x ∈ {A,B,C,D,F}. For parameter E, we have three pairs of the linear
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regression coefficients {αi, βi}, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and a discretised cumulative distribution H,
so that:
H (1) = ψ
H (2) = ω
H (3) = 1
where {ψ, ω} ∈ [0; 1]2 and ψ ≤ ω , which represent the relative weight of each correlation regime
(subclass) in the experimental data. These cumulative distributions are then used as follows:
1. For each x ∈ {A,B,C,D, F} // x is a parameter and x its distribution
(a) u← U(0, 1) // a random number u is generated from the uniform distribution U(0, 1)
(b) x← G−1x (u) // a parameter receives the value from its inverse cumulative distribu-
tion
2. End For
3. v ← U(0, 1) // a random number v is generated from the uniform distribution U(0, 1)
4. i← H−1(v) // i takes the value from the inverse cumulative distribution
5. {α, β} ← {αi, βi}// the pair of coefficient that corresponds to the value of i is selected
6. E ← αD+ β + e // E is obtained from the linear relationship that links it to D, e is the
Gaussian noise e N (0, σ)
7. τ = max
[
A. expB.(d−C)
2
; min (max [D.d+ E;F ] ; 1)
]
// Once each parameter has been
assigned a value, τ can be processed from the values with Eq. (3.4)
Fig. 3.39a shows the range of variations achieved by the new semi-linear model in the [60; 100]
class. By computing the average of many generated profiles we obtain curves that accurately
reproduce the average measurements, as shown in Fig. 3.40 for the averages of a thousand
profiles of each class. Fig. 3.41 shows how the semi-linear model improves on the logistical one
(the intermediate speeds class is shown).
Thus, the semi-linear model solves the trailing effect that was problematic with the logistical
model, and shows that with an appropriate set of parameters, the model can closely reproduce
experimental data. It remains possible to obtain more diversity by adapting the Gaussian kernel
smoothing method, as recommended for the logistical model.
In a simulated environment, a profile can be generated each time a connection is established
between 2 nodes (typically when it enters within a static maximum range threshold); one emitter
can have several profiles active at the same time if it is connected to more than one receptor.
Some limitations remain with this new model. At first, there is no way of knowing which
conditions effects a particular profile. If two neighbouring vehicles are connected to the same
emitter, it is possible that one vehicle has a profile corresponding to dry, sunny weather while
the other has humid, overcast conditions. Secondly, the model's user cannot select a specific
type of influence, such as weather (the only way to do so would be to include sub-classes that
would have their own distributions of A,B, . . . F ). Small correlations between other parameters
than D and E have not been investigated and might still have an effect on the overall model.
3.7. 802.11P MODELISATION 101
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Range (metres)
Fr
am
e 
lo
ss
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
(a) Frame loss profiles generated with 100 sets of drawings of u
50 100 150 200
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Range (metres)
Fr
am
e 
lo
ss
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
(b) Zoom on the frame loss peaks caused by ground-reflection interferences, for 100 sets of drawings of u
Figure 3.39: Generation of frame loss profiles for the [60;100] km/h class
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Figure 3.40: Averages of 1,000 profiles for each of the four classes, compared to the measured
averages (in black)
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Figure 3.41: Comparison of the averages for the experimental data and the two models (for
class [60; 100] km/h)
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3.8 Conclusion: influence of 802.11p limitations on aug-
mented perception and safety applications
In this chapter, we have extensively discussed the results of an empirical performance evaluation
of 802.11p, with a focus on supporting higher-level CS safety applications. Data from this
evaluation was used to build a new empirical model that will be utilised in the following chapters,
to support our CS simulation architecture and, eventually, augmented perception. However,
we must now discuss the consequences of the results from our evaluations, on upper layers of a
cooperative architecture. The performance attainable by 802.11p strictly limits the performance
one gets from an augmented map, or any other type of applications expected to use remote
information shared through wireless telecommunications.
Range showed a strong dependency on the relative speed between the emitter and the receptor.
Frame loss follows the same trend, since frame loss and range are related. The best findings
from our investigations concerns latency. Indeed, we have found that latency depends on the
size of the data exchanged. For 100 bytes MAC frames, latency remains under 4 milliseconds in
almost all circumstances, regardless of range and relative speed. Relative speed did not show any
influence, and range mattered only when close to maximum range, as ad-hoc mode mechanisms
started to delay the transmission of frames. Note that large frames will probably be affected
in these conditions and fare worse than the smaller frames we used for our measurements.
While it might not change much for smaller frames, the specific OCB mode that was created
for 802.11p will likely extend the range compared to ad-hoc mode. Indeed, frames sent with
the OCB mode should offer, given the same exact hardware set-up, similar performance as
management frames. Our measurements have shown that management frames (beacons) could
be picked up, up to 200 metres further than normal frames in some settings.
A trend that emerged from the analysis of our data is that a lot of previous studies must have
overestimated the performance of 802.11p, our results being more pessimistic than existing
literature in most cases. We used a fairly low-cost set-up, which is typically what automotive
manufacturers will want to have before CS start getting deployed on the road. We believe
our implementation is not a deployment-worthy one. Yet, it is likely that the only major
difference between our setup and actual ones in the future, is the antenna. We were limited
by hardware availability, and had to use stick antennas, which are unlikely to be deployed on
the road (but for some very specific cases). As shown in previous research [93, 86, 81] and our
own results, antennas are important. If combined with the vehicle's body effects, the quality
of antennas led to range variations amounting up to 500 metres, and explained a perceived
directivity in maximum transmission range. We can confidently argue that it explains some
unexpected findings from previous studies, notably the very directivity from [83]. Nonetheless,
these hardware inhomogeneities alone cannot explain the total performance variability that
was measured. Some arose from meteorological conditions, such as the relative air humidity,
while others have sources that remain unidentified. A particularly infamous phenomenon was
the capture blindness that we experienced many times. The receptor vehicle was unable to
pick-up frames sent by the static emitter until it was less than 50 metres away, while nothing
had changed from previous experimental runs.
Based on these measurements, we propose a new, simple approach to build an application-
oriented model of 802.1p performance. This model has the advantage of taking into account all
the variations we discussed above, and to also reproduce their relatively unpredictable beha-
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viour. This model, we believe, bridges the gap between physical layer and network models by
providing a focus on some simple, yet central, performance indicators for 802.11p in small-to-
medium sized networks. It will be entirely focused on delivering realistic performance indicators
to upper-layer CS simulations. It will also form the basis of our CS simulation architecture de-
scribed in Chapter 4, and the augmented map building approach from Chapter 5 onwards.
What do the present chapter's findings say in terms of limitations for augmented perception?
In Mourllion [31], the author recommends an augmented map covering a radius of 500 metres
around the ego-vehicle. Within the context of their study, this value applies to a freeway
context, and is probably too large for an urban setting. At 130 km/h, 500 metres corresponds
to approximately 15 seconds, which is a reasonable timeframe for safety applications. However,
given our data, the range of actually achieving communication with other vehicles and RSUs for
an ego-vehicle driving on a freeway will vary widely. Indeed, connectivity range with RSUs will
be relatively limited. With a frame loss threshold of 25%, reliable connection will be established
with the RSUs only 400 metres ahead of it. In most cases, frame loss will be lower than 5% only
within 250 metres of the RSUs. Connectivity with vehicles driving in the opposite direction is
even worse, as their relative speed is largely above 200 km/h. In that case, range will shrink
to values which are close to 802.11g/n specifications, that is: 150-250 metres. However, the
ego-vehicle will still be able to achieve long range communications with a vehicle driving in the
same direction. This might be used to compensate for the limited connectivity with RSUs and
counter-driving vehicles, by using relaying schemes.
The influence of these limitations on safety applications will depend on the applications' specific
goals. On an freeway, a vehicle-hosted collision warning application will likely be able to perform
well, within Mourllion's augmented map radius, as there is no requirement to connect to counter-
driving vehicles or to RSUs, especially if the percentage of equipped vehicles is large enough.
However, an exit/entry ramp monitoring application hosted on a RSU might find it more useful
to use a range of other exteroceptive sensors rather than rely on 802.11p. In a suburban setting,
where relative speeds will be lower, 802.11p performance will be better, although non-LoS will
have to be considered there.
In conclusion, 802.11p-based telecommunication have the necessary qualities to support CS in
general, and augmented map building in particular, but developers must be cautious about the
expected performance. They specifically need to account for the possibility that performance
can degrade quickly and in an unexpected manner. We will remain cautious of this fact for
the remainder of this research, which calls for using robust data fusion methods to build the
augmented map.
Summary of chapter's contributions
 Outcomes
 An open-source 802.11p IVCD was successfully deployed on vehicles.
 A comprehensive evaluation of 802.11p IVC was performed on track in a close-to-
real-road setting.
 An empirical model of key 802.11p performance metrics was developed.
 Key findings
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 802.11p performance was worse than expected in terms of range.
 Range (and frame loss) showed a strong dependence on the relative speed between
an emitter and a receptor.
 Fluctuations of up to 500 metres were possible depending on the quality of the
antenna.
 Latency was limited, and remained stable regardless of speed or range.
 Limitations
 The measurements did not account for the presence of other vehicles, IVC-equipped
or not.
 Latency was measured principally for smaller frames, the scope of measurements
with larger frames remained limited.
 The specific outside of BBS context mode for 802.11p was not used.
 The 802.11p model is not adapted for VANETs of more than a few vehicles.
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Chapter 4
Simulation architecture for
Cooperative Systems applications
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the limitations of the most common telecommunication techno-
logy used to support Cooperative Systems (CS). It demonstrated how the theoretical perform-
ance of 802.11p has been overestimated. Indeed, if simple and inexpensive hardware is allowed
to achieve performance strong enough to support potential safety-critical CS applications, care
had to be taken in some settings. Notably, we showed that the range reduction linked to high
relative speeds suppress any range advantage that telecommunications could have on exclus-
ively mono-vehicle sensors. The previous chapter then built an empirical model of 802.11p.
To support this model, we argued that we needed a modelisation of performance metrics that
were the most relevant to higher-level simulations of CS application. Such simulations aim at
studying the benefits of CS application, notably for road safety, without having to account for
finer details in the underlying network layers; this is the research methodology that was chosen
at the conclusion of Chapter 2.
The aim of the present chapter is to design and build a simulation architecture that can support
higher-level CS applications. It should be generic enough to be used to support studies on
many different types of CS applications, including but not limited to augmented perception.
Demonstrating the simulation architecture's usefulness will be a two-tiered process; (1) at first,
our goal will be to show that previous results on the safety benefits of IVC can be validated
using the architecture; then (2) our goal will be to test whether these results still hold when the
simulation's realism is increased. Building such an architecture relates to the following research
questions outlined in Chapter 1:
1. Can an augmented map-based risk assessment system be more efficient than a similar
non-cooperative system?
2. What are augmented perception limitations, given current technology in embedded com-
puting and telecommunications?
Chapter 3 has partially answered the second question by addressing the issue of telecommunica-
tions limitations. The present chapter will provide the framework within which further answers
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will become achievable.
Indeed, the architecture designed in the present chapter will be used within this thesis as the
core framework in which research on augmented perception will take place. In Chapter 3, we
argued that before looking into CS, it was necessary to study the performance of their underlying
level, telecommunications, in the road environment. Similarly, in the present chapter, we must
first build a realistic simulation environment before any meaningful research on augmented
perception can be undertaken. The CS simulation architecture was built by taking advantage of
the multiple functionalities of the SiVIC simulator and the RTMaps multi-sensors prototyping
platform. This architecture is very versatile and can be used to simulate a wide variety of on-
road scenarios. Its principal contribution is to increase the degree of realism for CS simulations,
notably by incorporating the 802.11p IVC model developed in Chapter 3. As mentioned before,
it will provide an environment within which augmented perception will be built and evaluated.
As such, it is a second important stepping stone toward augmented map construction.
However, before addressing augmented perception in the next chapter, we will firstly discuss
results related to the safety benefits of CS, by considering only our reference scenario (the
vehicles string). This will allow us to demonstrate the usefulness and interest of our simulation
architecture outside of augmented perception per se, with an EEBL application of increasing
complexity.
Since the aim of this chapter is to develop a CS simulation architecture to study safety-orientated
cooperative applications which includes augmented perception, it makes sense to use a reference
scenario that is not too complex and where CS safety benefits can be immediately verified by
acting on only a limited set of parameters. Indeed, thanks to this relatively simple scenario,
there have been a number of studies on the safety benefits of introducing IVC inside strings of
vehicles. So far, these results have been generally positive, showing that even a limited amount
of cooperative vehicles was enough to decrease crashes and by extension, reduce road fatalities.
A more detailed description of these results was provided in Chapter 2.
In the first part, we show that we can reproduce results from previous simulations with a
simple version of the EEBL scenario within our simulation framework. However, many of these
previous simulations make important assumptions on the telecommunication's performance or
limit the realism of the string's behaviour (for example, by having strings of regularly spaced
homogeneous vehicles). In the second part, we use a more realistic scenario with strings that
differ at each run. Our architecture allows studying finer details than generally available in other
comparable simulations, which has allowed us to obtain unexpected new results regarding some
of the criteria used to assess the safety benefits of EEBL. They show that EEBL might actually
not decrease the severity of rear-end collisions, even though the actual number of such collisions
is reduced.
Chapter Outline
The first section presents the rationale and motivation for building a CS simulation architecture
in great detail, notably outlying the requirements for an accurate simulation of Cooperative
applications.
Then, the second section presents the design of our CS simulation architecture. Firstly, it intro-
duces the software that enables our architecture (further details are available in the appendices).
Next, it explains its design in detail, and provides a validation to our implementation. In the
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third section, the architecture's validation is achieved by reproducing previous results using our
architecture.
The fourth section discusses the improvements enabled by our architecture. In the first instance,
it presents how our architecture can be used to study CS usage scenarios with a high degree
of granularity, notably by extending on the scenario used for validation. Then, we discuss new
results that have emerged from simulating EEBL. It shows that some, not all, safety benefits of
EEBL may have been overestimated with previous simulations, especially regarding the safety
criterion based on the severity of collisions.
Lastly, the fifth section closes this chapter with a summary of its main contributions and
findings.
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Rationale: a complex CS simulation architecture for close-to-reality simulation
In Chapter 2, we discussed why the relative failure of an on-road implementation of an EEBL
system warranted a focus on simulations to study the limitations or the effectiveness of CS,
specifically the vehicles string scenario. In this section, we will discuss the rationale behind
developing an improved simulation architecture that is generic enough to be used to support
studies on many types of CS applications, including but not limited to, the vehicles string
scenario and augmented perception.
Advanced simulation architectures or platforms are highly desirable for CS. Indeed, develop-
ing CS requires additional resources, notably in terms of telecommunication and perception
hardware, which are both time consuming and expensive. Therefore, it is essential to have
a simulation environment or platform that allows prototyping and evaluating extended, en-
riched and cooperative Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) in the early stages of
the system's design. There are many ways prototyping and evaluation can be undertaken, for
example, developers might want to test the effectiveness of an anti-collision application at an
intersection under a number of different traffic conditions. Or, they might want to test its
robustness to changing meteorological conditions. For that, a virtual simulation platform has
to integrate models of various road environments, virtual on-vehicle sensors (proprioceptive &
exteroceptive), infrastructure-based sensors and IVC devices, which are all consistent with the
laws of physics. Similarly, a physics-based model for vehicular dynamics coupled with actuators
(steering wheel angle, torques on each wheel) is required to maximise realism. By using such
a platform, it becomes possible to accurately simulate the performance of future cooperative
ADAS within a realistic environment.
We concluded in Chapter 2 that it was warranted to improve existing simulations of the vehicles
string scenario in order to study the benefits of EEBL in a more realistic environment. Such
an effort should also lead to the creation of a platform that meet the requirements outlined
in the previous paragraph, where augmented perception can be studied, as well as any other
type of cooperative application. So, our aim shall be to develop an architecture that can
simulate and evaluate CS applications in a broader context, to continue on verifying the safety
benefits of EEBL (such as in [22, 23]) and to enable the accurate simulation of complex systems
featuring augmented perception. Eventually, this architecture should be able to support the
development of actual CS applications that will be deployed on the road, for prototyping like
we did in Chapter 2 or for actual commercial use.
The proposed architecture builds upon the SiVIC-RTMaps interconnected platform function-
alities [28, 96] to meet performance and realism requirements. Our CS simulation architecture
will bring several improvements to the SiVIC-RTMaps coupling, notably IVC as well as vehicle
control. The principal change is the extension to the existing transponder-like IVC simulation
in SiVIC [97] using the 802.11p empirical model we created in Chapter 3. This allows simulat-
ing small-scale networks of IVC-equipped vehicles and RSUs on a freeway, rural or suburban
context. In order to have a real-life simulation of a human driver as well as introducing mech-
anisms related to CCW like emergency braking manoeuvres, several improvements are made to
the vehicle's controllers compared to previous versions. Having realistic vehicle motion model
and controllers are important, as some CS safety-orientated applications need to act on the
vehicle's behaviour to perform their task. For example in the vehicles string scenario, it is
important to have a realistic braking model to simulate emergency braking manoeuvres. We
will present the architecture's different modules, including supporting platforms such as SiVIC
in further detail in section 4.2.
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Within this chapter, the main goal of our architecture is to evaluate the impact of introducing
IVC devices into a driving situation that can lead to crashes, compared to using non-cooperative
ADAS or without any ADAS altogether. To demonstrate that we can obtain meaningful results,
we will show how an EEBL application can be simulated with it, using the reference vehicles
string scenario. This will happen in two stages.
Firstly, in order to validate our approach, we have found that our application reproduces results
from the previous larger scale simulations [22, 23] (see 4.3) using a simplified scenario. Secondly,
some new results have emerged by using a more realistic scenario (see 4.4). Indeed, we evalu-
ated the severity of crashes, via the computation of the Equivalent Energy Speed (EES, more
details on how to compute it are given 4.3.3), from several hundred runs of our own simulation.
If introducing IVC decreases the number of crashes as expected, the average EES does not
decrease. This means that the severity of the remaining crashes remain constant, whatever the
percentage of IVC-equipped vehicles are.
These results raises a few concerns about the actual safety benefits of EEBL in particular, and
IVC or CS in general. It is often assumed that IVC can help in reducing the severity of crashes
(notably for the vehicles string scenario in Mourllion [31]), and in some cases it might be more
beneficial to favour this effect rather than focusing on reducing crash numbers (a practice called
crash mitigation or pre-crash braking). Our results do not invalidate the benefits of EEBL, as we
did get a significant reduction of collisions when IVC was randomly distributed in the vehicles
string with an increased equipment percentage. However, our results suggest that the efficiency
of an EEBL application in reducing the severity of the crashes might have been overestimated
by studies such as [22, 23]. These results are discussed in more details in 4.4 and 4.5.
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4.2 CS/EEBL simulation architecture design
In this section, we will explain the simulation architecture's modules (namely, the V2V/I
802.11p simulation and vehicles controllers), as well as the underlying functionalities of the
SiVIC and RTMaps platforms that support it.
4.2.1 SiVIC-RTMaps interconnection
Our CS simulation architecture is based on the interconnection of the sensors simulation plat-
form SiVIC and the prototyping platform RTMaps. The combined platforms offer many of
the functionalities that are required for advanced simulations of cooperative applications, thus
limiting further additional developments.
SiVIC [28] is a platform designed to enhance the process of developing and evaluating ADAS.
This platform enables the simulation of multi-frequency sensors embedded in static or dynamic
devices, equipments and vehicles commonly used in ADAS. In this context, raw data from
perception systems or actuators systems are substituted by realistic synthesised data or devices.
This functionality is useful for scenarios featuring hazardous environments, complex situations,
or nonexistent or erroneous data (from sensors or actuators). Moreover, data analysis can always
be performed with accurate ground truth references. Initially, the SiVIC platform was built
with the objective of prototyping local perception applications. Since then, ongoing extension
of the platform include the virtual prototyping of control/command or decision algorithms [98]
and CS applications [97].
RTMaps is marketed by Intempora1, based upon work undertaken at Mines ParisTech a
decade ago [94]. Its primary goal is to record and process a large number of simultaneous data
flows such as images, laserscanner scans, positioning data (from GPS, odometer or INS), etc.
User-developed algorithms, for image processing or data fusion for example, can be deployed in
the RTMaps framework in dedicated libraries called packages. Packages themselves contain
components that can apply specific treatments to the data flow. Recorded data can be easily
replayed, which is especially useful to fine tune algorithms with multiple re-runs of the same
on-tracks measurement. The interconnection between SiVIC and RTMaps allows us to replace
real measurements with simulated ones at RTMaps's inputs, creating a fully Software-In-the-
Loop (SIL) development and prototyping approach.
4.2.2 The SiVIC platform
4.2.2.1 Platform's objectives & general functionalities
Many developments aim at improving the safety of road environments through ADAS. These
studies generally take into account an ego-vehicle perception and the corresponding reaction
of the vehicle (e.g. braking and accelerating). However, an ego perception is no longer suffi-
cient in many situations, as additional information is needed to minimise risk and maximise
driving security. This additional information requires additional resources which are both time
consuming and expensive.
The SiVIC platform is a very efficient tool to develop, prototype and assess high level ADAS
(see Fig. 4.1a), including CS applications. It uses a realistic graphics environment (Fig. 4.1b),
1www.intempora.com
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(a) General architecture of ADAS prototyping with SiVIC
(b) Multiple captures from the Versailles-Satory's test tracks scenery; SiVIC's visual rendering is focused on
generating accurate image dynamic, rather than merely acceptable realism to human eyes
Figure 4.1: The SiVIC platform
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supported by physically accurate behaviours for vehicles and sensors. It can generate a flow of
time-stamped and synchronised data that can be recorded and/or interacted with by prototyp-
ing and/or data treatment platforms such as RTMaps or Matlab. Furthermore, SiVIC can
generate multiple scenarios with event-driven mechanisms, so that the robustness and reliability
of control and perception algorithms can be extensively tested against many parameters. Thus,
SiVIC can be used, coupled with a platform such as RTMaps, to perform most developments
in a Software-In-the-Loop (SIL) approach, pushing the on-vehicle testing further towards the
end of the development cycle. At this stage, algorithms developed in RTMaps and tested with
SiVIC can be seamlessly integrated into an on-board hardware.
4.2.2.2 Sensors modelling
Proprioceptive and exteroceptive sensors are modelled in SiVIC so that from the point of view
of an algorithm, there is no difference between a fully SIL sensor and an on-vehicle sensor.
Sensors available in SiVIC are:
 Observers that output reference data on an object's position and behaviour
 Cameras (can be configured as software or hardware cameras)
 Inertial Navigation Systems (3 axes accelerometer + 3 axes gyrometer)
 Infrared transmitter (for LoS IVC)
 Odometer
 Telemetric laserscanner (multi-layered, capable of using either ray-tracing or Z-Buffer
methods)
 Radiofrequency transponders.
At the time of writing, additional sensors are being implemented in SiVIC which are close
to deployment. Most are related to the implementation of a realistic model of electromagnetic
waves propagation in the platform. They include a GPS simulation that goes up to the influence
of the satellite's ephemerides and radar. It is the RF transponders, which are used for a CS
application in [97], that are extended here to take advantage of a more realistic model of IVC
behaviour, based on field measurements. The most advanced electromagnetic systems models
could be used, but unless a perfectly life-like simulation is required, they will generally add
too much processing requirements to a CS-orientated application. Our empirical model has the
advantage of being both realistic and computationally light enough, compared to those lower
level physical models.
4.2.2.3 Vehicles modelling
SiVIC provides a parametric model developed by Sébastien Glaser [99] (see also [100]) for the
dynamic behaviour of the vehicle bodywork on the three axes (roll, pitch and yaw/heading). It
also takes into account the dynamics of shock absorbers and non-linear tyre road forces [101,
102]. Eventually, coupling between longitudinal and lateral axes, the impact of normal force
variations, and alignment of the car are also integrated. The vehicle's chassis is modelled with
an unbending suspended mass. This model allows installing a large number of on-board sensors
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easily. We will use the notations of the chassis dynamics illustrated in Fig. 4.2. This model's
architecture can be enhanced, if necessary, with advanced control chassis such as ESP, ABS or
power train. It is also straightforward enough to install many sensors that will feed observers
(amongst others) and ultimately, control algorithms. Several control modes are available; (1)
human driver; (2) raw trajectory following (discarding many physical limitations of the vehicle);
(3) realistic trajectory following lateral and longitudinal controllers; and (4) external control
from RTMaps or any similar development platform.
Figure 4.2: Dynamic vehicle model
Using a realistic model vehicle as part of our CS simulation architecture is important on many
different levels. The simulation must be able to accurately reproduce the vehicle's behaviour
when performing active tasks, such as an automated emergency braking manoeuvre or co-
operative driving/manoeuvring. This is useful as part of the EEBL application which will be
demonstrated later in this chapter. Furthermore, studying augmented perception and, further
on, risk in a given driving simulation, requires that the behaviour of vehicles be reproduced
accurately at both short (less than a second) and medium (up to a few minutes) time scales.
4.2.3 Overall architecture
From the beginning, we developed our CS simulation architecture for EEBL applications, spe-
cifically to simulate strings of IVC-equipped vehicles. However, it can be easily expanded and
applied to other scenarios by adding the appropriate modules. Indeed, the architecture is
partially scenario-specific, both in SiVIC and RTMaps:
 Scenarios are built in SiVIC using script files that specify the location of objects and many
other parameters such as the environment, type of sensors mounted on vehicles, etc.
 The cooperative application itself is developed and implemented in RTMaps in the
form of specific-purpose components. For example in this chapter, it takes the form of a
component, tasked with computing the vehicles' control commands within a set of rules,
influenced by the traffic situation and messages exchanged over a virtual V2V network.
However, developments such as vehicles' control mechanisms (the controller equations them-
selves) and the 802.11p model are not scenario-dependent and are an integral part of SiVIC,
which remains available at all times.
Fig. 4.3 shows the data flow and relationship between the environment, sensors and algorithms.
At the environment level, the different objects considered as part of the road includes obstacles
and beacons that belong to the transponder simulation. The road (technically, each segment)
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has a set of information that describes its curvature or the number of lanes, amongst other
things. This data is recorded by the sensors embedded on each vehicle. The vehicles also receive
information from the upper layer (algorithms) so that controllers can act upon them.Vehicle
1 is considered the leader and is fitted with a transmitter, while the other vehicles (2 to n)
are followers, fitted with receptors. Apart from this distinction, each vehicle has identical
features. At the upper layer, a set of algorithms use information sensors to perform a number
of tasks. It is here that most of the user-developed application will be located, for example an
augmented map-building application, which receives information collected by sensors (including
the information that is transmitted via the 802.11p simulation).
The arrows between the middle and upper layer show the data/action chain that occurs when
the EEBL simulation is run. At the onset, data flow is relatively straightforward. Data from
the environment is flowed to the decision and control algorithms that compute the commands,
which is then fed back to the actuators so the vehicles maintain a string as specified by the
user. Then, at some point an event is triggered in the leader vehicle (by the decision/event
upper algorithm first), which starts the emergency braking manoeuvre. New commands are
sent to the leader's actuators as well as to the communication module, allowing the diffusion of
the emergency braking command further down the vehicles string.
Fig. 4.4 shows the actual implementation of relationships and functionalities from Fig. 4.3
in the SiVIC-RTMaps environment. Command algorithm functions take place principally in
RTMaps. Vehicles are controlled with a combination of the cooperative system and control
blocks. They use information shared via IVC, obtained from sensors to command the vehicle's
behaviour in SiVIC. Data is exchanged between SiVIC and RTMaps through a shared memory
stack and Data Distribution Service (DDS) middleware. One can notice that the possibility
of human control is given to vehicles; a scenario with a vehicles string formed from many
human-driven vehicles is achievable using distributed computing.
Information collection for the command algorithms and information exchange through IVC take
place exclusively within SiVIC; there is no exchange of information in RTMaps between the
components controlling the vehicles. Here, vehicle 1 can have additional control constraints as
required by the scenario, which in the EEBL one is mainly the location of the emergency braking
event. However, there is no limitation on solely imposing additional constraints to vehicle 1,
this is only a requirement of the EEBL scenario. Actually, there is no specific difference between
the components controlling the leader and the followers, thus allowing them to perform each
role interchangeably.
4.2.4 Pre-existing transponders simulation
The pre-existing transponders simulation comprises of two plug-ins, for transmission and recep-
tion and both are strictly one way. Each plug-in can be attached to any object in the simulation,
from vehicles to roadside objects. The simulation is driven from the receptor's point of view.
Whenever prompted, a receptor will check all the transmitters loaded in the simulation are in
range, as specified in the receptor's parameters. Each emitter within range will then transmit
its data frame. It is possible to use several receptors on a single vehicle, and receive messages
from different transmitters.
The transponders were programmed to use the same frame pattern as real equipments. In
order to match this format, the transponder used three types of data - bits, bytes and strings-
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which are contained within a frame script. A frame script includes, for each line representing
data, four fields - name, type, amount and the actual data. Once this data is processed by the
parser, a frame is produced. A receptor transponder decodes the frame pattern using the same
algorithm found in real devices.
4.2.5 802.11p enhanced simulation
As initially used in [97], the range of the transponders were very limited (< 20 metres), as they
only had to provide speed regulation information to passing vehicles. By extending the range,
it was possible to get a simple simulation of IVC. However, this simulation was not represent-
ative of what would happen on a real road situation. Additionally, the existing transponders
simulation did not include latencies which, depending on the type of IVC used, the range of
communication and more importantly the size of the frame, can become non-negligible con-
sidering SiVIC's simulation step (5 milliseconds). Consider for example the 46 milliseconds
average application-to-application latency measured with the 802.11g implementation in 2.5.
Thus, we modified the existing transponder-like simulation to incorporate our empirical model,
presented in Chapter 3.
The original functions of the transponders are kept, however when a receptor confirms if it
is in range with the transmitters, new tests are applied to comply with the new model. At
first, the simulation will determine whether the frame will be transmitted successfully. . The
relative speed (V ) and distance (D) between the transmitter and the receptor are extracted.
To reduce computational load, the process continues further only if the distance is found to
be under an arbitrary threshold of 1,500 metres (slightly larger than the maximum range at
which our model can achieve a non-100% frame loss probability, all classes taken into account);
otherwise, the transponders are out of range. If it passes the first test and there is a potential
connection between the two transponders for the first time, a frame loss profile τ is generated
from the appropriate speed class. If there is an existing profile already and if V is not in the
same class as this profile, a new one is generated in the appropriate class. Then, the frame loss
probability for that range, τ (D), is extracted from the profile and the frame's success is tested
against this value. If successful, the receptor is allowed to read the frame's content according
to the existing procedure.
Once a profile has been generated for two specific transponders, it is tagged as active and
continues to be used for any frame exchange between these two specific transponders as long
as three conditions are met:
 D remains under 1,500 metres
 V does not move to another speed class
 there was no more than 30 seconds for which the frame loss probability τ (D) was τ (D) = 1
This latter condition creates a certain profile latency: indeed, it is possible that two transpon-
ders have a relative behaviour so that D will oscillate around the point whereτ (D) = 1. This
could happen, for example, with two vehicles driving on a freeway in the same direction. The
profile latency means that a new τ is not generated immediately after τ (D) = 1, but rather
after τ (D) has been equal to one for at least 30 consecutive seconds (given D is still under
1,500 metres). Without this mechanism, τ (D) could suddenly jump for close values of D, as
the same transponders couple switch from one profile to another.
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One emitter can have several profiles active at the same time if it is connected to more than one
receptor; thus if n is the number of transponders in the simulation, the maximum number of
active profiles at any moment is n(n−1)2 . There is no correlation between two profiles τ1 and τ2;
it means that if a RSU establishes a connection with two vehicles v1 and v2 driving side-by-side,
for which V1 = V2(relative to the RSU) and D1 ∼= D2, it is possible that τ1 (D1) and τ2 (D2)
are very different. However, if v1 and v2 are actually diametrically opposed from the RSU and
D1 = D2, that τ1 (D1) 6= τ2 (D2) is not necessarily a problem: environmental conditions and
hardware inhomogeneities (as seen in Chapter 3) mean that the quality of the transmission
is not necessarily the same for all the RSU antenna's angular opening. However, given the
distributions of the parameters of τ , it is equally likely that τ1 (D1) = τ2 (D2)± ε when v1 and
v2 are close to each other. Implementing a correlation between profiles by linking a transponder
to others that are geographically close and generating profiles for positions clusters instead of
individual vehicles, is an avenue for future extension of the work presented in this thesis.
Latency can be applied at this stage, by delaying the frame's extraction through a number of
simulation steps. We have shown in Chapter 3 that point-to-point latencies remained (99.47%)
under 4 milliseconds for frames less than a 500 bytes (typical for EEBL applications). A
simulation step is 5 milliseconds in SiVIC's default configuration, which means that a short
frame can be passed on to the receptor transponder without delay. We implemented a test
mechanism based upon the amount of data which is encoded into the frame: if the amount
is larger than a threshold (500 bytes), a delay is applied on the frame's data extraction. The
number of simulation steps by which the frame is delayed is based on a simple linear regression
from latencies measured experimentally. For example, a 500 bytes frame would be delayed by
one simulation step, which corresponds to a total latency of 10 milliseconds. This mechanism
is relatively limited, but it works well for the small-to-medium size networks that our CS
simulation architecture is tailored for.
4.2.6 Vehicles' control
In order to obtain the most accurate sensor data, compared to a real situation, it is necessary
to handle both a vehicle dynamical model and to simulate realistic actuator models. The
actuators are motor and braking torques applied on each wheel and the steering wheel angle,
thus simulating front wheel drive, rear wheel drive or four wheel drive.
Figure 4.5 shows the model's level of complexity, and the links between all the different physical
modules involved in it. Each module is complete with a list of available parameters. These
parameters can be modified during the simulation. Vehicles' control is based on the same
architecture as described in [97]. Vehicles are controlled longitudinally by torques on the wheels
and laterally by the steering wheel angle; controls are non-coupled.
Similar to the previous architecture, lateral control is performed with an accurate map of the
test track: angular and lateral deviations from the vehicle's lane are computed from this map.
The controller uses the road's curvature at the vehicle's position, the inter-axles distance, and
the angular and lateral deviations.
δ (t) = atan (L×K (t)) (4.1)
with
K (t) = Kref (t)− [µ⊥ × (ψ − ψref ) + λ⊥ × e⊥] (4.2)
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Figure 4.5: SiVIC's vehicle model, with attributes, parameters and commands
122 CHAPTER 4. SIMULATION ARCHITECTURE FOR CS APPLICATIONS
In the previous lateral equations 4.1 and 4.2, δ (t) is the lateral command, L is the inter-axle
distance, set at 2.58 metres. K (t) is the correction on the vehicle's curvature, depending on the
road's curvature. The correction term depends of two gains µ⊥ and λ⊥ with, respectively, the
following values: 0.8 and 0.05. ψ and ψref are, respectively, the vehicle's heading and the road's
heading. e⊥ is the lateral deviation. If δ (t) is greater than δmax, then we apply a saturation
stage:
δ (t) = δ (t) / |δ (t)| × δmax (4.3)
In our application, vehicles can be asked to follow the left, central or right lane during the
simulation. If required, lane detection and tracking can be used instead of a track map, so that
any simulated road can be used.
Longitudinal control has been improved from the previous architecture. Previously, vehicles
were instructed to follow a certain speed, which was modified manually or from roadside beacons
using the transponders simulation. This mechanism is kept, although it is now overridden by
two additional controls.
A first, we have an interdistance regulation mechanism. As our typical demonstration scenario
involves a string of several vehicles following each other, vehicles need to remain within accept-
able interdistances at all times. On each vehicle, a pitch-stabilised narrow-beamed laserscanner
is used to measure the distance to the leading vehicle. To maintain an acceptable interdistance,
the vehicle's reference speed (or speed target) Vref is computed with equation 4.4.
Vref = V −
(
V × (tinter − th)− dtarget
tinter − th
)
(4.4)
Where V is the vehicle's current speed; tinter the minimum acceptable intervehiculary time;
th the driver's reaction time; and dtarget the distance to the closest obstacle, as measured by
the laserscanner. This mechanism is used to simulate human drivers that allow themselves a
certain intervehiculary time.
For the leader vehicle, the reference speed is extracted from frames received from the infra-
structure transponders. When a receiver attached to the leader vehicle receives the new speed
information, the following control is applied:
Ct = 3×R×M × (V − Vref ) (4.5)
where Ct is the torque order applied to the front wheels, R the wheel's radius, and M the
chassis' mass. V is the leader vehicle's speed and Vref is the reference speed. For a follower
vehicle, the same equation is used but with Vref computed from equation 4.4.
A second approach has been developed in order to maintain a Time To Collision (TTC) around
2 seconds. From a speed Vf (follower vehicle's speed), the distance required to maintain the 2
seconds TTC is D (t) = Vf (t)× 2.0. Then, the safety distance is e = Dlf (t)−D (t), where Dlf
is the vehicular interdistance between a leading vehicle and its follower. The safety speed e˙
is also estimated. From there, the command applied to the wheels is computed as follows:
Ct = M ×R× (Kp× e+Kd× e˙) +
4∑
i=1
Ii × ω˙i (4.6)
with ω˙i the derivative speed of wheel i, Kd the derivative gain and Kp the proportional gain.
Kd and Kp are set at 0.4. If Ct is negative, then the current manoeuvre is a deceleration, and
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Ct is applied to the four wheels (Ct/4). If Ct is positive, then the current manoeuvre is an
acceleration, and the torque order is applied only to the front wheels (Ct/2).
Secondly, we have an emergency regulation mechanism. This mechanism is triggered only on
IVC-equipped vehicle, when an emergency braking frame is successfully received and decoded
by the receptor. Immediate or delayed reaction can be chosen, allowing a simulation of either a
reactive or informative system (i.e. one with automated braking versus one that simply flashes
an alert to the driver). In the former, Vref is simply set to zero immediately after the frame is
decoded. In the latter case, Vref is only updated after a th has delay passed. At the moment,
the only way for the vehicle not to stop is to miss the emergency braking frame. A future
extension will make it context-aware, so that vehicles which are far away from the actual event
(e.g. more than 500 metres) and still receive an emergency braking frame, can either ignore it,
or enter into a state of heightened alert (where th is decreased and tinter increased). The leader
vehicle has a similar mechanism for the initial emergency braking, which is triggered when its
curvilinear abscissa on the tracks reaches a user-defined value.
124 CHAPTER 4. SIMULATION ARCHITECTURE FOR CS APPLICATIONS
4.3 Validation of the architecture with a repeatable scen-
ario
4.3.1 Introduction and setup
Firstly, we need to validate our architecture in a simple, repeatable scenario. By repeatable
we mean given its start up conditions, the scenario will always produce the same output, which
is mathematically formal. In our context, this can be verified by analysing the behaviour of the
vehicles. Indeed, each vehicle starts to stop at the same timestamp, if no parameter is changed
when the scenario is restarted. For our purpose, the only parameter that will change is the IVC
equipment ratio (ρ). At a given value of ρ the string will always behave exactly in the same
way, whatever the number of runs. The advantage of this formal scenario is that there is no
need to replay it many times to obtain meaningful results.
We set up a scenario which is identical in practice to the scenario studied in [22, 23]. In previous
papers, a large string of homogeneous vehicles was considered; the vehicular interdistance was
the only parameter that could change. With our architecture, this type of scenario can be
reproduced only at a smaller scale. This limits the achievable results' granularity, but should
not be an impairment to the validation.
A five vehicles string (1 leader, 4 followers) is set up in SiVIC on a section of straight road.
The vehicles are positioned from the start so their interdistances are equal to the desired value
(40 metres) and are also given the same initial speed (70 km/h). The vehicles are completely
homogeneous in terms of characteristics (mass, braking capacity, etc.) and driver behaviour
(reaction time, allowed safety distance, etc.). We have th = 1 second and tinter = 2 seconds.
Follower vehicles are equipped with receptors, depending on the desired equipment ratio ρ. An
event-triggered mechanism is used to count the number of crashes. Additionally, the vehicles
are set in reactive mode whereby there is no delay between the receipt of an emergency frame
and the beginning of the braking action.
IVC equipment follows the scheme presented in Table 4.1. Since the scenario can be repeated,
running each equipment sub-scenario once is sufficient. One can than modify a parameter
in the scenario to observe its influence on the whole string. For example, we will change
the interdistance between the vehicles from 20 to 35 metres and observe its impact on crash
severity. In terms of the traffic density used in previous studies, these interdistances correspond
respectively to 2,800 and 1,800 vehicles per hour.
4.3.2 Crashes number analysis
As expected, the crash count decreased each time an IVC-equipped vehicle is introduced in the
string. Because of the limited number of vehicles in the string, we found that the number of
vehicles that crashed was always the same as the number of non-equipped vehicles (counting
the leader as equipped in all scenarios). This linear relationship between crash number and ρ
is only a rough approximate of the results from [22, 23].
4.3.3 Crashes severity analysis
We can now estimate the severity of crashes thanks to SiVIC realistic motion models. To do so
we will use an Equivalent Energy Speed (EES)-based severity criterion similar to the one used
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Table 4.1: Repartition of IVC-equipped vehicles in the repeatable scenario
ρ = 0/5 = 1/5
v0 v1 v2 v3 v4
1 0 0 0 0
ρ = 2/5
v0 v1 v2 v3 v4
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
ρ = 3/5
v0 v1 v2 v3 v4
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1
ρ = 4/5
v0 v1 v2 v3 v4
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
ρ = 4/5
v0 v1 v2 v3 v4
1 1 1 1 1
by Mourllion [31]. The severity of a crash depends principally on two parameters; the relative
speed between the impactor and the impactee, and their combined masses at the impact.
Let us take two vehicles veh1 and veh2, with respective masses m1, m2 and speeds V1, V2. If
veh2 rear-crashes into veh1, their collision can be approximated to an inelastic collision that
leads to the formation of an agglomerate of both veh1 and veh2, of mass mag and speed Vag,
according to equation (4.7). In such an inelastic collision, kinetic energy is not conserved and
the dissipated energy is transformed into heat, leading to a deformation of the vehicles.
m1V1 +m2V2 = magVag (4.7)
Vag =
m1V1 +m2V2
mag
=
m1V1 +m2V2
m1 +m2
(4.8)
Equation (4.8) gives the speed of the agglomerate composed of veh1 and veh2 after their colli-
sion; considering no mass is lost during the collision (mass can be lost if parts of the vehicles
are ejected), then mag = m1 + m2. The quantity V2 − Vag provides the change in speed for
veh2 during the collision: this quantity is labelled the Equivalent Energy Speed, notably when
considering a complete dissipation of kinetic energy. Indeed, when considering the collision of
two mobile vehicles, the EES gives the speed at which one vehicle would need to hit a static
obstacle, such as a concrete wall, to dissipate the same kinetic energy as was dissipated by the
collision of both vehicles. By developing equation (4.8), we get equation (4.9) for the EES. If
the two vehicles have equivalent masses, as the case in our scenario, it can be further simplified
to equation (4.10).
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Table 4.2: Proportion of fatalities and severe injuries given the EES
EES (km/h) <25 35 45 55 65 75 85 >85
Percentage of fatalities and severe injuries 0 2 10 30 55 80 95 100
ees = V2 − Vag = (V2 − V1) m1
m1 +m2
(4.9)
ees =
1
2
(V2 − V1) (4.10)
The EES is linked to injuries experienced by the vehicle's occupant(s) through crash database
analysis such as one commonly used in Europe performed by the LAB2. Table 4.2 gives the
measurement proportion of fatalities and severe injuries given the EES [50]. A severity function
can be mapped out from this data, as completed by Mourllion [31].
The EES analysis is done in post-processing based on the vehicle's variables recorded during the
simulation runs. We modified the scenario's original setup so that vehicles follow each other at
35 or 20 metres. To allow the string to maintain its interdistances at 20 metres, it is necessary
to lower tinter to 1 second, otherwise the vehicles will start to slow down to form a string with
about 2 seconds of intervehiculary time. As expected, the computed EES is larger at the lower
interdistances. When vehicles are 35 metres apart and not equipped, they start to slow down
about 20 metres away from their predecessor because of the delay introduced by th. In that
case, the average speed at collision is about 50 km/h (14.5 metres.seconds-1). IVC-equipped
vehicles do not collide with their immediate predecessor. We note that the average EES for
the whole string decreased by 18% between the runs where ρ = 0/5 (non-equipped string) and
ρ = 4/5 (there are no collision remaining at ρ = 5/5). This shows that the string's safety increases
when more vehicles are IVC-equipped.
The same behaviour is measured with interdistances of 20 metres. However, in that case, be-
cause vehicles are much closer to each other and th was not modified, non-equipped vehicles
collide with their predecessors at full speed, having barely had the time to initiate an emer-
gency braking manoeuvre. Adequately, the EES is higher than with the string at 35 metres
interdistances. However, it follows the same decreasing pattern with increased IVC equipment.
Overall, the repeatable scenarios confirm the conclusions given in [22, 23] on the contribution
of IVC to vehicles strings safety.
2Laboratoire d'accidentologie, de biomécanique et d'études du comportement humain (Accidentology, Bio-
mechanics and Human Behaviour Laboratory), a common PSA Peugeot Citroën and Renault research laboratory
in Nanterre, France
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Figure 4.6: Screen capture of the architecture in action (with 4 vehicles); the RTMaps windows
is open on the right side, with multiple vector viewers (displaying vehicle data and the scenario
parameters) visible on the bottom left corner; the SiVIC view is in the top left corner. The full
Satory tracks' scene is loaded here, which is not necessary for all runs, as it reduces FPS
4.4 Analysis of a non-repeatable scenario
4.4.1 Introduction and setup
In the previous section, we described a repeatable scenario where the string was heavily con-
strained. However, our architecture's interest lies in the more detailed simulations that it can
generate, compared to those constrained scenarios. This will be easily demonstrated with the
results that we obtained while running a more realistic, less constrained and non-repeatable
version of the vehicle strings scenario. This approach allowed us to test if the results from
previous studies and our repeatable scenarios will still hold when the vehicles string behaved
more realistically. As we will see later on, this is not completely the case.
Note that in the present context, non-repeatability means that given the same starting con-
ditions, two consecutive scenarios will provide different results. For this scenario, the non-
repeatability arise from the interdistance regulation mechanism described in 4.2.6. While the
starting positions are always identical, the interdistance regulation at very short distances will
make the vehicles stop regularly and maintain small speeds, even completely stopping at times.
This means that the strings generated at each run will have different sets of interdistances
between the five vehicles. Even if the variations are relatively small, and some runs will be
played out almost identical to each other, the scenario is not entirely repeatable.
A five vehicles string (1 leader, 4 followers) is set up in SiVIC, on the virtual reproduction of
Versailles-Satory's la routière test track, modelled on a French non-segregated trunk road (route
nationale). See Fig. 4.6 for a screen capture of the architecture in use. Each vehicle can be
configured individually, but for the sake of simplicity, we will keep a homogeneous fleet in terms
of acceleration, braking power and reaction time (th = 0.5 second). All vehicles (noted vehi)
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have tinter = 2.5 seconds; except veh2 for which tinter = 1.5 seconds, in order to simulate a
slightly more risky driving. Having only a single aggressive driver can be seen as a conservative
figure. Indeed, according to government statistics, more than half (56.4%) of the drivers do
not follow safe interdistances recommendations (at least 2 seconds) in dense traffic [3]. For this
scenario, vehicles are also operating in reactive mode, maintaining enough similarity with the
previous studies we aim at reproducing.
Contrary to the previous repeatable scenario, the vehicles start and stopped while grouped to-
gether in one location on the track. From this starting position, the vehicles arrange themselves
in a string on the right-hand lane, and progressively speed up to 70 km/h generating, as we
mentioned, a different string each time. Follower vehicles are equipped with receptors, depend-
ing on the desired equipment ratio. IVC equipment is randomly selected for each individual
follower (initially it was planned in pre-processing, but the architecture's latest version allows
to do it directly online) until there is the required number of equipped vehicles. The equipment
is reset with each new run. The emergency braking event takes place in a long straight section
approximately 700 metres from the starting position.
The scenario was replayed at least a hundred times for each of the following equipment ratios:
0/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, and 5/5. The ρ = 1/5 case is not simulated as it corresponds to having only the
leader vehicle equipped, which is no different from ρ = 0/5 in this scenario. A total of 716 runs
were simulated, which generated 1,197 crashes. The following variables were recorded for all
vehicles: curvilinear abscissa, TTC, dtarget, V , Vref , emergency frame broadcast and instances
of collisions.
4.4.2 Crash number analysis
Fig. 5.18 shows the normalised total rear-end crashes at different equipment ratios. Crash
numbers have been normalised to compensate for the different number of runs at each value of
ρ; the number of crashes recorded for ρ = 0/5 is set as the reference and valued at 100, allowing
an immediate percentage comparison with other values of ρ. By introducing 2 IVC-equipped
vehicles (ρ = 2/5, or 40%), the number of crashes fell by 17%; with ρ = 3/5, the number of
crashes fell by 50%, and with ρ = 4/5, the number fell by 80%. In a completely equipped string,
no crashes were recorded. Note that the crash number is maintained at 100 for ρ = 1/5 since,
as we explained in the previous subsection, it is indistinguishable from ρ = 0/5.
As we already stated, in [22, 23] the number of vehicles in the string was significantly higher,
which allowed for better granularity of ρ. Compared to the repeatable scenario however, the
large number of simulation runs make it possible to obtain more refined and more realistic
results. Contrary to [23], our results do not show a strong 1x type decrease in crashes when the
IVC equipment ratio increases. However, they follow the same trend; for example at a 2,600
vehicles/hour capacity, the reduction in crash numbers between ρ = 0% to ρ = 80% is very
similar to our results. Furthermore, it can be noted that in our scenario, IVC equipment starts
to provide a reasonable safety increase with only more than 50% of equipped vehicles. This is
probably an issue related to the limited granularity afforded by 5 vehicles strings. Nonetheless,
our results are coherent with the EEBL scenario and shows that our CS simulation architecture
can be used to complement larger simulations like [23] by offering more detailed results, which
we shall look into from now on.
Being able to record and study variability inside the string for each individual vehicle is a major
improvement in our architecture design. Different kinds of data can be considered for study,
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Figure 4.7: Illustrations of the reduction in crashes obtained by introducing IVC in the vehicles
string
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which we will demonstrate using two examples. Firstly, it is possible to extract information on
the behaviour of each vehicle concerning crash patterns associated with them over the whole
experimental run and secondly, their behaviour during a single run.
4.4.3 Crashes number pattern for individual vehicles
In a detailed analysis of our first example, Fig. 4.7b reproduces Fig. 5.18 data (the dashed
black curve), and overlays it with the normalised crash counts for each individual vehicle. From
this figure, it is evident that while the string taken globally see less crashes with increased
IVC equipment, it is not necessarily the case with individual vehicles. Indeed, for veh4, having
40% of IVC equipment led to a 47% increase in the number of crashes encountered by this
vehicle. At 60% equipment (ρ = 3/5), the crash count was still 15% higher than in a fully
non-equipped scenario. At 80% equipment, the percentage decrease in crashes encountered by
veh4 was similar to the other vehicles with 40% equipment.
At face value, this result would suggest that while drivers would collectively benefit from using
EEBL, some drivers would see the likelihood of them crashing increase. Obviously, this is an
unacceptable conclusion in the name of road safety. This is further aggravated by the knowledge
that, if the absolute number of crashes is considered, veh4 is the one with the least number of
crashes at ρ = 0/5. How could introducing IVC make the previously safest vehicle, the least
safe? We shall investigate the reasons for this phenomenon, which will demonstrate it is not
something possible in an actual on road situation.
Indeed, from the detailed recordings, veh4 appears to be following veh3 with a slightly above
average interdistance. In the scenario without IVC, this is not an issue and the vehicle manages
to stop before colliding with veh3 in most cases, hence it has a lower number of crashes relative
to the others. On the other hand, at ρ = 2/5, if veh2 or veh3 are equipped with IVC, veh3 will
have a tendency to stop earlier than it did in the non-equipped scenario. Because of this, the
relative speed between the two vehicles is large when veh4's controller starts to press the brakes.
In that case, even at maximum braking capability, veh4 is unlikely to stop before colliding with
veh3, which led to the 50% increase in crashes we measured.
Unfortunately, this behaviour stands out as a limitation to our simulation. Indeed, on a real road
situation, veh4's driver would become aware of veh3's braking manoeuvre with the activation
of its braking lights so, veh4 would thus stop much earlier than what the current controller
decides to do. Thus, our scenario artificially increases the chances of a crash for that specific
vehicle. Future work shall allow simulating this type of behaviour more appropriately.
Nonetheless, this happens only with veh4, which does not misrepresent the results for the whole
string. All the remaining vehicles behaved according to the scenario expectations. Additionally,
if we filter the runs to keep only the ones where veh4's interdistance is comparable to the string's
average, veh4 behaves just like the other vehicles. Also note that veh2's count is higher than
the others on average (ignoring veh4) because of its aggressive driving style, which is consistent
with the scenario settings.
4.4.4 Behaviour of individual vehicles
For this second example, we focus on one vehicle in a single run. Fig. 4.8 shows the variables
related to the interdistance regulation for veh3, taken during a ρ = 3/5 run, where it was not
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Figure 4.8: Detailed variables measurements for one vehicle during a simulation run
equipped with an IVC device. The command Vref represented by the blue curve (left-hand
axis) depends on either transponder-distributed speed instructions, which is the case when it is
limited to 5 metres/second for a few seconds at the beginning of the run, or on dtarget, shown by
the green dotted curve (right-hand axis), via equation 4.4. Two types of interdistance variations
are visible on the figure: (1) normal variations triggered when the leading vehicle is actually
getting closer to veh3, such as is the case around the 5.85× 108 or 5.9× 108 timestamps; and
(2) sharp variations that occurs when either veh2 or veh3 is turning and thus veh2 exits the
frontal laserscanner's narrow beam, this happen a lot between the 5.75 × 108 and 5.85 × 108
timestamps. The interdistance measurement is capped at 50 metres, the useful range of the
laserscanner model used for this scenario.
V (red curve, left-hand axis) is well regulated according to Vref . On three occasions the vehicles
came close enough for veh3's controller to compute that it was necessary to press the brakes.
This usually happens due to the propagation of braking waves started by vehicles at turns
or when they enter or exit different speed regulation zones. One can also note, just after
the 5.7 × 108 timestamp, a brief period for which Vref fluctuates a lot, very quickly. This
is a visual representation of the interdistance regulation behaviour that led to the scenario's
non-repeatability.
Eventually, the vehicle's emergency braking pattern can be analysed from these data. Around
the 6.05×108 timestamp, the vehicle starts to stop because dtarget becomes too small; the delay
introduced by the human reaction time is clearly visible: when the vehicle starts to brake, the
interdistance has already shrunk by more than 10 metres. Even at maximum braking power,
veh3 cannot stop before the impact with the preceding vehicle, which is shown by the vertical
black dotted line just after the 6.1×108 timestamp. The impact takes place at a relatively slow
speed of 6 metres.seconds-1(~22 km/h).
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4.4.5 Crashes severity analysis
Using the same 716 runs, we will now analyse the severity of the crashes using the same EES
criterion that we used for the repeatable scenario. The EES results are shown in Fig. 4.9. Each
coloured bar represents the average EES for one vehicle measured over all the runs played for
one value of ρ. The standard deviation of the averages is also shown, as well as the average
EES for the whole string (the dotted black line).
The figure shows that while increasing the number of IVC equipment leads to less crashes, it
does not reduce the severity of the remaining crashes, except for complete equipment where no
crash has taken place. The dispersion of individual averages does not allow us to conclude that
the average crash severity actually increased. However, the average severity is demonstrably
not decreasing, contrary to what we saw taking place in the simpler repeatable scenarios (unless
of course when ρ = 5/5 where there is no crash). Note that the veh3 outlier (94% increase) at
ρ = 4/5 is computed from only two crashes from 224 runs. In the two runs where it crashed,
veh3 was following the preceding vehicle very closely to the minimum acceptable interdistance,
thus did not have the time to react accordingly during the emergency braking event. If the
standard deviation is small for this vehicle, it is because both crashes took place in runs that
happened to be almost exact repetitions.
If we look into the detailed distribution of EES for each individual vehicle, this lack of improve-
ment is quite obvious. Fig. 4.10 shows the histogram of the EES distribution for vehicles 2 to
5, with ρ = 0/5; . . . ; 4/5 (with the histogram bins centred every 5 km/h in [0; 30]). To ease the
reading, and since we are focused on distributions rather than absolute counts, the histograms
have been normalised on the total number of crashes for each vehicle at each value of ρ, so 100
is the total number of crashes for a vehicle and each bar of the histogram shows the percentage
of crashes that fall within a certain EES interval. If the severity was indeed decreasing with
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Figure 4.10: Distribution of EES for each vehicles, at ρ = 0/5; . . . ; 4/5
an increase in ρ, we would expect the distributions to slide towards the left, i.e. towards lower
EES. However, there is no such general movement. The shapes of the distribution fluctuate,
but the averages remain relatively stable or can even increase in some cases.
While the EES absolute values remain largely under any dangerous threshold due to the scenario
conditions, implications are worrying at higher speeds. Indeed, from the point of view of a
system's contribution to road safety, it is better to have several weak crashes, where no one is
injured, then one or two violent ones, where fatalities occur. In [22], it was shown that using the
raw number of crashes to evaluate IVC's contribution to the string's safety was always more
pessimistic than using an EES-based severity criterion. However, we found here that while
the number of crashes indeed decreased significantly, the severity of the remaining crashes did
not decrease. In this case, a crash number-based criterion would have been considerably more
optimistic than the EES-based severity criterion.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, our goal was to design a framework that could be used to support research on
the limitations of Cooperative Systems (CS) in general, and augmented perception in particular.
In Chapter 2 we concluded it was better to focus on using more realistic simulations instead
of focusing on real-world systems. Developing and prototyping CS applications within a
simulated environment comes with stringent requirements. The simulation has to integrate
with models of the road environment, vehicles, sensors and communication technologies which
are all consistent with the law of physics. Using simulation to meet these requirements enables
a much wider field of research and experimentation than keeping a focus on actual on-road
systems, as the logistical and experimental protocol constraints are lifted.
We have found that there is a need for improved realism in terms of CS simulation. In order
to answer this, we developed a cooperative system simulation architecture within the SiVIC-
RTMaps interconnected platforms. This architecture uses the SiVIC-RTMaps' capabilities
to provide realistic simulations that meets the aforementioned requirements, while allowing
some flexibility in terms of what can be developed within it. It improves upon previous sim-
ulation architectures developed at LIVIC (as seen in Gruyer et al. [97], Vanholme et al. [98]
for a co-pilot simulation using a simple I2V mechanism, or in Mourllion [31] for a high level
augmented perception simulation); the two main improvements concern; (1) the introduction of
the empirical modelisation of 802.11p IVC discussed in Chapter 3; and (2) an improved vehicle
controller, allowing for an automated vehicle to behave more like a human-driven one. The fine
granularity of the physical models, and the number of accessible variables within the simulation,
allows studying the behaviour of an individual vehicle over the length of an entire scenario. We
validated this architecture by reproducing results from previous research on the contribution of
IVC to the reduction of rear-end crashes in vehicle strings with a heavily-constrained repeat-
able scenario. Our results are coherent with previous studies both in terms of the reduction of
crash numbers and reduction in the severity of the crashes (which is computed with the EES
criterion).
However, at the end of Chapter 3, it was concluded that 802.11p performance has been over-
estimated by previous research. This begged the question, could this mean that the safety
benefits of CS have been overestimated too, by a form of assumptions propagation? In order
to provide a preliminary answer to this question, as far as EEBL is concerned, we implemented a
more realistic, non-repeatable scenario that allowed analysing crashes and vehicle behaviour in
the string with considerable detail. Our results confirmed IVC's efficiency to reduce collisions,
showing that IVC limitations are not a problem within this scenario. However, we also obtained
surprising and potentially worrying results regarding the severity of the crashes. Indeed, we
found that contrary to expectations, the average severity of a crash appears to remain constant
when an IVC is introduced in the string. Earlier results [22, 31, 23] suggested that introducing
IVC would lead to less crashes, and that the remaining crashes would be less severe. Our results
suggest that, indeed there will be less crashes however, on average the remaining crashes will
remain as severe as previously. This implies that if the material cost of a series of crashes in a
vehicles string would decrease (less damaged vehicles), the human cost might actually increase
in some cases.
As this scenario is a representative of a form of CS application that will be proposed to main-
stream users in a not too distant future (which was a reason we selected this as our reference
scenario), these results are not trivial and further consideration should be given to them before
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deploying an actual EEBL application. This study allowed us to demonstrate the interest of our
architecture outside of the context of augmented perception, into a more general CS context.
From now on, our architecture will provide the environment within which augmented perception
will be built and evaluated.
Summary of chapter's contributions
 Outcomes
 A generalist Cooperative Systems simulation architecture/framework was developed.
 Key findings
 When improving the realism of the simulation, an EEBL system appears to not
improve the average severity of a crash in a vehicles string, contrary to previous
results.
 However, the safety benefits of EEBL according to the number of crashes criterion
were confirmed.
 Limitations
 Controllers of the vehicles generate behaviours under certain conditions that might
not be the best representation of real behaviours.
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Chapter 5
Building an augmented map
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we designed a simulation architecture aimed at supporting studies on
higher-level Cooperative Systems (CS) applications, such as ones that looked into the safety
benefits of these systems. We argued that if offered significant improvements over previous
simulations of CS applications, notably by including the empirical performance model of 802.11p
IVC that we developed in Chapter 3. The architecture's capabilities were demonstrated by
studying an EEBL application, which allowed us to obtain new results regarding the safety
benefits of EEBL. We found that contrary to expectations, the average crash severity appeared
to be unaffected by the EEBL application. Our results suggest that there will be less crashes,
leading to a probable decrease in material costs, but that the human cost will remain stable,
or might actually increase in some rare cases. Eventually, the CS simulation architecture was
also poised to become the core framework in which further research on augmented perception
would take place.
The first aim of this chapter is to design an augmented map building architecture, within the
simulation framework that was presented in the previous chapter. Similar to the simulation
framework that supports it, this map-building architecture should be generalist, and be able to
accommodate the exchange of both localisation, proprioceptive and exteroceptive data.
The second aim of this chapter is to evaluate the performance of augmented perception for risk
assessment by comparing it to non-cooperative perception within the context of a specified CS
safety-orientated application. Logically, we will use the vehicles string reference scenario. This
study will provide answers to the following principal research questions:
1. What are augmented perception's limitations, given current technology in embedded com-
puting and telecommunications?
2. Can an augmented map-based risk assessment system be more efficient than a similar
non-cooperative system?
Our first step is to build the generalist augmented map building architecture. Having a general-
ist approach implies that (1) we dissociate the augmented map from its client applications, and
that (2) the architecture should be able to accommodate different construction approaches, such
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as decentralised or server-based fusion. The first point means creating an augmented map that
has features which can be used by different types of client applications. The second point can
be achieved through an adequate re-arrangement of the components dedicated to constructing
the augmented map within the CS simulation architecture, by forming distinct fusion trees. A
centralised server-like approach can be simulated by having a single map-building tree receiving
data from all vehicles, while a decentralised approach can be simulated with having as many
map-building trees as vehicles in the simulation. As part of this design, we have ensured that
the exchange of complex local maps is covered. Indeed, within the context of augmented per-
ception, the exchange of local maps including exteroceptive data is still fairly recent. Current
augmented perception systems are mostly classified to two types: (1) systems that exclusively
use localisation and proprioceptive local and remote data; and (2) systems that use the same
remote data and complement them with local exteroceptive data.
On the other hand, the data fusion algorithms and methods are fixed within the architecture's
components. Data fusion is performed using Kalman filtering and the Dempster-Shafer Theory,
as a follow-up to previous works concerning the adaptation of these mathematical principles to
augmented perception. Theoretical considerations will be presented in further detail before the
actual design of the architecture.
After the map-building architecture has been designed, we test it on our reference scenario
with a risk-assessment system. The risk of the current driving situation is computed for each
vehicle, from information received through local perception or augmented perception. This
latter approach accounts for the limitations of IVC performance that we studied in the previous
chapters, and allows obtaining results which are close to what could be expected to happen on
the road. We show that the augmented map-based risk assessment process allows for up to
7 seconds of additional advance warning compared to a non-cooperative process, despite the
presence of IVC imperfections. This demonstrates the usefulness of augmented perception in
the reduction of road fatalities.
Chapter Outline
The first section consists of a literature review on augmented perception, including a few remain-
ders on data fusion. It helps understanding the current division in two schools regarding the
granularity of exchanged information, and details issues with spatio-temporal synchronisation
and data independence.
The second section provides details on the theoretical foundations for our map-building archi-
tecture , including Kalman filtering, the Dempster-Shafer Theory and our approach to multi-
hypothesis tracking. Afterwards, the third section exposes the design of the map-building
architecture within the framework laid out in Chapter 4.
The fifth section provides the performance evaluation of the augmented map-building architec-
ture, comparing it with non-cooperative perception for a specific risk-assessment problem.
Eventually, the sixth section concludes this chapter by summarising its outcomes .
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5.2 General principles and Literature review
5.2.1 Multi-sensors fusion
5.2.1.1 Introduction
Multi-sensors fusion is a classic way to build the local map. A local map is a representation
of the outside environment surrounding a vehicle, as perceived by the vehicle's sensors. The
part of the environment that is perceived or observed by the sensors is usually called the scene.
Embedded sensors collect information about the environment, but the type and quality of such
information often diverge. Actually, each individual sensor creates its own representation of
the environment. Then, these separate representations can be combined through multi-sensors
fusion to create a unified multi-sources representation.
Building such a local map is done by joining tracks representing objects in the vehicle's en-
vironment together into a common representation and fusing tracks describing the same real
objects. The goal of this process is to improve the accuracy, reliability and robustness of the
perception, so that errors in some sensors or processing algorithm will not make the perceived
scene completely irrelevant. Representing one's environment is achieved through a number
of stages, which are usually considered as a sequence following two major axes: (1) detec-
tiontrackingclassification on one hand, and (2) mappinglocalisation on the other hand [103].
Fig. 5.1 shows the relationship between these stages.
 Detection: also called the segmentation stage, it consists of identifying which measure-
ments originate from the same real object, among the raw data. Thus, this stage outputs
a list of objects located into the scene. No hypothesis on the object's nature is taken at
this stage.
 Tracking: it consists of following the timely evolution of detected objects and estimating
a number of objects' properties. For example tracking one object during several sensors
timestamps can allow estimating its past motion and predicting its future motion: speed,
heading, etc. To achieve this, tracking covers two sub-stages - association and fusion.
Association consists of linking together objects detected at time ti with objects detected
at time ti−1. Fusion then combines these two objects into a single object. Tracked objects
are usually called tracks.
 Classification: it consists of completing the detection stage by identifying the nature of
the detected object. This stage is essentially orientated towards higher level applications
or interest zone extraction.
 Mapping: it consists of reconstructing an object's outline. Indeed, it is probable that
at time ti a detected object is partially occluded by another object. Its exact shape, its
outline, is thus not visible. Mapping allows reconstructing the object's outline over several
timestamps, so this data can be sent to higher-level applications. A good mapping can
also be useful to the classification stage.
 Localisation: this stage tries locating a vehicle in its environment according to raw sensors
data. Excluding satellite positioning systems that provide an absolute localisation data
as their raw output, localisation here implies localisation approaches relative to objects
within the scene.
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Figure 5.1: General principles of the perception and data fusion process
Multi-sensors fusion add a number of stages which are similar to the one that will be neces-
sary for augmented perception. These will be detailed more specifically in section 5.2.2. In
that section, we will present the common architectures used for multi-sensor fusion and some
generalities on the problem of data representation.
5.2.1.2 Data fusion architectures
Combining several sensors into a multi-sensors local map aims at exploiting both complement-
aries and redundancies between different sensors in order to extract as much information as
possible from the environment, and to increase the number of estimable parameters for a said
object. It can also be used to refine the estimation of an object's parameter in case several
sensors are providing data on the same parameter (e.g. a laserscanner and stereovision system
providing ranging information).
The subject of local mono or multi-sensors map building is well documented in the literature. At
first we can distinguish two approaches for the choice of techniques and technologies for multi-
sensors local maps: (1) the sensors-to-map approach and (2) the map-to-sensors approach.
The sensors-to-map approach is based on sensors; one defines the sensors and data treatment
techniques one wants to use (or what is available), which in turn constrains the available
information that can be used to build the map. The map's characteristics are limited by the
sensors' characteristics in terms of available data, data granularity, data imperfections, etc.
This obviously limits the applications that can be client of the said map. On the other hand,
the map-to-sensors approach follows the reversed thought line: the final map is defined at first
and then sensors and treatments that will be able to provide the required characteristics are
chosen, allowing a more flexible approach in terms of map building.
For multi-sensors data fusion, we can find three main families of architectures  centralised,
decentralised and hybrids, i.e. the combination of the two previous ones, architectures. We
shall now take a look at their respective advantages and disadvantages.
Fig. 5.2a shows a centralised architecture. In this layout, raw data from sensors are initially
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synchronised, if necessary, before any treatments are applied to them. There is few or no
treatment directly at the sensor level, the treatment as a whole is made later, at a higher
level. In this architecture one does not have proper multi-sensors association, tracking and
fusion, as all the data are used at the same time to extract objects and track them; the process
is conducted directly on the raw data flow of several sensors at the same time. Historically,
centralised approaches have been the first type of multi-sensors fusion to be developed [104].
The main advantage of centralised architectures lies in their good tracking performance [105].
However they can, in modern settings, be overloaded by computation load in complex envir-
onments with numerous sensors and staunch real-time requirements (which is the case on the
road). Furthermore in such centralised architectures, the error is global to the whole system
and strongly influenced by the least performing sensors. A single sensor's defect will also affect
the whole system. One can find generic examples of centralised example in [106] (an automated
electronic components recognition system) or in [107] (data fusion between laser scanner, inertial
data, digital maps and propagated data), inter alia.
Fig. 5.2b shows the principles of a decentralised architecture. Raw sensors data are at first
treated in order to extract objects, then these objects are synchronised, if necessary, and sent
to an association-fusion process that creates the local map. Decentralised architectures are also
sometimes called hierarchical [104] or autonomous architectures [108]. Decentralised architec-
tures have the following advantages: treatments can be adapted to each sensor according to their
nature and performances, the global computing load is reduced, and the system's robustness to
a sensor's defect or breakdown is increased.
A potential disadvantage of decentralised approaches is that the necessary independence of data
might be compromised [104, 105] (for more on this problem, refer to section 5.12). Salahshoor
et al. [105] also noted that decentralised architectures are conceptually more complex than
centralised architectures, which may limit their scope. One example (shown on Fig. 5.2c)
is presented by Labayrade et al. [109] for a multi-sensors obstacle detection system using a
laserscanner and stereovision. However, the authors note that stereovision is very inaccurate
beyond a range of about 15 metres, which renders the treatment of stereovision data difficult.
They solve this problem using the next kind of architecture we will describe (see Fig. 5.3a).
Eventually, Fig. 5.2d shows a hybrid architecture. It combines the centralised and decentral-
ised approaches with the aim of benefiting from advantages on both sides. Fig. 5.2d diagram
is far from exhaustive, it is possible to design other forms of this architecture, more complex
or with different levels of centralisation and decentralisation. The main advantage of hybrid
architectures is that they allow fine-tuning the map-building system according to users' require-
ments as well as according to the sensors characteristics. One can for example locally treat the
data of the most precise sensors through a separated branch from the main central branch in
a partially decentralised architecture to minimise the impact of the least precise or reliable
sensors. A hybrid architecture also allows solving specific issues of the other architectures while
generally benefiting from their combined advantages. For example as we already mentioned in
[109] stereovision is inaccurate beyond 15 metres, which limits the interest of performing a full
tracking processing on this data. A hybrid architecture shown in Fig. 5.3a was proposed in
order to avoid this problem by performing a full processing on laserscanner data and only using
stereovision-extracted objects to increase the confidence on the laserscanner tracks, without any
tracking of these stereovision objects. Another example can be found in Gad and Farooq [110]:
the author selected a hybrid architecture, shown in Fig. 5.3b, which was deemed more efficient
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than solely centralised or decentralised architecture for the problem of military maritime tac-
tical surveillance. This architecture's interest is that the same sensors data are processed in
two different branches before being united. The main disadvantage of hybrid architectures also
lies in their conceptual complexity, similarly to decentralised architectures.
5.2.1.3 Format and data representation
As we mentioned, the local map is modulated according to the sensors' capabilities and the
applications that will use it. An adequate way to represent all the accessible information or, at
least, a part of it must be selected. It would be unwise to try to represent all the parameters
estimated for one object, while a specific application might only be interested in a specific
subset of information about an object. This problem is also relevant to augmented perception,
notably given the fact that we aim at having a generic-enough augmented map that can be used
to feed different client applications. The following data representation formats can be found in
the literature - direct, attributes, grid and Gaussian representations.
A direct representation, as its name suggests, directly represents raw sensors data. This kind
of representation is preferred if one has accurate enough sensors, such as laser scanners for
example. Direct representations allow for a good precision of some objects' parameters (shape,
position) but, as there is no preliminary treatment whatsoever on the data, they cannot be
used to represent estimated or predicted objects. It means direct representations are limited to
directly measured data only, for visualisation or pre-treatment purposes. Because of that, they
are said to be geometric-only representation. Note that direct representations might suffer
from memory problems if the sensor(s) sampling frequency is high. Also, they do not model
imperfections. Fig. 5.4 shows an example of such direct representations.
Attributes representations uses objects which are composed of so-called state vectors to repres-
ent the known objects in the scene. They usually limit the range of the available parameters to
some which are chosen according to what will be the map's final use. For example a vehicle-like
object could be represented by a state vector containing its GPS-measured absolute position,
speed, heading and dimensions; a tree could be represented by a vector containing solely the
equivalent rectangle occupied by the tree in a flat two dimensional representation. Imperfec-
tions are included in attributes-based representation but usually not with the most realistic
modelling. The advantage of these representations is essentially its memory efficiency and that
it can include treatments' outputs (tracking, etc.). As they require more parameters to obtain
a sufficient description of objects, attributes representations might be disadvantaged when used
in heterogeneous environments. Fig. 5.5 (from Gate [103]) show an example of an attributes
representation compared to the real environment it represents. This is the standard type of
data representation that is used within the context of the present thesis.
A grid representation divides space into a grid where resolution might be fixed or variable.
Each grid element, or cell, is associated with a unique probabilistic parameter; this parameter
will usually be the probability that the cell is occupied by an object of any nature. We can
find an example in [42] for local laserscanner data. Grid representations are good at modelling
precisely all the imperfections on the cell's parameter; however, they have important memory
and computational requirements, in order to maintain a sufficient grid resolution. For safety
application, grid resolutions in the centimetre range are required.
Gaussian representations can be found in two categories: (1) methods that stem from direct
representations and try to solve their imperfection's modelling issues; and (2) methods that stem
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Figure 5.4: Direct environment representation of laserscanner points in RTMaps
Figure 5.5: Example of an attributes representation, compared to the real scene, with objects
represented as rectangles (which dimensions are linked to their variance) and with a vector
representing the direction and magnitude of speed
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from grid representations and try to enhance direct-inspired Gaussian representations. The
first category of methods use a direct representation where data points are linked to a Gaussian
(normal) curve modelling measurements imperfections. However, this approach poses serious
memory problems with the increasing number of points and related Gaussian curves. In order
to limit this memory inflation, the second category steps in, inspired by the aforementioned grid
representations. There, the environment is divided into a grid which resolution is chosen so that
several data points fall into a single cell [111]. A Gaussian curve representing the probably that a
point is occupied by a measurement is computed for each cell at the beginning and updated with
each new measurement. The resolution of this bidimensional Gaussian is actually sub-cellular:
each point within the cell has a probability that is different to its neighbour. This gives a
continuous sub-cellular representation with a limited number of Gaussian that has to be stored,
hence attenuating memory issues. Similar to direct representations, Gaussian representations
can only be geometric representation: they can only include raw data measurements by ranging
sensors.
Eventually it is possible to combine different representations into a multi-layered hybrid form,
to benefit from the different types' complementarity. For example Gate [103] quotes Wang and
Thorpe [112] who used a three-layered representation: (1) direct for successive raw sensor data;
(2) grid-based for objects' geometric parameters and (3) attributes-based for position and speed
estimations. It is probable that an augmented map system might have to use such a kind of
hybrid representation.
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Figure 5.6: The three stages from local maps to the augmented map
5.2.2 Augmented maps
5.2.2.1 Introduction
Multi-sensors data fusion allows building a local map that take benefits from a vehicle's sensors
complementary and redundancies. Creating an augmented map does the same, but at the
scale of a group of vehicles and other perceptive objects (e.g. roadside sensors). We saw in
the previous chapters how such a group is linked by wireless IVC within the framework of
Cooperative Systems. Locally-perceived information is fused with information received from
distant sources to create the augmented map. Implementing this process raises a number of
questions: how to manage data exchange? Where should the map building process be located
in the system? What are the necessary treatments to build an augmented map and how does
it differ from mono-vehicle multi-sensors fusion?
The map-building process can be summarised into three main stages: data synchronisation,
association and fusion (see Fig. 5.6). We shall explain each one of them in detail further in
this section. Then, we will consider the two schools of thought that exist regarding the type
of information that should be exchanged over IVC, namely only positioning/proprioceptive
information versus exteroceptive information.
We will also cover the architectures that can be used to create an augmented map, which are
similar to classic multi-sensors fusion architectures; the augmented map's domain, that is its
size as well as the possibility to use different layers of variable granularity; and eventually the
data independence problem that forbids certain data feedback configurations.
5.2.2.2 Data synchronisation: spatial and temporal alignment, prediction
In CS, the problem of data synchronisation is more acute than inside a mono-vehicle multi-
sensors fusion framework. Each vehicle (or each roadside sensor) can have its own local refer-
ential, equal in terms of spatial referential and clock. This will compound with the fact that
communications are not instantaneous. Data will be transmitted and received, from the point
of view of the map-building system, in an asynchronous manner. This is equally true for all
types of architectures.
Spatial synchronisation In order to solve the problem of spatial synchronisation, a common
absolute spatial referential will have to be chosen between all the involved actors. If propagated
data is expressed into a common coordinate system, they can be used immediately by the map-
building system without the need for any additional treatment. At minimum, the position of
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any transmitting vehicle should be expressed into the common referential; exteroceptive data
sent from this same vehicle could still be expressed into a vehicle-relative referential. However
it would probably be simpler for the map-building system that all data are expressed into the
same system. Propagated exteroceptive data would be expressed into the absolute referential
relatively to the position of the vehicle that sent them, either directly in the absolute referential
or as relative measurements from the vehicle's position. In all cases, one can see that the
accuracy of the vehicle's positioning will have an impact on the exteroceptive data.
As satellite positioning devices become ubiquitous, it seems logical to use this same reference as
the extended perception absolute referential. The coordinate system that is used by the GPS is
currently the World Geodetic System, revision 1984 (WGS 84) [113], which gives coordinates in
a Latitude Longitude Altitude (LLA) format. However, other coordinate systems are possible.
One of the principal disadvantage of WGS 84 is that it has a spheroidal reference surface, so the
coordinate system is spherical. This can increase the complexity of the mathematics involved
in analysing objects' behaviour. At the scale of augmented perception systems, transforming
spherical coordinates to the planar Cartesian coordinates via the Lambert conformal conic
projection is an interesting alternative. If such transformation is necessary, it should be the
first stage in the synchronisation stage.
Temporal synchronisation Temporal synchronisation is a two-fold problem. Firstly, a com-
mon time reference must be chosen for the CS application in order for the map-building process
to know when each data packet it receives was created. Secondly, the fact that transmission is
not instantaneous means that received data always represent past measurements.
Once again, satellite positioning systems provide an answer to the issue of finding a common
reference. The GPS system is widely used in various scientific applications to provide a common
time reference in to the Universal Time, Coordinated (UTC) system [114]. Time-keeping is
integral to the positioning function of the GPS system, and GPS receivers all operate within
this common time reference. Thus, it is relatively straightforward to assume that if GPS can
be used to provide an absolute spatial reference to an augmented-map building system, it can
also be used to provide an absolute external time reference. Road actors must then ensure
that they remain synchronised with this common reference, so the data timestamps expressed
in it are actually accurate; more information on the practical way to achieve and maintain
synchronisation was covered in Chapter 3.
In a decentralised architecture, where map-building is done in each vehicle, the latest local
sensors data is likely to be more current than any received data. In a centralised architecture
all the objects received by the server will be marked at different timestamps. Obviously CS
safety-orientated applications, such as CCW, require the most current possible knowledge of
their host's environment. Temporal synchronisation brings all the received data to the most
current time, by estimating their evolution over the time that passed since the measurement
was taken. An estimator algorithm should used to predict the evolution of objects based on
their know parameters such as their position and their motion.
The most popular estimator is the Kalman Filter [115, 116] and its variations. The original
Kalman Filter is a linear estimator and is relatively well adapted to augmented perception
issues; we will give the mathematical definition of the filter in section (5.3.1). A number of non-
linear variants have also been developed for which evolution is not necessarily linear. The first
variants are the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) and then the Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF);
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which are used in a variety of context in multi-sensors fusion. For a relevant example concerning
the issue of prediction in augmented perception, an EKF is used by Wender and Dietmayer [42]
to predict the evolution of the propagated position information of other vehicles between the
measurement time and the map-building system current time. In his thesis, Mourllion [31]
compared four non-linear Kalman derivatives, concluding that the EKF and DD1 (divided
differences of 1st order) variants are more adapted to the problem of prediction in augmented
perception, when a complex state-transition (i.e. motion) model is used for vehicles. However,
recent work [117] have shown that there are few practical differences between the four filters
if both the predictive and updated steps are considered. However, if the updated step is not
efficient (e.g. if GPS data is of bad quality) then the UKF and DD2 (divided differences of 2nd
order) variants should be preferred.
Other estimators exist such as the alpha-beta filter, particular filters, Luenberger observers,
fuzzy estimators, etc. but none has reached the popularity enjoyed by the Kalman Filter.
5.2.2.3 Association & tracking
Once all objects have been correctly estimated to the current timestamp, the second step in
the map-building process is association. Association aims at determining which objects in
all the various propagated local maps and the predictions built from the previously-computed
augmented map actually represent the same objects. Typically the association process should
also be able to manage new and disappearing objects. New objects are objects that are observed
where previously nothing was known to exist and cannot be associated with any existing object.
In a mirror fashion, disappearing objects are objects that were known to exist and for which no
new data has been received for a certain amount of time. New and disappearing objects will be
common in the highly dynamic environment found on the road. Fig. (5.7) shows a graphical
version of the association problem, with one augmented map and at least two propagated
(and synchronised) local maps. In the augmented map, pentagons represent the known objects,
which motions have been predicted to the current time during temporal synchronisation. In the
local maps, squares represent the position of the ego-vehicle and circles represent the measured
positions of other vehicles. The grey circle is a new object that has not been previously measured
while the red pentagon is an object in the augmented map that has disappeared from local
maps. Data association must be used to decide that circles and squares represent the same
given pentagon, and what to do about the old pentagon and new circle, for which there will
be no association with any other object.
There are several different methods to associate objects observed by different sensors. However,
at first it might be interesting in some situations to perform what is called a gating. Gating
is similar in principle to the extraction of interest zones. Its aim is at reducing the number
of objects that can be associated together by deciding that, beyond a certain threshold, two
objects cannot possibly be representing the same real one. For example this gating can be
performed with an elliptical validation region or gate constructed from the covariance matrix
of the coordinates of a known augmented object and received objects [118].
Simple methods to associate data are available. For example one can use the nearest neighbour
method; that simply considers the distance between the propagated and known objects and
associate the propagated object that fall closest to any given known object. The distance
can be computed using the Euclidean distance, the Mahalanobis distance, etc. This method
150 CHAPTER 5. BUILDING AN AUGMENTED MAP
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
Local map 1
Local map n
Augmented map
Figure 5.7: The data association problem
Table 5.1: Some characteristics of association methods
Association method Can manage new data? Multi-targets Computational load
Nearest neighbour No No Low
PDA No No Low
JPDA No Yes Average
NNJPDA No Yes Low
MHF Yes Yes Heavy
Belief theory Yes Yes Average
unfortunately cannot manage new objects and has several other limitations that make it difficult
to use for complex problems [119].
Some more complex methods are based on probabilistic approaches: probabilistic data asso-
ciation (PDA), joint probabilistic data association (JPDA and JPDAM), nearest neighbour
JPDA, etc. Overall, these methods compute association probabilities between known objects
and received ones. The Multi-hypothesis Filter (MHF) (for example used in Streit and Lugin-
buhl [120]) is a method that considers each received object and compute the probabilities for
three hypotheses on the received object: (1) that it associates with an existing object; (2) that
it associates with a new object; and (3) that it is a false alarm. This method can manage new
objects but is unfortunately relatively computationally heavy. Their characteristics on a few
key points are shown in Tab. 5.1, from [121, 122, 119].
An alternative approach growing in popularity is the Belief theory, also known as the Dempster-
Shafer theory [123, 124]. The Belief theory is advantageous in the augmented perception context
because it can handle imprecision and incertitude better than probabilistic theories, as well as
manage new objects, ignorance and conflicts. It was notably adapted by Mourllion [31] for
extended perception based on research by Gruyer [119] and Royère [125]. A more detailed
explanation of what the Belief Theory consist of and how it applies to augmented map building
is given in section (5.3.2).
5.2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND LITERATURE REVIEW 151
5.2.2.4 Fusion
The fusion stage is simple compared to the two previous ones, as it just consists of fusing the
associated propagated objects with the augmented ones in order to obtain the best estimation
for the augmented objects at the current time. One can simply use an average of the object's
state vector parameters, which is quick and straightforward. However, a better way to proceed
(see [31]) is to use the updated step of a Kalman Filter, where the propagated objects are
considered a new measurements of the augmented object. The fusion equations extracted from
a Kalman Filter's updated stage can be found in section (5.3.1).
5.2.2.5 The two schools of information exchange
We have previously described the three main stages that are required to build an augmented
map from the fusion of data contained in local maps that have been shared (propagated) on the
network. Now, one might ask, what should these exchanged local maps contain exactly? As
we have seen in previous chapters, CS safety applications have strong requirements in terms of
latency. Increasing the amount of information exchanged between vehicles will lead to latency.
The temporal synchronisation stage can compensate for some latency, but it has limits. Indeed,
at some point an augmented map running in pure predictive mode would see the variance-
covariances matrix of its objects reach values large enough so that the objects' position and
behaviour estimation is meaningless. To avoid such problems, the information included in the
propagated local maps must be selected carefully.
We have identified two schools of thought in the literature, from an earlier assessment by
Batz et al. [126]. These two opinions differ on their preferred combination of local and propag-
ated data. On one hand, a number of researchers follow the PP approach: positioning-
proprioceptive; on the other hand, other researchers follow the EE approach: exteroceptive-
enhanced.
The PP approach proponents argue that exteroceptive sensors such as laser scanners or radars
are too expensive to be mass commercialised within the general public, at least to the short-to-
medium term. Cooperative applications should be able to provide collision prevention and other
safety tasks based solely on the exchange of localisation data: absolute location as measured
by satellite positioning systems, dynamic data (acceleration, speed, heading, etc) as measured
by satellite or inertial sensors. An additional claimed advantage of these inexpensive systems
would be their simple architectures and required software and algorithms, hence the possibility
to run them on standard ECUs.
For these reasons, the PP approach is currently relatively successful with researchers throughout
the world. For example, Lytrivis et al. [127] have developed a trajectory prediction system that
is based on the propagation of satellite positioning and inertial data coupled with the precise
knowledge of the road environment around the ego-vehicle, obtained from pre-loaded digital
maps. According to the authors this system is more robust than a prediction system based solely
on radar data, identifying 92% of potential collisions within a 400-metre radius. Ammoun et al.
[66] developed an intersection collision prevention system with only GPS data being propagated
between vehicles; collision probability is given from predicted trajectories with Kalman filtering;
in [? ], they developed a lane changing manoeuvre collision prevention system functioning with
similar parameters (lane change manoeuvre follows a polynomial model). Other examples
can be found in [128], where a state vector containing proprioceptive data for intersection
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management is propagated to other vehicles, or in [129, 130, 68, 131] for different simultaneous
driving scenarios (frontal or lateral collisions, intersections, etc.). These latter references are
examples of systems not dedicated to a single type of scenario and provides collision prevention
capabilities at all times, which is not a given in current literature. The PP approach has also
been used in multi-model transportation systems, for example in [132] where a system that
warn drivers near a level crossing if there is an incoming train is detailed.
The EE approach proponents argue in contradiction that positioning and proprioceptive sensors
combined with and IVC are not robust enough for safety applications such as collision preven-
tion. EE proponents argue that PP-based systems require a precise positioning system and
a constantly available communication medium [126]. Furthermore, the PP approach can only
function well in a homogeneous environment where all vehicles have to be similarly equipped.
Objects in the road environment that cannot be equipped with positioning systems and IVC,
such as pedestrians, bicycles and some elements of the infrastructure as well as objects that
could be equipped but are not, namely vehicles, are excluded from the system. Invisible, a
collision against them could not be predicted nor prevented. Precise digital map might cover
the problem of invisible infrastructure but they do have to be very precise and up-to-date
at all times. This is why the EE approach uses both proprio and exteroceptive data, from
local or propagated sources depending on the specific task or selected approach. That way,
exteroceptive sensors can be used to complement positioning and proprioceptive sensors if the
latter happen to be faulty, or unable to perceive a given object (and potential threat) in the
environment.
Although we have shown in previous chapters that the IVC performance is reasonable and is
likely to support safety-orientated applications such as CCW, the other points made by EE
proponents are sound. In order to assess risk in the road environment, we need to be able to
perceive all the objects that could be potential threats. This can only be realistically achieved
by using exteroceptive sensors.
We can list a number of recent research studies that belong to the EE school. For example,
in [42] laserscanners are used for local exteroceptive perception to complement propagated PP
data (DGPS and motion variables). The authors also note the possibility of exchanging data on
a vehicle's size and nature in order to have a more reliable estimation of an object's parameters,
or to transmit various data such as stae of its mass, blinkers or pedals. Chan and Bougler [133]
presented a cooperative infrastructure-vehicle system for collision prevention during a left turn
in urban intersections. An instrumented vehicle sends PP information (notably its DGPS-
measured position) to an infrastructure-based server that manages the intersection. The server
is also directly connected to a roadside radar, and is tasked with performing the data fusion;
crash risk assessment information is then transmitted to concerned vehicles to warn the drivers.
A similar system is described in [134] where a server assesses the risk for right-hand turn
manoeuvres at intersections (the equivalent to a left-hand turn manoeuvre in the United States
or Europe). This research provides an example of non-802.11 IVC, as an infrared link is used:
a vehicle sends its position and motion data to the server, which detects right-hand turns and
uses a camera (a radar in [133]) to detect any occluded vehicle that the turning driver might
not see. Eventually, Mourllion [31] also describes a simple system based on the exchange of
localisation and exteroceptive data (any kind of telemetric sensors) to control an automated
braking system. Braking is initiated according to the sign of the scalar product of the vehicles'
speed and respective distance vectors.
We should note that many of these previous research studies use high-quality positioning sys-
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Figure 5.8: Decentralised augmented map building architecture
tem such as DGPS or RTK GPS, while on the other hand, the PP approach often emphasise
its reliance on mainstream affordable positioning technology. Using enhanced GPS devices will
incur extra costs, which may reduce the advantage of using exteroceptive sensors, where costs
are now low enough to be deployed in vehicles (as shown by the increasing number of high-end
vehicles featuring pre-crash braking systems or AAC). A better solution might be to use ex-
teroceptive sensors to complement affordable positioning devices, which are still able to provide
some reasonable quality of services, as shown by examples from the PP approach.
5.2.2.6 Architectures
When referring to the map-building architecture, one must distinguish two different things. On
one hand, there is the data fusion architecture that can be adopted to build the map; such
an architecture will usually be similar to multi-sensor fusion architectures used to build local
maps. On the other hand, there is the upper-layer architecture that dictates where certain
computation tasks are performed. Choosing where the map-building processing is located is not
trivial. It is possible to consider an architecture where each vehicle build its own augmented
map by fusing local and remote information. On the other hand, one can develop a centralised
architecture where a roadside server is tasked with computing the augmented map for a given
area. This common map would then be used by applications, either at the server level or
remotely from individual vehicles according to the needs. Combining the two approaches is
also possible.
The decentralised approach has a relatively simple principle: the map building process is dis-
tributed in every vehicle. In other words, an augmented map exists in each vehicle alongside
a local map (Fig. 5.8). NNote that the map-building need not be limited to vehicles; roadside
units can also build their own augmented map to perform their tasks (however, this would
typically make the architecture a hybrid of decentralised and centralised approaches). It is
possible to have two types of data exchanges in this architecture. On one hand, vehicles can
exchange raw data, coming directly from their sensors with few preliminary treatments. In
other words, the data of interest is not formatted as objects are described by state vectors. The
exchange of PP data can be seen as this as it is easy to simply copy the data outputted by a
GPS into a message sent over IVC. Streaming the data flow from exteroceptive sensors is also
a possibility but, because of its high load on the IVC [135], remains limited to very specific
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Figure 5.9: Centralised augmented map building architecture
applications with few actors, principally in mobile robotics [136]. On the other hand, we find
the exchange of local maps that include standardised objects. This is the only approach that
enables applications with a large number of vehicles. However, it must ensure that the issue
with data independence, also known as data incest [137] is taken care of.
The centralised approach, also called server architecture, is fundamentally opposed to the
decentralised one (Fig. 5.9). The augmented map creation process is located in a single location
for a group of vehicles and roadside sensors, typically within a roadside server. Each vehicle
builds its own local map and transmits information to a centralised server that fuses all this
data together to create a global, augmented map.
There are two possible uses for the server-side augmented map: (1) it can be sent to the
vehicles under the server's supervision so they use it locally, or (2) it can be used to feed server-
side applications where the processed results are then sent to the concerned vehicles. The
second option would limit the amount of data exchanged through IVC, but would also be more
vulnerable to a fault in the server. Indeed, centralised architectures are more sensitive to defects
since the whole system is stopped if the server is non-functional. In a decentralised architecture,
a defect in one vehicle will have fewer consequences for the whole system. Processing critical
safety applications on the server might reinforce this weakness. Furthermore, if the safety
application is defective while the augmented map-building process remains functional, the map
is also lost for all, as the vehicles cannot benefit from it. In a decentralised architecture, the
affected vehicle might be more at risk but other vehicles would still be functional.
On the other hand, the principal advantage of a centralised system is that the processing power
available at the server is very likely to be much larger than what is embedded in vehicles, thus
allowing for more complex algorithms. It is also simpler to exploit a precise knowledge of the
road environment as the coverage area is limited in size compared to the digital map that would
be required on a vehicle.
The granularity of the server's coverage area is an important factor to determine. The coverage
area must be dimensioned according to the applications that run on the server, as well as the
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Figure 5.10: Scatternet augmented map building architecture
server's processing power. Typically, one can expect that a server managing collision preven-
tion applications would be in charge of a known danger area, such as an intersection and its
immediate surroundings.
It is possible to imagine other architectures other than centralised or decentralised ones , or
to combine them into hybrid architectures; two examples are: (1) scatternets and (2) mobile
agents.
The scatternets architecture [136] is a multiple mobile centralised groups architecture (Fig.
5.10), that is inspired from the piconets (pico-networks) used by the Bluetooth standard. It
would keep the idea of locating the augmented map-building process at a single location for a
group of vehicles, similar to a centralised architecture, but would also distribute this processing
on a master vehicle instead of an infrastructure-side server. Then, the master vehicle would build
the augmented map for a small group of vehicles in its vicinity. Numerous master vehicles would
be present at a given time within a geographical zone. Relays on the roadside infrastructure or
on some vehicles would be used to link relevant information between the different groups.
Mobile agents architectures [135] propose a more exotic approach In this context, it is the
processing that moves, not the data. The mobile agent is an algorithm that can migrate from
one machine to another to execute a specific function (that is embedded inside its code). This
can happen without any acknowledgement from the host.
In the context of augmented perception, one could imagine the following scenario: a mobile
agent launched from a roadside server would move from vehicle to vehicle. The agent would
shuttle the augmented map, adding to it locally available data at each of its stops; it would
move between vehicles (and infrastructure sensors) without leaving any augmented map-related
data into any of its temporary hosts. Then it would deliver the augmented map to the server
that would use it for safety applications. Several agents can very well shuttle within the same
group of vehicles at the same time in order to reduce delays at the server. More simply, the
mobile agent could serve as a mobile buffer for locally processed objects; the agent's role would
simply be to collect information in the vehicles and roadside sensors and bring them to the
server for final processing. This approach might reduce the amount of messages transmission
required.
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5.2.2.7 Considerations on the augmented perception's domain
To the question of which architecture to chose, it is also important to question oneself about the
extended perception domain, i.e. the radius around a vehicle or a server-serviced area within
which extended perception will be active.
The next question that comes up during the design of an augmented map is its domain, i.e. the
area covered by the augmented perception architecture. An augmented map can theoretically
be extended to cover a large geographic zone; if one had the processing infrastructure and
adequate sensors, one could create an augmented map covering a whole country. Obviously,
this is way outside of the realm of current possibilities. More realistically, the augmented map
covers a geographic zone where the size will depend on factors such as its architecture and the
considered applications.
The map-building architecture conditions the map's size. In a decentralised architecture, each
vehicle has its own map centred on its current position; it might be more appropriate to limit
the size of the coverage area to the most immediate area of interest. It is also possible to
use a variable coverage map, depending on the number of objects inside it. If traffic is low,
vehicles one kilometre away will be included into the map, but if traffic is denser, the map will
be reduced to shorter distances such as 400 metres, for example. In a centralised architecture,
a-priori, the server can maintain a larger map because it is likely to have superior computing
power compared to a single vehicle. However, smaller areas can be considered if the server is
dedicated to specific areas, such as intersections. Obviously, the map will not be centred upon
the server's location. In both cases, a minimum coverage area must be ensured, so that the
augmented map is at least of equal interest than non-cooperative sensors.
Our goal to create a generic enough map might become a liability Here. The map coverage
would need to be consistently adequate for the application with the largest requirements; this
might lead to unwarranted excess processing load. A way to compensate for this problem would
be to design the map-building architecture so that it is aware of the applications feeding into it,
so that it can adapt to their requirements. For CCW, the system must allow enough margins to
the driver (or an automated system) to react to a dangerous situation as soon as it is identified.
In a centralised intersection management system, for example, it means extending the server's
coverage area far enough from the intersection itself so that vehicles entering inside the coverage
area can be warned in time of an incident at the intersection. For a decentralised approach, in
[31], it is proposed to take into account a 500-metre radius around the ego-vehicle (about 15
seconds at 130 km/h), so that processing resources will not track objects too far away to be of
any immediate threat to the ego-vehicle.
Eventually, the performance of IVC technologies also influences the map's size. For a 500-
metre map, the theoretical range [26] of 802.11p-based IVC is larger than the map. However,
we have shown in Chapter 3 that the achievable range depends on the relative speed between the
emitter and receptor, and that in some cases at high relative speed it can be very limited. This
is especially problematic for V2I communication: if we consider 25% as the acceptable frame
loss threshold, reliable connection will be established between a RSU along a freeway and a
moving vehicle about 400 metres ahead of the RSU in the best scenario. In most cases, frame
loss will be lower than 5% only within 250 metres of the RSU. Considering a server managing a
dangerous intersection, incoming vehicles might establish a delayed connection with the server.
Relaying information via vehicles or roadside units should allow extending the map beyond the
range of a single communication unit In the case of vehicles driving on a freeway, the fact that
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Figure 5.11: Illustration of the data independence problem
Table 5.2: A posteriori probability densities for the data independence problem
Probability density
No No p (T | A,B)
Yes No p (T | A,B,C)
No Yes p (T | A,B,C)
Yes Yes p (T | A,B,C,C)
the intervehicular range is not reduced, as their relative speed is low compared to their absolute
speed, can be use advantageously to counter this problem..
5.2.2.8 The data independence problem
Within the framework of augmented perception, the data independence problem is an issue
that is essentially affecting decentralised architectures where map-building process is distributed
among many actors. It arises when the same information is taken into account more than once,
whereas we suppose that all data is independent, i.e. unique. The consequence of this non-
unique use is an over-converging, an artificially increased confidence into an estimation by the
map-building system. We can quote Mitchell [137] to explain this problem.
In Fig. 5.11, three vehicles A, B and C send data about a common target vehicle T to a
processing system located in F (a roadside server for example). Vehicle C is always out of
range of F and must relay its data through A and B. However C is not always in range with
either, so in order to maximise the likelihood that its data will be successfully transmitted to
F , it systematically sends its data to both A and B (in a broadcasting or multicasting fashion).
We assume that server F considers that all data it receives are independent. If data from C
are relayed via A and B at the same time, F will receive and use the same information twice,
as evident with the a posteriori probabilities densities in Table 5.2. The probability densities
depends on the success of the two possible transmission routes between C and F , through A
or B. The last case, where both transmissions were simultaneously successful, is the one where
data independence is not maintained as we can see with the double appearance of C.
Karam [136] addresses a practical version of this issue for cooperative localisation between three
vehicles. On Fig. 5.12, the left panel shows two vehicles R1 and R2 that localise themselves
with satellite positioning and proprioceptive sensors, and detect the other vehicle with an
exteroceptive sensor (typically a laserscanner). The yellow and green ellipsoids represent the
positioning incertitude of R1 and R2 respectively.
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Figure 5.12: Data independence problem for the localisation of vehicles
After an exchange of information through IVC, each vehicle has two estimations of its own po-
sition and of the other vehicle's position; these two estimations are fused to obtain an increased
accuracy as shown on the central panel. These improved estimations are dependant of each
other; however at this level it does not pose any problem yet. The information is only used
once in each vehicle: R1 fuses its own position assessment with the position estimated by R2
within R2's referential.
Now, a third vehicle R3 arrives on the scene (right panel). It is detected by the two first vehicles,
and then the three vehicles exchange their information. R3 now has three estimates of its own
position, from its own sensor(s) and from R1 and R2.
However, here R3 will not be able to fuse these estimates because the estimates by R1 and R2
depends on the relative [R1R2] distance. This distance would be used twice by R3 because it
was used by both R1 and R2 to improve the accuracy of their own position.
To solve this problem, several approaches exist. One is based on the manipulation of graphs
and dependencies trees [138, 139, 140]. For example, Howard et al. [138] propose a solution
implementing a dependencies tree imposing constraints on the update of an object estimation
by other data. One object can only be updated by a single source (a parent) but can update
all its descendants (unlimited numbers). The dependencies tree evolves with new observations.
However, the authors acknowledge that their approach cannot solve all the data independ-
ence problems, and that their approach is best suited to small groups. We can also mention
Roumeliotis and Rekleitis [141] who propose to exchange only some estimates according to
interdependencies. However, this leads to a sub-optimal solution as some information will be
excluded.
Nonetheless, there are simpler solutions. Using a timing tag to mark the spatial and temporal
origin of a piece of information could avoid taking it into account two times. Another solution
is to tune treatments on local data, indeed ff in a given vehicle its local map is built from
locally perceived data only, and that this process is strictly segregated from the augmented
map building process (no feedback), then data independence will be ensured. This means that
vehicles are allowed only to exchange their local maps. This approach is used in [31, 136]
5.3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 159
5.3 Theoretical foundations
In this section, we will detail the theoretical foundations upon which our map-building ar-
chitecture is constructed; these include the (linear) Kalman Filter and the our approach to
Multi-Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) with the Dempster-Shafer Theory. Note that we will not
necessarily provide a detailed demonstration of the involved mathematics as some of them are
fairly common knowledge (notably the Kalman Filter). Adequate details will be provided for
important points or regarding our contribution to these theoretical foundations.
5.3.1 Kalman Filter
The Kalman Filter is a recursive algorithm allowing an estimation of unknown state variables
from a noisy series of measurements; it has been in use for several decades now [115, 116]. Both
discrete (the original) and continuous version exists; we will describe the discrete version only,
as we use discretised digital data. The filter is widely used for signal processing, notably in
data fusion, tracking or localisation applications.
It is able to output a statistically optimal (verifying the CramérRao bound) estimate on
the state of the underlying system, together with a variance-covariance matrix providing the
estimated accuracy of the filter. More precisely, its output will be optimal if (1) the process
model is linear and accurately matches the underlying real system, (2) the measurement and
process noises have a Gaussian distribution, and (3) the covariances of the noises are exactly
known.
The Kalman Filter is divided into two steps:
 the prediction step, where the estimates of the state variables at the next time step, along
with their uncertainties, are computed based on an input (the control vector).
 the update step, where the estimates are updated with measurements using a weighted
average, with more weight being given to estimates with higher certainty.
Before we describe the actual algorithm, we shall first explain the dynamic model that is taken
into account by the Kalman Filter. The filter is based on linear dynamic systems discretised in
the time domain, which are modelled on a Markov chain built on linear operators perturbed by
Gaussian noises. The state of the system is represented as a vector of real numbers. At each
discrete time step, a noised linear operator is applied to the state to generate the new state
and some information from the controls on the system if they are known. Let us have the state
transition function f and the measurement function g; then the model can be written as:
Xk+1|k = f
(
Xk|k, uk, vk
)
vk  N (0, Rv, k) (5.1)
Zk+1 = g
(
Xk+1|k, nk
)
nk  N (0, Rn, k) (5.2)
where:
 Xk+1|k is the real state vector at time k + 1 given the previous state vectors available up
to time k
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 Zk+1 is the measured state vector at time k + 1
 uk is the control vector
 vk and nk are, respectively, the process and measurement noises, which are assumed to
be independent white Gaussian noises centred on zero, with positive variance-covariance
matrices Rv,k and Rn,k
As we said, the model can be represented by a Markovian Gaussian states model:
Xk+1|k = AkXk|k +Bkuk + vk vk  N (0, Rv, k) (5.3)
Zk+1 = Ck+1Xk+1|k + nk+1 nk+1  N (0, Rn, k) (5.4)
where:
 Ak is the state transition model from state Xk to Xk+1
 Bk is the control-input model which is applied to the control vector uk
 Ck+1 is the observation model (also the measurement matrix) which maps the true state
space into the observed space
From the previously described model, the Kalman Filter's goal is to compute an optimal es-
timate Xˆk+1|k+1 at time k + 1 of the real state vector, Xk+1|k+1, with the variance-covariance
matrix Pk+1|k+1. The filter is implemented using the two steps mentioned before, but not before
a first initialisation step:
Xˆ0 = E [X0] = Z0 (5.5)
P0 = E
[(
X0 − Xˆ0
)(
X0 − Xˆ0
)t]
= Rn,0 (5.6)
Rv,0 = E
[
(v − vˆ) (v − vˆ)t
]
(5.7)
Rn,0 = E
[
(n− nˆ) (n− nˆ)t
]
(5.8)
Then, ∀k [1, . . . ,+∞[, the steps are repeated (see also Fig. 5.13):
(1) Prediction step:
Xˆk+1|k = AkXˆk +Bkuk (5.9)
Pk+1|k = AkPkAtk +Rv,k (5.10)
(2) Update step:
Kk+1 = Pk+1|kCtk+1
[
Ck+1Pk+1|kCtk+1 +Rn,k+1
]−1
(5.11)
Xˆk+1|k+1 = Xˆk+1|k +Kk+1
[
Zk+1 − Ck+1Xˆk+1|k
]
(5.12)
Pk+1|k+1 = [I −Kk+1Ck+1]Pk+1|k (5.13)
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Figure 5.13: A graphical presentation of the Kalman Filter algorithm
Kk+1 is the Kalman gain; it is an optimal value that minimise the trace of Pk+1|k+1. In a three
dimensional localisation problem, the trace of Pk+1|k+1 is the sum of the variance on the x, y
and z axes, so minimising it means that the position estimate's certainty increases (this is also
said to mean that the filter is more informative).
The gain is used to weigh the relative confidence in the predictions or measurements. Indeed
if Rn, the measurement noise variance-covariance matrix, is small, then Kk+1 will have a large
value. On the other hand, if Pk+1|k+1 is small, then Kk+1 will be small too. In the former case,
the Kalman Filter gives more credit to the measurements than the model, in the latter case the
filter gives more credit to the model than the measurements.
5.3.2 Multi-Hypotheteses Tracking using the Belief Theory
In section 5.2.2.3, we described the data association and tracking problem, and gave a few
references on methods to solve this problem. In the present section, we will present a multi-
hypotheses tracking (MHT) algorithm based on previous work by Mourllion et al. [142], Mourl-
lion [31]. This algorithm uses the Dempster-Shafer Theory (belief functions) to allow such
mutli-hypotheses tracking and is able to solve problematic associations that arose in previous
implementations of the theory. Belief functions provide an interesting formalism to manage and
handle imprecision, uncertainty and missing information. Instead of strictly considering prob-
ability distributions over a finite number of hypotheses, like the majority of other approaches,
belief functions are also computed over all subsets of hypotheses. A larger frame of discernment
than the one used in probability is then considered, allowing a better modelisation of doubt
when data is insufficiently informative.
The algorithm described in this section combines the advantages of MHT (creation and destruc-
tion of objects) with a very high level of accuracy concerning target disappearance, allowing
it to discriminate between objects that have disappeared for good (by moving away of the
sensors' range) or being only temporarily invisible, because of occultations by another object
for example. This is achieved by solving issues related to the maximum global belief criterion,
allowing it to avoid problematic local associations that can arise while the global belief criterion
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is still satisfied.
We will provide here a formal description of the algorithm, where its implementation using
actual data is covered in section 5.4.3. However, at first, we will give a general introduction to
the Dempster-Shafer Theory.
5.3.2.1 Introduction to Dempster-Shafer Theory
Belief functions were introduced by Dempster [123] in 1967 and further refined by Shafer [124]
in 1976, taking the name of the Dempster-Shafer Theory. It is also sometimes referred to as the
Belief Theory. Further extension was undertaken by Smets [143, 144] to create the Transferable
Belief Model (TBM).
At first, we define Ω, the universal set that represents the various possible states for the sys-
tem under consideration, i.e. the frame of discernment. The possible states are the simple
(singletons) acceptable propositions Hi, so that:
Ω = {H1, H2, . . . ,Hn} (5.14)
{Hi} ∩ {Hj} = Ø ∀i 6= j (5.15)
From this universal set, we can define the power-set 2Ω that is the set of all subsets of Ω,
including the empty set ∅. The power-set includes all the combinations based on the hypothesis
from the universal set. A proposition A can be a singleton hypothesis or a complex hypothesis,
which includes more than one hypothesis. ∅Ω represents impossible propositions (conflicts) and
Ω the total ignorance, since it includes all existing hypothesis.
2Ω = {A/A ⊆ Ω} = {ØΩ, H1, H2, . . . ,Hn, H1 ∪H2, . . . ,Ω} (5.16)
In [145, 119, 146], the authors used an extended universal set Θ, the extended open world, by
creating a new hypothesis, labelled ∗ which representing any new hypothesis that is not initially
modelled in Ω. This approach allows discriminating between conflict and new hypothesis, which
is not possible in the general approach.
Θ = {H1, H2, . . . ,Hn, ∗} (5.17)
2Θ = {ØΘ, H1, H2, . . . ,Hn, H1 ∪H2, . . . , ∗,Ω} (5.18)
The Dempster-Shafer Theory allows to evaluate the likelihood of a proposition A through its
belief mass mΩ (A), the mass of elementary probability on the said proposition A, a function
defined as:
mΩ : 2Ω → [0, 1]
A → mΩ (A) (5.19)
The set of belief masses constitutes the basic belief assignment (BBA), which verifies:
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mΩ (ØΩ) = 0 (5.20)∑
A∈2Ω
mΩ (A) = 1 (5.21)
mΩ (A) is the degree of belief put in proposition A, more precisely it expresses the proportion
of all relevant and available evidence that supports the claim that the actual state belongs to
A but to no particular subset of A. mΩ (Ω) represents the mass of ignorance. If A is a complex
hypothesis (i.e. not a singleton one), it means that given the current state of knowledge on
the system, no mass could be assigned to a more specific proposition. This represents a partial
ignorance of the system's state. Total ignorance is represented by the following masses set:
mΩ (Ω) = 1 and mΩ (A) = 0 ∀A 6= Ω. The mass mΩ (ØΩ) is the mass of conflict (the BBA is
labelled as normal ifmΩ (ØΩ) = 0), and propositions A that have a non-null mass (m
Ω (A) > 0)
are called focal elements. When focal elements are composed only of singleton hypotheses, the
masses are linkable to probabilities, creating a set of Bayesian masses. If the extended open
world Θ is used, then, mΘ (ØΘ) +m
Θ (∗) = mΩ (ØΩ).
From the mass assignments, we can define the upper and lower boundaries of a probability
interval. This interval contains the precise probability of A (in the classical sense), and is
bounded by two non-additive continuous measures called belief and plausibility, so that:
bel (A) ≤ P (A) ≤ pl (A) (5.22)∑
B|B⊆A
mΩ (B) ≤ P (A) ≤
∑
B|B∩A6=ØΩ
mΩ (B) (5.23)
pl (A) = 1− bel (A) (5.24)
where B is the set of propositions that implies A.
After the sets of mass assignments have been obtained, the problem becomes how to combine
two independent sets of mass assignments, in other words, how to combine evidence from
difference sources (such as different sensors)? There are a number of different rules to do so,
the principal one being the Dempster-Shafer (DSR) rule.
Let us consider S information sources ∀A ⊂ Ω, which resulting BBA is mΩ1,...,S , called the joint
mass. Their respective focal elements are B1, . . . , BS . The DSR is computed so that the final
mass of conflict is null (mΩ1,...,S (ØΩ) = 0). The joint mass is given by:
mΩ1,...,S (A) =
1
K
∑
B1∩...∩BS=A
mΩ1 (B1) . . .m
Ω
S (BS) (5.25)
where K is a normalisation constant measuring the amount of conflict between the sets, and
given by:
K = 1−
∑
B1∩...∩BS=ØΩ
mΩ1 (B1) . . .m
Ω
S (BS) (5.26)
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Figure 5.14: Targets and tracks: the association problem
The normalisation is necessary as it distributes the mass of conflict on all the other masses,
to maintain the sum at its expected value of 1. If the information sources are in agreement,
K tends toward 1; on the other hand, if they are in total conflict, K tends toward 0, making
coefficient 1K very large. Use of that rule has come under serious criticism when significant
conflict in the information is encountered [147, 148], for the normalisation process destroy
any information that we had on conflicts. In fact, conflict is a kind of information in itself,
and the origin of this conflict becomes an issue, especially when the DSR makes a conscious
assumption to ignore conflict. A solution to this problem will be outlined in section 5.3.2.3.
5.3.2.2 Multitarget tracking problem formulation
Let us have objects Oi,k which have their state vector at time k as follows:
Oi,k =

xi,k
yi,k
Vx,i,k
Vy,i,k

We consider a Markovian Gaussian states model similar to the one described by the Kalman
Filter equations (5.3) and (5.4). At each iteration of k, sensors provide raw data, which are
then processed to obtain a set of detected object Xi,k referred to as observations or targets.
The behaviour of the known objects is predicted to the same time through a Kalman Filter,
giving a set of known predicted objects Yj,k called the tracks.
Tracks {Yj,k}∀j∈{1,...,nk} are related to observations (targets) {Xi,k}∀i∈{1,...,mk} (see Fig. 5.14)
according to a model like equation (5.4). The number of tracks nk and targets mk are variable
over time; objects can be obstructed from view, appear and disappear very quickly between
two measurements. There is also the possibility of false alarms, and association ambiguities
when targets are located in close proximity to each other. The fact that objects can appear
and disappear justifies the use of an elaborated multi-target tracking approach such as MHT.
For the remainder of this chapter, we will use the following notations for Belief Theory-related
mathematics. From the point of view of target Xi, Hj is the hypothesis that Xi is associated
with Yj (in other words, that track Yj,k and target Xi,k describe the same object); the mass
for Hj is noted mi,j (Hj). If one have two hypothesis Hj that Xi is associated with Yj and
Hk that Xi is not associated with Yk, then we can write the joint mass mi,jk (Hj); this allows
tracking the information sources that have been used to build a particular joint mass. The joint
mass for N sources of information (sensors) is noted mi,. (Hj), with the dot meaning all.
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5.3.2.3 BBA combination with conflict management
As we noted in section 5.3.2.1, using the DSR when there is a significant amount of conflict
between the various information sources leads to the loss of any information regarding this
conflict. This is due to the normalisation process required to adhere to the condition that the
mass of conflict is null, mΩ1,...,S (ØΩ) = 0. A solution to this issue, using the extended open world
Θ was proposed by Gruyer [119] with Royère [125] later expanding on it. They formulated a
way to compute the final joint masses directly from the initial mass distributions, for N sources:
mi,. (Hj) = mi,j (Hj)
N∏
a = 1
a 6= j
(1−mi,a (Ha)) (5.27)
mi,. (Hj ∪ ∗) = mi,j (Θ)
N∏
a = 1
a 6= j
(
1−mi,a
(
Ha
))
(5.28)
mi,. (Hj ∪Hk ∪ ∗) = mi,j (Θ)mi,k (Θ)
N∏
a = 1
a 6= j
a 6= k
(
1−mi,a
(
Ha
))
(5.29)
...
mi,. (Hj ∪ . . . ∪Hm ∪ ∗) = mi,j (Θ) . . .mi,m (Θ)
N∏
a = 1
a 6= j
a 6= k
...
a 6= m
(
1−mi,a
(
Ha
))
(5.30)
mi,.
(
Hj
)
= mi,j
(
Hj
) N∏
a = 1
a 6= j
mi,a (Θ) (5.31)
mi,. (Θ) =
N∏
a = 1
mi,a (Θ) (5.32)
mi,. (∗) =
N∏
a = 1
mi,a
(
Ha
)
(5.33)
mi,. (Ø) = 1−

N∏
a = 1
(1−mi,a (Ha)) +
N∑
a=1
mi,a (Ha)
N∏
b = 1
b 6= a
(1−mi,b (Hb))

(5.34)
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Then, a Pignistic step is performed to share the masses of disjunction hypotheses (any of
Hj ∪ . . .∪Hm ∪∗) to the singleton hypotheses [125], as the disjunctions need to be removed for
the tracking process which is based, so far, on the assumption that a target can be associated
with only one single track. Pignistic probabilities have been coined by Smets [144] to describe
the assignation of regular probabilities to the possible options that can be taken for a given
decision, such as placing a bet1.
At first, let us consider two observers looking at the same scene. The first observer looks at the
potential associations between observed objects and known objects (Xi is associated with Yi)
and uses the extended universal set Θx = {X1, . . . , Xm, ∗}; the second observer looks at the
potential associations between the known objects and the observed objects (Yi is associated
with Xi) and uses the extended universal set Θy = {Y1, . . . , Yn, ∗}. Note that the number
of observers is not related to the number of sensors or sources of information. Indeed, if
we have only a single sensor, we will still consider two observers that are going to look for
associations between objects as explained before. From these two observers, we can create two
belief matrices with the Pignistic probabilities of association between tracks and targets. The
Pignistic probabilities are constructed as such:
P : 2Θ → [0, 1] (5.35)
P (A) =
∑
B ∈ 2Θ
A ⊂ B
|A ∩B|
|B| ×m (B) (5.36)
P (Ø) = m (Ø) (5.37)
where |S| is the number of singletons elements in a set S, here A and B. The belief matrices
are:
Mpgi,. X1 · · · Xm
Y1 P1,. (Y1) · · · Pm,. (Y1)
...
...
...
Yn P1,. (Yn) · · · Pm,. (Yn)
∗ P1,. (∗) · · · Pm,. (∗)
Ø P1,. (Ø) · · · Pm,. (Ø)
Mpg.,j Y1 · · · Yn
X1 P.,1 (X1) · · · P.,n (X1)
...
...
...
Xm P.,1 (Xm) · · · P.,n (Xm)
∗ P.,1 (∗) · · · P.,n (∗)
Ø P.,1 (Ø) · · · P.,n (Ø)
1Quoting Professor Smets (emphasis ours), The transferable belief model is based on the assumption that
beliefs manifest themselves at two mental levels: the `credal' level where beliefs are entertained and the 'pig-
nistic' level where beliefs are used to make decisions (from `credo' I believe and `pignus' a bet , both in Latin).
Usually these two levels are not distinguished and probability functions are used to quantify beliefs at both levels.
The justification for the use of probability functions is usually linked to 'rational' behavior to be held by an ideal
agent involved in some decision contexts.
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Then, we need to solve the possible contradictions or ambiguities that can be found between
these two matrices. If there is no contradictions, we have Pi,. (Yj) and P.,j (Xi) with the largest
values in their respective columns, and so on. Contradictions arise when the two matrices do not
associate the same objects together, such as when in Mpgi,. object X1 is associated with Y1 (the
probability P1,. (Y1) has the highest value) whereas inM
pg
.,j , object Y1 is associated withXm (the
probability P.,1 (Xm) has the highest value). Without ambiguities, all the probabilities in each
column are unique (in a single matrix). If ambiguities arise, there are two equal probabilities
in a same column; for example, in Mpgi,. , if P1,. (Y1) = P1,. (Yn).
To solve any of these two problems, Gruyer et al. [149] used a global Pignistic matrix and the
Hungarian Algorithm [150, 151] to find the best optimal global association, according to the
maximum global belief criteria. Note that the global Pignistic matrix is only computed if there
are some ambiguities or contradictions in the two belief matrices. Otherwise, the associations
can be extracted from them directly (a decision is taken). If it is required, the global matrix
which is constructed from the two belief matrices is:
Mpgi,j Y1 · · · Yn ∗1 · · · ∗m
X1 M1,1 · · · M1,n P1,. (∗) · · · 0
...
...
...
...
Xm Mm,1 · · · Mm,n 0 · · · Pm,. (∗)
∗1 P.,1 (∗) · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
∗n 0 · · · P.,n (∗) 0 · · · 0
with:
Mi,j =
Pi,. (Yj) + P.,j (Xi)
2
(5.38)
If we have three targets {X1, X2, X3} and four tracks {Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4}, the final decision process
can be visualised as such:
X1 X2 X3 ∗ ∗
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Y1 ∗ Y2 Y3 Y4
In that case, X1 is associated to Y1 and X3 is associated with Y2. X2 is associated with the ∗
hypothesis, which mean it is a new object; a new track Y5 will have to be created in consequence
(added to the universal set Θ). The ∗ hypothesis is associated with Y3 and Y4, which means that
the two tracks have disappeared. They will not be deleted from the system's map immediately,
indeed targets that correspond to them might re-appear later because the objects are only
temporarily out of view. The system will keep them (the action is referred to as propagation)
and continue to process them for a certain time, by using a confidence value. A new track has
its confidence set to a value depending on the incertitude on its initial detection.
The confidence belongs to [0, 1], it increases when there is a successful association, and decreases
when no targets can be associated with a track; when it reaches zero, the track is taken out
of the system. The lifespan of a track can be modulated depending on the function that is
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Figure 5.15: Tracks' confidence update process
used to increase/decrease confidence. The simplest approach is to use a linear function (see
Fig. 5.15). Gruyer [119] proposed using Bezier curves to modulate the pessimism or optimism
of the tracking strategies, allowing it to maintain longer or, on the other hand, quickly remove
a track that is not associated with the targets anymore.
5.3.2.4 Multi-hypotheses tracking approach
Multi-Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) removes the previous assumption that a target can be asso-
ciated with only one track and vice versa. Indeed, this assumption can force a decision that is
incorrect. Abandoning the assumption of uniqueness has several benefits. Now, the system
will be able to include multiple hypothesis in its decision (the equivalent of doubt), or, on the
contrary, reject any decision because the available data is of poor quality. This will prove useful
in a highly volatile environment such as on the road. Mourllion et al. [142], Mourllion [31]
proposed two methods to work with MHT, the Cascade and Threshold methods, each with
their specific advantages and disadvantages.
Cascade method Let us call the k-level hypotheses all the complex hypotheses (disjunctions)
composed of k singletons. We build belief matrices like on page 166, but using the normalisation
shown in Eq. (5.39) and (5.40); in that case the information on conflict is lost.
P : 2Θ → [0, 1] (5.39)
P (A) =
∑
B ∈ 2Θ
A ⊂ B
|A ∩B|
|B| ×
m (B)
1−m (Ø) (5.40)
The Cascade method operates a recurring Pignistic repartition of masses from the k-level hypo-
theses to the (k − 1)-level hypotheses. It looks for the first hypotheses (complex or singleton)
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that has a mass greater than 0.5 (if the belief mass on a hypothesis is greater than 0.5, it will
represent the belief maximum, since the sum of all masses is always equal to 1). Starting at the
highest k-level (i.e. Θ), the Cascade method spreads the masses from a k-level to the underlying
level, as long as it cannot find a mass greater than 0.5. If a hypothesis has a mass greater than
0.5, it is propagated further down the processing chain. The Cascade method must run for all
targets currently available to the association process.
However, if the propagated hypothesis is complex, the Cascade method continues its spreading
of masses to obtain the weights that will be affected on that propagation. Indeed, if the method
returns the hypothesis H1 ∪ ∗, we need to know in which proportions the system believes H1
or ∗ are the correct.
If no mass greater than 0.5 can be found at any level, the Cascade method cannot take a
decision. However, it has not been designed to reject a decision. If there is no suitable mass
obtained from the Pignistic repartition, a reversed cascade is attempted, starting from the
smallest k-level and spreading mass to the higher (k + 1)-level.
Threshold method The Cascade method has two issues: (1) it is computationally complex,
and (2) it does not manage conflict because the of the masses normalisation from Eq. (5.39)
and (5.40). To compensate for these issues, Mourllion et al. propose a second less complex
method, dubbed the Threshold method, which is considered superior (see Table 5.3 for their
respective advantages and disadvantages).
This time, the Mpgi,. and M
pg
.,j Pignistic matrices (page 166) are used. For each line, a weighted
threshold t is computed according to Eq. (5.41), where kt ∈ [0, 1] is the weight.
ti = kt (1− Pi (Ø)) (5.41)
Any associations from the Pignistic matrices where probability is lower than t is filtered. The
value of weight kt can be used to control the number of hypotheses that pass through the
filtering process.
The smaller kt, the larger the number of hypotheses that can pass through the filter; in that
case, we have a cautious filter. This will lead to the creation of virtual tracks, that will
continue to be processed through future iterations until more information becomes available
and they are associated more precisely or disappear (they were false detections).
On the other hand, if kt ≥ 0.5 only a single hypothesis will be accepted at maximum. This
means that with these large values of kt, the filtering process will not allow any hypothesis
through. In other words, it means the association algorithm will reject taking any decision
on the hypotheses. Mourllion [31] recommends that this latter case should be used only for
computations internal to the association process, without affecting the overall decision taken
by the algorithm (upon which some critical upper-level systems might depend). The upside of
filtering a large number of hypotheses is that false alarms will be filtered in most situations.
If target Xi is associated to the two tracks Yj and Yk, two virtual tracks Y
∗
ij and Y
∗
ik are
actually created. The system is said to be doubting or hesitating on to which decision to take.
These virtual tracks are added to the universal set and will be processed by the system in
subsequent iterations, alongside normal tracks. The two tracks are likely to diverge, leading to
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Table 5.3: Comparison of the Cascade and Threshold MTH methods
Methods Cascade Threshold
Complexity High Low
Number of generated tracks Accurate Inaccurate
Conflict is accounted for? No Yes
Can reject decision? No Yes
the association of one with Xi and the other to the ∗ hypothesis. This latter track will see its
confidence decrease until it is removed from the tracking system.
5.3.2.5 Conclusion
The augmented map building architecture described in section 5.4 allow the implementation of
either of these methods. It will be the first time the whole MHT system is implemented in a
framework that will, eventually, be fed with actual on-vehicle sensors and IVC-received data.
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5.4 Building the augmented map
In this section, we will describe the architecture we implemented to build an augmented map,
using the principles described in the previous section. The map-building architecture is set
within the SiVIC-RTMaps-based framework described in Chapter 4. It is hosted on both
software suites; however, most of the computing is performed within RTMaps. We will first
give a general overview of the architecture, before explaining the three main stages in detail :
(1) spatial and temporal synchronisation, (2) association, and (3) fusion.
5.4.1 Global architecture
Fig 5.16 shows the overall high-level architecture of our map-building system. We limited
ourselves to a single information layer covering objects and their behaviour within a certain
area around the ego-vehicle, or the interest zone managed by a roadside server. The architecture
includes the three main stages described in the literature review, as well as the IVC module
and the local map-building modules. The architecture gives the point of view of a vehicle, with
a decentralised map-building approach, i.e. one where each vehicle (or road actor) computes
its own augmented map from local and remote data. In a centralised approach, the local map-
building modules would not necessarily be present, if the roadside server is not linked directly
to roadside sensors.
Fig 5.17 provides a more detailed view of the architecture. We will now explain each module's
function, before a more detailed presentation is given in the following subsections for each of
the three main stages.
Local map modules The local map modules are tasked with building the vehicle's local
map. The most simple case has a vehicle which only sensor is a positioning one (typically a
GPS). In this case, the local map contains only an object which describes the vehicle's location
and any available information on its type. Proprioceptive information, from an INS central
for example, can be used to enhance the vehicle's localisation. If the vehicle is equipped with
exteroceptive sensors, any object detected is included in the local map in a similar format as
the object describing the ego-vehicle.
The local map information is sent to both the synchronisation and IVC modules; the former
will update it to the current timestamp, if necessary, so it can be used to create the augmented
map, while the latter will format it appropriately and send it to other vehicles via the 802.11p
IVC simulation. This latter action involves passing information from RTMaps to SiVIC and
back.
IVC module The IVC module is based on the IVC simulation described in Chapter 4 and the
802.11p model from Chapter 3. It is principally located within SiVIC; information is exchanged
with modules in RTMaps through the shared memory and DDS mechanism. For more detail
on this module's functions, refer to Chapter 3, section 3.7 and Chapter 4, section 4.2.5.
Spatial and temporal synchronisation The spatial and temporal synchronisation module
receives information from the IVC module and the local map modules. It has three roles, each
performed by an independent sub-module (components).
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At first, it must prepare the data received from remote sources and from the local map so that
they are all coherent. For that, the module decodes data that arrive from remote sources and
creates objects of a standardised format, so that the state vector of each object contains the
same fields ; this task is undertaken by the Data Interface component. Whether each field is
filled with meaningful information depends on the data that was received from other vehicles.
The standardised state vector is:
X =

ID
S
A
tmin
tmax
T
{X,Y, Z}LLA
{X,Y, Z}LAM
{VX , VY , VZ}LAM
σXX , σY Y , σXY
E
C
Occ

(5.42)
The field's signification are the following:
 ID is the object's unique identifier.
 S is a boolean value used to described the object's state. It can take the following values:
 0 = Inactive
 1 = Ready to be used
 2 = In use
 3 = Synchronised
 4 = Associated
 5 = Fusion in progress
 6 = Fused
 A is a boolean value used to verify if the object is an augmented object (which is the case
when it is fed back from the augmented map).
 tmin, tmax, T are timestamps. tmin and tmax can be used to follow the object's flow
through the architecture, to compute internal delays notably as well as expressing how
old the object is. T is the object's most recent timestamp in the common temporal
reference, that is used when its behaviour has to be predicted to what is considered the
current time. T is an 64-bits integer value expressing the number of microseconds elapsed
since January 1, 1970.
 The triplets {X,Y, Z}LLA and {X,Y, Z}LAM give the object's position within two sets
of coordinate systems: {X,Y, Z}LLA in the GPS's reference WGS 84 coordinates, and
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{X,Y, Z}LAM for a Lambert conformal conic projection-based coordinate system. Lambert-
like coordinates are used for the absolute referential in SiVIC, allowing the architecture
to accept data from real positioning systems or from simulated ones (such as the CarOb-
servers).
 The triplet {VX , VY , VZ}LAM gives the object's speed along the three axis, in Lambert
coordinates.
 {σXX , σY Y , σXY } are elements of the object's variance-covariance matrix; the number of
elements might vary depending on whether the system is set to work in two dimensions
only (2× 2 matrix) or in three dimensions (3× 3 matrix).
 E is an error code value that can be used to signal a problem with the object.
 C gives the confidence in the object's existence.
 Occ records the number of occurrences (counted in loop iterations) for which the object
has been detected and tracked.
In a second time, the standardised objects are synchronised spatially by the Spatial Alignment
component. The component is tasked with verifying that all objects have a coordinate system in
common; the choice of which coordinate system to use is set by the user. If Lambert coordinates
are used globally, but one object only has its WGS 84 coordinates triplet filled, the component
will transform them to update the Lambert coordinates triplet.
Eventually, the standardised objects are temporally synchronised by the Temporal Alignment
component. To do so, the prediction step of a linear Kalman filter is used. The objects'
behaviour is evaluated to a common timestamp which is considered as the present time (all
objects will have the same value in field T ). This timestamp is set the instant data enters
the component, and will not change in any downstream component. It will also be used as
the augmented map's timestamp. The Temporal Alignment receives feedback from the Fusion
module, so that objects in the augmented map are also aware of the new common timestamp.
Association & tracking The association and tracking module receives synchronised remote
and local objects as well as the previously synchronised augmented objects from the synchron-
isation module. Here, remote and local objects are associated with previously known augmented
objects, and if no match can be found, instructions are given to create new augmented objects.
The module also manages the disappearance of objects, that is when one augmented object
has not been associated with any remote or local object for a certain amount of time. . The
Multi-Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) algorithm described in Section 5.3.2 is used to perform this
task.
Fusion The last module performs the fusion of existing augmented objects with remote or
local objects, or the fusion of remote and local objects together to form new augmented ob-
jects, following the instructions received from the association and tracking module. This last
component uses the updated step of a linear Kalman filter, which is looped so that augmented
objects can be updated with data from the remote and local objects which are considered as
new measurements within the Kalman filter's formalism. The module outputs the augmented
objects forming the augmented map, using the same standardised state vectors as described
earlier.
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5.4.2 Spatial and temporal alignment
In this section, we will present in more detail the functions of the spatial and temporal syn-
chronisation module. As we explained in the previous section, it performs three roles: (1) data
standardisation, (2) spatial alignment via coordinate systems transformation, and (3) temporal
synchronisation via the prediction of objects' behaviour. The Data Interface component which
is tasked with the first role is relatively straightforward, so we will not describe it any further.
Rather, we will concentrate on the spatial and temporal alignment tasks.
5.4.2.1 Coordinate systems transformation
Spatial alignment is used to express all the received objects in a common coordinate system,
if this is not already the case. In our architecture, we consider a Lambert conformal conic
projection-based coordinate system as our default reference, as it allows using Cartesian co-
ordinates (
{
x y z
}
, also called geographical coordinates) directly, which is useful when
treating simulated data outputted from SiVIC, which are also expressed in a Lambert-like
Cartesian system. A GPS sensor is more likely to output positioning data in the WGS 84
coordinate system, in a Latitude Longitude Altitude (LLA) style format.
Let us have
{
x y z
}
the Lambert coordinates and
{
φ λ α
}
with φ the latitude, λ
the longitude and α the altitude; φ0 and λ0 respectively the reference latitude and longitude;
and φ1 and φ2 the projection's standard parallels. In France, the standardised Lambert93
projection2, which is used for official maps, has φ0 = 46°30 N, φ1 = 44° N, φ2 = 49° N and
λ0 = 3° E
To convert from WGS 84 to Lambert, we use equations (5.43) to (5.45):
x = ρ sin [n× (λ− λ0)] (5.43)
y = ρ0 − ρ cos [n× (λ− λ0)] (5.44)
z = α (5.45)
where:
n =
ln (cosφ1 secφ2)
ln
[
tan
(
pi
4 +
1
2φ2
)
cot
(
pi
4 +
1
2φ1
)] (5.46)
F =
cosφ1 tan
n
(
pi
4 +
1
2φ1
)
n
(5.47)
ρ = F cotn
(
pi
4
+
1
2
φ
)
(5.48)
ρ0 = F cot
n
(
pi
4
+
1
2
φ0
)
(5.49)
5.4.2.2 Prediction of the object's behaviour
Temporal alignment is used to bring all the received objects to the current time. This is neces-
sary as some objects might have been delayed by non-trivial amounts of time while they were
2http://lambert93.ign.fr/
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propagated in the wireless network, or in some overloaded software components. Additionally,
some objects might not have been updated for some time, yet they are still considered as ac-
ceptable by the downstream modules. The behaviour of these objects need to be predicted so
they can be associated with any new data relating to them that might have arrived in the mean
time. Eventually, for the downstream association and fusion to be meaningful, the objects need
to describe the state of the road scene in a single instant.
The estimator that we use to predict the evolution of objects at time tk+1based on their known
parameters at time tk is a linear Kalman Filter. The prediction stage, equations (5.9) and
(5.10), is the only part of the filter that is needed here.
Let us have ∆t = tk+1 − tk, the difference between the current time tk+1 and the object's last
main timestamp (i.e. T ). ∆t will vary according to the object's nature. If the object is an
augmented object fed back from the latest augmented map, ∆t is the time elapsed since the
augmented map was last updated. If the object is a locally-perceived object, ∆t is the time
elapsed since it was detected by the exteroceptive sensors and updated in the local map. If
the object comes from the local map of another vehicle, exchanged over IVC, then ∆t is the
time elapsed since that local map was created; in that case, ∆t can be expressed as ∆t =
∆inf,e + ∆telecom + ∆inf,r, with ∆inf,e and ∆inf,r processing latencies in the emitter and
receptor, respectively, which include latencies in the local map building chain at the emitter
and data decoding and standardisation at the receptor; ∆telecom is the total latency introduced
in the IVC simulation.
To project the vehicle's behaviour to the current timestamp, we need a state-transition model,
which will give us the state-transition matrix Ak and the control-input matrix Bk. The state-
transition model is linear, since we are using a linear Kalman Filter. Hence, it will be a simple
two-dimensional state-transition model. Let us consider two options, that differs from the
nature of the control vector. The first model uses the vehicle's acceleration for the control
vector, while the second model is simpler and uses the vehicle's speed for the control vector.
The state vectors are, respectively, X =
[
x y Vx Vy
]
and X =
[
x y
]
. The state-
transition models are given by the equations (5.50) when using the acceleration for the control
vector, and equations (5.51) when using the speed for the control vector:
Xk+1|k 7→

xk+1 = xk + Vx,k∆t
yk+1 = yk + Vy,k∆t
Vx,k+1 = Vx,k + αx,k∆t
Vy,k+1 = Vy,k + αy,k∆t
(5.50)
Xk+1|k 7→
{
xk+1 = xk + Vx,k∆t
yk+1 = yk + Vy,k∆t
(5.51)
From these models, we can extract the state-transition and control-input matrices Ak and Bk
for the first model:
Ak =

1 0 ∆t 0
0 1 0 ∆t
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 Bk =

0 0
0 0
∆t 0
0 ∆t

And similarly for the second model:
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Ak =
[
1 0
0 1
]
Bk =
[
∆t 0
0 ∆t
]
The control vectors uk are, respectively, uk =
[
αx αy
]
and uk =
[
Vx,k Vy,k
]
.
We remind the Kalman Filter's prediction stage equations in (5.52) and (5.53). Filling them
with the vectors and matrices defined above, we obtain equations (5.54) to (5.57).
Xˆk+1|k = AkXˆk +Bkuk (5.52)
Pk+1|k = AkPkAtk +Rv,k (5.53)
Xˆk+1|k =

1 0 ∆t 0
0 1 0 ∆t
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
×

x
y
Vx
Vy
+

0 0
0 0
∆t 0
0 ∆t
×
[
αx
αy
]
(5.54)
Pk+1|k =


1 0 ∆t 0
0 1 0 ∆t
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
×

σx2 σyx σxVx σxVy
σxy σy2 σyVx σyVy
σxVx σyVx σV 2x σVxVy
σxVy σyVy σVyVx σV 2y
 (5.55)
×

1 0 ∆t 0
0 1 0 ∆t
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

+

0.2 0 0 0
0 0.2 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

Xˆk+1|k =
[
1 0
0 1
]
×
[
xk
yk
]
+
[
∆t 0
0 ∆t
]
×
[
Vx,k
Vy,k
]
(5.56)
Pk+1|k =
[
1 0
0 1
]
×
[
σx2 σxy
σxy σy2
]
×
[
1 0
0 1
]
+
[
0.2 0
0 0.2
]
(5.57)
We shall use the second, simpler state-transition model withX =
[
x y
]
and uk =
[
Vx,k Vy,k
]
for the remainder of this chapter. Note that since we use position data received from GPS-like
positioning system, the vehicle's position and speed are not accurately known. Thus, the initial
variance-coviariance matrix P0 must have non-null values on its diagonal.
5.4.3 Association and tracking
After the objects have been synchronised to tk+1, they need to be associated together to de-
termine which actual objects they represent. At this stage, we have objects coming from several
local maps through IVC, the targets, and the objects from the augmented map at time tk (if
tk 6= t0), coming through a feedback process, the tracks. They are associated using the 2-by-2 
procedure described by Gruyer [119], and later expanded in the approach described in section
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5.3.2.3. The association process' implementation is relatively complex, so to make it easier we
will not indulge into too much detail.
Given the targets {X1, . . . , Xm} and the tracks {Y1, . . . , Yn}, the double observers (see page
166) approach is used to compute the belief masses for each hypotheses Xi is associated with
Yj and Yi is associated with Xj, including the ∗ hypothesis (a new or lost object). The belief
mass sets are computed as follows, for an hypothesis Hj :
mi,j (Hj) =
0 if Ic,i,j ∈ [0, τ2]Φ1 (Ic,i,j) if Ic,i,j ∈ [τ2, 1] (5.58)
mi,j
(
Hj
)
=
Φ2 (Ic,i,j) if Ic,i,j ∈ [0, τ1]0 if Ic,i,j ∈ [τ1, 1] (5.59)
mi,j (Θ) =

1− Φ2 (Ic,i,j) if Ic,i,j ∈ [0, τ1]
1 if Ic,i,j ∈ [τ1, τ2]
1− Φ1 (Ic,i,j) if Ic,i,j ∈ [τ2, 1]
(5.60)
where Ic,i,j is the similarity index between target Xi and track Yj , which is based on a weighting
of the Mahalanobis distance between the target and tracks by their respective confidence. τ1
and τ2 are thresholds used to alter the impartiality of the association. For example, for a
given value of mi,j (Hj), the association is optimistic if a low value of Ic,i,j is necessary, and
pessimistic if a high value of Ic,i,j is required. A simplified situation exists when τ1 = τ2, in
which case if τ1 = τ2 = 0.5 the association process is impartial, optimistic for τ1 = τ2 < 0.5 and
pessimistic for τ1 = τ2 > 0.5. The functions Φ1 and Φ2 are defined according to Eq. (5.61) and
(5.62), where τ = τ1 = τ2 and α is reliability index expressing the reliability of the information
source used to assess Hj .
Φ1 (Ic,i,j) =
α
2
[
1− cos
(
pi
Ic,i,j − τ
1− τ
)]
(5.61)
Φ2 (Ic,i,j) =
α
2
[
1 + cos
(
pi
Ic,i,j
τ
)]
(5.62)
Then, the mass are combined and the Pignistic repartition and decision process from 5.3.2.3 is
applied; the output is a single association matrix. Let us have 7 targets {X1, . . . , X7} and 5
tracks {Y1, . . . , Y5}, where object Y2 has disappeared from the scene and X5 and X7 correspond
to new objects never seen before. The initial association matrix is:
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7
X1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
X2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
X3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
X4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
X5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
X6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
X7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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To make the matrix square, it was necessary to add to virtual objects Y6 and Y7. However,
note that Y6 is not associated with any target. This is because the association between X2
and Y2 is actually incorrect, its presence is a necessary consequence of the combination of the
belief matrices. However, it will disappear in a subsequent filtering process based on mi,. (∗)
and m.,j (∗): the mass on the existing erroneous association is lower than the belief mass for
the ∗ hypothesis. The final, filtered association matrix is:
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 ∗1 ∗2
X1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
X4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
X5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
X6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
X7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
One can see that Y2is not associated with anything, so it will either be filtered or propagated to
the next iteration, depending on its confidence value. In our implementation, if the confidence
drops under 0.2, the object is removed from the system. Note the two objects ∗1 and ∗2;
they are new objects that will be created as new tracks, while the virtual tracks Y6 and Y7
are removed from the system. Virtual tracks or objects are always removed from the process,
even if new objects are being created for them, as it is the case here. A filtered version of the
above matrix (reduced to be Ntracks ×Ntargets, where Ntracks includes all the tracks that are
propagated, associated and created, here Ntracks = 6) is then passed on to the next stage in
the map-building process.
5.4.4 Fusion
Fusing the synchronised and associated objects together is the final stage of the augmented
map creation. After fusion, the map will be left with updated or new augmented objects. A
simple way to fuse associated objects together is to compute the average of their state vectors'
variables. However, this process is not the most optimal. A better approach is using the update
stage of the linear Kalman filter, especially so since we used the predictive stage for temporal
synchronisation. The equations pertaining to the Kalman Filter's update stage are given in
equations (5.63) to (5.65); however, they need to be adapted to our problem.
Kk+1 = Pk+1|kCtk+1
[
Ck+1Pk+1|kCtk+1 +Rn,k+1
]−1
(5.63)
Xˆk+1|k+1 = Xˆk+1|k +Kk+1
[
Zk+1 − Ck+1Xˆk+1|k
]
(5.64)
Pk+1|k+1 = [I −Kk+1Ck+1]Pk+1|k (5.65)
The standard filter consider the estimate Xˆk+1|k and will associate it with a measurement Zk+1
to form an updated estimate Xˆk+1|k+1. In our setting, we firstly considered that Xˆk+1|k is
the synchronised augmented object Xˆ0,k+1|k, which will serve as the anchor for the fusion
process. We have a number of other objects
{
Xˆ1,k+1|k . . . Xˆi,k+1|k
}
associated with the
augmented object. We consider that these objects are our new measurements, so that:
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{
Xˆ1,k+1|k . . . Xˆi,k+1|k
}
=
{
Z1,k+1 . . . Zi,k+1
}
(5.66){
P1,k+1|k . . . Pi,k+1|k
}
=
{
Rn,1,k+1 . . . Rn,i,k+1
}
(5.67)
If a group of objects have been associated together but there is no pre-existing augmented
object, than the object with the first ID is selected as the anchor. From that, an iterative
process can be used to update the anchor with all the associated objects, recalculating a new
Kalman gain K at each iteration. At the end of the iterative process, we get the new state
vector estimate Xˆk+1|k+1 and variance-covariance matrix Pk+1|k+1 for the augmented object.
A visual illustration of this process is provided in Fig. 5.18. The process is repeated for all
groups of associated objects in the map. For new objects perceived by a single sensor, they are
simply created in the augmented map by a straightforward copy. Using the two dimensional
state-transition model from 5.4.2.2, equations (5.63), (5.64) and (5.65) simplify to (5.69), (5.70)
and (5.71), with an object Xˆi,k+1|k acting as measurement Zi,k+1.
Ck+1 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(5.68)
Kk+1 =
[
σx2 σxy
σxy σy2
]
0,k+1|k
[ σx2 σxy
σxy σy2
]
0,k+1|k
+
[
σx2 σxy
σxy σy2
]
i,k+1|k
−1(5.69)
Xˆk+1|k+1 =
[
xk+1|k
yk+1|k
]
0
+Kk+1
([
xk+1|k
yk+1|k
]
i
−
[
xk+1|k
yk+1|k
]
0
)
(5.70)
Pk+1|k+1 = [I −Kk+1]
[
σx2 σxy
σxy σy2
]
0,k+1|k
(5.71)
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(a) Four associated objects and their respective variance ellipsoids
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
X axis (metres)
Y 
ax
is
 (m
etr
es
)
(b) The same four objects, overlaid with the fused augmented object and its variance
ellipsoid (magenta)
Figure 5.18: Illustration of the fusion process for an augmented object
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5.5 Performance evaluation, cooperative versus non-cooperative
In this section, we will analyse data collected using our augmented map-building architecture, in
order to compare its performance versus non-cooperative perception. Given the overall context
of this thesis, this performance comparison will not be made in terms of classic performance
criteria for algorithms. Rather, we will look into the improvements that CS can bring to the
performance of risk assessment. To do so, we will use a classic risk criterion based on the Time
to Collision (TTC) metric; further details on how this will be adapted for our scenario are given
in 5.5.2. The limitations introduced in the augmented map-building process by limitations of
the underlying layers, specifically from telecommunications as investigated in Chapter 3, will
be accounted for in this study.
5.5.1 Scenario
We used our reference vehicles string scenario, as presented in Chapters 2 and 4; the setup is
actually identical to the non-repeatable scenario described in section 4.4. A five-vehicle string
(1 leader, 4 followers) is set up in SiVIC, starting from grouped positions at one location on the
test track. From these start positions, the vehicles arrange themselves in a string on the right-
hand lane and progressively speed up to 70 km/h. The fleet is still homogeneous to simplify the
scenario, with tinter = 2.5 seconds; this latter value simulates a medium density string where
drivers drive according to classic safety recommendations (i.e. maintaining at least 2 seconds
of intervehiculary time). The drivers' reaction time is th = 0.5 second.
To create a risky driving situation, we use the emergency braking event also used in Chapter
4. The lead vehicle performs an emergency braking manoeuvre about 700 metres from the
start position, in a straight section of the track. EEBL systems are not equipped on any of the
vehicles, so they only react according to the instructions outputted by the controller described
in Chapter 4. We consider two sub-scenarios in terms of CS equipment:
1. No CS-equipped vehicles in the string. However, veh5 is fitted with a set of exteroceptive
(laserscanner) and localisation sensors to build a map of its immediate environment; this
map is used to compute a risk indicator for the driving situation relatively to veh5.
2. All vehicles are CS-equipped, they broadcast their position to each other. All vehicles
will build an augmented map from local positioning data and the information received
from the other vehicles, for example, in veh5, an augmented map is built from local data
and information from veh1,...,4. The maps are then used to compute a risk indicator for
the driving situation relative to ego-vehicle. A number of variations to the scenario will
be considered, relating to the frequency at which data is broadcasted to other vehicles.
5.5.2 Risk indicator
In order to compare the interest of CS versus non-cooperative systems in a risk assessment
context, we need a unique risk criterion or measurement metric. Over the years, a number of
approaches have been proposed to measure the risk of a given driving situation (examples are
listed in [152]), with a common thread: the risk indicator must be simple enough to be easily
understood by drivers, and yet convey an appropriate and representative estimation of the risk
and danger of the driving situation. For this study, we will use the most common risk metric,
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Figure 5.19: Risk functions from two studies using TTC
the Time to Collision (TTC). Note that TTC is used to get an instantaneous risk which is
re-computed at all times, there is no notion of a duration of operations over which the risk
could accumulate (exposure).
The TTC is a projection of the time remaining at time t before a future collision between two
vehicles, if they do not change their driving behaviour (which is speed, acceleration or direction
of driving). It is compared to the driver's reaction time, if the TTC is smaller than his reaction
time, crash is inevitable. If the TTC is small, but not smaller than the driver's reaction time,
substracting the two values can give the remaining time for the driver, or an automated crash
avoidance system, to perform avoidance actions. On the other hand, if the crash is indeed
inevitable, there might still be enough time for mitigation actions to take place, such as an
emergency braking manoeuvre to reduce the vehicle's speed at the expected collision time. As
seen in Chapter 4, fatality and injury rates are directly related to the speed of impact between
two objects on the road. TTC is actually a surrogate of risk; indeed, risk is usually considered
as a combination of the probability for an event to happen and of the gravity of said event. In
terms of road safety, the instantaneous crash risk is thus the probability of crash multiplied by
the expected severity of said crash, if it were to occur.
The probability of crash can be computed from the TTC through a function, such as from
[153, 154] which are shown in Fig. 5.19. In the case of Ammoun [153], the crash probability
is directly indicative of risk; on the other hand, for Glaser et al. [154] the probability obtained
from the TTC is then multiplied by a severity value. The severity is obtained in a similar
process that we get the relationship between severity and EES in the previous chapter. In Fig.
5.19, the two functions are both linear functions that assign a maximum risk/crash probability
when the TTC is under a certain threshold (1 or 2 seconds) and no risk/probability at all (or
a very small constant value) when it is above a certain threshold (10 or 5 seconds).
Despite its popularity, TTC is not always the most relevant indicator. For example, when
two vehicles drives at the exact same speed, their TTC value would be high, leading to a low
risk. However, if the vehicles are driving at this same speed but within less than 20 metres,
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for example, from each other, the TTC will still be high, although this situation is clearly
dangerous: the following vehicle would have no time to react to any event presented by the lead
vehicle. To circumvent this problem, previous studies usually couple TTC with other values.
For example, Glaser et al. [154] use the intervehicular time, and build a risk function based on
that metric.
In a simple, two-vehicle situation, the TTC can be used directly, from the point of view of
the following vehicle. However, when we start to consider augmented perception, there will be
more objects inside the ego-vehicle field of view. This should allow building a more complex
representation of the driving risk for the ego-vehicle but also for a given driving situation.
Let us have a string of n vehicles {veh1, . . . , vehn}, where the ego-vehicle (the only one that can
have exteroceptive sensors) is vehn. Note that the process we will explain actually takes place in
all other vehicles when they are equipped with the cooperative risk assessment system; we will
describe the process only from the point of view of vehn to limit cluttering. The TTC TTCn−1
with the immediately preceding vehicle (vehn−1) is computed to represent a risk-assessment
system based on a mono-vehicle system. Simultaneously, we will also evaluate risk through the
augmented map in order to easily compare the outputs of the two systems. To do so, we use
several steps.
At first, the TTC regarding all of the known objects in the augmented map and the ego-vehicle
vehn are computed: {TTC1,n, . . . , TTCn−1,n}. Then, using the function f from Glaser et al.
[154] (shown in Fig. 5.19 as the red curve), we compute a crash probability Pi,n for each
vehicle i ∈ [1, n− 1]. Then, the risk Ri,n for each vehicle is computed according to Eq. (5.73),
where g is a function that computes the severity of the potential crash using the EES and
G, which is the transfer function linking the EES to the likelihood of injury or death, built
from an analysis of car crash databases. Note that here, we will consider only the likelihood
of severe injury or death, the most pessimistic scenario; G would change if one considers the
likelihood of, for example, mild injuries. The EES is computed with Eq. (5.75), where for a
vehx, Vx is its speed (at the impact, the same as used for the TTC if nothing changes) and
mx its mass. We actually take the maximum between the two values computed with g to
represent two variations of the same crash: g (Vn, Vi) represents the severity of a crash where
the two involved vehicles have not changed their speed compared to the current time; on the
other hand, g (Vn, Vi − γTTCi,n) represents the severity of the crash that would happen if vehi
was to perform a sudden emergency braking manoeuvre with deceleration γ (γ w 0.8g in our
implementation), which is closer to the actual conditions of the scenario. That way, the most
pessimistic risk assessment is prepared for.
Pi,n = f (TTCi,n) (5.72)
Ri,n = Pi,n ×max [g (Vn, Vi) , g (Vn, Vi − γTTCi,n)] (5.73)
g (Vn, Vi) = G (eesi,n) (5.74)
eesi,n = (Vn − Vi) mi
mi +mn
(5.75)
In our test scenario, we will have four objects plus the ego-vehicle from which the driving scene
will be considered. This means that in the non-cooperative application, we will only have one
risk R4,5 since veh5 is only capable of sensing veh4 which is in front of it, blocking the view to the
other vehicles. In the cooperative application, we have an array of risk {R1,5, R2,5, R3,5, R4,5}
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for veh5, but also for all the other vehicles, as such: {Rj,i, . . . , Rn,i} where j ∈ [1, n] , j 6= i .
Next, we combine these risks to obtain the global risk Rg,i as perceived by a single vehicle vehi.
The total global risk pertaining to the driving situation as perceived by all vehicles isRg; the
higher Rg, the more dangerous the driving situation (see the results section for further details
on how the Rg,i and Rg are computed).
5.5.3 Results
We implemented the scenario in our architecture, running both the cooperative and non-
cooperative risk assessment processes at the same time. The maps produced by the local
and augmented perception systems are shown in Fig. 5.20, when the string was formed. We
used a standardised representation where the objects themselves are squares centred upon the
object's absolute position; they are surrounded by their incertitude ellipsoids (build from the
variance-covariance matrix) which represented the area within which there is a 0.9 probability
that the object was located. A white line was used to represent the speed vector, in m.s−1,
which is shown to scale.
The following parameters were used:
 veh1, . . . , veh4 sent their positioning data every 500 ms, with a latency of no more than
5 ms.
 veh5 updated its own position every 100 ms.
 veh5 created a local map every 50 ms and an augmented map every 100 ms.
Firstly, let us study the risk assessment performed with the local map. As mentioned before,
only R4,5 was available since veh5 was only capable of sensing veh4 with its front-facing laser-
scanner. On Fig. 5.21a and Fig. 5.21b we present TTC4,5, P4,5 and R4,5, the time to collision,
probability of collision and risk computed for veh4, for two simulated runs (henceforth: A and
B).
In both case, we noticed that the risk starts to increase after a plateau of about 10 to 5 seconds
before the crash; this corresponds to a reduction of TTC4,5; TTC4,5 had previously remained
stable for half a dozen of seconds. TTC4,5 starts to decrease as veh4 is pressing the brakes and
veh5 is still driving toward it a full speed. Interestingly, R4,5 was relatively lower during the
first half of the scenario despite a large value of P4,5, in both A and B. This can be explained
as such: at the beginning, even if the crash probability rises, the risk value decreases because
the vehicles are driving relatively slowly and moving away from each other; thus, the severity
value decreases, taking R4,5 down with it.
Let us have a threshold of Rx = 0.7 to say that the driving situation is dangerous. With local
perception only, the driver will be warned about 5 seconds before the actual crash. This is a
short advance warning time, but it would be enough for the driver to prepare for a dangerous
event and initiate some mitigation or avoidance manoeuvre (at the speed of the scenario). Note
that in both runs there is a brief instant (after the 40 and 50-second marks, respectively) where
the situation would be flagged as dangerous because R4,5 is above the threshold.
Now, we want to compare the performance of the local risk assessment to an augmented-
perception based approach. We need to compute Rg, which represent the risk for the whole
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(a) Local map built by veh5 using exteroceptive sensors and its GPS only;
veh4 is visible, as well as a ghost object (on the left, which is most likely
a misidentification of a ground reflection) that has not been filtered out of
the system yet.
(b) Raw information present at the beginning of the augmented map build-
ing process in veh5: in red, the latest available objects received from other
vehicles as well as from veh5's GPS; in green the augmented objects already
known, fed-back from the previous loop. Here, there is a significant differ-
ence between the augmented and received objects because the image was
captured well into the 500 ms GPS update cycle.
(c) The augmented map built by veh5 with data received from the other
vehicles and its local positioning data.
Figure 5.20: Visualisations of the local and augmented map
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(a) Variables for run A
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Figure 5.21: Local measurements of TTC, crash probability and subsequent risk
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Table 5.4: Variations of dt over a few runs
twarning tA tL dt
47.29 51.94 58.85 6.91
57.27 60.55 67.82 7.27
50.0 53.52 59.86 6.34
97.45 101.05 108.28 7.23
96.77 99.93 107.2 7.27
379.85 383.05 390.66 7.61
driving situation. For each vehicle vehi (with i ∈ [2, n], i.e. excluding the leader vehicle), we
compute a global risk Rg,i (see Eq. (5.76)), which is the lower boundary of the global risk
perceived by that vehicle, in relation to the other vehicles. Essentially, Rg,i is close to the
risk computed with local sensors only, as the closest vehicle driven in front of the ego-vehicle
is likely to pose an immediate significant source of risk. However, the other vehicles are also
accounted for, which might be more useful in other driving context than our reference scenario.
In the present scenario, the differences between R4,5 and Rg,5 stem principally from the different
frequencies at which the tracks are updated in the local and augmented map. Then, we compute
the average of these vehicle-centric global risks, to form the actual global risk Rg (Eq. (5.77)),
which represents the risk for the whole driving situation, i.e. the total risk.
Rg,i ≥ max (Rj,i, . . . , Rn,i) where j ∈ [1, n] , j 6= i (5.76)
Rg =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
Rg,i (5.77)
On Fig. 5.22 and Fig. 5.23, we show the Rg,i, Rg (noted the total risk) and R4,5 (noted the
local risk) for runs A and B ; although the figures are relatively complex, which might make
them harder to comprehend, they allow us to observe the situation in great detail.
In both runs, at about the middle of the run, the local risk R4,5 rose above the 0.7 threshold
while Rg remained under that threshold. At that moment, veh5 assessed that it was in a
dangerous driving situation (TTC4,5 came to just 2 seconds, as seen in Fig. 5.21), but the
other vehicles were not in such a situation, allowing Rg to remain under the threshold. In that
case, the global risk was not more informative than the local risk.
The vertical dotted line represents the instant when the lead vehicle started to perform its
emergency braking manoeuvre (in the EEBL scenario, it would also be the moment a warning
message was sent to the other vehicles); it takes place 47.29 and 57.27 seconds in the scenario,
for A and B respectively. One can see that the global risk for veh2 almost starts to increase
immediately, until it reaches 1 at the actual collision (the step effect is caused by the frequency
at which Rg,2 is updated). The increase in Rg,2 starts to increase Rg too. In run A, Rg passes
the 0.7 threshold when Rg,3 do so; however, in run B, only Rg,2 increase is enough for Rg to
pass the threshold, as it was stable at a higher value before (in run B the string was slightly
denser than in run A).
However, the most important finding of these two runs can be found in the value we label dt;
dt is the time difference between an instant tL, at which the local risk assessment mechanism
returns a value greater than the 0.7 threshold, and an instant tA, at which the total risk
assessment mechanism returns a value greater than the same threshold. In run A we have
dt = 6.91 seconds, and in run B dt = 7.27 seconds. More instances of dt are given in Tab.
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Figure 5.24: Example of the repartition of vehicles in the string, just before the emergency
braking, compared to the average and envelop of frame loss
5.4. We see that over these runs, dt was always larger than 6 seconds. This means that further
than the 5 seconds, at most, of advance warning given just by the local perception, we can now
have a total advance warning of 11 to 13 seconds by using augmented perception. The driver
of veh5 can be warned in advance of an issue taking place further in the string before it has the
capability to become aware of it. Although in our scenario the implementation did not include
a driver reaction driven by the risk assessment process, the advance warning would allow veh5
to prepare in several ways: the driver's reaction time can be shortened by its enhanced state
of alertness, and the vehicle's speed would likely be reduced. Altogether, the driver would
most probably be able to avoid a rear-end crash with veh4, even without the presence of an
EEBL-like CCW system.
The results above were obtained with non-perfect IVC, modelled according to our empirical
model from Chapter 3. Within the scenario's conditions, IVC imperfections appeared not to
be a hindrance to the timely output of a warning signal when Rg passes the danger threshold.
This can be partially attributed to the short-to-medium range at which V2V communications
were taking place in the scenario.
Indeed, the vehicles string is spread over a distance of 250 to 300 metres at most, with inter-
distances varying from 30 to 60+ metres. An example centred on the first vehicle is shown in
Fig. 5.24, with a 220-metres-long string; in these conditions, the average frame loss is less than
5%, the only significant area where frames can be lost at a higher rate is the ground-reflection
area. Note that this graph applies only to the first vehicle. From the point of view of veh3,
both veh1 and veh5 are located within the ground-reflection interference area. Latency is not
affected by range, but the size of the frames exchanged between vehicles is at most 0.5 kilobyte,
meaning latency will be 9 to 12 milliseconds on average.
The most obvious limitation of this system is that the first few vehicles in the string will usually
not benefit from the enhanced risk assessment process. For example, in run A, veh4 would have
an advanced warning of only 2.71 seconds compared to its local perception; the local and total
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risk as seen from veh3 would cross the 0.7 threshold at the same time and veh2 would only
receive an advance warning from the augmented perception after the actual crash, defeating its
purpose. On the other hand, in run B, veh3, veh4 and veh5 would receive an advance warning
of respectively 2.5, 5.06 and 7.27 seconds; only veh2 would not benefit from the system.
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5.6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was, at first, to design and implement an architecture for building
an augmented map using the SiVIC-RTMaps framework, and, secondly, to show that it can
perform better than a non-cooperative approach to assess the risk of a driving situation within
our reference scenario.
Before tackling any of this chapter's goals, we offered a literature review covering several related
subjects from multi-sensors data fusion and the construction of local maps to the construction
of augmented maps. Afterwards, we provided the theoretical foundations upon which our map-
building architecture is based. After presenting the renowned Kalman Filter, we expended on
our association approach, which is based on the Belief Theory. The Belief Theory offered a good
compromise in terms of accuracy and processing requirements compared to other, essentially
probabilistic, methods. Furthermore, it is capable of managing the apparition of new objects
and the disappearance of older ones, which is required in the highly changing road environment.
We detailed a Multi-Hypothesis Tracking algorithm that is based on early works undertaken
at the LIVIC laboratory, and for which we provided the first actual implementation in our
map-building system.
Then, we presented the design of our actual map-building architecture. This architecture took
full advantage of the SiVIC-RTMaps framework and of the CS-simulation architecture, that we
developed in Chapter 4. In terms of actual programming, the two architectures exist side-by-side
and exchange data wherever and whenever necessary. Objects' parameters are extracted from
the SiVIC-side of the CS-simulation architecture and passed on to the map-building modules.
It is important to stress out that our map-building architecture is not limited to simulated data
from SiVIC. Indeed, it is transparent to the origin of input data and can be deployed easily
with data collected on actual vehicles with real sensors (this is facilitated by using RTMaps).
A few examples of the architecture's output were presented to illustrate the type of map it can
build, as well as the different stages of the building process.
We then implemented a simple risk assessment system based on a combination of the crash
probability obtained from the TTC, and the expected severity of the probable crash, obtained
from the EES. By combining different appropriate risk values, we extracted the global risk as
perceived by a vehicle depending on whether it used only local sensors or had access to the
augmented map. We chose to put our focus on the last vehicle of a 5-vehicle string, in order to
compare the two approach in an emergency breaking scenario (the same as in Chapter 4).
Our results showed that the local risk-assessment system can inform the drivers that they are
entering "dangerous" driving conditions with at most 5 seconds of warning before the actual
crash, in the case of an emergency braking manoeuvre in our vehicles string scenario. On the
other hand, the augmented-map based risk-assessment system only gives an additional 2 to 7
seconds of advance warning, for a total of almost 13 seconds of warning before the crash, in the
best case scenario (for the string's last vehicle). The advance warning remained consistent over
several runs of the same non-repeatable scenario, with varying intervehicular distances in each
string.
These results were obtained with the IVC simulation from Chapter 3, that accounts for real-
istic frame loss and latency. It showed that, within the limits of the vehicles string, IVC
imperfections did not have a significant effect on the augmented map's risk assessment capab-
ility. Imperfections might have a more significant effect at longer ranges; however, the relative
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speed between the vehicles is small (under normal driving conditions), so the very low speed
and low speed classes of our frame loss model would be used most of the time (see Fig. 3.40
in Chapter 3). With this model's calibration, any significant effect of frame loss would be felt
only 350 to 400 metres away from the emitter. The five-vehicle string is only 250 to 300 metres
long, meaning that frame loss was relatively limited (but non-zero, and sometimes subject to
the ground-reflection interferences). Latency is not affected by range, and would have been 5
to 10 milliseconds, given the size of the exchanged frames. A perfect system would probably
have yielded better results. However, such results would not be representative of what would
happen on an actual road when compared to our current results.
We argue that this additional time would be largely sufficient for a driver faced with such an
emergency scenario to adapt their behaviour and prepare for the incoming "braking wave"; it
is likely that the driver of the fifth vehicle would be able to avoid a crash. However, we found
that only a part of the vehicles present in the string benefited from this increased warning. The
closer they are to the initial event, the less likely they were to be warned with sufficient time to
change their behaviour. This result is not completely unexpected, as the global risk indicator is
built from a combination of the risks perceived by each vehicle. Given that these vehicle-centric
risks are heavily skewed toward the risk computed with the vehicle immediately in front of
them, the global risk will only rise once a sufficient number of vehicles consider themselves in
dangerous situations. Typically, the first crash is usually enough for the global risk to pass over
the danger threshold. Although the first half of the string will not gain much from this system,
the second half of the string will have enough warning to avoid or mitigate any further crashes.
Summary of chapter's contributions
 Outcomes
 A generalist augmented perception architecture was developed.
 Key findings
 Augmented perception provided 2 to 7 seconds of additional warning in an emergency
braking scenario compared to non-cooperative risk-assessment.
 IVC imperfections did not preclude risk-assessment with an augmented perception-
based process.
 Limitations
 The risk-assessment method is based on TTC, which might not be the most relevant
to all driving situations.
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Chapter 6
Towards risk assessment: an
application
6.1 Introduction
The overarching context of this thesis is the reduction of road fatalities through the improvement
of drivers' perception and comprehension of their environment, which are the main contributing
factors to road crashes. In Chapter 1, we explained how augmented perception is relevant to
this goal, which can be pursued by developing the ability to assess road risk through information
extracted from the augmented map. In the following chapters, we explored how to build an
augmented map, as well as the limitations introduced by current telecommunication technology.
We will know explore how augmented perception can be used to improve drivers' safety.
The aim of this chapter is to design a simulation of a CS-based road risk assessment applica-
tion, and to demonstrate how CS can perform better than non-cooperative systems. The focus
will be on near-miss incidents which is a specific and new area of research. Near-misses are an
appropriate surrogate for injuries and fatalities resulting from actual crashes, which will allow
us to introduce the concept of road risk assessment. The simulation will focus on the specific
problem of detecting near-misses, which is similar to the problems of road risk assessment. This
will allow us to propose an inexpensive approach to collect and sort data on near-misses incid-
ents, so they can later be used by road safety authorities to apply appropriate countermeasures.
We will show how this approach can improve upon non-cooperative automated detection sys-
tems, similar to the ones currently used in naturalistic driving studies, which are often very
time-consuming. The present chapter will give a first set of answers to the following principal
research question: How can crash risk be assessed with an augmented map built from local
sensors' data gathered from multiple vehicles?
Our approach will consist of designing a dedicated simulation. Indeed, contrary to previous
chapters' CS simulation architecture, the nature of near-misses events requires for the simulation
to account for a large number of vehicles. To do so, we will overlay an RTMaps-based C++
simulation over a traffic simulator (VISSIM). Using a pre-existing traffic simulator saves time
with design and development, and allows a focus on the CS/IVC simulation layer, which will
be designed so that it can, in due time, incorporate the 802.11p model developed in Chapter
3. This justifies not using pre-existing network+traffic simulators. The simulation presented
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in this chapter is considerably simpler than in Chapter 4, but takes into account the same
limitations nontheless.
After building the simulation, we will analyse the results of a number of 15-minute-long runs,
reproducing a high traffic density urban freeway. Given the parameters of the simulation, the
number of detected near-miss events always remain under the optimal squared curve. We will
also show the influence of some factors, such as the distribution of IVC equipped vehicles and
IVC defects, such as frame loss and latency, on the system's ability to detect near-miss events.
Then, we will compare those results with similar runs featuring a non-cooperative approach to
detect near-miss events. The non-cooperative approach is based on the collection of exterocept-
ive data from each vehicle; we will show that the enhanced awareness provided by augmented
perception allows for detecting a larger amount of relevant events. This demonstrates that CS
can be useful in assessing a road risk measurement surrogate such as near-misses.
Chapter Outline
The first section introduces the context of near-miss research, and provides the rationale for
this study regarding the state-of-the-art from the available literature.
The second section expands upon the study's design. The near-miss event is defined formally,
and the mathematical background is presented. Then, the requirements for the scenario are
outlined. Eventually, the CS and IVC simulation mechanism are explained.
The third section discusses the study's results and outlines a few limitations that come about
from those results and the simulation's design.
Finally, the fourth section concludes this chapter by summarising its outcomes.
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6.2 Presentation of the application's context and rationale
6.2.1 Near-misses
Near-miss incidents have been demonstrated to be appropriate surrogate for injuries and fatal-
ities resulting from actual crashes, as they reflect similar driving errors and generate extreme
driving conditions [155] But what exactly are near-miss events? Dingus et al. [156] defined a
near-miss as a rapid controlled or uncontrolled acceleration, deceleration, swerve, lane change,
or stopping to avoid a crash. They later refined this definition to distinguish between near
crashes and relevant incidents [157]. A near crash is defined as any circumstance that re-
quires a rapid, evasive manoeuvre by the subject vehicle, or any other vehicle, pedestrian, cyclist
or animal to avoid a crash. On the other hand, a relevant incident is defined as any circum-
stance that requires a crash avoidance response on the part of the subject vehicle, any other
vehicle, pedestrian, cyclist, or animal that is less severe than a rapid evasive manoeuvre but
greater in severity than a `normal manoeuvre' to avoid a crash. It can be argued that these
definitions are very similar; fundamentally, the distinction is one of severity.
Thus, a generalised definition of a near-miss is an unplanned event where several vehicles come
in close proximity to each other but do not collide. There is only a potential crash that would
have taken place if their behaviour had been slightly different (for example, with slight delays
in reaction time, or with non-sufficient evasive actions). This is, broadly, the definition we will
use throughout this chapter. More details on how this definition is actually used are provided
in section 6.3.2. The number of involved vehicles must be at least two, but does not have to be
limited to two. For the sake of simplicity, we will consider a near-miss to involve two vehicles.
Within this chapter, we will consider the notions of road risk as equivalent to near-misses. A
situation where many near-miss events occur will be described as high risk, while a situation
with few near-misses will be described as low risk. This equivalence is similar to the safety
index that was used in [158, 159], where it is applied to safety-related events occurring in actual
driving situations. We can apply this approach both to individual vehicles or groups of vehicles
at any given time.
6.2.2 The safety pyramid models
Compared to actual collisions, near-misses occur at a considerably large rate. Indeed, collisions
(or crashes) are only the highest layer on the industrial safety pyramid model developed by
Heinrich [160] and Bird and Germain [161], see Fig. 6.1. Created by analysing statistical data
of workplace-related incidents, these models were initially aimed at the insurance industry. They
showed that it would be more cost-effective to focus (in terms of intervention and prevention
policies) on the many events (near-misses implies there were no injuries) that incurred limited
property damage than to focus on the more severe but considerably rarer incidents involving
human damage. An investigation by company ConocoPhillips Marine (in 2003) found that for
every single fatality there are at least 300,000 at-risk behaviours, defined as activities that are
not consistent with safety programs, training and components on machinery, which includes
bypassing safety components on machinery or eliminating a safety step in the production process
that slows down the operator.
There have been a recurrent research effort to adapt these models to road safety. Indeed, this
model is useful for risk assessment, as both near misses and at-risk behaviours are relevant
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Major injury
29
Minor injuries
300
Incidents without injuries
(a) Model by Heinrich [160]
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(b) Revised model by Bird and Germain [161]
1
Fatality
30
Lost workdays cases
300,000
At-risk behaviours
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Recordable injuries
(c) Model by ConocoPhillips Marine
Figure 6.1: Pyramid models
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Figure 6.2: Pyramid model applied to road safety
to dangerous driving situations which may lead to crashes. Thus, near-misses can be seen as
surrogate measures of the knowledge of crash causative factors.
Early research by Williams [162] conclude that traffic conflicts such as near-misses were not
adequate to predict crashes. Williams found that methodological problems with the existing
detection methods and theoretical inconsistencies limited the potential of traffic conflicts (the
name for near-misses in use at the time) to predict crashes. He also argued against the pyramid
model, citing a lack of evidence for the ability to predict the occurrence of events from one
layers based on measurements in another layer.
However, further research, such as by Hauer and Garder [163] or Tarko [164], presented enhanced
methodologies that allowed the use of these incidents as predictors or precursors of crashes,
leading to more adequate representations of crash probabilities. They provided motivation for
further research into near-miss incidents (see next subsection). The safety pyramid concept
itself was successfully applied to road safety by Hyden [165] (see fig 6.2).
6.2.3 Collecting data related to near-misses
Most of the road safety statistics cover only actual crashes, regardless of their severity. Indeed,
since near-misses and dangerous behaviours involve no actual damage to any of the involved
parties, they usually go unreported. Since they occur in driving situations that are similar
to the ones that could have led to a crash, there are large amounts of data on risky driving
situations that are lost because of this invisibility of near-misses.
To collect data on near-miss events, the principal answer has been, so far, to organise a large
scale naturalistic driving study. Generally, naturalistic driving studies consists of fitting vehicles
with transparent un-obstructive sensors that have no effect on the driver whatsoever, and are
only present to record information of interest. At first, this approach was designed with the
objective of collecting data on actual crashes, which are relatively rare events and requires many
hours of normal driving, in order to happen. The increased rate of occurrence of near crashes
implies that naturalistic driving studies are well suited for collecting the required data.
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Depending on the way the data is collected, large scale naturalistic driving studies generate a
considerable amount of data. For example , the NHTSA 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study
[155] was undertaken with the aim of obtaining data on driver performance and behaviour
before a crash, fitting a hundred vehicles with data recorders that supply multiple data on
the driver and the state of the vehicle, including video recordings. Similar studies have been
undertaken in Europe [166] and later again in the USA [167]. Near-miss events studies can also
benefit from data collected by naturalistic driving studies focused on other issues; for example,
the current Euro-FOT program1 that is evaluating the use and benefits of a dozen advanced
driving assistance systems (ACC, lane departure warning, forward collision warning, etc.) in
naturalistic conditions.
However, obtaining actual relevant data is a difficult and complex process. In order to extract
these events from the whole data, a time-consuming human verification of recorded video data
is necessary. Considerable time and resources could be saved with reliable automated analysis
[167]. However, NHTSA experience have shown that less than 10% of the events that have
been flagged as safety events or near-miss events by automated data collection systems are
actually real safety critical events. This current lack of a comprehensive methodology capable
of collecting, cataloguing and reporting standardised near-miss incidents, severely limits the
road safety practitioner's ability to develop, test and implement mitigation strategies.
6.2.4 Proposed contribution of CS
Previous studies have established that collecting and sorting relevant near-miss data is a sig-
nificant research problem. Thus, we propose that Cooperative Systems, using CCW-like ap-
plications, can be used to collect data and which then automatically distinguishes between real
safety events and false positives or, at least, reduce their ratio to a more manageable number.
This would allow a considerable reduction in the workload for researchers tasked with verifying
and analysing the data collected. Collection of data on near-miss events is fundamentally a
problem of increasing the environment's awareness. As seen in previous chapters, CS applica-
tions build on technologies that increases such awareness, either for automated systems or for
the drivers themselves.
Consequently, the aim of this chapter will be to show that CS can be used as an inexpensive
approach to collect and sort data on near-miss incidents, especially if the data collection sys-
tems are linked to ADAS which provide safety functionalities. This would allow following the
deployment rate of systems providing an immediate safety benefit and, thus, maximising their
acceptability to the general public. We should also demonstrate that a CS-based approach is
more accurate than non-cooperative approaches. It can also be hoped that CS will reduce the
number of false positives and other inadequately flagged events.
There is no fundamental functional difference between a CCW application and one tasked with
detecting near-misses, as they both need to perform similar tasks such as projecting vehicles'
behaviour and estimating the risk of a collision through similar surrogate measures. The only
difference would lie in the way the collision risk information is used.
1http://www.eurofot-ip.eu/
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6.3 Simulation Design
6.3.1 Experimental requirements
The goal of this study is to show that a CS-based application can be used to successfully detect
near-miss events in traffic flow, and improve on non-cooperative data collection approaches. A
possible benefit could be the ability to reduce the number of false positives that have to be
filtered from naturalistic driving databases.
To do so, we need a simulation of a CS application that can detect driving incidents that
arise from risked, non-normal driving situations and count them, which will be compared to an
absolute ground truth also extracted from the simulation. Experimental requirements are:
Requirements concerning the CS/IVC simulation
The CS/IVC simulation must:
 Function like a simplified version of the architecture developed in the previous chapters.
 Allow as many vehicles to be simulated simultaneously.
 Allow a heterogeneous fleet (i.e. the presence of non-equipped vehicles).
 Allow imperfections to be taken into account, without limiting them to IVC. Possible
imperfections could be latency, frame loss, GPS inaccuracies, sensors failures or incorrect
identifications.
Requirements concerning the simulated environment (scenario)
The simulation environment, i.e. the considered scenario, must:
 Allow non-normal driving situations to arise from vehicles' behaviour.
 Allow the use of high density traffic flow.
 Be a variation of the reference vehicles string scenario.
6.3.2 Near-miss definition and detection
In order to compute the number of near-miss events that can occur in a given driving situation,
we first have to formally define them within the context of the simulation. In our study, we
use a definition that differs from the logic used by Dingus et al. [156, 157], inter alia, where a
near-miss involves evasive manoeuvres. Rather, we will use a broader definition; such as: any
conflict between moving vehicles or situation of very close speed/distance proximity [157].
The Time to Collision (TTC) is a classical risk indicator, and is used as a surrogate safety
criteria in traffic micro-simulations, notably with VISSIM [168, 169]. Other surrogate measures
include the gap time, the encroachment and the post-encroachment times, and the deceleration
rate [170]. The TTC also has the advantage of being relatively simple to compute online or
for a multitude of vehicles within a simulated environment. We consider it to be a sufficient
measurement of risk for the purpose of this chapter.
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Within the simulation, TTC will be used to formally define the notion of conflict between
two vehicles. We shall presume two vehicles are in conflict when there is a single position I
that is projected to be occupied by two different vehicles, within a time period TTCmax. This
definition limits the type of conflicts detected to those that imply the existence of a potential
intersection between vehicles' trajectories although, some types of conflicts will not be recorded.
For example, two vehicles driving in parallel lanes and drifting laterally towards each other. On
the other hand, conflicts that occur in intersections, lane change manoeuvres or in the same
lane (rear-end crash-like situations) will be detected.
The existence of conflict(s) does not necessarily imply a crash, but it is adequate to argue that
our definition covers both near-misses and crashes. The distinction between these two sub-types
of conflicts can be made through the TTC. Indeed, when the TTC is less than 2 seconds, it is
presumed that the crash is inevitable [153] and with maximum risk because the driver only has a
very limited time to react and change the vehicle's behaviour to avoid a collision. However, the
exact TTC that yields maximum risk does depend on the driving conditions, notably the relative
speed and trajectory angle of the two vehicles involved. For example in [171, 154] the maximum
risk (the probability of a crash is 1) is reached when TTC < 1 second. Thus, depending on the
chosen value for TTCmax, the detected conflict can represent a more or less risked situation.
With low values of TTCmax, the proportion of actual crashes in the recorded data will be higher
than with larger values. However, since crashes are rare events, according to the pyramid model
the detected events will mostly be near-misses. Because of the specific conditions of the traffic
simulation (see in section 6.3.3.1), we will not distinguish between different types of conflicts,
and consider all recorded events as near-misses (more formally, relevant safety incidents).
To detect a near-miss event, a straightforward procedure is followed. The position and speed
of each vehicle within the simulated environment are recorded with a timestamp; the position
for both the front and rear of the vehicle is also recorded. For an ego-vehicle, all the vehicles
in a given radius are identified. Then, potential near-miss between the ego-vehicle and each of
its marked neighbours are computed. Since the simulation is not running in real time, we
can follow an exhaustive approach where potential collisions and near-misses are estimated for
a significant number of paired-vehicles each time.
Let us consider two vehicles veh1 and veh2. Their trajectories are projected up to TTCmax
seconds later, using the position and speed at time t. It is assumed that the speed at time t
remains a good estimate of the speed during the whole time period. In other words the vehicle's
acceleration is either nil or at least very small. The position B (Xb, Yb) of the front of veh1 at
time t+TTCmax is obtained from the position A (Xa, Ya) of veh1's rear at time t, the length L
of the vehicle and the speed
−→
V (VXa , VYa) of the vehicle at time t, according to equations (6.1)
and (6.2):
Xb = Xa + L× cos θ + VXa × TTCmax (6.1)
Yb = XYa + L× sin θ + VYa × TTCmax (6.2)
where:
6.3. SIMULATION DESIGN 205
−→
V = (VXa , VYa)
θ =
(−→
i ,
−→
V
)
L = length of the vehicle
The same procedure is followed for for veh2, with respectively points X (Xx, Yx) and Y (Xy, Yy).
. As explained previously, a near-miss (or even a collision) occurs when there is an intersection
between the two projected trajectories. Two intersection cases must be considered: (1) when
the trajectories are not parallel, and (2) when they are parallel.
The case of non-parallel trajectories is shown in Fig. 6.3. It has to be noted that the relative
angle between the two trajectories is exaggerated for the sake of clarity; indeed, in the actual
scenario (see next subsection) vehicles will be driving mostly toward the same direction in two
lines, with no intersection considered. Thus, the case presented in Fig. 6.3 will only take place
when some vehicles are changing lanes, with an angle that is shallower than the one shown. A
near-miss is equivalent to the existence of a point I that belongs to the projected trajectories:
near-miss ⇔ I ∈ [AB] and I ∈ [XY ]
⇔ ∃ (α, γ) ∈ [0, 1]2 so that−→AI = α−−→AB and−→XI = γ−−→XY
⇔

α (Xb −Xa) + γ (Xx −Xy) = Xx −Xa
α (Yb − Ya) + γ (Yx − Yy) = Yx − Ya
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
The case of parallel trajectories is simpler, with two different situations. In the first situation,
the vehicles are driving in the same direction in two different lanes, so their trajectories are
parallel and cannot intersect; the near-miss detection process does not go further with this
vehicle pair. In the second situation, both vehicles are driving in the same lane which increases
the possibility of a rear-end collision or near-miss incident. Their trajectories can overlap
because the vehicles in the simulation drive at the centre of their lane.
After simplifications, a near-miss is recorded when the follower vehicle reaches the position of
the leading vehicle's rear within the TTCmax time period, considering an initial interdistance
d at time t, according to (6.3) (see also Fig. 6.4). In other words, there is a near-miss if the
classical TTC falls behind the specified value.
near-miss ⇔ d
V
< TTCmax with V speed of the following vehicle (6.3)
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Figure 6.3: Computation of the intersection for non-parallel trajectories
Figure 6.4: Computation of the intersection for overlapping trajectories
6.3.3 Scenario and driving environment
Detecting a near-miss event will take place in a driving scenario which is a variation to our
reference vehicles string scenario. Since we require a large number of vehicles, the CS simulation
architecture from the previous chapters cannot be used because it is adapted to only a dozen
vehicles. Here, in order to obtain realistic results, we need our scenario to include hundreds of
vehicles. The best way to obtain such numbers is to use a traffic simulator software. Specifically,
we will use the VISSIM2 traffic simulator. Before moving on to the way we implemented the
traffic simulation for the purpose of our study, further clarification is required regarding the use
of traffic simulators.
6.3.3.1 Near-misses and safety incidents in traffic simulators
The capability of traffic simulation software and their behavioural models to accurately repro-
duce non-normal driving conditions that lead to incidents or conflicts such as crashes is still a
matter of debate. It is argued that most of the car-following and lane changing models used in
traffic simulators have been designed solely to recreate normal driving conditions. In [172], it
is argued that because of the assumption that vehicles will always maintain a safe distance, it
is difficult to test and validate the correlation between extracted conflict statistics and actual
crash risk.
Xin et al. [172] further notes that if non-normal driving conditions could be generated by these
simulators, it was the result of modelisation outliers and breakdown, rather than an intentional
2http://www.ptv-vision.com/en-uk/products/vision-traffic-suite/ptv-vissim/overview/
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outcome by the models' designers. They argue that the models cannot generate specific driver
behaviours that can occur during non-normal driving situations such as emergency situations.
A problematic point is the modelisation of attention lapses which, they argue, are too simplified
(in VISSIM's case, an user-inputed probability to extend the driver's reaction time). Olstam
and Tapani [173] described other areas of the car-following model that can be seen as an issue.
Namely, a following vehicle's reaction is too similar to the leading vehicle's initial action, which
can lead to instabilities in a string. Typically, following vehicles have smoother reactions the
further away they are from the initial event.
Nonetheless, there is another side to the coin. Focusing on the Wiedemann model used spe-
cifically in VISSIM, Olstam and Tapani [173] argue that a good feature is the model's ability
to create oscillations in throttle control, which are found with actual drivers and usually not
modelled correctly in simulations. In [170], VISSIM's model is found to allow the modelisation
of complex intersections/junctions and "friendly" merging. This latter type of manoeuvre is
not limited to intersections or freeway ramps (as the case in other simulators) and can take
place at any location on the simulated network and can also be used for overtaking manoeuvres.
The friendly merging feature is useful in creating realistic disruptions (notably potential safety
events) in a vehicles string, which other models lack.
Through the use of surrogates, a number of studies have used VISSIM (or similar simulators)
to study safety problems. These surrogates include the classical TTC [168, 174, 169], but also
the gap time, the encroachment and the post-encroachment times, and the deceleration rate
[170].
Such studies make an underlying assumption that an individual's vehicle safety performance
provides a fundamental indication of their relative risk to being involved in crashes [158]. Cunto
et al. [159] compared the performance of VISSIM's model to empirical data on crashes in a
freeway context. Simulated conflicts measured with surrogates were not adequately linked to
real crash occurrences, which the authors explained by: (1) the surrogates were focused on
measuring conflicts, of which a small subset were represented by actual crashes; and (2) there
was a lack of empirical data including both normal and non-normal driving situations (the same
problem that naturalistic driving is trying to solve).
However, they have shown in [158, 159] that the simulation's model is sufficient to establish a
link between safety surrogate measurements, conflicts between vehicles and crashes. Applied on
empirical data, the surrogates used within simulations were yielding a low safety "score" when
crashes occured on the road. A low safety score derived from surrogates can thus be made into
a certain higher potential driving and crash risk.
These studies indicate that if surrogates for crashes can be applied realistically inside micro-
scopic simulations, then it can be argued that the pyramid model hold for these simulations
too. The findings by Cunto and Saccomanno [158], Cunto et al. [159], that crashes are more
likely when surrogates show a degraded safety score, correspond perfectly to the relationship
between near-miss events and actual crashes. The surrogates used to assess safety and risk are
the same that are used to assess near-miss events. It can also be argued that because they are
proportionally much more common than crashes, which are rare events, near-miss events form
an integral part of what is deemed normal, or close to normal driving situations.
This leads us to the conclusion that traffic simulators, and specifically VISSIM, can be used
to support our study on near-miss event detection through Cooperative Systems, versus non-
cooperative approaches. Obviously, it would be desirable that near-miss and crashes, among
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other incidents, could be modelled directly and realistically within the traffic simulator. How-
ever, within the context of our study, we only require non-normal driving conditions within
the scenario, so that we can record near-miss events that take place. Whereas these conditions
arise from modelling outliers, approximative models or an improved realistic behaviour model,
like the one proposed by Xin et al. [172], is not relevant at this stage.
6.3.3.2 Simulation implementation
Several reasons led to the selection of VISSIM as our traffic simulator. The principal reason
is that, as outlined in the previous subsection, VISSIM's car-following model has been shown
to generate non-normal driving situations that are adequate to assess for risk. From a more
practical point of view, VISSIM is able to export CSV files describing the evolution of the
scenario at each of the simulation time step; which could then be fed to our CS/IVC simulation.
We also chose not to use integrated V2V-traffic simulator, such as the SUMO package3. This
allows us to have complete control on the IVC simulation, so that it can be developed with the
802.11p model from Chapter 3. More details on the IVC simulation are given in section 6.3.4.
The driving environment consists of a two lane, three-kilometre long, straight section of a
freeway, with only one direction taken into account. Simulating both traffic directions would
be redundant, and increases the processing load without any benefit to the results. Vehicles are
allowed to change lanes, creating two parallel vehicles strings that exchange members from
time to time. Thus, it consists of a heavier version of our reference vehicles string scenario.
Then, a 3,000 vehicles/hours flow is injected onto this section for 15 simulated-minutes; this
flow is equivalent to a dense peak-hour traffic flow typical of urban freeways. Since the simula-
tion runs for only 15 simulated-minutes, about 750 vehicles have the time to enter the freeway's
section before the end of the scenario. Vehicles at the section's entrance are distributed expo-
nentially. The fleet is heterogeneous  90% of the vehicles are light vehicles and the remainder
10% are lorries. Light vehicles and lorries are all identical to vehicles of the same type (in terms
of dimensions, mass, etc.).
The string uses a set of European driving rules; vehicles are obligated to drive in the right-
most lane (or left-most lane in Australia) and the slow lane when not overtaking. However,
given the flow that is injected into the freeway section, it is highly unlikely that the fast lane
will be empty. If the slow lane is full, vehicles maintain themselves into the fast one; even-
tually, both lanes can be completely blocked if a traffic jam occurs. Vehicles are set with an
average forward/backward looking distance of 100 metres, which limits their natural percep-
tion distance. Drivers can see the vehicles immediately in front and behind them, with limited
ability to see one or two cars further, which can happen in a real setting by seeing through
other vehicles' glasses, or when a slight amount of swerving on the lane allows a view past the
vehicle's immediate neighbours. The Wiedemann 99 [173] car-following model is used which
provides a large array of parameters to tweak the vehicles' behaviour, and it has been shown
to be able to reproduce empirical data, given the appropriate calibrations [158].
An important additional parameter is distraction to drivers. In order to make the string's
behaviour more realistic, and to  favour near-misses by increasing the probability of non-
normal driving conditions, the model drivers can suffer from temporary lapses in attention,
which happen with a probability of 0.2. This latter parameter makes hazardous conditions
3http://sumo.sourceforge.net/
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more common when the scenario is played out. This setting is necessary because even though
near-misses are more likely to occur than actual crashes (as we saw with the pyramid model),
arguably they still remain relatively uncommon over short time scales such as 15 minutes.
This assumption allows us to gain time by playing one simulated-hour of traffic in only 15
simulated-minutes.
The simulation is updated every 0.1 simulated-second. As we said, parameters from all the
vehicles present on the freeway section, at each timestamp, are exported to a CSV file. The
saved parameters include the vehicle's identifier, its type and variables relating to its position
and its motion. We recorded a number of iterations of the 15 simulated-minute scenario, which
were then used as inputs for our CS/IVC simulation.
6.3.4 CS/IVC Simulation
As stated in the requirements (6.3.1), this study requires a simulation of a CS application that
can detect risky situations and count them, which will be compared to an absolute (simulated)
ground truth. Using the simulation architecture we developed in previous chapters directly
is not possible, because of the fleet size requirements. This means that we must design a
new simulation, that is dedicated to our present problem, while staying true to its general
principles. To do so, we shall use an approach with distinct components, similar to what was
done in Chapter 4. Here, the simulation will consist in one component tasked with simulated
IVC, which will then feed information to a component tasked with simulating a decentralised
augmented map building architecture. For the sake of an early demonstration and to streamline
the design process, the latter component will be considerably simpler than the architecture
studied in Chapter 5.
The CS/IVC architecture is developed within RTMaps based on two separate components;
programming is done in C++ similar to other earlier RTMapsmodules. The first component is
dedicated to extracting data for all vehicles at each time stamp from the pre-generated VISSIM
scenario. The second component receives the extracted data and provides the actual V2V and
extended map building simulation. The data extraction component is trivial, so we will only
cover details relating to the two processes within the second component.
6.3.4.1 IVC simulation
The IVC simulation covers three main functions: (1) the distribution of IVC-equipped vehicles
in the fleet, (2) the management of the communication range, and (3) the management of
imperfections (e.g. latencies and frame loss). It is designed to provide a simplified version
of our previous simulations, with assumptions that allow faster processing by reducing the
amount of required computations. However, the simulation architecture is general enough for
its features to be extended to include more realistic processes.
Distribution of IVC devices in the fleet At the start-up of the simulation, vehicles are
randomly allocated IVC devices. To streamline the process, allocation is performed beforehand
for 3,000 vehicles, the maximum amount that can get injected onto the freeway section during
the 15 simulated-minutes. Consequently, each run of the simulation will have a different affect-
ation pattern. A uniformly-distributed random number is generated for each vehicle vehi; this
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Figure 6.5: Cooperative systems simulation user-set parameters
number is then compared to a threshold. If the random number is inferior to this threshold, vehi
will be flagged as having an IVC device. The threshold is a function of the desired equipment
ratio ρ, which is set by the user.
To ensure variability in the way equipped vehicles are distributed in the total fleet, the random
numbers that generator's seed can be created automatically or manually set. In the former
case, it is based on the host computer's clock. The influence of using different seeds, and
thus generating vastly different repartitions of equipped vehicles, while equipment ρ remains
constant will be discussed in section 6.4.2.
Communication range The communication range is determined with a classical Boolean
model (all or nothing). For vehicle vehi, the distance between vehi and all other vehicles at
the current timestamp in the simulation is computed. If the distance with vehicle vehj is less
than a given threshold, vehi and vehj are considered in range of each other; all vehicles within
range of vehi can exchange information with it. Vehicles remain in direct line of sight for the
duration of the simulation, and routing issues are not taken into account. This is the simplest
possible simulation of IVC communication [175], and is well suited to our simplified scenario
using a straight section of the freeway.
The radio range is set as a static parameter within the simulation. The 802.11p performance
evaluation from Chapter 3 suggests taking a default value of about 800 metres, considering that
the vehicles are driving at high speed relative to their environment, but low speed relatively
to each other. However, considering the length of the simulated road, this would make almost
half of the vehicles capable of communicating with each other at any moment. Additionally,
there is no justification in projecting trajectories for vehicles that are 500 metres away when
considering potential near-miss incidents (especially so since TTCmax is set at 2 seconds). It can
be argued that the IVC range here also simulates a pre-selection windowing process, focusing
on the near-miss detection application interest area. For the remainder of this chapter, a range
of 100 metres will be used.
Management of IVC and sensor imperfections Before any information on vehicle posi-
tions and behaviours are shared, a number of imperfections can be applied to the information
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transfer. Most issues related to lower layers of the communication architecture such as medium
access and collision control, are not within the scope of this simulation, which is similar to
our model developed in Chapter 3 and applied to the CS simulation architecture in Chapter
4. Nonetheless, two parameters can be used to simulate imperfect communications: (1) frame
loss, and (2) latency. Both are defined in terms of probability. Additionally, an error can be
added to the position of the vehicles and speed as outputted by VISSIM in order to simulate
the presence of GPS inaccuracies. This can lead to significant errors in a system that relies
solely on GPS to obtain information about vehicle positions, so it is important to study their
impact on the near-miss detection performance.
For the purpose of this study, equipped vehicles are assumed to broadcast position information
every 100 simulated-milliseconds (that is, at every simulation time step). Typical delays, both
in 802.11g [176, 177] and 802.11p (see Chapter 3), are in most cases smaller than a simulation
step, so they are not accounted for. However, there is small but significant, probability of delays
exceeding this 100 millisecond threshold because of interferences during the frame's propagation
in the wireless medium, or processing delays; for example about 10% in 802.11g as we found
during Chapter 2's on-road experiment. Thus, we allow these types of larger latencies to occur
within our simulation.
The user can set a probability of latency, which is applied to transmissions between vehicles.
A uniformly distributed random number is drawn and compared to the user-set probability, to
decide whether a message is delayed or not. The information that should have been transmitted
at time t but is delayed, is stored in a buffer to be delivered at the next timestamp t+1, normal
transmission resumes at t+ 2. Because of this mechanism, latencies larger than 100 simulated-
milliseconds are not possible in the present version. The default latency probability can be
inferred from Chapter 2 or Chapter 3 measurements.
Frame loss is simulated in the exact same way, although the transmission information is com-
pletely deleted instead of being delayed. So the receptor vehicle vehj will have no information
pertaining to vehi during the current timestamp.
Non-IVC-related errors can also be added to the position and speed of the vehicles as measured
by GPS-like sensors. Contrary to transmission errors, GPS errors are systematically present.
They can be adjusted by changing a standard deviation parameter; if this value is zero, pos-
itioning and speed errors are effectively removed, simulating perfectly accurate GPS sensors.
Positioning (GPS) and speed measurement errors are distributed normally [178]. The Box-
Muller transform [179] is used to generate three normally-distributed numbers from a set of
random numbers generated with a uniform distribution. Errors applied to the position and
speed are functions of the user-set standard deviation parameter and the aforementioned nor-
mally distributed numbers. They are recomputed for each simulation step, allowing a certain
degree of variability in the GPS coverage quality, and differences between individual vehicles.
Perfect conditions are simulated with all the imperfections parameters set to 0. Running our
simulation in these perfect condition is used to determine the absolute number of near-miss
events, the ground truth.
6.3.4.2 Augmented perception simulation
The second process covered by the CS/IVC simulation component is the augmented perception
simulation. Once vehicles have been equipped in the initialisation stage, and the IVC simulation
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Figure 6.6: Augmented map nested structures
processed through its stages, each equipped vehicle's augmented map is updated. From the
point of view of vehicle vehi, the augmented map is an array of structure, with any j index left
empty if vehj is not within radio range or no information was received because of latency or
frame loss; on the other hand, the array is updated with relevant data if the transmission was
successful. Each vehicle has its own map. Fig. 6.6 shows the nested structures used for the
map. This approach provides a simplified version of the map described in the previous chapter
too.
Maps are updated with the data extracted from the simulator, modified with any imperfections,
if present, first for vehicle vehi, then for all vehicles vehj,...,k within radio range of vehi. Since
we use a structure nesting 3,000 indices-long arrays several times, processing time is reduced by
using only the upper half of the ij matrix and by limiting the indices to the IDs of the vehicles
present on the road at current time t. That way, if the vehicle with the lowest ID present
(thus the oldest) on the road is vehk and the vehicle with the highest ID (the youngest) is
vehl, only indices from k to l are considered in the augmented map updates. It is possible that
vehx|k<x<l is not present on the road at time t while vehk still is (possibly because vehx|k<x<l
has used the fast lane while vehk is stuck in the slow lane); in that case, index x will also be
ignored by the update process. If the map at index x is filled but vehx|k<x<l is not present on
the road anymore, the map is purged.
6.3.4.3 Near-misses detection
Once all equipped vehicles have had their maps updated to the current timestamp t, the near-
miss events detection process can start. Its mathematical aspects have already been explained
in section 6.3.2; these equations are transposed in C++ code. The near-miss detection process
is divided into three sequential stages, performed at each simulation step: (1) projection of
vehicles' trajectories, (2) detection of potential and actual intersections, and (3) filtering of new
events.
Trajectories projection Projection of the vehicles future trajectories is done by linear ex-
trapolation for the next TTCmax seconds (2 seconds, by default), according to equations (6.1)
and (6.2). This is performed for all vehicles present on the freeway section at the current
simulation step.
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Detection of intersections Then, the simulation checks whether the projected trajectories
intersect. A first filter is applied by computing the determinant of each trajectories pair, then
the actual projected segments are checked with the computation of the relevant α and β. If
both tests pass, a near-miss event is detected.
Filtering of new versus already-detected events A problem that arises from the mech-
anism described above is its inability to discriminate between new and already detected events
so the same near-miss events might get counted several times. Because of small variations in the
vehicles' behaviour, information loss from IVC or GPS inaccuracies, the same event between
vehicles vehi and vehj can be detected at timestamp t, lost at timestamp t+1 and detected
again at timestamp t + 2. The event detected at t + 2 is obviously not a new event, as only
0.2 simulated-seconds have passed since the first detection. It is imperative we distinguish real
new events from events that are getting re-detected after brief interruptions.
In order to do so, a bi-dimensional array stores the number of simulation step for which one
specific near-miss event between vehi and vehj has been detected. In order to be flagged as a
real new event, it has to be detected at least 20 times in a row (it needs to last a minimum of 2
simulated-seconds). If an event is detected for less times than the required threshold and then
is not seen for a certain period of time (5 simulated-seconds), it is then purged. This mechanism
allows the removal of any false alarms related to small variations in directions produced by the
GPS imperfections and boundary, transitory events. The number of simulation step threshold
is set at 20 by default but can also be updated by the user.
Once the filtering is done, a simple loop counts the number of new events and adds it to the
running total of near-miss events.
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Figure 6.7: Percentage of detected events versus ρ, with (blue) and without (red) imperfections
6.4 Results
In this section, we present results obtained from running our near-miss detection simulation
on the traffic scenario recording made in VISSIM from section 6.3.3. Firstly, we will describe
a set of general results obtained through varying the simulation parameters. The relationship
between the IVC equipment ratio ρ and the number of detected near-misses, and the influence
of IVC and GPS imperfections are also explored. Secondly, we will consider the influence of
equipped vehicles within the fleet and its influence on the number of detected events. Eventually,
we will compare the detection results obtained with the cooperative approach versus using the
non-cooperative approach close to current naturalistic driving data collection studies.
6.4.1 General results analysis
Relationship between ρ and the number of detected near-misses At first, we will
analyse the relationship between the IVC equipment ratio ρ and the number of detected near-
misses. To do so, we re-process the driving scenario a number of times (runs). For each
and every run, most parameters remain identical; the principal change was with ρ, which was
increased gradually from 5 to 100%.
Fig. 6.9 presents the results obtained from this driving scenario: the red curve represents a
perfect situation with an error-less GPS and no communication issues; the blue curve rep-
resents an imperfect environment with the following parameters: GPS standard deviation: 3.0
metres; probability of message loss: 0.01; probability of delay: 0.05. The used IVC distribution
seed is the same between the red and blue curves. In both cases, the default parameters are used
for the communication range (100 metres), TTCMax (2.0 seconds) and the new event threshold
(20).
The two y = x and y = x
2
100 curves are also shown for reference, in black and grey respectively.
The y = x represent the ideal but unreachable case where the percentage of detected near-miss
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Table 6.1: Events detection for varied frame loss and latencies probabilities
Frame loss probability 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0 0
Latency probability 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.15
Detected events 12,430 11,658 10,794 13,267 13,277 13,293
Percentage of the total events 84.88 79.60 73.7 90.59 90.66 90.77
events would be identical to the IVC equipment ratio; the curve is included for visual reference.
On the other hand, the y = x
2
100 represents the ideal behaviour that we can expect from our
system. Indeed, without exteroceptive sensors, the two concerned vehicles need to be equipped
for a near-miss event to be detected. Only events contained within the intersection of the sets
of total near-miss events concerning each vehicle vehi and vehj can actually be detected. Thus,
the total number of detectable events is the combination of all the equipped vehicle event sets
intersections. This is expressed by a curve with an equation such as y = α × x2, where here
α = 1100 so that y is expressed in percent. Another way to describe it is that the probability
of two vehicles in a near-miss event to be equipped is the square of the probability for a single
vehicle to be equipped (which is a factor of ρ, our x).
Our results show that even in a perfect situation, the percentage of detected near-misses remains
inferior to the y = x
2
100 curve, with the largest difference observed around ρ = 50%. At this
point, we have to question whether this difference is systematic, or the creation of one specifisc
distribution of equipped vehicles (that is, one particular seed). Indeed, we can assume that some
vehicles might be more accident-prone than others, and if these vehicles are not equipped with
cooperative perception, the near-miss events they produce will not be recorded. In order to
verify this, we will study the influence of the equipped vehicles distribution in section 6.4.2.
Despite these limitations, the results show that a CS-based near-miss detection application is
capable of collecting data on such events with relative success. At low values of ρ, the number
of near-miss events detected would be low compared to the actual real number, but the system
would still have an improved ability to detect, online, events of interest with a reduced amount
of false positives.
IVC imperfections influence In Fig. 6.9, we can see that the IVC and GPS imperfections
decreased the number of detected events by 8.4% compared to a perfect situation with ρ = 100%.
Our results show that, in the way they are presently simulated, transmission latencies have a
very limited influence on the detection of near-misses. On the other hand, frame loss impacts
the detection considerably more. This is evident from the additional runs shown in Table 6.2
where these runs have been computed with a fixed seed at a 95% equipment ratio.
The scenario with perfect conditions and ρ = 95% yields 13,280 events, or 90.68 % of the total
number of near-miss events in this scenario. This value is very close to the one obtained with
only delayed messages, which only changed by 0.18% while the latency probability increased
from 0.05 to 0.15.
On the other hand, frame loss had a stronger influence on the detected events. With a 0.15
probability of loss (generally higher than what we measured on-track, see in Chapter 3) at each
timestamp, 2,486 events were not detected compared to the previous count. The number of
detected events decreased by 11.18% when the frame loss probability increased by 0.10 from
0.05 to 0.15.
With latency but no loss, increasing the latency probability actually increases the number of
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Table 6.2: Events detection for varied GPS imperfections
Standard deviation (m) 0 1 2 3 5 10 20
Detected events 2,863 2,635 2,609 2,572 2,570 2,439 2,308
Percentage of the total events 19.55 17.99 17.81 17.56 17.55 16.65 15.76
detected events, from a value slightly lower than the perfect case to a value slightly higher than
the perfect case. Because of the new event filtering threshold, some of the delayed frames that
would otherwise have been ignored, are instead counted as new events. Thus, a limited number
of near-misses are counted twice as false positives. Some events are also lost, accounting for the
-0.09% difference at 0.05 delay probability. However, this effect is eventually counteracted by
false positives when the latency probability becomes large enough. Unfortunately, the present
simulation cannot discriminate between real new events and false positives (see 6.4.4)
GPS imperfections influence We now consider that IVC are perfect. Table 6.2 presents
the results of runs focusing on GPS imperfections only. The same seed is used for all simulations
and the equipment ratio is 50%.
With a 5 metres standard deviation, GPS imperfections reduce the number of detected events
by 2% . With a large 20 metres standard deviation, which is unlikely in an open freeway
environment but possible in urban areas, the reduction reaches only 3.79%. This shows that
while GPS imperfections contribute towards reducing the number of detected events, they do
not contribute as much as frame loss, which remains the dominating factor.
This limited effect of GPS imperfections also highlights the robustness of our definition of a
near-miss event. With a 20 metres standard deviation, one could expect that a large number
of events would not be detected because the projected trajectories may not intersect anymore.
While it gives no indication on the quality of our event definition (see section 6.4.4), it shows
that most of the events detected are not fringe events that would otherwise be removed by large
sensor imprecision. However, it is impossible to distinguish positives from false positives, so
the proportion of false positives in the detected events in highly imperfect conditions could be
higher than in normal conditions.
6.4.2 Influence of varying distributions of equipped vehicles
In the previous section, we found that even in perfect conditions, the number of detected events
always remained smaller than the y = x
2
100 curve, which is expected to be the actual number of
events. We asked whether this difference was systematic, or a result of bias in the distribution of
IVC-equipped vehicles in the fleet. Studying the influence of the equipped vehicles distribution
on the number of detected events is simple; one must just modify the seed used for the random
selection of equipped vehicles.
Fig. 6.8 shows the effect of different seeds on the cumulative number of detected near-misses
within the same scenario, for 7 different seeds with no imperfections and ρ = 50%. Although
the final amount varies from 2,500 to 3,500, most of the curves follow a similar pattern. The
average deviation from the runs' mean is 12.5%. The seeds were chosen as random strings of
8+ figures. The red curve shows the most differentiation from the average, with a sharp rise
between the 200th and 400th simulated-seconds compared to the other curves. This is likely the
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Figure 6.8: Cumulative number of detected events for 7 different seeds over the same scenario
result of having a group of vehicles engaged in a high number of near-miss events within this
timeframe that were insufficiently equipped with the other seeds.
Fig. 6.9 shows the percentage of detected events relatively to ρ, for two different seeds. Both
curves remain under the y = x
2
100 curve shown in grey. While their difference with the said
reference curve varies depending on the equipment ratio, both curves ultimately converge toward
the final, absolute value at ρ = 100%. Note a convergent point around ρ = 60%.
In Fig. 6.10, we display the envelope of half a dozen curves obtained with different seeds.
The lower bound, in red, has its largest difference (~11%) from x
2
100 at ρ = 75%. The higher
bound follows x
2
100 much more closely, with a maximum difference of only 3%. The seed used
to generate this maximum bound is likely to be close to the seed required for obtaining the
optimal detection of near-misses events, for that specific traffic scenario.
We can conclude that there is a bias introduced by the seed, preventing the actual number of
near-miss events to be detected even with a perfect system. The variations introduced by this
bias are larger than the variations introduced by IVC and sensors imperfections. This would
be the case too in a real on-road system. However, these distribution-induced variations do not
rule out variations that arose from IVC and sensors imperfections, as we performed our analysis
with the same seed in all these cases. Our results are unlikely to change if the IVC and sensor
imperfection simulations were re-run with a different seed.
6.4.3 Cooperative versus non-cooperative approaches
In the previous sections, we only considered the ability of a CS-based approach to successfully
detect relevant near-miss events. In this section, we will compare it to a non-cooperative
approach, in order to show how using CS can improve the detection process.
We define a non-cooperative data collection approach as a system similar to the current nat-
uralistic studies, where a number of probe vehicles are equipped with sensors to record their
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Figure 6.9: Percentage of detected events versus ρ, with 2 different seeds (no imperfections)
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Figure 6.10: Percentage of detected events versus ρ, maximum and minimum envelope
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Figure 6.11: Detection rate versus ρ for cooperative and non-cooperative approaches
behaviour and that of their immediate neighbours. For example, this can include the use of two
forward and rear facing radars or laserscanners to measure TTC and other relevant surrogates.
We adapted our simulation so that it can reproduce such a non-cooperative approach. With
these adaptations, the range of IVC now becomes the depth of the local ranging sensors' field of
view. In dense traffic, the range of any forward/backward facing sensor will be relatively limited,
reaching only the ego-vehicle's first neighbours. We consider two possible depths: 25 and 50
metres; this means that one vehicle's local map will include vehicles 25, or 50, metres ahead
and behind. Without obstructions, a laserscanner's typical maximum range is 200 metres, but
they are only accurate within the first hundred metres.
The near-miss events detection procedure remains the same, so it can be compared to the
cooperative approach. Fig. 6.11 shows the comparison between the CS-equipped scenarios from
Fig. 6.7 and the same scenarios with the non-cooperative simulations, regarding the relationship
between ρ (for the non-cooperative approach, ρ represent the ratio of sensors-equipped vehicles)
and the percentage of near-misses detected.
We can see that at all values of ρ the cooperative approach allows detecting a larger num-
ber of events. However, the improvement becomes significant (10% or more) only when the
system's equipment ratio is larger than 50%. For ρ = 100%, the CS-based approach allows
doubling the ratio of detected events compared to a 50-metres depth non-cooperative method,
and quadrupling from the 25-metres depth non-cooperative method. The non-cooperative ap-
proach represent only the upper-bound for the number of detections; it is possible that a more
detailed simulation shows that the non-cooperative approach can detect less events than what
we measured.
6.4.4 Discussion of results
Our current approach has a few limitations that must be discussed. One obvious limitation of
this study relates to the assumptions taken with the IVC simulation, which is purportedly kept
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relatively simple compared to the approach followed in the previous chapters. The assumptions
taken are not unrealistic, but it can be argued that we considered only the lower bounds for the
magnitude of imperfections that could affect an actual CS-based near-misses detection system
deployed on the road. Nonetheless, the present assumptions have not hindered the system from
performing as expected.
Another limitation is found in the discrimination of false positives. Some of the near-miss
incidents detected using CS might be false positives, which are events detected twice (or more)
in a row despite our filtering mechanism. This problem usually arise from delayed messages, and
might be more problematic if latencies larger than 0.1 second are allowed, which was not the
case in our study. Other types of false positives can be fringe events that meet the conditions for
near-misses only for a very brief time, while the manoeuvre leading to them was not dangerous
itself and well controlled. In the present framework, we cannot verify whether the detected
events are real near-misses or only transitory situations which will quickly evolve away from
near-miss conditions. Nonetheless, the detection variations introduced by false positives are
only a subset of the variations from other effects, the most important being the distribution of
equipped vehicles, as they come from specific conditions.
We have taken the assumption that all detected events that do not verify the above conditions,
i.e. false positives, are true positives in the sense that they represent real near-miss events
indicative of risky driving conditions. Current approaches to detecting near-miss events have at
best a 10% rate of true positive [155]. With this, false positives can cover many types of driving
situations that are erroneously identified as dangerous by automated systems, and will not
arise solely from the boundaries we mentioned in the previous paragraph. In our simulation, we
cannot discriminate these types of false from the true positives. All detected events are assumed
to arise from non-normal driving conditions (especially from lapse of attention). A number of
false positives must also have been generated by GPS inaccuracies. However, we have shown
that increased GPS inaccuracies decreases the total number of detected events which means
that more events are missed than false positives created because of it.
Nonetheless, it can be argued that cooperative systems should bring an improvement compared
to non-cooperative approaches. Indeed, non-cooperative approaches use local sensors to detect
events that are flagged as near-misses. Since the system is hosted on a single vehicle, there is
only a single point of view from which the system can determine whether it's found itself in a
conflict situation. The system's output is thus vulnerable to errors from its sensors. By using
a cooperative approach, a single incident can now be processed from different point of views,
using a larger set of sensors, thus reducing the likelihood that the information is erroneous.
Put simply, if a vehicle vehi detects a near-miss event with vehicle vehj , vehj can use its own
system to confirm whether this event was a true positive. If vehi's detection arose solely from
a sensor imperfection, e.g. a large inaccuracy in its positioning system, vehj will not detect
it; this should allow filtering the event as a false positive or, in a more sophisticated approach,
attributing weights to each detection.
Further work is required in evaluating the effects of the different parameters on the accuracy
of the detections. Further research is also needed to assess whether detection of near-miss
incidents using CS are recorded accurately in terms of time.
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6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, our goal is to design a simulation of a CS-based road risk assessment application,
which could offer a novel cooperative approach to detect near-miss events, which can be used as
a surrogate measurement for risk in any driving situation. Our approach allows alleviating the
limitations in naturalistic driving and driving simulator experiments. Our results have shown
that this approach is feasible and can produce useful results to evaluate the number of near-miss
events on the road, albeit more work will be necessary to allow for more realistic simulations.
This chapter also introduced the concept of risk assessment through a demonstrated surrogate,
near-misses.
We have shown that without exteroceptive sensors, the relationship between the equipment
ratio and the number of near-misses detected follows a square curve and with the present simu-
lation parameters, the number of detected events always remains under the optimal squared
curve. This demonstrates the ability of a CS-based approach to detect a large proportion of
near-miss events. We also showed that the distribution of equipped vehicle within the traffic
flow is the biggest influence factor to how efficient the detection process will be. Nonetheless,
communication imperfections were found to have a significant influence too, with frame loss
shown to decrease the number of detected events by up to 10%. GPS imperfections and mes-
sage delay were shown to have a less significant effect. Eventually, we demonstrated that the
cooperative approach is better than a non-cooperative approach based on front and back-facing
ranging sensors. Improvements were significant when the equipment ratio was over 50%, for
lower ratios, the difference between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches was less than
10% however, at large equipment ratios the CS-based approach allowed doubling the propor-
tion of detected events (quadrupling was possible, depending on the non-cooperative approach
parameters).
The realism of the simulation needs to be improved, but we remain confident that our results
will remain valid under these conditions.
Summary of chapter's contributions
 Outcomes
 A Cooperative Systems-based near-miss events detection simulation.
 Key findings
 Demonstration of CS-based system's ability to count near-miss events.
 The prime factor that has an influence on the number of detected events is the
distribution of equipped vehicles in the fleet.
 The number of false positives is likely to be greatly reduced with CS.
 Limitations
 Impossibility to discriminate false from true positives.
 Lack of some key driving situations (e.g. crashes) in the traffic simulation.
 Simplified IVC simulation.
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Chapter 7
General Conclusion
7.1 Thesis aim & research methodology
The over-arching aim of this thesis is to identify road risks by using distributed information
extracted from an augmented map thus, demonstrating that Cooperative Systems (CS)-based
safety applications can have better performance compared to non-cooperative ones. This relates
to two of our research questions, namely: how can crash risk be assessed in real-time with an
augmented map built from local sensors' data gathered from multiple vehicles?  and can an
augmented map-based risk assessment system be more efficient than a similar non-cooperative
system? .
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a number of research steps were required before being able to do
so. Most notably, we found that there was a lack of comprehensive evaluation of the limita-
tions of augmented perception stemming from the underlying telecommunication technologies
(the third research question). Many promising results have been obtained by previous research
related to augmented perception , and the safety benefits of CS in general, but in many cases
these previous results did not account for the type of defects that would be encountered on the
road. This is highly relevant to risk-assessment, as limitations and defects from the supporting
technologies might reduce, or in the worst cases suppress, the expected benefits of cooperat-
ive safety applications. Furthermore, we found complete and dedicated architectures to build
augmented maps were not available, be it for simulations or actual on-road implementation, as
well as complex simulation of CS.
Our first step was to select a research methodology aimed at studying the safety benefits of
CS and risk-assessment with augmented perception. The three potential methodologies were
(1) advanced simulations, (2) theoretical investigation, or (3) full on-road implementation in a
research setting. We excluded the theoretical methodology immediately, on the grounds that
it would become too complex given the level of detail we were aiming for. A-priori, none of
the two remaining competing methodologies was superior to the other, although we identified
a lack of information regarding the merits of the empirical methodology and, especially, its
disadvantages. As part of the process to select one approach over the other, we implemented an
EEBL application on Satory's test tracks (during the second semester of 2010), where results
were, at best, mixed. Indeed, on one hand, we showed that there was no major difficulty
in designing an EEBL application for several vehicles, and putting them on the track; useful
engineering experience was gathered on that occasion. On the other hand, we highlighted a
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number of issues with the fully empirical approach, such as human factors. This led to a
compromise in selecting the final research methodology.
We concluded that it was necessary to focus on advanced simulations to reach our goals, but
that simulation alone was not appropriate. On the contrary, we found using empirical data was
necessary in improving the quality of CS simulations, in order to tackle the issues that we men-
tioned earlier regarding Inter-Vehicular Communications (IVC) performance. For example, we
could not find an appropriate modelisation of IEEE 802.11p performance that was constructed
from empirical data.
7.2 IVC evaluation & modelisation
Our first major investigation concerned the limitations of 802.11p-based IVC, which directly
addresses our third research question, what are augmented perception's limitations, given cur-
rent technology in embedded computing and telecommunications? . Indeed, IVC limitations,
because IVC is the very technology that enables any cooperative applications, is the principal
factor that would affect the performance of augmented perception. 802.11p is set to become the
most common standard for wireless IVC on the road, yet it is still relatively new and lacking
in terms of actual performance characterisation. To fill in the gaps, we undertook an empirical
performance evaluation of 802.11p in close-to-real-road settings on the Satory test tracks in
2011 and 2012. As part of these experimentations, we tried to cover gaps in other previous or
concurrent performance evaluations, for example making sure that the whole normal range of
driving speeds were covered.
Transmission range showed a strong dependency on the relative speed between the emitter and
the receptor; frame loss followed the same trend, since frame loss and range are related. We
also found that latency only depended on the size of the data frames exchanged. For 100 bytes
MAC frames, latency remained under 4 milliseconds in almost all circumstances, regardless of
range and relative speed. Relative speed did not show any influence, and range mattered only
when close to maximum range, as ad-hoc mode mechanisms started to delay the transmission
of frames.
A trend that emerged from the results of our experiment was that a lot of previous studies must
have overestimated the performance of 802.11p. Indeed, our results were more pessimistic than
existing literature in most cases. Hardware inhomogeneities were a problem: if combined with
vehicle's body effects, the quality of antennas led to range of variations amounting up to 500
metres, and explained a perceived directivity in the maximum transmission range. We can con-
fidently argue that this explains some unexpected findings from previous studies. Nonetheless,
these hardware inhomogeneities alone cannot explain the total performance variability that was
measured. Some arose from meteorological conditions, such as the air's relative humidity, while
others have sources that remain unidentified.
Based on these measurements, we proposed a new, simple approach to build an application-
oriented model of 802.11p performance. Three versions were proposed, in varying degrees of
sophistication. This model has the advantage of taking into account all the variations measured
on the track and in reproducing their relatively unpredictable behaviour. This model, we
believe, bridges a gap between physical layer and network models by providing a focus on some
simple, yet central, performance indicators for 802.11p in small-to-medium-sized networks; it is
entirely focused on delivering realistic performance indicators to upper-layer CS simulations.
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7.3 CS simulation & augmented perception architectures
Continuing with the research problem of assessing the limitation of augmented perception, we
encountered a related problem, how to build an augmented map, so its performance can be
evaluated?. Consequently, our next step after the on-road experimentations for 802.11p was
to develop a simulation architecture within the SiVIC-RTMaps interconnected platforms. We
used the latter platforms' capabilities to provide very realistic simulations, allowing a large
research flexibility (dedicated task-performing modules can be developed in C++ and added
in a plug-in fashion to the whole simulation architecture). For example, the fine granularity
of the physical models, and the number of accessible variables within the simulation, allows
studying the behaviour of an individual vehicle over the length of an entire scenario. This
architecture actually provides the foundation for two aspects of our research; (1) the building
of an augmented map, and (2) the evaluation of the cooperative systems' performance in terms
of road safety, most notably risk-assessment.
A first version of our architecture, based upon previous research at the LIVIC laboratory,
provides two significant improvements; (1) the introduction of the empirical modelisation of
802.11p IVC discussed earlier; and (2) an improved vehicle controller, allowing for an automated
vehicle to behave more like a human-driven one.
Building upon this early architecture, we designed an augmented map-building architecture,
taking the form of a series of plug-in modules that exchange data with the vehicles and IVC
simulations whenever necessary. The map-building architecture uses a centralised data fusion
architecture, organised along three important stages - synchronisation, association and fusion.
The synchronisation and fusion stages use the classical linear Kalman Filter, which is a well
known efficient estimator popular among the data fusion research community. The principal
innovation concerns the association stage, where we offer the first actual implementation, within
the context of augmented perception, of a Belief Theory-based Multi-Hypothesis Tracking al-
gorithm.
It is important to stress that our map-building architecture is not limited to simulated data
from SiVIC. Indeed, it is transparent to the origin of input data and could be deployed easily
with data collected on actual vehicles with real sensors (which is facilitated using RTMaps).
Overall, we believe the complete system formed by our CS and augmented perception simulation
architectures is an innovative concept that has not been applied yet; it holds a strong potential
for further growth and enhancements in the next few years. In its current form, it is best fitted
to small or medium-sized groups of vehicles, which is also the condition in which the underlying
802.11p model is the most representative of actual performance.
7.4 Safety benefits of CS & risk assessment
The previous developments allowed addressing the question of whether an augmented map-
based [cooperative] risk assessment system can be more efficient than a similar non-cooperative
system, specifically in terms of the safety benefits provided by this cooperative system. We
concluded from our on-track experimentations that 802.11p performance had been overestim-
ated by previous research. At this point, we had to test whether some of the expected safety
benefits of CS obtained in previous research were overestimated too, whether they were affected
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by the reduced IVC performance. Indeed, perfect or excellent IVC conditions were often as-
sumed in these studies. To answer this question, we implemented a realistic EEBL scenario in
a vehicles string (our reference scenario, using five vehicles), reproducing the scenario of earlier
research, that allowed analysing crashes and vehicles' behaviour in considerable detail. Our
results confirmed that CS were indeed useful in reducing the number of collisions in the string
after an emergency braking event, and showed that IVC limitations were not a problem within
this scenario.
However, we also obtained potentially worrying results relating to the severity of the crashes.
Indeed, we found that contrary to expectations stemming from previous research, the average
crash severity appeared to remain constant when comparing strings with CS-equipped vehicles
and strings lacking CS. Earlier results suggested that introducing IVC would lead to less crashes,
and the remaining crashes would be less severe. In our simulations, on average, the remaining
crashes remained as severe as previously. This implies that if the material costs of a series of
crashes in a vehicles string decrease (less damaged vehicles) with an increased equipment ratio
of EEBL, the human costs might actually increase in some cases. Interestingly, this limitation
does not appear to be related to IVC limitations.
After this initial study that used only the CS simulation, we implemented a cooperative risk-
assessment system that used the outputs of the augmented perception architecture. The goal
of this implementation was to compare the performance of a classic risk-assessment approach
using either augmented perception or local perception only, directly assessing the first two main
research questions. Several local and global risk indicators were used, based on a combination
of the crash probability, obtained from the TTC, and the expected severity of the probable
crash, obtained from the EES. By combining different risk values, we extracted the global risk
as perceived by a vehicle depending on whether it used only local sensors or had access to the
augmented map. The driving scenario remained the reference emergency braking into a vehicles
string, and featured five vehicles.
Our results showed that the local risk-assessment system can inform the drivers that they are
entering "dangerous" driving conditions with at most 5 seconds of warning before the actual
crash. On the other hand, the augmented-map based risk-assessment system offered an addi-
tional 2 to 7 seconds of advance warning, to a total of almost 13 seconds of warning before the
crash, in the best case scenario (for the string's last vehicle). The advance warning remained
consistent over several runs of the same (non-repeatable) scenario, with varying intervehicular
distances in each string. Once again, IVC imperfections did not hinder the system's perform-
ance.
Our conclusion is that this additional time would be sufficient for a driver in such an emergency
scenario to adapt their behaviour and prepare for the incoming braking event. However, we
found that only some of the vehicles present in the string benefited from this advance warning.
Closer to the initial emergency event, the less likely they were to be warned with sufficient
time to change their behaviour. This result was not completely unexpected, as the global risk
indicator is built from a combination of risks perceived by each vehicle, which displayed a bias
towards the closest vehicle. Although the first half of the string would not gain much from
this system, the second half of the string should have enough warning to avoid or mitigate
any further crashes. The results demonstrate, for this specific type of emergency scenario,
augmented perception-based risk assessment approaches were indeed more efficient than non-
cooperative ones.
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To further show the interest of augmented perception for risk assessment, we developed an
additional dedicated simulation within the context of near-miss research. Near-misses are often
used as surrogate measurements for crashes. CS present a particular interest in solving the
complex issues related to collecting data in naturalistic driving studies, and helping extract
relevant events. Our simulation results demonstrated the ability of a CS-based approach to
detect a large proportion of near-miss events. We also showed that the distribution of equipped
vehicles within the traffic flow is the biggest influence factor to how efficient the detection
process will be. Nonetheless, IVC imperfections were found to have a significant influence too,
as frame loss was shown to decrease the number of detected events by up to 10%. On the other
hand, the effects of GPS imperfections and latency were shown to be more limited.
Finally, we showed that the cooperative approach is better than a non-cooperative approach
(using front and rear-facing ranging sensors). Improvements became significant when the equip-
ment ratio was over 50%. With large equipment ratios, the CS-based approach allowed doubling
the proportion of detected events (quadrupling was possible, depending on the non-cooperative
approach parameters). However, for lower ratios, the difference between cooperative and non-
cooperative approaches was found to be less than 10%.
7.5 Summary of chapters contributions
In this section, we provide a synoptic outline of the contributions and limitations of the research
presented in this thesis, broken down to each individual chapter.
7.5.1 Chapter 2: Studying the safety benefits of Cooperative Systems
 Outcomes
 A research methodology focusing on improving the realism of CS simulation, includ-
ing empirically-driven improvements, was selected.
 Demonstrated the technical feasibility of an EEBL implementation.
 Engineering guidelines were set for further on-road performance analysis.
 Obtained performance benchmarks for latency in 802.11g IVC.
 Limitations
 Human factors and experimental protocol issues did not allow the study of the safety
contribution of IVC into a vehicle's string.
7.5.2 Chapter 3: Evaluation of telecommunications for augmented
perception
 Outcomes
 Successfully deployed an open-source 802.11p IVCD in vehicles.
 A comprehensive evaluation of 802.11p IVC was performed on tracks in a close-to-
real-road setting.
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 Developed an empirical model of key 802.11p performance metrics.
 Key findings
 802.11p performance was less than expected in terms of range.
 Range (and frame loss) showed a strong dependence on the relative speed between
an emitter and a receptor.
 Fluctuations of up to 500 metres were possible depending on the antennas' quality.
 Latency was limited and remained stable regardless of speed or range.
 Limitations
 The measurements did not account for the presence of other vehicles, IVC-equipped
or not.
 Latency was measured principally for smaller frames, the scope of measurements
with larger frames remained limited.
 The specific outside of BBS context mode for 802.11p was not used.
 The 802.11p model is not adapted for VANETs of more than a few vehicles.
7.5.3 Chapter 4: Simulation architecture for Cooperative Systems ap-
plications
 Outcomes
 Developed a generalist Cooperative Systems simulation architecture/framework.
 Key findings
 When improving the realism of the simulation, an EEBL system appeared not to
improve the average crash severity in a vehicles' string, contrary to previous results.
 However, the safety benefits of EEBL according to the number of crashes criterion
were confirmed.
 Limitations
 Vehicle controllers generate certain behaviours that might not accurately represent
the real behaviour under certain conditions.
7.5.4 Chapter 5: Building an augmented map
 Outcomes
 Developed a generalist augmented perception architecture.
 Key findings
 Augmented perception provides 2 to 7 seconds of additional warning in an emergency
braking scenario compared to non-cooperative risk-assessment.
7.6. FUTURE RESEARCH 229
 IVC imperfections did not preclude risk-assessment with an augmented perception-
based process.
 Limitations
 The risk-assessment method is based on TTC, which might not be relevant to all
driving situations.
7.5.5 Chapter 6: Towards risk assessment: an application
 Outcomes
 A Cooperative Systems-based near-miss events detection simulation.
 Key findings
 Demonstration of CS-based system's ability to count near-miss events.
 The prime factor that has an influence on the number of detected events is the
distribution of equipped vehicles in the fleet.
 The number of false positives is likely to be greatly reduced with CS.
 Limitations
 Impossible to discriminate false from true positives.
 Lack of some key driving situations (e.g. crashes) in the traffic simulation.
 Simplified IVC simulation.
7.6 Future research
This thesis has opened a number of avenues for further research. In this section, we will
provide a few suggestions on how our research can be extended in the future, using the tools we
developed in the present thesis, as well as discuss openings towards research in other, related
disciplines.
The on-track evaluation of 802.11p performance was undertaken in a controlled environment
with a limited number of emitters active at any given time. It is probably necessary to as-
sess the same performance metrics within two new contexts; (1) open road, and (2) crowded
telecommunication medium. The first type of experimentation should allow assessing the ef-
fects of perturbations such as traffic and varying types of scenery (urban, suburban, etc.). The
second type, should allow assessing the effect of many concurrent data exchanges by IVCDs,
over the same shared medium. Although logistical limitations would obviously limit the ability
to test with a large number of emitters, a V2V-V2I mixed scenario could be implemented on
the Satory's test tracks, as LIVIC is now in possession of 17 functional 802.11p IVCDs. Fur-
thermore, other experimentations should focus on assessing whether the OCB mode from the
802.11p standard actually makes a difference in safety-critical priority messages, especially in
the context of a crowded or highly imperfect network environment.
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These additional experimental data collections should allow the enhancement of the 802.11
model developed within this thesis, which shares the same limitations as the existing meas-
urements. Some environment influences are covered by the current model, but cannot be dis-
criminated from each other; for example, different weather conditions. An extended version of
the model might also need to include correlation between two neighbouring vehicles. Presently,
two neighbouring vehicles (or IVCDs more generally) could have widely different frame loss
profile, which might not be a representative of actual conditions. Eventually, small correlations
between each of the model's parameter might have been unaccounted for.
Using our CS-simulation architecture, we confirmed that CS were useful reducing the number
of collisions in the string after an emergency braking event, and showed that IVC limitations
were not a problem within this scenario. Our architecture holds the potential for further
verifications of the CS safety benefits with other applications deployed in more complex or
challenging scenarios. Additional analysis should also be conducted to determine why there are
no apparent benefits in terms of crash severity in the vehicle scenario.
Eventually, further research should be undertaken in relation to the risk-assessment capability
of the augmented map. Although we obtained promising results, the risk-assessment system we
used remained relatively simple. Notably, it is based on a single risk surrogate measurement, the
TTC. A more realistic approach would require combining several risk measurements together,
notably by using the new capabilities offered by the augmented map. A variety of scenarios,
including situations at intersections, overtaking and other manoeuvres could then be tested.
This should allow creating an actual system that could be installed in sensors and IVC equipped
vehicles to provide risk assessment functions to the drivers, which is likely to be a desirable
application. To conclude, the augmented map-building architecture is available for further
testing with different inputs, most notably by using actual data from real vehicles instead of
SiVIC; its versatility should allow for a large range of testing contexts.
This thesis also has a number of practical implications for further multidisciplinary research.
This is especially the case for Human Factors research, which were outside of our research scope.
One aspect is the question of how to convey augmented perception-related information to the
driver. Since such a system extends the driver's perceptive horizon away from its natural limits,
questions arise as to how such additional information should be presented to the driver. The
system is at risk of being useless if too much information is presented to the driver, not allowing
him to concentrate on relevant safety issues, or if the driver is unable to easily understand the
new information. These problems should be tackled with appropriate Human-Machine Interface
(HMI) designs. Another area of further research concerns the usage that can be made of the
additional warning provided by augmented perception, and its influence on the driver's reaction
time, level of alertness and workload. Although it is straightforward to state that an early
warning is a positive outcome, it is necessary to assess how drivers use this additional warning
time and the effect it might have on their behaviour. Furthermore, another potential related
research concerns testing whether the knowledge of having a system capable of detecting risk
well ahead of an actual dangerous driving condition would affect drivers behaviour, with regards
to the risk-homeostasis theory.
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Installation and implementation guide for 802.11p drivers
Introduction
This guide's aim is to help with the installation of configuration of an 802.11p device (modem)
based on ALIX3D3 boards and Atheros AR5413 802.11 chipset. The guide refers to the in-
stallation guides from the Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge (GCDG)1, which open-source
softwares were used. It helps clarifying some steps and configurations that are missing from the
GCDG's guide(s), as well as fixing some bugs that might arise during implementation. With
this guide, the user should have a fully functional 802.11p modem, ready to operate in the ITS
band. This guide's procedures can also be applied to any type of desktop or embedded device
that can be fitted with Atheros chipsets working with the ath5k driver.
Credits are given to the authors of the drivers and other softwares which are referred to in this
guide. The author also would like to thank Jan de Jongh (TNO, the Netherlands) and Sagar
Behere (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden) for their help by emails during the initial
implementation, upon which this guide was created.
Release Date Reason of change Status Distribution
0.1 19/07/2011 First draft Draft
1.0 20/07/2011 Release version (French) Release LIVIC, LEMCO, INRIA
1.1 28/07/2011 Corrected some details Release LIVIC, LEMCO, INRIA
1.2 14/06/2012 Translated into English Release QUT
1www.gcdc.net
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Recommended Configuration and Dependencies
The installation described here was made on an ALIX3D3 board fitted with an AR5413 802.11
abg 802.11p class 2 compliant chipset. The used OS was a command-line only Ubuntu 9.10
(Karmic Koala); theoretically another Linux version (Fedora for example) can be used, but it
is highly recommended to use kernel version 2.6.31.
The following packages and software are necessary for the drivers' installation process and
need to be installed beforehand via aptitude (do not forget to configure aptitude's proxy in
/etc/apt/apt.conf if working on a new Ubuntu install):
 GCC compiler
 Kernel header files2
 python-m2crypto
 libgcrypt11-dev
 pkg-config
The following archives and files are provided into the 80211p_LIVIC_Atheros.rar archive:
 GCDCCommStackBranch-2.0.tgz
 compat-wireless-2009-12-11.tar.bz2
 libnl_1.1.orig.tar.gz
 enable_80211p.sh
 3 patch files (its-ath.pathc, its-mac80211.patch & its-wireless.patch)
 db.txt
 confuse-2.7.tar.gz [for cargeo6]
 tunctl-1.5.tar.gz [for cargeo6]
GCDC's original documentation is included in GCDCCommStackBranch-2.0.tgz, in the /doc
folder, including:
 GCDC-Comm-Stack.doc, the main documentation as written by Jan de Jongh
 CALM-FAST-router-design.odt, the ath5k driver specific documentation as modified by
Eric Koenders (an OpenOffice file).
Patching ath5k and installing Compat-wireless
Installing the modified ath5k driver is the first state. The modified version was coded by Eric
Koenders and is able to accept 802.11p-relevant frequencies and other parameters. The original
(non-modified) ath5k driver is included in the open-source compat-wireless package. The re-
commended compat-wireless version (December 11, 2009 version) is included in 80211p_LIVIC-
_Atheros.rar, and we recommend using it instead of any other version, especially more recent
ones.
On the GCDC communication stack's documentation, it is written that with a 2.6.31 kernel,
a simple installation procedure is possible. This is not the case, and one must used the
installation procedure described in the documentation's section 4.3.2 (pages 21 to
24), which is patching the compat-wireless sources before installing them.
2apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname r)
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The ./makepatch command is not necessary, as the patch files already exist in the /src/kernel
folder. Beware: unzipping the archive in a Linux OS seems to lead to a systematic problem
that empties the patch files. We encountered this problem several times in the LIVIC and
LEMCO labs, on several unrelated occasions. The quick fix is to unzip the files in a Windows
OS and transfer them later on the Linux device, replacing the faulty unzipped files. Note that
its-mac80211.patch is always empty; its-ath.patch is 12,800 bytes and its-wireless.patch is
1,100 bytes.
One can then follow the installation procedure as described in the original documentation, after
the ath5k driver's selection. However, beware: if the compat-wireless sources were compiled
before patching them to verify they were no missing dependencies, as recommended in the
original documentation, a new makefile will have to be created with the driver's selection script
(page 20, /scripts/driver-select ath5k) again to re-compile the patched sources.
Once compat-wireless is installed, the modified ath5k driver is functional: however, it is not
ready yet to be used with 802.11p: there is a final undocumented stage. This stage consists
in editing a specific modprobe option in the driver:
 Create a new ath5k.conf file in the /etc/modprobe.d folder
 Insert the following command line: options ath5k all_channels=1 (a list of the driver's
options can be displayed with the modinfo ath5k | more command)
 Restart the device.
The modprobe option allows the driver to accept the ITS channel which are listed in the
regulatory domain (more information below).
Installing the GCDC remainder
The remainder of the GCDC communication stack is not necessary, unless one want to use the
CALM functionalities. As this guide focus on enabling a 802.11p device, we shall not enter into
the details of such additional functionalities. However, there are a few things that remain to
be installed to configure and use the new driver properly:
 iw
 wireless-crda
 the wireless-regdb tool
Their installation procedure is described on pages 24 to 26 of the original documentation. It
is relatively straightforward and does not require any additional details3, but one point: with
the archive's sources, compilation of iw will generate several identical errors [error:
'ULONG_MAX' undeclared (first use in this function)]. To fix this problem:
 Open the netlink-local.h file in the /libnl-1.1/include folder
 Insert #include <limits.h> at the beginning, save
 Restart compilation
Note that is would be redundant to use wireless-regdb at this stage. This tool does not need to
be installed, the compilation and make install command are used to create and then install a
regulatory.bin file in a wireless-crda folder. To correctly supervise this procedure, please refer
to the next section.
3Beware, in certain cases the compiling and installation commands are not always listed in the correct order,
or might be incomplete. For example, wireless-crda is installed correctly with make, then make install.
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Changing the regulatory domain
Once the Communication stack is installed, the next step is modifying the authoriesed channels
to access the ITS band. As the ITS band has not be fully finalised in some countries (Japan,
Australia, etc.) the regulatory domain does not include the ITS band by default, and only
covers channels for versions a, b, g and n of 802.11 (and less known, but finalised versions).
Fortunately, it is possible to modify the regulatory database to insert the required channels.
The wireless-regdb tool, packaged in the Communication stack, is designed to do so. Using
wireless-regdb is described on the original documentation's pages 25 and 26.
However, the original documentation is lacking. The make install command works, i.e. a
new binary file regulatory.bin is generated from the db.txt file and automatically copied in the
appropriate folder. However, after that the ITS band continue to be rejected by the driver
(which can be seen as they are not listed with iw reg get or in the dmesg output). For the
regulatory domain modifications to be accounted, one must copy the .pem files from
the /wireless-regdb-2009.11.25 folder to the /wireless-crda/pubkeys folder before
compiling and installing wireless-crda.
Beware, once the ITS channels are correctly activated, iw list or iw dev wlan0 info will return a
buffer error. This is normal, as the new channels add to much information for the iw command
output buffers. The ITS channels are here, as they are now listed in iw reg get and dmesg.
As the GCDC is a Dutch project, the original documentation uses a modification to the Dutch
regulatory domain; one can use any regulatory domain. However, we recommend using the US
domain which is used by default once the ath5k driver is installed, instead of the world domain,
00 (especially from an Australian perspective, as the Australian ITS band will likely mimic
the US one). For the sake of simplicity, and to avoid domains intersections4, adding the ITS
band to the US domain is the easiest. Find below the domain to enter into db.txt before using
wireless-regdb, with the added band highlighted in bold red script.
country US:
(2402 - 2472 @ 40), (3, 27)
(5170 - 5250 @ 40), (3, 17)
(5250 - 5330 @ 40), (3, 20), DFS
(5490 - 5600 @ 40), (3, 20), DFS
(5650 - 5710 @ 40), (3, 20), DFS
(5735 - 5835 @ 40), (3, 30)
(5842 - 5932 @ 40), (N/A, 27), DFS
For increased safety, we also added the ITS channels to the world domain, even if this might
not be necessary:
#This is the world regulatory domain
country 00:
(2402 - 2472 @ 40), (3, 20)
# Channel 12 - 13. No HT40 channel fits here
(2457 - 2482 @ 20), (3, 20), PASSIVE-SCAN, NO-IBSS
# Channel 14. Only JP enables this and for 802.11b only
(2474 - 2494 @ 20), (3, 20)
# Channel 36 - 48
(5170 - 5250 @ 40), (3, 20), PASSIVE-SCAN, NO-IBSS
# NB: 5260 MHz - 5700 MHz requires DFS
# Channel 149 - 165
(5735 - 5835 @ 40), (3, 20), PASSIVE-SCAN, NO-IBSS
(5842 - 5932 @ 40), (N/A, 27), DFS
An already edited version of db.txt is provided at the root of the 80211p_LIVIC_Atheros.rar
archive. Copy it into /wireless-regdb-2009.11.25 before compilation to use it. One can change
4Domains always go toward the most restrictive setting, in a cumulative way. If one moves from the US to
the FR domain, only the frequencies included in both domains will be usable. Coming back to the US domain
later will maintain this limitation: only the US frequencies included in the FR domain will remain accessible.
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the regulatory domain as many times as necessary, by editing db.txt and using the wireless-
regdb tool again.
Configuring wlan0 for 802.11p
The last step before being able to use 802.11p is configuring it properly for this version of 802.11.
The necessary changes are mostly done with iw, iwconfig and ifconfig and are described in the
CALM-FAST-router-design.odt original documentation. However, one must also configure IP
addresses, especially if working on a virgin OS installation. The wlan0 interface (on the one
you use) can be configured statically as any other interface with /etc/network/interfaces. To
use a dual IPv4 and IPv6 configuration:
Using network layer software, such as CarGeo6, will focus on eth0 and the tunnel interface that
will be created, so the static wlan0 address is not important for them.
One must than modify wlan0 to use the appropriate ITS frequencies. By default, wlan0 will
start in 802.11g frequencies, and in the infrastructure mode. 802.11p will likely be more useful
in ad-hoc (IBSS) mode. To quicken this procedure, we recommend creating a script such as the
enable_80211p.sh script available in 80211p_LIVIC_Atheros.rar, with the following code:
Execute this script after the device's start-up. It can be automated so that wlan0 is immediately
configured in 802.11p. Note that Eric Koenders's documentation add the beacon 0 parameter
on the last command. This is supposed to de-activate beaconing (normally a part of the BSS
functioning) and is supposed to have been added to the iw sources that are given with the
Communication stack. However, this parameter was always rejected with our tests (invalid
argument -22 errors). This is not a problem however, as deactivating beaconing seems to have
been a specific requirement of the GCDC, and is not likely to be necessary for other users.
Note that we did not look into using the outside of BSS context mode for 802.11p, which is
aimed at reducing latencies by getting rid of most authentication procedures. Users will have
to look it up for themselves.
Also note that one can easily use this script-based approach to configure a virtual interface on
wlan0 that can be set in monitor mode to sniff all the packets at the chipset level.
Beware: with a 2.6.32 kernel configuration with the CarGe6 suite installed, the iw dev [inter-
face name] ibss leave command does not work. Frequency can still be changed with set freq of
ibss join, however.
At this point, the device is configured and ready to be used. For information, a few ping results
are copied below. They were taken between two modems cargeo6-router1 and cargeo6-router2,
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in IPv4 and IPv6, in an indoor context with a few metres of range; both had external 8 dBi
gain antennas.
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Notice d'installation des logiciels, scénario de la file de véhicule
: EDA, RTMaps, MySQL
Introduction
Cette notice est rédigée pour permettre l'installation des diverses composantes logiciels néces-
saires à la mise en ÷uvre du scénario de la file de véhicules sous un système Linux (Ubuntu a
été utilisé, mais une autre version est envisageable).
Recommandation importante
Pour installer les divers logiciels, il est fortement recommandé d'être sous un compte super-
utilisateur (généralement le compte root). Ce compte est accessible, entre autres, au démarrage
de Linux en tapant la commande sudo s une fois logé comme utilisateur normal. Le mot de
passe peut être redemandé après cette commande pour valider le passage en super-utilisateur ;
pour le compte livic, mot de passe cvis, sur les eBoxes, le mot de passe super-utilisateur est le
même que celui du compte livic.
Release Date Reason of change Status Distribution
1.0 23/08/2010 First version Release LIVIC
1.99 28/10/2010 Second version 99% finalised Draft LIVIC
2.0 09/11/2010 Second final version Release LIVIC, Univ. Sherbrooke
2.1 02/12/2010 Added files & folders chart Release QUT
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Installation d'EDA et du service BrakeAlert
Le dossier INSTALL LINUX contient les fichiers nécessaires à l'installation d'EDA et des ser-
vices BrakeAlert et SpeedAlert. La présente notice y est incluse, ainsi que les fichiers suivants
:
 Sous-dossiers IV, RSU et Sources
 Installeur JDK (jdk-6u21-linux-i586.bin)
 Installeur Knopflerfish (knopflerfish_osgi_2.4.0.jar)
 Librairie librxtxSerial.so
 Fichier jar RXTXcomm.jar
On va maintenant détailler pas à pas la procédure d'installation. Attention, dans la suite
on note le dossier /bin_[]. Ce dossier peut être soit appelé /bin_rsu ou /bin_iv
en fonction de la version installée.
1. Installer le JDK Linux :
(a) Ouvrir un terminal dans le dossier où les fichiers d'installations sont copiés
(b) Taper la commande ./jdk-6u21-linux-i586.bin
2. Installer le framework Knopflerfish :
(a) Ouvrir un terminal dans le dossier où les fichier d'installations sont copiés
(b) Double-cliquer sur knopflerfish_osgi_2.4.0.jar
3. Copier dans le dossier souhaité pour l'application (par exemple /home/livic/) les dossiers
RSU ou IV, en fonction de l'application désirée.
4. Placer la libraire librxtxSerial.so dans le dossier /usr/lib et le fichier RXTXcomm.jar dans
le dossier . . . /jdk1.6.0_21/jre/lib/ext
5. Placer le contenu du dossier /Sources/Jars dans le dossier dans /knopflerfish_osgi_2.4.0/-
knopflerfish.org/osgi/jars
6. Copier le dossier /Sources/platadbosm dans /var/lib/mysql (après l'installation de MySQL,
cf. page 6)
7. Créer un dossier /cvis-poma dans /usr/local/share/ et y copier le dossier /Sources/OSGi
bundles
8. Dans le dossier /bin_[], ouvrir le fichier shell EDA_1.0.1.6 avec un éditeur (clique droit,
puis mousepad par exemple), et modifier les variables suivantes (avec les chemins d'accès
complets) :
(a) INSTALL_PATH doit pointer vers le dossier où EDA est installé (un dossier différent
du dossier contenant les fichiers de l'application, par exemple /home/livic/eda)
(b) JAVA_PATH doit pointer vers le dossier /jdk1.6.0_21/bin
(c) KFPRO_PATH doit pointer vers le dossier /knopflerfish.org/osgi
(d) RUN_PATH doit pointer vers le dossier /bin_[]
9. Ouvrir un terminal dans /bin_[] et y taper la commande chmod a+x EDA_1.0.1.6
10. Dans le dossier /bin_[]/conf.d, ouvrir le fichier KF_cvis_1.6.xargs avec un éditeur et en-
trer le chemin d'accès complet du dossier /knopflerfish.org/osgi/jars à la ligne -Dorg.knopflerfish.gosg.jars
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11. Dans le dossier /bin-[]/conf.d, ouvrir le fichier OSGi_Properties.xargs avec un éditeur
et entrer le chemin d'accès complet du dossier d'installation d'EDA tel qu'indiquer pour
INSTALL_PATH a l'étape 7.a. à la ligne -Dorg.osgi.framework.dir
12. Dans le dossier /bin_[]/conf.d, ouvrer le fichier EDA_1.0.1.5.xargs avec un éditeur puis
modifir les paramètres suivants :
(a) Pour la RSU et les véhicules :
i. Mettre un identifiant unique à la ligne [].eda.host.identifier
ii. [].eda.rsu.scenario doit pointer vers le dossier /bin_[]
iii. [].eda.comm.multicastAddr doit pointer vers l'adresse de groupe qui sera utilisée
pour le multicasting (en IPv6)
iv. [].eda.iv.breakalert doit ponter vers le dossier contenant le fichier sonore au
format wave (typiquement /bin_[])
(b) Pour la RSU seulement :
i. [].eda.comm.multicastInte doit pointer vers l'interface à utiliser (eth1 ou eth0)
pour envoyer les messages5
ii. [].eda.breakalert.portcom doit être bien formaté pour Linux (/dev/ttyS0) et
non Windows (COM1)
iii. [].eda.iv.speedlimit.target doit pointer vers l'adresse du (ou des) véhicule(s)
recevant la notification de changement de limitation de vitesse, si utilisée.
iv. Dans la section installation, le service suivant doit être non-commenté : eda.service.breakalert.rsu-
1.0.1.6.jar
v. Dans la section start, le service suivant doit être non-commenté : eda.service.breakalert.rsu-
1.0.1.6.jar
(c) Pour les véhicules seulement :
i. Dans la section installation, le service suivant doit être non-commenté :
A. eda.service.breakalert.iv-1.0.1.6.jar
B. eda.service.speedalert.iv-1.0.1.6.jar (si véhicule POMA)
C. eda.service.spy.iv-1.0.1.6.jar (si véhicule POMA)
ii. Dans la section start, le service suivant doit être non-commenté
A. eda.service.breakalert.iv-1.0.1.6.jar
B. eda.service.speedalert.iv-1.0.1.6.jar (si véhicule POMA)
C. eda.service.spy.iv-1.0.1.6.jar (si véhicule POMA)
L'installation est normalement terminée. Pour exécuter et utiliser les services EDA, se référer
à la notice de mise en route : string scenario.
Installation de RTMaps
Une version spécifique à Linux de RTMaps doit être installée sur les machines qui en ont besoins
(véhicules POMA principalement). Le CD d'installation de cette version est disponible sous la
forme d'une image ISO dans le dossier /Sources/RTMaps.
En premier lieu, il est nécessaire de monter (mount) le fichier ISO. Pour cela :
 Dans le dossier /media, créer un nouveau dossier iso (ou tout autre nom souhaité)
 Ouvrir un terminal dans le dossier qui contient le fichier ISO RTMaps_dev_3_4_9_linux-
_i386_gcc4_1_LIVIC.iso
 Taper la commande mount o loop [nom de l'archive ISO] /media/iso
5Ce paramètre n'est pas obligatoire mais permet d'éviter certains problèmes si EDA tente d'envoyer ses
messages sur une autre interface que l'interface Ethernet en le forçant à le faire.
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Une fois le fichier ISO monté, on devrait voir apparaitre dans le dossier /media un nouveau
dossier correspondant au contenu de l'ISO. Il y a notamment un guide PDF d'installation. Si
ce guide n'est pas accessible sur la machine concernée, la procédure est la suivante :
 Ouvrir un terminal dans le dossier du fichier ISO monté (/media/iso)
 Taper la commande ./install_dev
 Suivre les instructions à l'écran
Lors de la procédure d'installation, RTMaps va demander un dossier où chercher le JRE. On
peut lui indiquer directement le dossier où il a été installé (. . . /jdk1.6.0_21/jre cf. page 3) ou
un dossier parent. Il sera ensuite demandé de choisir entre la version préinstallée et la version
6u20 que RTMaps peut installer. Choisir la version la plus récente des deux (typiquement celle
installée avec EDA, u21 ou u22).
Il est ensuite nécessaire d'installer les drivers HASP. Une archive tar.gz les contenant se trouve
dans /media/iso/hasp_drivers (HASP_SRM_LINUX_3.50_Run-time_Installer_script.tar.gz).
Attention, il sera probablement nécessaire de copier l'archive dans un autre dossier que le
dossier /media/iso/hasp_drivers qui est en mode read-only. Le dossier où il sera copié n'a pas
d'importance, l'installation des drivers copiera les fichiers dans les bons dossiers.
Pour décompresser l'archive, ouvrir un terminal dans le dossier la contenant et taper tar zxvf
[le nom complet de l'archive]. Un nouveau dossier sera créer dans le dossier courant avec le
contenu de l'archive tar. Suivre les instructions dans le fichier readme.html pour installer HASP.
Installation de MySQL
L'installation d'un client/serveur MySQL est un processus simple sous Linux. Pour le compléter
il est toutefois nécessaire que la machine concernée soit connectée à internet, ce qui n'est pas
forcéement correctement paramètré par défaut. Pour se connecter à internet avec un eBox (ou
tout autre machine sous Ubuntu/Debian) se référer à l'annexe 1 : activation de l'accès internet
sur une eBox (page 7).
Une fois internet activé :
 Ouvrir un terminal dans n'importe quel dossier
 Taper la commande apt-get update afin de mettre à jour les listes du service apt-get
 Taper la commande apg-get install mysql-client et suivre les instructions à l'écran
 Taper la commande apg-get install mysql-server et suivre les instructions à l'écran
Attention, l'installation du serveur va demander un mot de passe pour aller avec le compte
d'utilisateur standard (root). Il est nécessaire de régler le mot de passe livic pour rester en
ligne avec certains fichiers sources d'EDA (hard-codés) ainsi que les instructions d'utilisation
de MySQL.
L'étape 6 de la procédure d'installation d'EDA couvre la question de la copie d'une base de
données au bon endroit dans la structure de fichier de MySQL pour pouvoir l'utiliser. Pour
ce qui est de la bonne utilisation de cette base, se référer à la notice de mise en route : string
scenario.
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Annexe 1 : activation de l'accès internet sur une eBox
Il peut être nécessaire à certain moment du processus d'installation d'avoir accès à internet.
Par défaut, les eBoxes utilisées pour ces scénarios ne sont pas configurés pour se connecter à
internet, car elles doivent échanger avec les serveurs NTP qui ne sont pas configurés pour se
connecter à un réseau autre que purement local (adressage en 192.168.1.XXX).
La procédure pour réactiver l'accès à internet est relativement simple :
 Ouvrir un terminal dans n'importe quel dossier
 Taper la commande nano /etc/network/interfaces, l'éditeur nano s'ouvre (cf. capture
ci-dessous)
 Aller à la section auto eth0 (ou eth1) et enlever le commentaire (#) devant la ligne iface
eth0 inet dhcp
 Commenter les lignes iface eth0 inet static, address, netmask, broadcast et toute autre
ligne de même retrait (gateway, network, etc.) si présente
 Taper Ctrl + O pour sauvegarder, puis Ctrl + X pour quitter
 De retour dans le terminal, taper /etc/init.d/networking restart pour redémarrer les in-
terfaces
Cette procédure permet donc de passer d'un adressage IP statique à une version dynamique en
DHCP. Si l'eBox est correctement connectée par Ethernet au réseau du LIVIC (ou tout autre
DHCP), l'accès internet devrait être immédiat. Taper ifconfig et vérifier la ligne de l'adresse
IPv4 pour s'assurer que le DHCP est bien actif : l'adresse IP devrait y être totalement différente
de l'ancienne adresse statique en 192.168.1.XXX.
Pour repasser en adressage statique, suivre la même procédure en inversant les zones à com-
menter dans /etc/network/interfaces.
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Annexe 2 : arborescence des fichiers
Ci-dessous l'arborescence de tous les fichiers installés, présentée pour un véhicule (IV). Elle est
identique pour une RSU, sauf le nom de certains dossiers.
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Notice d'expérimentation, scénario de la file de véhicule
Introduction
Cette notice est rédigée afin d'utiliser et de réinstaller, si besoin est, la configuration de
l'expérience de la file de véhicule, mise au point et réalisée au LIVIC entre avril et novembre
2010. Cette configuration présente des points et limitations spécifiques (notamment au niveau
de l'utilisation de GeoNet) qui peuvent avoir été résolues après la rédaction de la présente notice
; se référer à toute notice ultérieure en conséquence.
Release Date Reason of change Status Distribution
0.0 11/10/2010 Created document Draft
0.1 28/10/2010 First draft 95% finalised Draft LIVIC
0.11 09/11/2010 Second final version Draft LIVIC, Univ. Sherbrooke
0.12 03/12/2010 Revised with D. Gruyer's advice Draft
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Référence : arborescence des fichiers
Ci-dessous, l'arborescence des fichiers mentionnés dans ce document. La structure pour un
véhicule est utilisée, celle pour une RSU est identique sauf les noms des dossiers contenus dans
/home/livic.
Véhicules instrumentés
Description du matériel embarqué
Les véhicules instrumentés présentés dans cette notice sont basés sur les véhicules TIC et TAC
(Renault Clio) et SCOOP (Citroën C4) du LIVIC. Il est possible de réinstaller le matériel dans
n'importe qu'elle véhicule pouvant supporter l'ensemble du matériel embarqué. Les véhicules
instrumentés sont de deux types : (1) véhicules  normaux  et (2) véhicules POMA. Le véhicule
normal fournit la base sur laquelle le véhicule POMA est implanté.
On suppose que les logiciels liés aux expérimentations ont été préalablement in-
stallés dans les véhicules suivant les instructions du fichier HOW TO LINUX. Les
informations de configurations détaillées sont disponibles dans ce fichier.
Véhicule normal L'architecture matérielle commune à l'ensemble des véhicules (normaux
ou POMA) comprend les éléments suivants :
 Un ordinateur embarqué eBox, dit eBox IV (Intelligent Vehicle), pour le traitement.
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 Un boitier IMARA pour les communications GeoNet.
 Un boitier serveur NTP de marque Brandywine.
 Une antenne GPS externe pour le serveur NTP
 Une antenne 802.11 interne ou externe.
Le véhicule fournit le switch Ethernet et le commutateur de périphériques (clavier/souris) né-
cessaires. L'eBox est alimentée en 12 volts, le reste du matériel embarqué est alimenté en 220
volts.
Les ordinateurs eBox utilisés dans cette expérience sont anciennement du matériel lié au projet
CVIS, et ont été utilisés pour nos besoins propres. Une image du disque dur de la première eBox
IV finalisée est disponible dans l'ordinateur livic74 (dans la salle stagiaire) si plus de clones sont
nécessaires.
Les eBox fonctionnent sous Linux Ubuntu [version], avec un noyau du projet CVIS compilé par
Ramsys. Stricto sensu, n'importe quelle implémentation de Linux peut supporter les services
utilisés : EDA et NTP. La procédure d'installation des services EDA et de tous les logiciels
nécessaires est détaillée dans un autre document (Configuration des applications EDApour
Linux et Windows). Une machine Windows peut également être utilisée, cependant ceci n'a
jamais été testé (sur les véhicules).
La gestion du Network Time Protocol (NTP) pour la synchronisation est assurée par un client
générique qui se connecte au serveur fournit par Brandywine (stratum 1). Ce client se lance
automatiquement au démarrage, pour vérifier son bon fonctionnement se référer à la page 12.
Pour le configurer, éditer le fichier ntp.conf que l'on trouvera dans /etc/. On doit y indiquer
le ou les serveurs NTP que le client cherchera. Il est possible de ne lui en indiquer qu'un seul.
L'adresse IPv4 du serveur Brandywine connecté à cette eBox sera mise comme adresse préférée
en entrant la ligne suivante :
server 192.168.1.XXX iburst prefer
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Le boitier IMARA, qui fournit les communications en 802.11 (a ou p) avec GeoNet, est en-
tièrement autonome et ne nécessite aucune intervention de l'utilisateur (si une intervention est
nécessaire, se référer à l'annexe de ce document). En termes d'antenne il est fortement recom-
mandé de ne pas utiliser les petites antennes d'origine en 2.4 GHz (interne au véhicule une fois
le coffre fermé), car la portée est limitée. Des mesures effectuées entre les 14 et 18 octobre 2010
ont montrées que les antennes internes avaient une portée maximale de l'ordre de 85 mètres, ce
qui est largement insuffisant.
Suite à ces premières mesures, l'utilisation d'une antenne externe en réception a permis de
mesure une portée de 240245 mètres. L'antenne externe utilisée a été préalablement utilisée
dans le projet SAFEPSPOT (visible sur l'image ci-contre), soit une antenne adaptée au 802.11p
à 5,9 GHz. Cependant, à cause d'une incompréhension technique, les boitiers IMARA étaient
alors configurés pour émettre en 802.11a à 2,4 GHz. Ceci a causé d'importants problèmes de
perte de signal et d'absence d'accrochage lors d'une répétition à échelle réduite (4 véhicules
dont 3 instrumentés) de l'expérience le 5 novembre 2010.
Des tests ultérieurs (17 novembre) effectués avec des antennes adaptées à une fréquence de 2.4
GHz ont montré une portée de 600 mètres, au moins, en ligne de vue directe. Il n'y avait pas
de problème significatif pour la réception des messages en passant à proximité de la RSU aux
vitesses considérés par l'expérience. Le présent scénario prenant place sur une ligne droite,
l'utilisation du 2,4 GHz n'est pas un problème.
Attention à bien s'assurer que les antennes correspondent à la fréquence utilisée
par les boitiers. Pour vérifier cela, se référer à l'annexe.
Les câbles utilisés pour relier les boitiers IMARA aux antennes sont des câbles normalement
adaptés au 5,9 GHz, mais néanmoins compatible avec le 2.4 GHz (car l'atténuation du signal
dans le câble est proportionnelle à la fréquence). Les sorties antennes des boitiers sont des prises
males, il est donc nécessaire d'utiliser des câbles avec au moins un coté femelle. Seul le jeu de
câbles bleu et noir acquis en novembre 2010 correspond à ce besoin (les câbles SAFESPOT ou
CVIS sont males-males). Véhicule POMA
L'architecture matérielle du véhicule POMA est la même que celui de véhicule normal, si ce
n'est que l'on a rajouté un GPS supplémentaire, branché (port série pour les données, port
USB pour l'alimentation) sur l'eBox. En d'autres termes, l'appellation POMA ne recouvre que
l'activation de la géo-localisation. Les applications et services qui utilisent cette géo-localisation
ne sont pas couverts par l'appellation POMA. Le premier véhicule POMA installé est la Clio
75E 5419G (identifiant IV03).
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Comparé à l'architecture normale, l'eBox du véhicule POMA dispose de RTMaps, dont le but
est de transmettre au service SpeedAlert d'EDA la position mesurée par le GPS. Les détails du
lancement de RTMaps sont décris dans la section suivante.
Configuration des applications EDA
Les fichiers de configuration des eBoxes IV se trouvent dans le dossier /home/livic/GOOD_IV-
/bin_iv/conf.d. Si la procédure d'installation décrite dans le document HOW TO LINUX est
bien suivie, l'eBox est normalement configurée. On rappelle toutefois les points importants ici.
Le fichier EDA_1.0.1.5.xargs contient les paramètres les plus importants :
 L'identifiant unique du véhicule (Dorg.cvisproject.cint.eda.host.identifier)
 L'adresse du groupe de multicasting auquel les véhicules doivent adhérer, et qui doit être
réglée dans tous les récepteurs comme l'émetteur (Dorg.cvisproject.cint.eda.comm.multicastAddr)
 Les bundles des services souhaités doivent bien être installés et lancés, ce qui revient à
s'assurer que les lignes suivantes ne sont pas commentées :
 install file:./bundles.d/org.cvisproject.cint.eda.service.breakalert.iv-1.0.1.6.jar
 start file:./bundles.d/org.cvisproject.cint.eda.service.breakalert.iv-1.0.1.6.jar
 Si POMA :
 install file:./bundles.d/org.cvisproject.cint.eda.service.speedalert.iv-1.0.1.6.jar
 start file:./bundles.d/org.cvisproject.cint.eda.service.speedalert.iv-1.0.1.6.jar
Attention à bien s'assurer que chaque véhicule a un identifiant unique au niveau
du paramètre Dorg.cvisproject.cint.eda.host.identifier
Arborescence locale :
Procédure de mise en route
On va maintenant décrire la marche à suivre pour mettre en route les véhicules instrumentés
normaux et modifiés POMA. Cette section est organisée linéairement dans l'ordre recommandé
de la mise en route du matériel et des logiciels.
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Alimentation Les besoins en alimentation sont d'une prise 12 volt pour l'eBox et de prises
220 volt pour les boitiers IMARA et NTP Brandywine. L'alimentation des écrans et autres
matériels embarqués est déjà assurée au niveau du véhicule et ne nécessite aucun câblage ou
installation supplémentaire.
 Les prises 220 volts doivent être branchées à la multiprise connectée sur le convertisseur
12-220 volts.
 La prise 12 volt de l'eBox doit être connectée sur les connecteurs plastiques du rack,
comme montré sur l'image ci-dessous.
 Le GPS de l'eBox POMA est alimenté en USB par l'ordinateur lui-même.
Attention à bien débrancher l'USB tant que l'eBox n'est pas complètement lancée,
car le GPS peut être abusivement interprété comme un périphérique d'interface.
La procédure suivante doit être suivie pour alimenter l'ensemble :
 Tourner le ou les commutateurs généraux sur les positions on (horizontale).
 Mettre les deux boutons de batteries 12 V sur on, voyants allumés.
 Le convertisseur 12-220V doit être alimenté, l'allumé s'il ne l'était pas déjà.
Le C4 possède deux commutateurs. Le commutateur placé le plus à gauche permet l'alimentation
des écrans dans l'habitacle indépendamment du reste du circuit. Les deux boutons les plus à
gauche seulement doivent êtres positionnés sur on.
Vérifier le bon lancement des boitiers IMARA et NTP, qui s'allument automatiquement dès
qu'ils sont alimentés. L'eBox nécessite une intervention manuelle sur le bouton de démarrage
(sur la face arrière) pour se lancer.
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Alimentation pour essais statiques Pour des essais statiques dans le garage ou à proximité
immédiate d'un accès au secteur, il est recommandé de fonctionner ainsi :
 Débrancher la multiprise du convertisseur 12-220V et la brancher sur une prise secteur.
 Mettre le convertisseur en position off.
 Mettre les batteries en ligne (commutateurs plus boutons) mais brancher un chargeur
comme sur l'image ci-dessous.
Attention, les batteries du C4 ne sont pas rechargées par l'alternateur du moteur
thermique comme sur les Clios, il faut donc :
1. Recharger le véhicule après utilisation.
2. S'assurer qu'on alimente et démarre les systèmes du C4 en dernier.
Démarrage de l'eBox Attention, certaines eBox peuvent avoir un floppy disk fail ou une
erreur CMOS. Appuyez sur F1 et continuer d'opérer normalement.
Une fois Linux lancé, le premier bureau est bugé (défilement en boucle), passer sur le second
bureau en tapant Ctrl + Alt + F2.
Le compte utilisateur est livic, mot de passe : cvis. Il est fortement recommandé de passer
en super-utilisateur avec le commande sudo s (le mot de passe peut être redemandé, c'est le
même que ci-dessus).
Entrer la commande startx pour lancer l'interface graphique Xfce. A ce stade, sur un IV POMA,
le GPS peut être branché.
Attention à bien vérifier que le switch de commutation de périphériques est correctement
réglé : il n'active pas nécessairement par défaut l'entrée qui est branchée. Les câbles dans les
véhicules sont marqués pour retrouver facilement quel câble correspond à quelle entrée.
Vérification de la connectivité 802.11/IPv6
Ouvrir un nouveau terminal et y taper ifconfig. Si le réseau est bien actif et que le boitier
IMARA fonctionne bien on devrait obtenir un résultat comme ci-dessous :
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On peut y noter une adresse IPv4 dans la gamme 192.168.1.XXX. Cette adresse est fixe, at-
tribuée par défaut au lancement et est locale à chaque véhicule. Deux eBox peuvent avoir
la même adresse tant qu'elles ne sont pas mise en réseau. On peut modifier cette adresse
(non recommandé) en modifiant le fichier /etc/network/interfaces (utilisation de l'éditeur nano
recommandé, ne pas oublier de relancer l'interface après).
On peut y noter également deux lignes concernant des adresses IPv6. Si une seule ligne est
visible, l'eBox n'a pas obtenu d'adresse IPv6. Pour régler ce problème on peut :
 Taper la commande ifconfig eth0 down puis ifconfig eth0 up.
 Attendre quelques minutes que le boitier IMARA soit proprement initialisé.
Attention (1), le nom de l'interface peut être eth0 ou eth1 en fonction des machines. Un
véhicule sera généralement en eth1. Cela n'impacte pas le fonctionnement normal, juste les
commandes à taper en cas de problème.
Toujours vérifier en tapant à nouveau ifconfig. Se référer à la page 32 pour des moyens plus
sophistiqués de vérifier le bon fonctionnement de la connectivité.
Attention (2), l'un des boitiers IMARA n'est pas tout à fait configuré au démarrage comme
les autres. Le DHCP n'y est pas désactivé, ce qui signifie que le boitier va prendre plus de
temps pour se lancer, attendant le time-out de sa recherche de DHCP. Une fois cette étape
passée, le boitier fonctionne de manière autonome comme les autres.
Attention (3), il est courant que les boitiers IMARA notent des erreurs au démarrage, dues à
l'arrêt par coupure de l'alimentation. Les boitiers effectuent une vérification de leur disque et
se relancent avant de fonctionner normalement par la suite.
Vérification du NTP Normalement, le client NTP se met en route automatique lors du
lancement de Linux et se connecte immédiatement au serveur Brandywine si le fichier /etc/-
ntp.conf contient la bonne adresse et la connectivité réseau est active.
Attention, certaines eBox peuvent afficher une date en janvier 2003 peut de temps après leur
lancement. Le NTP corrige cette erreur après quelques minutes.
Pour vérifier que le NTP fonctionne bien :
 S'assurer que la LED Valid Time est bien allumée (elle se trouve sous le connecteur de
l'antenne). Si cette LED n'est pas allumée, le serveur n'a pas encore réussit à acquérir une
base de temps stable. Le serveur peut fonctionner en intérieur, mais il est recommandé
de se placer à l'extérieur pour acquérir une bonne base plus rapidement.
 Ouvrir un terminal, puis taper ntpq. Taper ensuite associations puis peers. On doit
obtenir les résultats suivants si tout fonctionne correctement (image ci-dessous). Taper
exit pour quitter le mode ntpq.
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 Une technique plus rapide est de taper ntqp p dans n'importe quel terminal. On ob-
tiendra la même réponse qu'à la commande ntpq > peers.
En cas de problème, on peut relancer le client NTP en tapant /etc/init.d/ntp restart.
Attention, le décalage entre l'horloge de l'eBox et l'horloge du serveur NTP (offset)
est exprimé en millisecondes avec les commandes ntpq > peers ou ntpq p.
Notons qu'il est possible que les commandes ntpq  p ou ntpq > peers mettent un certain temps
à réagir sur certaines machines. Ceci n'a pas d'incidence sur le fonctionnement du client NTP.
Véhicule POMA, lancement de RTMaps La fonction de géo-localisation de l'IV POMA
est réalisée grâce à RTMaps. On a déjà noté l'importance de ne pas brancher le GPS dès le
début, mais bien d'attendre que Linux soit correctement initialisé (et de préférence que l'on soit
sous Xfce).
Pour lancer RTMaps :
 Ouvrir un terminal dans le dossier /usr/local/bin
 Taper la commande ./RTMaps-3.4
Les diagrammes (.rtd) peuvent être trouvés dans le dossier /home/livic/plata/diagram/ le dia-
gramme permettant une simple localisation avec GPS est LINUX_Plata_test.rtd.
Il est fortement déconseiller de tenter d'exécuter un diagramme directement, la procédure nor-
male est de lancer le diagramme une fois l'environnement RTMaps préalablement ouvert.
Le diagramme peut être démarré immédiatement. Un vector viewer s'ouvre au démarrage et
permet de vérifier que le GPS fonctionne correctement (cf. capture ci-dessous). Les informations
présentées sont dans l'ordre :
 La position donnée sous la forme : latitude, longitude altitude orthométrique, altitude
ellipsoïdale et biais.
 Le nombre de satellites visibles (SV, satellite view)
 Un indice de qualité (de 0 à 8, échelle non incrémentale)
 Un vecteur de précision (DOP, dilution of precision)
 Le temps UTC
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Il est conseillé d'utiliser un  bureau  différent pour RTMaps, afin de ne pas encombrer l'écran.
Xfce permet d'utiliser jusqu'à quatre bureaux accessibles en faisant glisser les fenêtres, par la
molette de la souris ou via le panneau de lancement rapide.
Le flux GPS peut être enregistré en connectant un composant recorder à l'une des sorties (en
fonction du formatage que l'on recherche). Ne pas oublier de spécifier le chemin d'accès pour
le fichier d'enregistrement, sinon il se placera dans /usr/local/bin par défaut.
Véhicule POMA, lancement de MySQL MySQL est nécessaire pour le service SpeedAlert
(qui utilise également RTMaps). Les véhicules POMA sont aussi équipés d'un serveur/client
MySQL Linux qui doit être démarrée avant les services.
Le serveur MySQL démarre automatiquement avec Linux, mais aucune base de donnée n'est
paramétrée pour être utilisée par défaut. Pour indiquer la bonne base de donnée au serveur
MySQL :
 Ouvrir un terminal dans n'importe quel dossier
 Taper la commande mysql u root p et indiquer le mot de passe livic
 Taper use platadbosm
 Taper status, le nom de la banque de donnée active doit être visible sur la seconde ligne
(cf. capture ci-dessous)
Lancement des services EDA Attention, si les bundles ont été changés, il est
nécessaire de supprimer le dossier /home/livic/eda pour s'assurer que les nouveaux
bundles sont bien installés et pris en compte lors du lancement d'EDA.
Si tout est correctement configuré, le lancement d'EDA et des services est simple :
 Ouvrir un terminal dans le dossier /home/livic/GOOD_IV/bin_iv
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 Taper ./EDA_1.0.1.6
 Une fois l'application lancée, cliquez deux fois sur le panneau dans le coin inférieur droit
pour activer les services (cf. capture).
Une fois lancée, l'application n'a plus besoin d'aucune intervention humaine. Lorsqu'un message
est reçu et correctement interprété par l'application, un panneau de signalisation  danger 
triangulaire apparait dans la moitié droite de l'interface.
Les applications liés aux véhicules POMA (service SpeedAlert) ajoutent des objets supplé-
mentaires dans l'interface. La limite de vitesse courante est affichée dans la partie gauche et
une alerte de dépassement de cette limite s'affiche dans la partie droite si c'est le cas. Cet
affichage peut entrer en conflit avec celui du service BreakAlert ; dans ce cas, l'un des pan-
neaux est affiché en petit en dessous de l'autre. Il est recommandé pour cette raison de ne pas
activé SpeedAlert lors d'essai avec une file de véhicule ou de les réaliser sur une route dont la
limitation de vitesse native est supérieure à la vitesse maximale obtenue dans l'expérience.
Attention, à l'arrêt le service SpeedAlert peut enregistrer une vitesse non-nulle à cause des er-
reurs de positionnement GPS. Cela entrainera l'apparition intempestive d'une alerte de dépasse
de vitesse. Ces alertes n'ont pas d'incidence sur le bon fonctionnement du service.
Attention, de nombreuses alertes sont visibles dans le terminal indiquant qu'une application
POMA ne peut pas se connecter au localhost. Ignorer ces alertes.
Logs
Les logs des applications sont stockés directement dans le dossier /home/livic/GOOD_IV/bin_iv
dans des fichiers .log. Les fichiers s'accumulant après un certain temps (un nouveau fichier est
créé à chaque lancement d'EDA), il est recommandé de les purger de temps à autres.
Les applications écrivent toutes dans un unique fichier de log dont la structure a été normalisée
afin de pouvoir être aisément exploitable avec des logiciels comme Excel ou Matlab. Attention,
si des bundles datant d'avant le 22 novembre 2010 sont utilisés, les logs ne seront pas normalisés
: ils seront plus facile à lire pour un humain mais plus complexe à trier pour une exploitation
rapide, comprenant notamment beaucoup de verbose qui peut poser problème à une application
comme Matlab. Pour les bundles postérieurs au 22 novembre, la structure suivante a été adoptée
:
 16:05:33.985;;spy;IV-03;spy6;48.78521666666667;2.099683333333333;29;
 11:05:47.097;;ba;RSU;breakAlert1;11:05:47.093;
Le log se présente sous le format d'une feuille CSV (character-separated value) avec une sépara-
tion par points-virgules. Les premières colonnes contiennent toujours les mêmes valeurs afin de
permettre de trier facilement le fichier, mais les colonnes de données supplémentaires peuvent
varier en nombre. Les colonnes initiales sont :
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 Le timestamp donné juste sous la forme de l'heure, à la milliseconde près. La date de
l'enregistrement peut être trouvée dans le nom du fichier plutôt que dans le log en lui-
même.
 Une colonne vide qui permet de maintenir l'alignement des colonnes. Cette colonne est
(rarement) utilisée pour une variation spécifique de l'application.
 Un identifiant du type d'information contenu dans la ligne. Les identifiants possibles sont
:
 ba : pour un log relevant du service BreakAlert (prise en compte du signal provenant
du cône-détecteur)
 spy : pour un log relevant du service Spy (service assurant un enregistrement et une
transmission des informations GPS une fois par seconde).
 MulticastTo ou MulticastFrom : pour un log relevant de l'envoi ou de la réception
d'un message multicasting
 UnicastTo ou UnicastFrom : pour un log relevant de l'envoi ou de la réception d'un
message unicasting
 L'identifiant du l'acteur (véhicule ou RSU) à l'origine de l'information de la ligne
 L'identifiant de l'événement dans le service d'origine, que l'on peut utiliser pour retracer
par exemple l'identifiant particulier d'un message.
Viennent ensuite les colonnes réservées aux données, par exemple dans le cas d'un message
BrakeAlert MulticastFrom l'heure à laquelle le signal du cône-détecteur a été reçu, ou bien
encore dans le cas d'un message spy la latitude, la longitude et la vitesse (telle que calculée à
partir du GPS).
Attention, les messages de type xTo ont une structure légèrement différente : il n'y a pas
d'identifiant de l'expéditeur ou du service concerné ; après l'identifiant de type on trouve
l'adresse cible (précise dans le cas d'un unicast ou le groupe dans le cas d'un multicast) et
puis le port utilisé pou émettre le message.
Les logs RTMaps, s'ils sont présents, sont stockés dans les dossiers spécifiés par l'utilisateur ou,
par défaut, dans /usr/local/bin.
Procédure d'arrêt
Logiciels Il est recommandé d'arrêter proprement les logiciels de la manière suivante :
 EDA est arrêté en sélectionnant le terminal hôte et en tapant Ctrl + c, il est déconseiller
de fermer le terminal comme on procéderait pour une application DOS sous Windows.
 RTMaps est arrêté comme sous Windows, en cliquant sur la croix ou en quittant dans le
menu principal ; le terminal qui l'hébergeait peut ensuite être fermé sans soucis.
Le client NTP ou MySQL n'ont pas besoin d'être arrêté. Pour éteindre l'eBox, clique-droit
n'importe où dans un bureau, aller sur l'onglet quitter du menu déroulant et sélectionner
éteindre.
Matériel La procédure d'arrêt recommandée est la suivante :
1. Arrêt de l'eBox.
2. Arrêt du convertisseur 12-220V, induit l'arrêt du serveur NTP Brandywine et du boitier
IMARA.
3. Mettre les deux boutons des batteries sur off.
4. Tourner le ou les commutateurs en position off (verticale).
Ne pas oublier de mettre en charge les batteries du C4.
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Road side unit
Description du matériel
La road side unit (RSU) se compose du même matériel que les véhicules, à l'exception du ré-
cepteur sans-fils lié au cône détecteur. L'eBox, le serveur NTP Brandywine et le boitier IMARA
sont identiques à ceux utilisés dans les véhicules, avec des différences logicielles seulement. Le
récepteur du cône-détecteur est branché (port série) sur l'eBox via un câble RS232 modifié pour
transformer la sortie 12 volts en signal compréhensible sur le ring RS232.
En rouge : le matériel d'alimentation ; en vert : le matériel de la RSU
Configuration des applications EDA
Les fichiers de configuration de l'eBox RSU se trouvent dans le dossier /home/livic/GOOD_RSU-
/bin_rsu/conf.d. Si la procédure d'installation décrite dans le document HOW TO LINUX est
bien suivie, l'eBox est normalement configurée. On rappelle toutefois les points importants ici.
Le fichier EDA_1.0.1.5.xargs contient les paramètres les plus importants :
 L'identifiant unique de la RSU (Dorg.cvisproject.cint.eda.host.identifier)
 L'adresse du groupe de multicasting (Dorg.cvisproject.cint.eda.comm.multicastAddr), qui
est réglée à ff02::1 par défaut.
 Le port série sur lequel l'application écoutera pour le signal du cône-détecteur (Dorg.cvisproject.cint.eda.breakalert.portcom),
qui est réglé sur /dev/ttys0 par défaut (équivalent à COM1 sous Windows).
 Les bundles des services souhaités doivent bien être installés et lancés, ce qui revient à
s'assurer que les lignes suivantes ne sont pas commentées :
 install file:./bundles.d/org.cvisproject.cint.eda.service.breakalert.rsu-1.0.1.6.jar
 start file:./bundles.d/org.cvisproject.cint.eda.service.breakalert.rsu-1.0.1.6.jar
Rappel : le port série 1 (/dev/ttys0) est celui qui est placé directement sous le port Ethernet
sur les eBoxes.
Pour le service SpeedAlert, il faut simplement s'assurer que le port sur lequel le récepteur du
cône-détecteur dédié est bien réglé (/dev/ttys1 par défaut) et que le service est bien actif, avec
la même procédure que ci-dessus.
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Procédure de mise en route
On va maintenant décrire la marche à suivre pour mettre en route la RSU. Cette section est
organisée linéairement dans l'ordre recommandé de la mise en route du matériel et des logiciels.
Alimentation Les besoins en alimentation sont les mêmes que pour le matériel embarqué
dans les véhicules : une prise 12 volt pour l'eBox et de prises 220 volt pour les boitiers IMARA et
NTP Brandywine. L'alimentation des écrans et autres matériels (commutateur périphériques)
est assurer via une multiprise commune qui peut être connectée directement sur le secteur, sur
un groupe électrogène ou à un convertisseur 12-220 volt, lui aussi présent sur le rack.
La procédure suivante doit être suivie pour alimenter l'ensemble :
 Abaisser le commutateur de la batterie de manière à ce que le cylindre métallique ne soit
plus visible (le commutateur en position ouverte est montré ci-après).
 Connecter la multiprise au secteur ou au groupe électrogène (après avoir préalablement
démarré celui-ci). Eventuellement utiliser le convertisseur 12-220V.
Le boitier IMARA, le commutateur de périphériques et le serveur NTP s'allument dès qu'ils
sont alimentés, l'eBox doit être allumée manuellement.
Démarrage de l'eBox Attention, certaines eBox peuvent avoir un floppy disk fail ou une
erreur CMOS. Appuyez sur F1 et continuer d'opérer normalement.
Le compte utilisateur est livic, mot de passe : cvis. Il est fortement recommandé de passer
en super-utilisateur avec le commande sudo s (le mot de passe peut être redemandé, c'est le
même qui ci-dessus).
Entrer la commande startx pour lancer l'interface graphique Xfce.
Connectivité & NTP Pour la vérification de la connectivité et du bon fonction-
nement du NTP se référer aux pages concernant les véhicules, respectivement page
11 et page 12.
Lancement des services EDA Attention, si les bundles ont été changés, il est nécessaire
de supprimer le dossier /home/livic/eda pour s'assurer que les nouveaux bundles sont bien
installés et pris en compte lors du lancement d'EDA.
Si tout est correctement configuré, le lancement d'EDA et des services est simple :
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 Ouvrir un terminal dans le dossier /home/livic/GOOD_RSU/bin_rsu
 Taper ./EDA_1.0.1.6
 Une fois l'application lancée, cliquez deux fois sur le panneau dans le coin inférieur droit
pour activer les services (cf. capture).
Comme dans les véhicules, l'application n'a normalement plus besoin d'intervention humaine
une fois lancée. La détection d'un signal au niveau du port série en provenance du cône-détecteur
déclenche le mécanisme d'envoi automatiquement. Si un message est envoyé, l'interface se
comporte comme dans les véhicules : un panneau  danger  triangulaire apparait dans la
moitié droite.
Attention, de nombreuses alertes sont visibles dans le terminal indiquant qu'une application
POMA ne peut pas se connecter au localhost. Ignorer ces alertes.
Logs
Les logs des applications sont stockés directement dans le dossier /home/livic/GOOD_RSU/-
bin_RSU dans des fichiers .log. Les fichiers s'accumulant après un certain temps (un nouveau
fichier est créé à chaque lancement d'EDA), il est recommandé de les purger de temps à autres.
Procédure d'arrêt
Logiciels Il est recommandé d'arrêter proprement les logiciels de la manière suivante :
 EDA est arrêté en sélectionnant le terminal hôte et en tapant Ctrl + c, il est déconseiller
de fermer le terminal comme on procéderait pour une application DOS sous Windows.
Le client NTP ou MySQL n'ont pas besoin d'être arrêté. Pour éteindre l'eBox, clique-droit
n'importe où dans un bureau, aller sur l'onglet quitter du menu déroulant et sélectionner
éteindre.
Matériel
La procédure d'arrêt recommandée est la suivante :
 Arrêt de l'eBox.
 Débrancher la multiprise de sa source de courant (en s'étant assuré que la partie laser est
correctement éteinte pour ce qui peut être éteint sans débrancher).
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 Relever le commutateur de la batterie de manière à ce que le cylindre métallique soit
visible.
Il est recommandé de remettre en charge régulièrement la batterie utilisée par le bloc RSU-
Laser. Le même type de chargeur que pour les véhicules (12 volts, 10 ampères) doit être utilisé
; plusieurs type de connecteurs différents sont disponibles sur les chargeurs du LIVIC en fonction
de la batterie montée avec la RSU.
Le cône-détecteur doit aussi régulièrement être rechargé. Il n'est pas recommandé d'utiliser les
mêmes chargeurs que pour les véhicules ou la RSU, mais plutôt un chargeur plus petit (900
mA, image ci-dessous). Chaque cône dispose de deux connecteurs placés sous le commutateur
on/off pour accès à la batterie.
Ne pas oublier de mettre en charge les batteries du C4.
Unité laser LUX
Description du matériel
En rouge : le matériel d'alimentation ; en jaune : le matériel de l'unité laser
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L'unité laser telle que mise en ÷uvre dans cette notice est partiellement liée à la RSU, cependant
la RSU et l'unité laser n'ont aucun besoin d'être liées : elles peuvent fonctionner de manière
complètement indépendante. L'unité laser se compose d'un ordinateur embarqué de marque
Xpc, sous Windows XP, du LUX Fusion System IBEO (2 capteurs + une ECU). Le matériel
partagé avec la RSU est le serveur NTP Brandywine, le switch Ethernet et l'alimentation (12 et
220 volts). Les deux capteurs du LUX sont montés sur une barre d'acier afin d'être positionner
à plat correctement. La barre peut être montée sur un trépied (comme sur l'image ci-avant)
ou sur tout autre type de support. L'écart entre les deux capteurs ou l'orientation de chacun
peuvent être modifiés, mais ceci nécessitera alors de remesurer ces variables.
Configuration des applications
Les logiciels et applications utilisés dans l'unité laser LUX ne nécessitent pas de configuration
spécifique qui ne soit pas explicitée dans les paragraphes ci-après.
Procédure de mise en route
On va maintenant décrire la marche à suivre pour mettre en route l'unité laser LUX. Cette
section est organisée linéairement dans l'ordre recommandé de la mise en route du matériel et
des logiciels.
Alimentation Les besoins en alimentation sont d'une prise 12 volt pour le système LUX et
de 220 volts pour le reste du matériel. Le LUX est alimenté via l'ECU, qui doit être connectée
directement sur la batterie ou peut être relié au commutateur général du rack RSUunité laser.
Pour le matériel nécessitant du 220 volts, la multiprise générale de la RSUunité laser comporte
toutes les connexions nécessaires (ordinateur, écran, etc.). Suivre la même procédure que page
21 pour alimenter l'ensemble de l'unité laser.
Attention, bien s'assurer que les deux télémètres lasers sont connectés à l'ECU avant de
l'alimenter.
Démarrage du PC L'ordinateur se démarre comme tout PCWindows. Le compte d'utilisateur
est livic et il n'y a pas de mot de passe.
Lancement du client NTP Contrairement à un système Linux, le client NTP peut ne pas
se lancer automatiquement lors du démarrage de la machine Windows. Si on doit le lancer,
cliquer sur l'icône NTP Time Server Monitor présente sur le bureau (dans la capture ci-dessous,
le client NTP est déjà configuré pour démarrer automatiquement, ce qui est réglage dans la
partie Service configuration à droite).
272 APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL DOCUMENTATION
Le client est configuré pour utiliser le même serveur Brandywine que la RSU (soit 192.168.1.163),
mais peut être modifié pour utiliser son propre serveur. Pour cela, cliquer sur l'onglet NTP
Configuration File et modifier le fichier en dessous de la ligne # Positioning PC comme sur la
capture ci-dessous. La ligne non commentée (sans # devant) est active ; il est possible d'avoir
plusieurs serveurs listés, le client essayera de se connecter à ces serveurs et sélectionnera celui
qui fonctionne le mieux. Lister un serveur non accessible n'est pas un problème, sauf si on
souhaite limiter les interrogations du client vers l'adresse de ce serveur. Ecrire prefer après
l'adresse IP d'un serveur permet de le priviliger par rapport aux autres.
Pour vérifier que le serveur fonctionne, aller sur l'onglet NTP Status. L'adresse du serveur doit
être visible, avec divers informations concernant le statut du client et le décalage entre les deux
horloges. Si le client a terminé son processus d'initialisation, l'ensemble de la ligne doit être
surligné en vert (cf. capture ci-dessous).
Vérification du bon fonctionnement du système LUX Le système Ibeo LUX s'initialise
immédiatement une fois alimenté. Pour vérifier qu'il fonctionne bien, plusieurs démarches sont
possibles.
En premier lieu, une vérification visuelle de l'état des LED sur le dos de l'ECU est nécessaire.
Si tout fonctionne bien, les LED de l'alimentation (verte) et des deux câbles reliant l'ECU aux
capteurs (oranges) doivent être allumées.
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En second lieu, on doit vérifier que les données sont bien transmisses sur le réseau et que
les réglages du système (hardware comme software) sont corrects. Pour vérifier que le système
produit des données, on peut utiliser le logiciel fournit par Ibeo ILV-Basic. On peut le démarrer
via le menu démarrer / ILV-Basic 1.7.1 / ILV-Basic ou en allant dans le dossier C:\Documents
and Settings\livic\Bureau\Demmel\ et en cliquant sur l'icône appropriée. Une fois le logiciel
lancé, entrer l'adresse IP de l'ECU dans la fenêtre en haut à droite et cliquer sur connect.
[CAPTURE DE LA BARRE DU MENU]
Si l'ECU et les capteurs sont actifs, la carte des données envoyées par les capteurs devrait
apparaitre, remplaçant l'image de fond. Si les positions et orientations des deux capteurs sont
bien réglés, la carte doit fournir une vue cohérente de l'environnement.
[CAPTURE DU LOGICEL ACTIF]
(expliquer comment régler le logiciel)
Lancement de RTMaps La fonction de RTMaps est d'enregistré les données produites par
le système LUX. Pour lancer RTMaps, aller à menu démarrer / Intempora / RTMaps 3.2 /
RTMaps Studio. Plusieurs diagrammes sont utilisables. Il est fortement déconseiller de tenter
d'exécuter un diagramme directement, la procédure normale est de lancer le diagramme une
fois l'environnement RTMaps préalablement ouvert.
Un premier diagramme préconfiguré Ethernet_raw_recorder.rtd peut être trouvé dans le dossier
R:\Demmel. Il contient un composant réalisé par Intempora pour effectuer une connexion avec
l'ECU du système LUX et sauvegarder les données brutes et traitées issues des lasers. Il est re-
commandé de choisir un chemin d'accès personnalisé pour l'enregistrement des données avec le
composant recorder (pour ce, clique droit sur le composant, propriétés puis modifier la première
propriété).
Le second diagramme préconfiguré ECU_decoder_recorder.rtd peut être trouvé dans le même
dossier. Il s'agit d'une version plus sophistiquée du premier diagramme, avec plusieurs com-
posants Intempora en cascade pour se connecter avec l'ECU et décoder les données reçues de
celui-ci. Le composant OGS Viewer permet par exemple de visualiser en trois dimensions le
nuage de points détectés en direct. Les deux autres composants présents sur l'image (scanner
info splitter et objects info splitter) permettent de formater correctement certaines informations
données sous forme de string par le premier composant. D'autres composants sont disponibles
dans le package rtmaps_ibeo_ethernet.pck. On peut connecter les sorties de ces composants
à divers recorders pour en enregistrer les sorties selon les besoins.
Les diagrammes doivent être démarrés seulement au moment souhaité lors de l'expérimentation,
afin de limiter la durée de la collecte des données (et faciliter le travail d'analyse ultérieure).
Procédure d'arrêt
Logiciels L'arrêt de la machine Windows ne présente pas de difficulté particulière. Il est
recommandé d'arrêter proprement les logiciels de la manière suivante :
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 RTMaps est arrêté, après s'être bien assuré que le diagramme ne tourne plus, en cliquant
sur la croix ou en quittant dans le menu principal.
 Cliquer sur la croix pour quitter le client NTP.
 Si l'ILV-Basic est utilisé, cliquer sur la croix comme pour tout autre logiciel.
Le client NTP n'a pas besoin d'être arrêté. On ne doit pas non plus arrêté les logiciels internes
à l'ECU LUX, qui sont inaccessibles en temps normal.
Matériel La procédure d'arrêt recommandée est la suivante :
 Arrêt du PC Windows
 Débrancher la multiprise de sa source de courant (en s'étant assuré que la partie RSU est
correctement éteinte pour ce qui peut être éteint sans débrancher).
 Relever le commutateur de la batterie de manière à ce que le cylindre métallique soit
visible.
Le système LUX ne sera plus alimenté lorsque le commutateur principal est relevé. Il n'y a pas
de précaution particulière à prendre avant de l'éteindre.
Outils divers
Vérification de la connectivité  Wireshark
Pour pouvoir vérifier la connectivité, il est présentement impossible de se connecter directement
dans les boitiers IMARA. Cependant, on peut observer les interfaces Ethernet pour vérifier que
les messages sont bien expédiés par EDA RSU ou reçu dans les véhicules. Cette opération est
réalisée avec Wireshark. Pour le lancer, ouvrir un terminal n'importe où et taper wireshark.
Une fois le logiciel lancé, cliquez sur le premier bouton à gauche pour obtenir la liste des
interfaces disponibles.
Sélectionner eth0 (ou eth1 en fonction de l'eBox) et cliquer sur capture ; ignorer les messages
d'erreur.
Une liste glissante des paquets échangés sur l'interface apparait alors, par défaut les messages
les plus récents sont en bas. Pour arrêter le défilement de la liste, simplement monter la vue de
manière à ce que le paquet le plus récent ne soit pas visible. En fonctionnement normal, des
paquets liés au NTP et au fonctionnement de GeoNet (router solication, neigbhour advertise-
ment, etc.) sont visibles en majorité. Les paquets EDA sont de type UDP (attention, le NTP
et l'UDP sont affiché dans la même couleur).
[CAPTURE D'UN MESSAGE NORMAL]
En date d'octobre 2010, un problème de fragmentation des paquets existe dans GeoNet. Si
un message est fragmenté parce qu'il est trop volumineux, le premier paquet va passer mais le
second n'apparaitra pas sur l'interface des récepteurs. L'absence de ce paquet (même s'il ne
contient que quelques octets de données utiles) empêche EDA d'interpréter le message correcte-
ment : aucune réaction n'est visible au niveau de l'application. Si ce problème est détecté, la
meilleure solution consiste à réduire la taille du message à l'émission pour qu'il rentre dans un
seul paquet (environ un kilo-octet au maximum).
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Exemple de fonctionnement anormal due à la fragmentation Dans la capture ci-
dessous, on a l'enregistrement des paquets au niveau de la RSU envoyé en unicasting (adresse
unique). Le message envoyé par EDA est coupé entre les paquets 27 et 28, le dernier étant
réinterprété comme le message entier.
Dans la capture ci-dessous au niveau d'un véhicule, le paquet 82 correspond au paquet 27 ci-
dessus (les temps indiqués à la deuxième colonne ne sont pas représentatifs du délai entre la
RSU et l'IV). Le détail du paquet est fourni ci-après. On peut remarquer, dans la ligne en
surbrillance, que le drapeau More Fragment est vrai. Sachant que le second paquet attendu
n'arrive pas, le message ne sera pas interprété par EDA comme valide.
Attention, Wireshark n'est pas installé sur toutes les eBoxes. Pour l'installer, il
faut se connecter à internet (se référer au document HOW TO LINUX pour la
procédure d'activation d'internet si besoin est) et taper apt-get install wireshark
(taper apt-get update est recommandé avant).
Portage d'un service
Il est possible de porter un service EDA RSU dans un véhicule et vice versa sans difficultés, le
matériel pour les supporter étant le même. Si on souhaite pouvoir disposer d'une RSU sur un
véhicule, la procédure suivante doit être suivie :
 Effectuer une copie du dossier /bin_rsu (il est recommandé d'en purger les logs dans la
copie) sur un support amovible.
 Coller ce dossier dans un dossier de son choix dans la machine cible, par exemple dans
/GOOD_IV.
 Dans /bin_rsu, ouvrir le fichier EDA_1.0.1.6 (avec l'éditeur mousepad) et dans /bin_rsu/-
conf.d ouvrir les fichiers KF_cvis_1.6.xargs et OSGi_Properties.xargs et vérifier que les
chemins d'accès pointent vers les bon dossiers. Il est possible que les environnements
Java et Knopflerfish ne soient pas installés exactement au même endroit dans chaque
eBox. Pour plus de détails se référer au fichier HOW TO LINUX, point n°8. Il est recom-
mandé pour la variable INSTALL_PATH d'utiliser un chemin d'accès différent que celui
du dossier /eda déjà utilisé par les services IV. Deux versions d'EDA en parallèle sur une
même machine n'est pas un problème.
 Dans /bin_rsu/conf.d, ouvrir le fichier EDA_1.0.1.5.xargs et s'assurer qu'il est bien con-
figuré pour une RSU suivant les instructions du fichier HOW TO LINUX, point n°12.
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La Clio XXX a été modifiée ainsi en novembre 2010 et peut fonctionner comme RSU ou comme
IV en fonction du besoin de l'utilisateur. C'est à l'heure de la rédaction de cette notice la seule
eBox possédant à la fois une RSU et un IV.
Ne pas oublier d'installer le boitier récepteur du cône-détecteur sur le véhicule transformé
en RSU. Son alimentation peut être assurée soit pas une batterie supplémentaire, soit en le
branchant sur les sorties de la batterie principales (celles de façade sont directement au bon
format des fiches des câbles du récepteurs, contrairement aux connecteurs plastiques du rack
supérieur).
Annexe : configuration des boitiers IMARA
Les boitiers IMARA sont normalement configurés pour fonctionner de manière complètement
automatique, cependant il peut être nécessaire d'effectuer une intervention sur les logiciels
internes ou de devoir effectuer quelques vérifications telles qu'un tcpdump sur une des interfaces.
De plus, il nécessaire de fournir quelques précisions sur leur fonctionnalités, e.g. les subtilités de
l'utilisation du multicasting. Cette annexe regroupe ces informations par sections thématiques.
Remarques sur le démarrage des boitiers Les boitiers peuvent mettre un certain temps
avant de se lancer, cela fait partie de leur fonctionnement normal et ne doit pas inquiéter. La
configuration de base des boitiers lance une requête DHCP pendant la procédure de démarrage.
Sachant qu'aucun DHCP n'est connecté, le boitier IMARA va tenter de se connecter jusqu'à
un timeout où il poursuivra sa procédure normale de démarrage.
Dans le cadre  normal  de l'expérimentation de la file de véhicules les boitiers sont allumés
et éteints en agissant directement sur leur alimentation. Ceci signifie que la procédure d'arrêt
normale pour un système Linux n'est jamais respectée. Les boitiers ne sont pas endommagés
par cette procédure, mais ils peuvent, lors du prochain démarrage, détecter des erreurs sur les
partitions de la mémoire principale (carte flash SD). Ces erreurs sont alors automatiquement
corrigées et le boitier redémarre normalement. Cette procédure allonge cependant d'autant
la durée effective avant que les communications ne soient utilisables. Les utilisateurs peuvent
suivre le déroulement de la procédure en branchant un écran sur les boitiers.
Clonage des cartes mémoires Afin de pouvoir multiplier le nombre de boitiers IMARA
sans nécessairement bloqués ceux de l'INRIA, des tests ont permis de montrer qu'un clonage
des boitiers IMARA sur des boitiers SAFESPOT était possible et fonctionnel.
Les boitiers SAFESPOT sont des boitiers NEC-HITACHI avec la même carte mère que les
boitiers IMARA mais une carte WiFi différente. Benoit Lusetti a cloné la mémoire flash d'un
des boitiers IMARA et placé ce clone dans un autre boitier IMARA pour s'assurer de son
fonctionnement. Ensuite, la carte a été branchée dans un boitier SAFESPOT. La différence
de carte WiFi entre les deux boitiers ne semble pas poser de problème du coté logiciel et une
communication a put être établie sans difficulté entre le clone et les boitiers originaux. En date
du 22 novembre 2010, quatre boitiers SAFESPOT ont été convertis en boitiers IMARA, venant
en complément des trois boitiers IMARA originaux toujours en notre possession.
Connexion aux boitiers Il est possible de se connecter aux boitiers par SSH. Dans leur
configuration actuelle, les boitiers, en plus de fonctionner automatiquement, sont verrouillés.
Ainsi, utiliser la commande Ctrl + Alt + F2-7 pour changer de bureau ne fera apparaitre
aucune console.
Pour se connecter en SSH, il faut en premier lieu obtenir l'adresse IPv6 du boitier visé. Cette
adresse est différente de celle donnée par la commande ifconfig dans une eBox connectée au
boitier. Il est possible de l'obtenir en analysant dans wireshark les messages de type neighbour
solicitation ou advertisement envoyé par le boitier, mais la méthode la plus simple reste de taper
la commande ping6 I eth0 (ou eth1) ff02::1. Cette commande va envoyer un ping vers toutes
les machines connectées localement (ff02::1 est le  link-local all-node multicast adress ), donc
dans un véhicule l'eBox et le boitier IMARA. Sachant que l'on connait l'adresse IPv6 de l'eBox,
APPENDIX A 277
on peut en déduire l'adresse IPv6 du boitier. Attention : les adresses seront présentées sous le
format de la seconde ligne affichée par la commande ifconfig (soit l'adresse pour le scope/lien).
[Capture écran ping6]
Pour se connecter en SSH au boitier, entrer la commande ssh -6 root@[adresse IPv6 du boit-
ier]%eth0 (ou eth1). Si c'est la première fois qu'une connexion SSH est réalisée entre ces deux
machines particulières, le client SSH va probablement demander de vérifier l'authenticité de la
clef publique, la valider. Le mot de passe sera ensuite demandé pour le compte root : ipv6. La
connexion directement en super-utilisateur est activée par défaut sur les boitiers IMARA.
Vérification de la fréquence utilisée A compléter
Fonctionnement du multicasting Le multicasting permet de diffuser un message à un
groupe de destinataires via l'utilisation d'une seule adresse cible de groupe. Il s'agit de l'équivalent
IPv6 du broadcast IPv4 avec la différence que l'on peut cibler plus précisément les destinataires.
En effet, une adresse de broadcast de type 192.168.1.255 considère comme destinataires toutes
les machines ayant une adresse en 192.168.1.XXX. En multicast, seule les machines ayant sci-
emment adhéré à l'adresse de groupe recevront le message.
Attention, une caractéristique importante du multicasting est qu'il fonctionne suivant un prin-
cipe d'arborescence. Le groupe de multicasting se compose de multiples récepteurs mais d'un
unique émetteur. N'importe qu'elle membre du groupe peut être configuré comme un émetteur,
mais cette configuration sera ensuite figé : on ne peut pas avoir deux machines qui émettent
sur un même groupe de multicasting. Pour le scénario de la file, ce fonctionnement n'est pas
handicapant puisqu'un seul émetteur est nécessaire : la RSU. Cependant des scénarios plus
complexes pour la perception étendue ne pourront pas fonctionner avec un unique émetteur. Il
est normalement possible de configurer les boitiers pour qu'ils adhèrent à plusieurs groupes de
multicasting, cependant cette solution peut rapidement devenir assez lourde. En effet, pour un
scénario avec cinq véhicules communicants, on aura besoin de 5 groupes. Le multicasting ne
pourra pas être utilisé systématiquement comme un moyen de diffuser l'information dans un
environnement comprenant beaucoup de véhicules ou RSU fonctionnant à la fois en émission ou
en réception, mais présente d'autres avantages. Par exemple, les véhicules pourraient tous être
membres d'un groupe particulier destiné à transmettre des messages urgents provenant d'un
centre de contrôle.
La configuration de plusieurs groupes de multicasting sur un même boitier reste pour le moment
hors de notre portée (en date du 22 novembre 2010). Cependant, il est possible de modifier la
configuration d'un boitier pour le faire passer de récepteur à émetteur et vice-versa.
Le fonctionnement d'un boitier en tant qu'émetteur ou récepteur est contrôlé au niveau des
interfaces réseau. Un message multicasté depuis une eBox va arriver via l'interface eth0 et sera
ensuite envoyée dans le tunnel tun0 pour être transmis à ath0, l'interface WiFi. Un démon
mcastd est en charge de la gestion des messages multicast et de leur bonne transmission d'une
interface à l'autre. De la configuration de ce démon dépent les groupes auxquels un boitier peut
adhérer et le sens de transmission des messages multicast, qui définie donc un boitier comme
émetteur ou récepteur. Si on tape la commande ps auxw|grep geo lors de connexion en SSH
avec un boitier, on verra apparaitre une liste comme-ci :
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La ligne surlignée en gras concerne le démon du multicasting. L'ordre  tun0 eth0  signifie
que ce boitier est configuré pour être un récepteur, car les messages multicast présents dans le
tunnel tun0 seront passé à eth0. Des messages adressé à groupe et qui arriveraient dans l'autre
sens, i.e. depuis eth0 (donc depuis l'eBox) ne seront jamais transmis au tunnel. Dans un boitier
émetteur, l'ordre est évidemment  eht0 tun0 .
Il est possible de modifier le démon en ouvrant le fichier mcastd-ifd.c dans le dossier /geonet/-
Demonstrations/ResCom/Software/multicast/geo_multicast avec un éditeur de type nano ou
vi, mais cette opération n'est pas recommandée pour le moment. Afin de pouvoir échanger
des informations entre plusieurs véhicules bidirectionnellement, la solution actuelle revient à
utiliser un unicasting vers les véhicules membres du groupe. Les applications EDA dans les
eBoxes peuvent unicaster le même message vers plusieurs destinataires à la suite sans difficulté,
en minimisant le décalage entre chaque envois. In fine, cette utilisation de l'unicasting se
rapproche de l'utilisation voulue de GeoNet. En effet, lorsque toutes ses fonctionnalités sont
activées, le protocole GeoNet permet la gestion du voisinage d'un n÷ud émetteur-récepteur. Via
la connaissance de la table des voisins et des zones géographiques à cibler, on peut géocaster
vers une zone précise où tous les récepteurs présents recevront le message. A termes, cette
fonctionnalité sera utilisée également pour nos expériences mais ce n'est pas encore le cas à au
moment de la rédaction de cette notice (les positions de chaque boitier IMARA sont réglées en
statique, par exemple).
